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Abstract 
This study examines four influences on earnings conservatism of financial 
reporting in Malaysia. The study employs a sample of 3,126 firm-year 
observations of Malaysian listed companies over the period 2003 to 2008 and 
measures conservatism by the asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure due to 
Basu (1997). First, the study assesses the degree of earnings conservatism in 
reporting during the period following the institutional reforms which started after 
the 1997 Asian financial crisis. The results suggest that conservatism has 
increased with the reforms which contrasts with the findings of Ball et al. (2003) 
who find no evidence of earnings conservatism in Malaysia. Second, this study 
investigates the effect of the adoption of IFRS on the level of earnings 
conservatism. The results show no systematic difference in the level of earnings 
conservatism for the short period of one to two years before and after the 
adoption, suggesting that conservatism may not be specific to any particular set of 
accounting standards. Third, this study examines the effect of ownership structure 
on earnings conservatism. Reporting by family firms and widely-held firms 
exhibits earnings conservatism, but this is not the case for state-controlled firms. 
The analysis also shows no significant difference between the levels of earnings 
conservatism for family firms and widely-held firms. Additional tests show that 
family firms that are strategically controlled by a family, that is, where a member 
of the controlling family acts as CEO and chairman of the corporate board, report 
significantly higher earnings conservatism than other family firms. Finally, the 
study examines the link between corporate governance and earnings conservatism. 
Employing a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables, this study 
does not find any evidence to link corporate governance and earnings 
 vii  
 
conservatism. This result is contrary to the evidence from developed markets, 
such as the United States and the United Kingdom, where firms with good 
governance are more timely in recognising bad news. This raises the possibility 
that the different ownership structures in Malaysia make corporate governance 
reforms less important. However, this suggestion is subject to environmental and 
cultural issues that have not been addressed in this study. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background and Objectives of the Thesis 
The purpose of this study is to examine the influences on earnings conservatism in 
Malaysia. The importance of this topic is highlighted because Ball, Robin, and 
Wu (2003) find no evidence of conservatism in financial statements of Malaysian 
listed firms, despite the importance of conservatism as key concept underlying 
accounting practice (Sterling, 1967). Malaysian accounting standards are 
perceived as being of high quality, because they are derived from UK and IAS 
standards, however, the weak institutional structures present in earlier years gave 
little incentive for preparers of financial statements to produce high-quality 
financial reports, i.e. to follow  conservatism (Ball, et al., 2003). After the 1997 
Asian financial crisis, the regulatory bodies in Malaysia undertook major reforms 
in corporate governance and financial reporting to redress the institutional 
weaknesses. It is therefore appropriate to examine the degree of earnings 
conservatism following the reforms. 
Another major event in the development of financial reporting in Malaysia has 
been the adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), effective 
from 1 January 2006. As IFRS tends towards fair value accounting, the degree of 
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conservatism (prudence) may be weakened.1 This raises the possibility that IFRS 
could be detrimental if con
manipulate earnings and thus reduces information asymmetry of investors as 
suggested by LaFond and Watts (2008). Using short-term horizons of one and two 
years before and after the adoption of IFRS, this thesis examines the impact of 
IFRS on earnings conservatism in Malaysia.  
This study also examines whether firm ownership structure has an influence on 
earnings conservatism. Given that family firms and state-controlled firms play 
pivotal economic roles in Malaysia and other East Asian countries, they are likely 
to also have a unique effect on financial reporting incentives. Different types of 
firms (family, state-controlled, and widely-held firms) have different stakeholders 
who face different types of information asymmetry and agency costs, and their 
managers also have different incentives to report earnings conservatively. It is 
thus appropriate to examine how the degree of earnings conservatism varies 
across reporting by different types of firms. 
Finally, this study examines the influence of corporate governance on earnings 
conservatism. Though several studies in developed countries have examined this 
issue, for example, Beekes, Pope, and Young (2004), García Lara, García Osma, 
                                               
1 
of con  
 free from bias intended to influence a 
decision or outcome. To that end, the common conceptual framework should not 
include conservatism or prudence among the desirable qualitative characteristics of 
accounting information. However, the framework should note the continuing need to 
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and Penalva (2007), and García Lara, García Osma, and Penalva (2009), the 
literature on the impact of corporate governance on earnings conservatism in 
Malaysia and other emerging markets remains sparse. While Malaysia introduced 
the Code on Corporate Governance in March 2000 to improve the quality of 
governance, no studies have specifically addressed the impact of change in 
corporate governance practice on earnings conservatism. 
1.2 Significant Contributions of This Thesis 
Basu (1997) introduced the first and most widely used measure of conservatism 
described as the asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure. It is based on the 
premise that the practice of conservatism will cause earnings to reflect bad news 
more quickly than good news. Using the Basu (1997) model, many studies try to 
provide explanations for differences in conservatism with respect to country-
specific and firm-specific factors. Pope and Walker (1999), for example, find 
differences in earnings conservatism between the United States and the United 
Kingdom, while Ball, Kothari, and Robin (2000) compare earnings conservatism 
between code-law (France, Germany, and Japan) and common-law countries (the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia), and find higher 
earnings conservatism in common-law countries. Extending these studies, this 
study aims to provide insight on earnings conservatism in an emerging market, i.e. 
Malaysia. By focusing on a single country, this study avoids several concerns 
relating to cross-country studies such as the possibility of endogeneity between 
the variables at the country level, noise in the variables, and severe correlated 
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omitted variables problems (Miller, 2004).2  
More importantly, this approach enables examination of issues specific to a single 
country, Malaysia, which is an attractive case study for several reasons. First, 
Malaysia provides a unique setting to examine whether changes in financial 
reporting incentives affect earnings conservatism. Ball et al. (2003) find no 
evidence of earnings conservatism in Malaysia and three other East Asian 
countries, Hong Kong, Singapore, and Thailand, when examining the period from 
1984 to 1996. Though the accounting standards of these countries are perceived as 
being of high quality3, it appears that the weak institutional features of the 
countries provided poor incentives for managers and auditors to provide high-
quality financial statements.  
Extending Ball et al. (2003), this study focuses on the years 2003 to 2008, the 
period following the reforms of corporate governance and financial reporting. My 
point of departure is the suggestion that the institutional structure became much 
stronger following the various initiatives undertaken by the regulators in 
Malaysia, some of which occurred in direct response to the Asian financial crisis 
and others which were reinforced by concerns raised after the crisis. These 
initiatives included: the Financial Reporting Act 1997; amendment of the 
                                               
2 According to Miller, a more focused study permits variables to be designed that more cleanly 
capture the construct being measured, and also frees researchers from the need for variables to be 
available across a wide range of countries. 
3 Each country has been either substantially influenced in the past by the UK or the US accounting 
standards, and continues to be influenced by International Accounting Standards (IAS). The 
accounting standards derived from the United Kingdom, the United States, and the IAS standards 
re associated with timely recognition of 
economic losses (Ball, et al., 2000). 
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Securities Law and Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements; the introduction of the 
Code of Corporate Governance; and establishment of the Malaysian Accounting 
Standards Board (MASB), the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance 
(MICG), and the Minority Shareholders Watch Group (MSWG).  
Second, this research contributes to a greater understanding of the phenomenon of 
conservatism, especially the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings conservatism. 
The implementation of IFRS is expected to reduce earnings conservatism since 
standard setters perceive conservatism as disturbing the neutrality and relevance 
of accounting information (Watts, 2003a). In contrast, Watts (2003a) and Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005) contend that conservatism plays a significant role in 
contracting, litigation, taxation and regulatory enforcement. In addition, LaFond 
and Watts (2008) argue that any attempt to eliminate conservatism would increase 
information asymmetry and hence would reduce the usefulness of accounting 
information. This study provides evidence as to whether IFRS adoption impacts 
on earnings conservatism.  
Third, this study examines the impact of ownership structure on earnings 
conservatism. This factor is crucial in the Malaysian business environment, where 
concentrated ownership structures are the norm (Thillainathan, 1999). Most of the 
literature on ownership structure focuses on its impact on performance, firm 
value, and agency cost; but the effect of ownership structure on earnings quality, 
in the form of earnings conservatism, has received little attention. Given that 
family firms and state-controlled firms play an important role in the Malaysian 
economy, it is important to examine the influence of ownership structure on 
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earnings conservatism. Several Malaysian studies have examined the influence of 
family ownership and control on various factors such as performance (Abdul 
Rahman & Haniffa, 2005; Abdullah, 2004; Che Haat, 2006), voluntary disclosure 
(Abdullah & Mohd Nasir, 2004), and aggressive reporting (Abdul Rahman & 
Mohamed Ali, 2006; Yatim, Kent, & Clarkson, 2006). For state-controlled firms, 
empirical evidence is very limited; some focus on the impact of state-controlled 
firms on firm performance (Ang & Ding, 2006), value (Lau & Tong, 2008), and 
earnings management (Yen, Chun, Abidin, & Noordin, 2007), but none examine 
earnings conservatism. This study, by constast, examines the impact of family 
ownership and control and state-control on firm performance (Ang & Ding, 
2006), value (Lau & Tong, 2008), and earnings conservatism (Yen, et al., 2007), 
but none examine earnings conservatism.  
Finally, this study provides evidence from an emerging market on the relationship 
between corporate governance and earnings conservatism. Theoretically, 
conservatism is an outcome of mechanisms to control and monitor managers, 
thereby enhancing contracting between parties (Watts, 2003a). However, the 
empirical evidence is limited and focuses primarily on developed countries, such 
as the United States (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; García Lara, et al., 2009), the 
United Kingdom (Beekes, et al., 2004), and Spain (García Lara, et al., 2007). This 
study examines the relationship between corporate governance and earnings 
conservatism in the emerging market, Malaysia. This study contributes to the 
body of knowledge on corporate governance and the growing empirical literature 
pertaining to earnings conservatism. The results should also be useful to 
regulators in deliberating policies on issues related to corporate governance. 
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1.3 Main Empirical Findings 
The first objective of this study is to examine earnings conservatism in Malaysia 
following the reforms in corporate governance and financial reporting. Using a 
sample of 3,126 firm-year observations from the period 2003-2008, this study 
finds evidence of earnings conservatism in Malaysia during during the period 
under study. This finding stands in contrast to Ball et al. (2003), who find no 
evidence of earnings conservatism in Malaysia for reporting during the period 
1984 to 1996. The findings of this study are consistent with earnings immediately 
reflecting a negative revision of future cash flows, but 
delaying the recognition of  from a positive revision of future cash. 
These results support the expectation that the institutional reforms, which started 
from the year 1997, created strong incentives for Malaysian firms to report 
earnings conservatively. 
Secondly, this study examines the impact of the adoption of IFRS on the level of 
earnings conservatism. The results show no systematic difference beween the 
levels of earnings conservatism for the short horizon period of one to two years 
before and after IFRS adoption. This suggests that the change from MASB 
standards to IFRS standards did not have any significant effect on earnings 
conservatism. This finding supports the argument of Ball et al. (2003) that 
accounting standards have less impact on earnings conservatism than do financial 
reporting incentives.  
Thirdly, this study examines how earnings conservatism varies between firms 
with different types of ownership structure, namely family firms, state-controlled 
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firms, and widely-held firms. Since different types of ownership generate different 
key stakeholders who are subject to different levels and types of agency conflicts, 
the incentives to report earnings conservatively also vary accordingly. For state-
controlled firms, the results show no evidence of earnings conservatism. This is 
consistent with the conclusion that state-controlled firms adopt more aggressive 
accounting. With regard to family firms and widely-held firms, there is evidence 
of earnings conservatism in both types of firms, indicating that bad news is 
recognised in a more timely way in accounting earnings than good news. Further 
investigation shows no statistical difference between the degree of earnings 
conservatism for family firms and widely-held firms, suggesting that family firms 
report earnings just as conservatively as do widely-held firms.  
This study also examines whether strong control by the family firm in the 
hypothesis, thereby providing stronger incentives to report earnings 
conservatively. The results support the prediction that strong control by the 
controlling family of firm management and the board of directors is associated 
with higher earnings conservatism. This result suggests that family firms have 
lower agency conflicts and incentives for opportunistic reporting when a member 
of a controlling family holds the position of both CEO and chairman. 
Finally, this study examines the relationship between corporate governance and 
earnings conservatism. Employing a comprehensive set of corporate governance 
variables, this study does not find any evidence to link corporate governance and 
earnings conservatism. This result is contrary to the evidence from developed 
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markets, such as the United States and the United Kingdom, where firms with 
good governance are more timely in recognising bad news. This raises the 
possibility that the different ownership structures in Malaysia make corporate 
governance reforms less important. 
1.4 Thesis Organisation 
The remainder of this thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews the 
literature on earnings conservatism, including explanations, constructs, and 
empirical evidence. An overview of the Malaysian institutional environment with 
regard to corporate governance, financial reporting, and ownership structure is 
provided in Chapter 3. Chapter 4 explains the proposed research design and 
discusses the development of the hypotheses, while Chapter 5 explains the 
research methodology including the sample, choice of measures for the variables, 
and the regression models. The descriptive statistics and explanations of the 
empirical results together with the sensitivity analyses, are presented in Chapter 6. 
Finally, Chapter 7 summarises the results and acknowledges the limitations 
inherent in the scope of study and research design. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
EARNINGS CONSERVATISM: A REVIEW OF LITERATURE 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter reviews the literature on earnings conservatism, including discussion 
of the concept, theoretical explanations, constructs, and empirical evidence. The 
concept of earnings conservatism is discussed in Section 2.2. Section 2.3 outlines 
theoretical explanations for conservatism from the literature. The development of 
measures of earnings conservatism is explained in Section 2.4. Section 2.5 
discusses the influence of institutional structures on earnings conservatism. 
Section 2.6 reviews the evidence on firm-specific determinants of earnings 
conservatism. The chapter is summarised Section 2.7. 
2.2 Concepts of Conservatism 
Basu (1997) 
require a higher degree of verification for recognizing good news than bad news 
. To differentiate this interpretation from the 
general explanation of conservatism, as used in accounting textbooks and 
standard- empirical studies refer to this concept as earnings 
conservatism (García Lara & Mora, 2004), conditional conservatism (Ball, et al., 
2000; Ball & Shivakumar, 2005), ex-post conservatism (Richardson & Tinaikar, 
2004), and news-dependent conservatism (Chandra, Wasley, & Waymire, 2004). 
To measure earnings conservatism, the Basu (1997) model regresses accounting 
earnings on stock returns where stock returns serve as a proxy for economic news. 
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Given that stock prices efficiently capture all types of economic news, and 
earnings conservatism results in asymmetric recognition of good news and bad 
news; the result must be a higher coefficient for negative stock returns (bad news) 
than for positive stock returns (good news). The difference between the 
coefficients is the measure of conservatism. Examples of earnings conservatism 
include the lower of cost or market rule for inventory, impairment accounting for 
non-current tangible assets, and the write-down (impairment) of goodwill. 
Earnings conservatism has several important economic roles. Generally, 
contractual relations, litigation, regulatory incentives, and the relationship 
between taxation and financial reporting influence the incentives for conservative 
reporting (Watts, 2003a). In terms of contracting, earnings conservatism facilitates 
more efficient contracting by restricting 
behaviour (Qiang, 2007; Watts, 2003a). Earnings conservatism helps protect the 
interest of fund providers. Debtholders, for instance, demand timely information 
about bad news since the option value for their claims is highly sensitive to a fall 
in firm value (Basu, 1997). In addition, by reporting earnings conservatively, 
managers reduce litigation risk (Ball, 2001; Ball & Shivakumar, 2005). Previous 
studies also find that international differences in earnings conservatism are linked 
 and regulatory 
infrastructure (Ball, et al., 2000; Bushman & Piotroski, 2006; Giner & Rees, 
2001).  
The second type of conservatism is referred to as unconditional conservatism 
(Beaver & Ryan, 2005), news-independent conservatism (Chandra, et al., 2004) 
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and ex-ante conservatism (Pope & Walker, 2003). Unconditional conservatism 
arises because of the accounting rules, accounting choices, and procedures that 
cause an understatement of book value and earnings (Easton & Pae, 2004), and 
thus yield expected unrecorded goodwill (Beaver & Ryan, 2005). This is 
consistent with Feltham and Ohlson (1995) who define conservatism as a 
persistent underst . In the 
extreme form, unconditional conservatism causes investments to trigger expense 
recognition, but not asset recognition (Pope & Walker, 2003, p. 2). Examples of 
unconditional conservatism include aggressive depreciation of property, plant, and 
equipment, immediate expensing of internally developed intangibles, and the use 
of historical cost accounting for positive net present value projects. Gassen, 
Fülbier, & Sellhorn (2006), however, argue that the economic functions of 
unconditional conservatism are far less obvious. Further, Ball and Shivakumar 
(2005) 
neutral in contracting, conditional conservatism (timely loss recognition) can 
enhance contracting effi -
jar reserves from continuous understatement of assets increases discretionary 
freedom of management, especially to mask negative developments (Gassen, et 
al., 2006).  
2.3 Theoretical Explanations for Conservatism 
Watts (2003a) provides four explanations for conservatism: contracting, litigation, 
taxation and regulation. Of the four explanations, contracting is more extensively 
discussed in Watts (2003) because it is the earliest source of conservatism 
recognised in the literature; and the arguments related to it are more fully 
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developed compared to the others. Discussions on the four explanations for 
conservatism together with a review of recent evidence are provided in the 
following sections. 
2.3.1 Contracting  
The first recognised explanation for conservatism is contracting (Watts, 2003a). 
Since debtholders have an asymmetric payoff with respect to net assets, they are 
interested in the lower end of the possible values of earnings and net assets. For 
example, in the case of liquidation, debtholders would receive less than the 
contracted sum if the net asset value is below the face value of the debt. The 
limited liability of shareholders and managers restrains managers from claiming 
their losses. Thus, to protect their investment, debtholders may request more 
conservative reporting of earnings and impose a strict debt covenant that includes 
a dividend covenant and a minimum requirement on net assets. Earnings 
conservatism thus promotes a more efficient debt covenant, including restricting 
excessive payment of dividends to shareholders. In addition, the debt contract 
may set a lower bound measure on net assets to trigger technical default, thereby 
constraining managers from making decisions that could reduce the value of net 
assets (Beneish & Press, 1993). 
Management compensation and employment contracts also contribute to 
conservatism. Given that managers have more information than other parties, 
conservatism ly biased estimate of future 
cash flows, which can lead to overpayment of compensation to managers. 
Earnings-based compensation plans, create incentives for managers to report 
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higher earnings, achieved by delaying the recognition of bad news and 
accelerating the recognition of good news. Moreover, managers have a higher 
propensity to opt for negative net present value (NPV) investments with larger 
positive immediate returns. Further, because of limited tenure and liability of 
managers, it is almost impossible to recover overpayment of compensation, or 
secure damages, from a poor investment decision made by managers. Even with a 
wealth (Watts, 2003a). In short, earnings conservatism has a pivotal role in 
mitigating tic reporting behaviour and alleviating agency 
conflicts. 
From a corporate governance perspective, earnings conservatism facilitates more 
effective monitoring of the board of directors, shareholders and debtholders. 
Given that managers have higher incentives to defer the recognition of future 
economic losses, conservatism helps to issue an early warning to the board of 
directors and shareholders by accelerating the recognition of economic losses. As 
a result, prompt corrective action, including terminating poorly performing 
managers and discontinuing negative NPV projects, can be undertaken to 
minimise losses and risks. 
Many empirical studies support the contracting explanation on earnings 
conservatism. Qiang (2007), for example, finds that contracting induces earnings 
conservatism. Ahmed, Billings, Morton, and Stanford-Harris (2002) find that 
conservatism mitigates bondholder-shareholder conflicts over dividend policy. 
Furthermore, they find a lower cost of debt in firms with higher accounting 
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conservatism. In short, this evidence supports the argument earnings conservatism 
can facilitate contracting. 
2.3.2 Litigation  
Watts (2003a) proposes a litigation explanation for conservatism. García Lara et 
al. (2009) contend that conservatism reduces litigation risk for managers, 
directors, and auditors. Prior studies on auditor litigation find that lawsuits against 
auditors often relate to non-conservative reporting such as overstatements of 
earnings or net assets (Kellogg, 1984; St. Pierre & Anderson, 1984) and high 
earnings-increasing abnormal accruals (Heninger, 2001). Thus, managers will err 
on the side of conservative reporting to alleviate litigation risk (Chung, Firth, & 
Kim, 2003), especially when the courts are more likely to award damages for 
overstated earnings or assets (Kellogg, 1984). At the same time, auditors also 
have greater incentives for conservative reporting of earnings as litigation against 
firms and auditors has become more common and more costly (DeFond & 
Subramanyam, 1998). 
Numerous studies support the effect of litigation on earnings conservatism. Qiang 
(2007), for example, finds litigation induces both earnings conservatism and 
unconditional conservatism. In the United Kingdom, Huijgen and Lubberink 
(2005) find greater earnings conservatism among firms that are cross-listed in a 
more litigious country (the United States) than among UK firms without a US 
listing. Al-Sehali and Spear (2004) find no evidence of earnings conservatism in 
Saudi Arabia, where expected litigation costs are low. In an auditing study, Cahan 
and Zhang (2006) find that ex-Andersen clients have greater conservatism, which 
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is consistent with the view that an nique source of litigation 
risk. Greater conservatism is also observed during periods of higher auditor 
liability (Basu 1997) and among firms hiring big audit firms (Basu, Hwang, & 
Jan, 2001). 
2.3.3 Taxation 
Taxation rules may influence accounting practices. Watts (2003a) argues that 
s managers of profitable firms 
 As 
such, firms would report low earnings (by accelerating the recognition of 
expenses and delaying the recognition of revenues) to minimise current tax 
obligations. Extant studies show the relationship between taxation and 
conservatism. Hellman (2008), for instance, finds that the link between 
accounting and taxation is stronger in code-law countries; hence those countries 
are linked to higher earnings conservatism (Ball, et al., 2000).  
2.3.4 Regulation 
The fourth explanation for conservatism is regulation. Regulation has a significant 
role in influencing the incentives for conservative reporting (Watts, 2003a). 
Governments, through legislation, and the accounting profession, through 
accounting standards, set and enforce conservative accounting rules. The rationale 
for these rules is to protect the interests of investors and creditors, thus ensuring 
well-functioning share and credit markets (Chung, et al., 2003). For instance, the 
over valuation of the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE) in 1929 caused the SEC 
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ban on upward valuation of assets (Walker, 1992; Watts, 2003a). Accounting 
rules, such as goodwill amortisation, also lead to conservative reporting in the 
United States.  
Many empirical studies support the above arguments. Sivakumar and Waymire 
(2003) find that enforceable accounting rules induce conservatism, while Qiang 
(2007) finds that regulation induces conservatism. Recently, Lobo and Zhou 
(2006) examined earnings conservatism levels following the adoption of the 
Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX), and find higher earnings conservatism following 
SOX. Bushman and Piotroski (2006) examine the effect of legal and political 
institutions on financial reporting incentives, and find that both factors 
significantly influence the level of earnings conservatism. 
2.4 Development of Earnings Conservatism Measures 
This section explains several measures of earnings conservatism employed in 
empirical studies. The measures include the Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings measure, the time-series test of loss recognition model (Basu, 1997), the 
accruals-based test of loss recognition model (Ball & Shivakumar, 2005), and the 
firm-year estimate for conservatism (Francis, LaFond, Olsson, & Schipper, 2004; 
Khan & Watts, 2009). In addition to the above measures, studies also employ the  
market to book ratio (Roychowdury & Watts, 2007), hidden reserve measure 
(Penman & Zhang, 2002), and negative accruals measure (Givoly & Hayn, 2000). 
However, I exclude the discussion of the last three models from this study since 
the convergent validity tests conducted by Wang, Ó Hógartaigh, and van Zijl 
(2009) suggest that these measures are from a different group of conservatism 
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measures. 
2.4.1 The Asymmetric Timeliness of Earnings Model  Basu (1997) 
In the Basu (1997) model, conservatism is defined as the extent to which current 
period accounting earnings asymmetrically incorporate economic losses relative 
to economic gains. With that notion, the following equation is regressed to test the 
difference in the timeliness of good news and bad news. 
Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it (1.1) 
where Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in 
fiscal year t; RDit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 
otherwise; and it is the error term. 
The coefficient 1 measures the response of earnings to returns when returns are 
positive, and 1 3 measures the response of earnings to negative returns. If 
1 3> 1 or 3>0, then earnings reflect bad news more quickly than good news, 
and thus 3 measures earnings conservatism. 
In this model, stock return acts as a proxy for economic income, assuming that 
stock prices reflect all available information. This is consistent with the evidence 
that stock prices lead earnings information (Ball & Brown, 1968; Kothari & 
Sloan, 1992). Accounting earnings, however, employs different verification 
standards for recognising bad news (negative stock returns) and good news 
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(positive stock returns), and this generates earnings conservatism. For bad news, 
lower verification standards are used, which results in immediate recognition of 
losses. For good news, higher verification standards are imposed which cause 
delay in recognising economic gains. These asymmetric verification standards 
lead to more timely reporting of bad news relative to good news.  
 reverse regression model has been the most widely used measure of 
earnings conservatism in empirical research. Among the studies that have 
employed this model are Ball et al. (2000), Ball et al. (2003), Ball and 
Shivakumar (2005), Bushman and Piotroski (2006), Francis et al. (2004) and 
Roychowdury and Watts (2007). Despite the wide acceptance, this model is 
subject to some criticisms (Bushman & Piotroski, 2006; Dietrich, Muller, & 
Riedl, 2007; Gigler & Hemmer, 2001).  
First, Bushman and Piotroski (2006) criticise the effectiveness of the model since 
it places heavy reliance on the assumption that stock prices capture all economic 
gains and losses. Given that the price formation process is not equally efficient 
across all markets (Morck, Yeung, & Yu, 2000), the effectiveness of the Basu 
model can be questioned. Furthermore, Gigler and Hemmer (2001) argue that 
stock returns might not reflect all non-earnings news, and might also reflect good 
and bad economic news differentially, possibly as a function of a firm s own 
disclosure policies. If the equity is mispriced, then the model is likely to have 
measurement error.  
Second, Dietrich et al. (2007) claim that the Basu regression is biased and hold 
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that the inferences made from this model should not be relied upon. The bias is 
derived from the choice of deflator for the variables in the regression and the 
partitioning occurring on the basis of an endogenous variable (i.e. negative or 
positive stock returns). This endogeneity is allegedly attributable to the fact that 
accounting income has an effect on stock returns (Lai & Taylor, 2008). Despite all 
the criticisms, Ryan (2006) concludes that the asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
model is still the best measure of earnings conservatism available. However, Ryan 
does encourage the use of multiple measures for earnings conservatism. I use the 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure of conservatism as the primary 
measure in the test of my hypotheses, outlined in Chapter 6. 
2.4.2 The Time-Series Test of Loss Recognition  Basu (1997) 
The second measure in Basu  (1997) study examines the time-series behaviour of 
earnings changes. This model has been used in several studies including Ball et al. 
(2000), Ball et al. (2003), Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Ruddock, Taylor, and 
Taylor (2006) and Jenkins and Velury (2008). This measure exploits the transitory 
nature of economic income (Samuelson 1965; Fama, 1970). Basu (1997) argues 
that while bad news affects earnings immediately, the effect does not persist. On 
the other hand, good news takes longer to be reflected in earnings, but the effect is 
more likely to persist in future periods. Thus, the transitory gain and loss 
components measure the tendency for increases and decreases in accounting 
income to reverse (Basu, 1997). 
The time-series test of loss recognition model assumes that a decrease in current 
earnings during a bad news period is likely to reverse in the next period. Thus, it 
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is expected that the reporting of bad news is associated with an increase in 
negative autocorrelation between current and future earnings. Good news, 
however, is recognised over several periods. Thus, an increase in current earnings 
during a good news period is more persistent, while a decrease in earnings is more 
transitory in nature. Consistent with conservatism arguments, prior studies (for 
example Basu, 1997; Brooks & Buckmaster, 1976; Elgers & Lo, 1994) find that 
negative earnings changes are more likely to reverse in the following period than 
positive earnings changes. To identify the transitory gain and loss components in 
earnings, Basu (1997) estimates the following linear regression. 
NIit = 0 1 it-1 2 it-1 3 it-1 it-1 it (1.2) 
where NIit is the change in earnings for firm i from year t-1 to year t, 
standardised by total assets at end of year t-1; D NIit-1 is a dummy variable equal 
to 1 if NIit-1 is negative, and 0 otherwise; and it is the error term. 
In equation (1.2), a reversal of transitory gains or losses from the prior period 
would result in a negative coefficient. If the recognition of economic gains in 
earnings is deferred until the underlying increases in cash flows are realized, then 
the gains to be recognise
to reverse. Hence, the implication is 1=0. For economic losses, conservative 
accounting results in early recognition of economic losses in earnings, hence the 
transitory income decreases tend to reverse in the future: the implication being 
2+ 3<0. If economic losses are recognised in a more timely fashion than are 
gains, the coefficient 3 is expected to be negative. I use the time-series test of 
loss recognition as an alternative means of testing my hypotheses.  
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2.4.3 Accruals-Based Test of Loss Recognition  Ball and Shivakumar (2005) 
Ball and Shivakumar (2005) examine differences in earnings conservatism 
between public and private firms. Since stock price information is not available 
for private firms, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) developed an accruals-based test of 
loss recognition as an alternative measure for earnings conservatism. This model 
assumes that the asymmetry arises because economic losses are recognised on a 
timely basis as unrealized (i.e., non-cash) accrued charges against earnings. In 
contrast, economic gains are recognised only when they are realized. From this 
argument, Ball and Shivakumar (2005) estimate the following piecewise-linear 
relation between cash flows and accruals in order to measure earnings 
conservatism. 
ACCit = 0 1DCFOit 2CFOit 3DCFOit*CFOit it (1.3) 
where CFOit is measured as earnings before exceptional and extraordinary items 
less accruals of firm i in fiscal year t; DCFOt is a dummy variable that takes value 
1 if CFOt is negative and 0 otherwise; and it is the error term. While ACCit is 
measured as: 
ACCt =  
- Creditors - Other current liabilities  
- Depreciation 
(1.4) 
Both variables, accruals and cash flow from operations, are standardised by total 
assets at the beginning of the period. 
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This model predicts a negative coefficient for cash flows 2 and a positive 
incremental coefficient 3 for negative cash flows is consistent with the argument 
that accrued losses are more likely in periods of negative cash flows.  
2.4.4 Firm-Year Measure  Francis, LaFond, Olsson, and Schipper (2004) 
Based on (2004) 
introduce the firm-year measure of conservatism by estimating equation (1.5) on a 
firm- and year-specific basis using rolling ten-year windows. 
ttjtjjtjjtjtjtj RETNEGRETNEGEARN ,,,2,,1,,1,0, *  (1.5) 
where EARNj,t is firm income before extraordinary items in year t, scaled by 
market value at the end of year t-1; RETj,t -month return ending three 
months after the end of fiscal year t; NEGj,t is 1 if RETj,t is negative and 0 
otherwise; and t is the error term. 
Consistent with Basu (1997), Pope and Walker (1999), and Givoly and Hayn 
(2000), Francis et al. (2004) measure conservatism using the negative of the ratio 
of the coefficient on bad news to the coefficient on good news, Conservatism= -
1,j 2,j 1,j. Larger values of Conservatism imply lower conservative earnings. 
2.4.5 Firm-Year Measure  Khan and Watts (2009) 
Khan and Watts (2009) introduce a firm-year measure for earnings conservatism 
(C_Score) by extending the Basu (1997) reverse regression model. Khan and 
Watts (2009) estimate equation (1.6), which allows coefficients to vary across 
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firms and over time. In this model, the timeliness of good news and incremental 
timeliness of bad news are assumed to be linear functions of time-varying firm-
specific characteristics for which Khan and Watts suggest namely Size, MTB, and 
LEV. 
Xit = 1 2Di + Ri (µ1 + µ2Sizei + µ3MTBi + µ4Levi) 
+ DiRi 1 2Sizei 3MTBi 4Levi) 1Sizei 2MTBi  
3Levi 4DiSizei 5DiMTBi 6DiLevi + it 
(1.6) 
where X is earnings; R is returns; D is a dummy variable that equals 1 if R is 
negative, and 0 otherwise; Size is the natural log of market value of equity; Lev is 
the ratio of long-term and short-term debt deflated by market value of equity; 
MTB is the market to book ratio; i is indexes the firm; and  is the residual. 
From the estimation, the timeliness of good news (G_Score) and conservatism 
(C_Score) are calculated using the following equations:  
iii LevMTBSizeScoreG 43213_  (1.7) 
iii LevMTBSizeScoreC 43214_  (1.8) 
where i and i, i=1 to 4, are constant across firms, but vary over time. 
Khan and Watts (2009) also provide evidence on the empirical properties of 
C_Score. The result shows that a higher C_Score is associated with higher Basu 
(1997) earnings conservatism, more negative return on earnings and more variable 
non-operating accruals, suggesting the validity of the C_Score measure. 
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Consistent with predictions in prior literature, Khan and Watts (2009) find that 
firms with a higher C_Score have higher information asymmetry, longer 
investment cycles, greater idiosyncratic uncertainty and greater probability of 
litigation. Lai and Taylor (2008) estimate and validate Khan and Watts  C_Score 
measure for conservatism (based on the 2007 working paper version) using an 
Australian sample. They find that the C_Score is positively associated with stock 
return volatility, investment cycle length and prior period conservatism. In 
addition, they find that the C_Score is negatively associated with firm size, firm 
age, and leverage.  
2.5 Institutional Structure and Earnings Conservatism 
Since the seminal work of Basu (1997) on earnings conservatism, numerous 
cross-countries studies have been conducted to examine how institutional 
structure influences earnings conservatism. The following studies provide 
evidence that institutional structure, including the legal/judicial system, securities 
laws, and political economy, create incentives that influence the behaviour of 
corporate executives, investors, regulators and other market participants, which 
indirectly shape the properties of accounting numbers, in particular earnings 
conservatism. 
Ball et al. (2000) examine earnings conservatism in code-law and common-law 
countries that include seven international GAAP regimes (Australia, Canada, 
United States, United Kingdom, France, Germany and Japan). The study 
documents substantial variation in asymmetric timeliness of earnings across 
regimes, where common-law countries exhibit higher earnings conservatism than 
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code-law countries. This result suggests legal and institutional environments have 
a significant influence on earnings conservatism in the countries examined. Ball et 
al. (2000) argue that enhanced common-law disclosure standards reduce the 
agency costs of monitoring managers, thus countering the advantage of closer 
shareholder-manager relationships in code-law countries. Another study by Giner 
and Rees (2001) examines earnings conservatism in three distinct legal traditions: 
French code (or civil) law, German code-law and English common law. The 
results show that earnings conservatism is stronger in the United Kingdom than in 
France or Germany. By concentrating on European countries, Giner and Rees 
(2001) minimise the impact of other social and economic differences and thereby 
isolate legal and accounting effects more clearly.  
Extending the previous studies, Bushman and Piotroski (2006) examine the 
influence of legal and political institutions on earnings conservatism using a 
sample of firms from 38 countries from 1992 to 2001. They find that firms in 
countries with a high-quality judicial system recognise bad news in a more timely 
fashion than firms in countries with a low-quality judicial system. In addition, 
strong public enforcement of securities is positively associated with slowness in 
the recognition of good news, while private enforcement of securities law has no 
effect on conservatism. In terms of state involvement in the economy, evidence 
from common-law countries (civil-law countries) reveals that firms facing high 
state involvement in the economy report earnings aggressively (conservatively). 
This evidence suggests that managers adjust their financial reporting in response 
to legal and political institutions.  
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In the United States, Lobo and Zhou (2006) examine the effect of the introduction 
of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) on earnings conservatism. Since SOX requires 
the CEO and CFO of all exchange-listed firms to certify the material accuracy and 
thereby providing greater incentives to report earnings conservatively. Consistent 
with the prediction, Lobo and Zhou (2006) find an increase in earnings 
conservatism in financial reporting following SOX. In addition, post-SOX 
financial reports have lower discretionary accruals than those in the period 
preceding SOX.  
Raonic, McLeay, and Asimakopoulos (2004) assess the impact of country-level 
disclosure regimes, legal enforcement, and the importance of equity markets on 
earnings conservatism of European firms. They find higher earnings conservatism 
for firms domiciled and listed in different markets, showing a varying level of 
earnings sensitivity to market news. This is partly due to the interaction between 
the different institutional factors that drive the demand for accounting earnings 
recognition. In short, the study concludes that regulatory enforcement is positively 
associated with the bias towards conservatism while equity market exposure 
appears to be positively associated with greater timeliness in earnings recognition. 
Grambovas, Giner, and Christodoulou (2006) extend Ball et al. (2000) and Raonic 
et al. (2004) by providing further evidence on earnings conservatism from the 
United States and from European Union (EU) countries. They find earnings have 
become more conservative in the EU as well as the United States. However, there 
is little evidence on differences in earnings conservatism between the two regions. 
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From the results, they argue that the changes in this property of earnings in both 
regions are attributable to a common factor that affects firms in both locations and 
is not limited to the economic convergence process that happened in EU 
countries.  
Numerous studies have documented evidence that accounting standards have a 
significant impact on earnings conservatism. Accounting standards play a critical 
role in corporate governance by informing investors and by making contracts 
more verifiable (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1998). A study 
by Pope and Walker (1999), which assesses the differences between conservatism 
in the United States and the United Kingdom, finds differences in the timeliness 
of income recognition in the two regimes operating under separate sets of 
accounting standards. In the United Kingdom, the write-offs of large transitory 
losses through extraordinary items was tolerated before the introduction of FRS 
No. 3 in 1993; however, in the United States, those items would be classified as 
components of ordinary earnings. The results suggest that the incentives facing 
UK firms to classify bad news earnings components as extraordinary items were 
strong over the sample period. Barth, Landsman, and Lang (2008) examine 
whether the application of International Accounting Standards (IAS) in 21 
countries is associated with higher accounting quality. They find that firms 
applying IAS have more timely loss recognition, less earnings management, and 
more value relevance of accounting information, than firms applying non-US 
domestic standards.  
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2.6 Firm-Specific Factors and Earnings Conservatism 
Apart from cross-country studies on earnings conservatism, several studies 
provide explanations on variation in the level of earnings conservatism as results 
of firm-specific factors. These studies include, among others, factors relating to 
firm ownership, external auditors, and board of directors. 
2.6.1 Firm Ownership 
Empirical studies find that firm ownership has a significant effect on earnings 
conservatism. Ball and Shivakumar (2005), for instance, examine whether public 
or private firms in the UK have different levels of earnings conservatism. Both 
types of firms are subject to similar auditing regulation, but the results show that 
private firms report with less earnings conservatism. Specifically, the results show 
that the asymmetric timeliness of earnings is lower in private firms than in public 
firms. Ball and Shivakumar  (2005) study suggests that different market demand 
affects earnings conservatism even though both types of firms are subject to the 
same basic rules.  
In the United States, Wang (2006) examines the relationship between founding 
family ownership and earnings quality on data from S&P 500 firms during the 
period 1994 2002. The findings show that, on average, founding family 
ownership has higher earnings quality, measured using various proxies including 
earnings conservatism. In terms of earnings conservatism, founding family firms 
have lower persistence of transitory loss components in earnings, implying higher 
earnings conservatism. In addition, founding family firms exhibit lower abnormal 
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accruals and greater earnings informativeness, implying an effect of family 
ownership on earnings quality. 
shareholdings have a significant influence on conservatism. Given that the 
presence of outside directors is crucial in promoting board independence, holding 
significant equity stakes would provide additional incentives for the outside 
directors to monitor (and if necessary confront) managers (Jensen, 1993). Using a 
sample from the S&P 500 over the fiscal years 1999 2001, Ahmed and Duellman 
(2007) find a positive relationship between 
conservatism, thus supporting the prediction. 
Recently, LaFond and Roychowdury (2008) examine the effect of managerial 
ownership on earnings conservatism. Given that earnings conservatism is a 
potential mechanism to address agency conflicts, LaFond and Roychowdury 
hypothesise that when managerial ownership declines, the severity of agency 
conflicts increases; and hence increase the demand for conservatism. Consistent 
with this prediction, the results show that, as managerial ownership declines, 
earnings become more conservative. This result shows that when managers have 
increased incentives to overstate gains and understate losses and are less exposed 
to the consequences of their actions, shareholders would demand more 
conservative reporting. 
2.6.2 Auditors 
Some studies argue that auditors could indirectly affect the quality of financial 
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statements through their influence on  accounting choices (Becker, 
Defond, Jiambolvo, & Subramanyam, 1998; DeFond & Subramanyam, 1998). 
Given that the courts are more likely to award damages for overstated earnings or 
assets (Kellogg, 1984), auditors generally have a preference for conservative 
reporting. Auditors would be expected to place pressure on the client to report 
earnings conservatively in order to reduce the litigation risk. The extent of 
auditor attributes such as auditor size, audit tenure, industry specialisation, and the 
provision of non-audit services.  
Basu et al. (2001) examine the effect of the size of the audit firm on earnings 
conservatism. Since Big Eight audit firms have greater exposure to legal liability 
(Thoman, 1996), Basu et al. (2001) predict that Big Eight auditors are more 
conservative than auditors who are not members of the Big Eight. The result from 
the Basu (1997) reverse regression model shows that the difference in the 
timeliness of earnings to good and bad news is greater for Big Eight audit clients, 
implying higher earnings conservatism. Further, earnings conservatism in Big 
Eight audit clients increases more than it does in non-Big Eight audit clients in a 
period of high liabilities, suggesting that Big Eight auditors are more sensitive to 
liabilities exposure. The result holds even after matching observations by year, 
industry and size.  
Extending Basu et al. (2001), Chung, Firth, and Kim (2003) examine the role of 
auditors in influencing a more conservative accounting in their clients  financial 
reporting. They contend that the economic performance of the client and the size 
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of audit firms determine the insistence of auditors on conservatism and the ability 
auditors have to force their clients to comply with their requests. Consistent with 
the prediction, the results show that Big Six audit clients report more conservative 
earnings than do non-Big Six audit clients only when the clients' financial 
performance is worse than expected. 
Krishnan (2005a) examines the role of auditor-industry specialisation on earnings 
conservatism. Previous studies argued that auditor-industry expertise is associated 
with higher audit quality . It is argued that 
industry specialists gain experience and accumulate industry-based knowledge 
that are precursors to superior audit judgment quality (Bédard & Biggs., 1991; 
Bonner & Lewis, 1990). Consistent with the prediction, Krishnan finds clients of 
specialist auditors have higher earnings conservatism than clients of non-specialist 
tendency to delay the recognition of economic losses. 
Johnson, Khurana, and Reynolds (2002) examine the effect of audit-firm tenure 
on earnings conservatism. Using two proxies for conservatism, they find a 
positive association between earnings conservatism and the length of the auditor-
client relationship. Specifically, they find an increase in conservatism between 
short audit-firm tenure (one to three years) and medium audit-firm tenure (four to 
eight years). However, the study finds no evidence of reduced conservatism for 
longer audit-firm tenures of nine or more years. These results imply lower 
conservatism for short auditor tenure, and thus provide evidence that mandating 
auditor rotation may adversely affect the quality of financial reports. 
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One of the controversial aspects in auditing and financial reporting studies is 
related to non-audit services. The provision of non-audit services by incumbent 
auditors is alleged to impair auditor independence. To provide more insight on 
this issue, Ruddock, Taylor, and Taylor (2006) examine whether high levels of 
non-audit fees is associated with reduced earnings conservatism. Their findings 
show that higher-than-expected levels of non-audit services are not associated 
with reduced conservatism. This result is robust even after using various proxies 
for economic news and conducting comprehensive sensitivity tests. 
Another issue that has attracted researcher attention is the indictment of Arthur 
Andersen, one of the biggest audit firms in the world. Krishnan (2005b) examines 
the timely reporting of bad news by Arthur Andersen  Houston-based clients. 
Using a control group consisting of Houston-based clients audited by other Big 
Six auditors, this study finds that Arthur Andersen clients are less timely in 
reporting bad news. This result suggests that the clients of Arthur Andersen's 
Houston office engaged in aggressive accounting practices i.e. delayed 
recognition of publicly available bad news.  
Subsequently, Cahan and Zhang (2006) examine accounting conservatism of ex-
Andersen clients following the demise of Arthur Andersen. The study posits that 
successor auditors demanded their ex-Andersen clients apply more conservative 
accounting so as to reduce litigation risk. The analysis shows ex-Andersen clients 
had larger decreases in abnormal accruals in the year 2002, after Arthur 
the successor auditors perceive the Andersen audit as a unique source of litigation 
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risk. Krishnan (2007) reports a similar finding when examining the level of 
earnings conservatism of the former Andersen clients when they were forced to 
switch auditor in 2002. This study finds that, before the switch of auditor, 
earnings of former Andersen clients were less conservative relative to earnings of 
non-Andersen clients. However, after the switch of auditor, earnings conservatism 
increase for the former Andersen clients but not for the control sample clients. 
These findings suggest that auditors and managers employ earnings conservatism 
as a risk-management strategy in the post-Andersen era. 
2.6.3 Board of Directors 
The board of directors is the apex of the monitoring and control system of large 
firms (Fama & Jensen, 1983). Conservative accounting information assists the 
board of directors in reducing deadweight losses resulting from agency problems 
and alleviates agency conflicts between contracting parties (Watts, 2003a). Hence, 
many studies examine the link between characteristics of the 
and earnings conservatism. 
In the United States, Ahmed and Duellman (2007) investigate the relationship 
between accounting conservatism and characteristics of the board of directors, in 
particular, 
incentives. The results from S&P 500 firms over the fiscal years 1999 2001 show 
a negative relationship between conservatism and the proportion of inside 
directors on the board. In addition, they find a positive relationship between 
outside directors ism, showing that ownership of 
shares by outside directors enhances their monitoring incentives. These results 
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suggest that both factors, board independence and the strength of outside 
, facilitate greater monitoring of managers that 
leads to more conservative reporting. 
Beekes et al. (2004) report a similar finding in a UK study. Using listed non-
financial firms from 1993 to 1995, they examine the relationship between board 
composition (in terms of the proportion of outside directors) and earnings quality, 
measured using earnings timeliness and conservatism. The results show higher 
earnings conservatism in firms with a relatively high proportion of outside 
directors. This finding implies that board composition is a crucial factor in 
determining earnings quality in the United Kingdom. 
In Spain, García Lara et al. (2007) investigate whether CEO influence over the 
board has a significant effect on earnings conservatism. As proxies for the 
influence of the CEO over the board of directors, this study employs two 
aggregate indexes incorporating six and eight variables relating to the board of 
directors and monitoring committees. The variables include board size, non-
executive directors, independent directors, executive chairman, board meetings, 
audit committee, nomination/remuneration committee and an executive 
committee. The results show that firms with a low level of CEO influence over 
the board exhibit higher earnings conservatism than firms with higher CEO 
influence over the board. This implies the importance of board independence in 
promoting greater earnings conservatism.  
Recently, García Lara et al. (2009) examine the relationship between corporate 
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governance and earnings conservatism in the US from 1992 to 2003. To capture 
the strength of corporate governance, this study employs a composite measure that 
includes various internal and external corporate governance components. The 
results show that firms with strong corporate governance exhibit higher earnings 
conservatism. Further tests on the endogenous nature of corporate governance 
find that the direction of causality flows from governance to conservatism, and 
not vice versa. This implies that governance and conservatism are not substitutes.  
2.7 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has reviewed the literature on earnings conservatism. This includes 
discussion of the concept of conservatism and explanations for accounting 
conservatism. This chapter also includes explanations of various earnings 
conservatism measures employed in previous studies and reviews the empirical 
evidence, especially the influence of institutional structures and firm-specific 
factors on earnings conservatism.  
The next chapter provides an overview of the Malaysian institutional 
environment, including corporate governance, financial reporting, and ownership 
structure.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
MALAYSIAN INSTITUTIONAL BACKGROUND: 
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE, FINANCIAL REPORTING, 
AND OWNERSHIP STRUCTURE 
3.1 Introduction 
This chapter examines the Malaysian institutional background with particular 
reference to corporate governance, financial reporting, and ownership structure. 
Section 3.2 discusses the institutional reforms implemented following the 1997 
financial crisis. The reforms in financial reporting in Malaysia, especially 
following the introduction of the Financial Reporting Act (1997) are outlined in 
Section 3.3. Section 3.4 explains the ownership structure of Malaysian firms, with 
particular emphasis on family firms and state-controlled firms. Finally, Section 
3.5 summarizes the chapter. 
3.2 The 1997 Asian Economic Crisis and Reforms in Corporate Governance 
3.2.1 Before the Crisis 
Attention to corporate governance emerged in Malaysia with the introduction of 
the Companies Act 1965 and was subject to progressive development long before 
the 1997 economic crisis. The 1965 Act describes the roles and responsibilities of 
directors and managers to keep proper accounting records (Abdullah & Mohd 
Nasir, 2004). Subsequently, the Securities Industries Act (SIA) 1983 and the 
Securities Commission Act (SCA) 1993 provided a legislative and regulatory 
framework for the Malaysian capital market. These last two Acts prohibited 
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artificial trading and market rigging, thereby effectively regulating the operations 
of securities dealers (Liew, 2007).  
The Securities Commission was established in March 1993 as a watchdog to 
improve the legal and regulatory framework governing the capital market. In the 
same year, the Bursa Malaysia Listing Requirements were revised to require all 
listed firms to set up audit committees of at least three people, comprising a 
majority of independent directors. This requirement was intended to improve the 
standards of corporate disclosure in Malaysia (Wan Hussin & Ibrahim, 2003). 
To enhance the accountability of directors and to promote good corporate ethics, 
the Companies Commission of Malaysia, formerly known as the Registrar of 
Companies, introduced the Code of Ethics for Directors in 1996. In the same year, 
the Securities Commission moved from a merit-based system to disclosure-based 
regulation, which ensured high-quality financial reporting by promoting improved 
standards of disclosure, due diligence, corporate governance and accountability 
among the directors of public firms. Under the new system, the role of the 
Securities Commission shifted from evaluating the relative merits of the issuer 
and its securities to regulating the disclosure of quality information (Che Haat, 
2006).4 The final implementation phase of disclosure-based regulation would 
require all listed firms, among other requirements, to: (1) publish financial 
                                               
4 Disclosure-based regulation (DBR) was implemented in three phases: Phase 1 (1996 1999) 
focuses on a flexible/hybrid merit-based regime which emphasises disclosure, due diligence and 
corporate governance; Phase 2 (1999 2000) moves to partial DBR which emphasises disclosure, 
due diligence and corporate governance, and the promotion of accountability and self-regulation; 
and Phase 3 (2001onwards), full DBR, was implemented emphasizing high standards of 
disclosure, due diligence and corporate governance as well as the promotion of self-regulation and 
responsible conduct. 
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statements on a quarterly basis within two months of each financial quarter (these 
statements included an income statement, a balance sheet, a cash flow statement 
and explanatory notes); (2) furnish annual audited accounts, and nd 
nd of the financial year; and (3) 
make immediate public disclosure of all material information of a financial and 
non-financial nature concerning its affairs (Nathan, Lin, & Fong, 2000).  
3.2.2 The Crisis 
The Asian economic crisis began in July 1997. The value of the Malaysian 
currency, Ringgit Malaysia (MYR), dropped from MYR 2.50 per US$ to, at one 
point, MYR 4.80 per US$. The Bursa Malaysia composite index fell from 
approximately 1300 to nearly 400 points in a few short weeks. Interest rates 
increased to more than 12% during the crisis. These problems started with the 
speculative short-selling of Malaysian currency, which was followed by high 
capital outflows from the country (Abdul Rahman, 2006). In December 1997, to 
control these problems, the Malaysian government imposed capital controls 
including pegging the Malaysian Ringgit at 3.80 to the US dollar. Other measures 
included restricting the trading of Malaysian stocks outside Malaysia, introducing 
a punitive tax for holding Malaysian stocks for less than one year and making 
unofficial trading of the ringgit illegal (Poon, 2000). 
The origins of the economic crisis are a matter of debate. Prime Minister Dr 
Mahathir accused currency speculator, George Soros, of causing the problem. 
Many economists, however, would argue the will of the country to overcome the 
crisis had been weakened by endemic structural and policy weaknesses (Fischer, 
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1998; Kawai, Newfarmer, & Schmukler, 2001; Miller & Luangaram, 1998; 
UNCSD, 2002; Zhuang, 1999). Among the alleged weaknesses were 
inappropriate exchange rate policies, poor corporate governance and transparency, 
inadequate prudential banking supervision, excessive short-term unhedged 
corporate foreign debt, and corporate moral hazard problems due to implicit 
government guarantees for risky debt-financed investments (Morris, Pham, & 
Gray, 2011). 
The financial crisis also caused a massive loss of foreign 
the Malaysian capital market (Abdul Rahman & Haniffa, 2005), and this was 
exacerbated by poor corporate governance. Rajan and Zingales (1998) argue that 
investors ignored weaknesses in East Asian firms when the economy was doing 
well, but quickly pulled out once the crisis began because they believed the region 
lacked adequate institutional protection for their investments. Further, 
expropriation of minority shareholders became worse during that period. In 
addition, Johnson, Boone, Breach, and Friedman (2000) argue that in countries 
with weak corporate governance, the financial crisis resulted in more 
expropriation of wealth by managers and thus caused a larger fall in asset prices.  
United Engineers Malaysia (UEM), a blue chip firm in Malaysia, provides an 
example of the expropriation of minority shareholders interests during the 
financial crisis. In November 1997, UEM acquired 32.6% of Renong, its 
financially troubled parent. The minority shareholders were horrified and saw this 
38.24% on the day the transaction was announced (Foon, 1997, November 19, p. 
41 
 
62). The controversy surrounding this transaction, which was undertaken without 
proper disclosure and prior shareholder approval, led to a significant loss in 
(Abdul Rahman, 2006).  
The impact of the financial crisis, in particular reduced investor confidence in the 
Malaysian capital market, provided a strong impetus for regulators to introduce 
reforms to enhance the protection of investors. The reforms targeted two main 
areas: corporate governance and financial reporting. La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, 
Shleifer, and Vishny (2000; 1998) contend that corporate governance is an 
important factor in financial market development and firm value. Johnson et al. 
(2000), for instance, show that country-specific measures of corporate governance 
explain the extent of currency depreciation and stock market decline in emerging 
markets during the crisis better than standard macroeconomic variables. In 
response to the demand for a stronger capital market, regulators adopted various 
strategies. These are discussed in the remainder of this section. Matters relating to 
financial reporting reforms are discussed separately in Section 3.3. 
Corporate governance reforms, among others, are crucial to: (1) strengthening the 
protection of minority shareholders  rights; (2) enhancing the transparency and 
accountability of directors; (3) strengthening regulatory enforcement; and (4) 
promoting training and education at all levels in corporations (Finance Committee 
on Corporate Governance, 1999). 
The reforms started with the establishment of the High Level Finance Committee 
on Corporate Governance by the Ministry of Finance in March 1998, followed by 
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a series of regulatory changes through the Securities Commission, Bursa 
Malaysia, and the Companies Commission of Malaysia. This included the 
establishment of the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance, and the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Committee. Table 3.1 summarises the corporate 
governance and financial reporting initiatives and reforms made by Malaysian 
authorities after the economic crisis.  
Table 3.1  
Corporate governance initiatives and reforms (1997 2002) 
Year Initiatives and Reforms 
1997 An independent accounting standard-setting board was introduced. 
1998 The formation of the High Level Finance Committee to conduct a detailed study on 
corporate governance and to make recommendations for improvements. 
1998 Amendments were made to the Securities Industry Central Depository Act (SICDA) 
with a view to enhancing transparency in share ownership amidst other improvements. 
1998 The Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance was established. 
1998 Regulations for directors and CEOs to disclose interest in the publicly listed companies 
(PLC) were introduced. 
1999 Quarterly reporting was introduced. 
1999 A revamp of the takeovers and mergers code was done. 
2000 The Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance was introduced. 
2000 Amendments were made to the Securities Commission Act 1993 by making the 
Securities Commission the sole regulator for fund-raising activities and the corporate 
bond market. 
2001 The Audit Committee must have a member who is financially trained. 
2001 The Malaysian Capital Market master plan was launched to further streamline and 
regulate the capital market and to chart the course for the capital market for the next 
ten years. 
2001 The Financial Sector master plan was launched to chart the future direction of the 
financial system over the next ten years. It outlined strategies to achieve a diversified, 
effective, efficient and resilient financial system. 
2001 The mandatory disclosure of corporate governance code compliance was introduced. 
2001 A minority shareholders watchdog group was established. 
2001 A mandatory accreditation programme for directors was introduced. 
2002 Internal audit guidelines for PLCs were introduced. 
Source: Mahmood, (2003); Securities Commission of Malaysia (www.sc.com.my/index.asp; 
accessed on 02.01.09); Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (www.micg.net/home.htm; 
accessed on 02.01.09) 
The High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, comprising 
government and industry representatives, carried out detailed investigations to 
identify and address weaknesses relating to the 1997 financial crisis. Bursa 
Malaysia and PriceWaterhouseCoopers (PWC), on the other hand, conducted a 
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survey on corporate governance of public listed firms and then made 
recommendations for corporate governance best practices for Malaysia (Ow-Yong 
& Kooi Guan, 2000). The result was the Report on Corporate Governance, 1999, 
which highlighted the importance of boards of directors as corporate governance 
mechanisms to protect and enhance shareholder wealth. The report aimed to 
improve corporate disclosure, promote good corporate governance practice in 
Malaysia, and to re-establish investor confidence in the Malaysian capital market 
(Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, 1999).  
Following the recommendations proposed by the Finance Committee on 
Corporate Governance (FCCG), the High Level Finance Committee on Corporate 
Governance introduced the Malaysian Code on Corporate Governance (MCCG) 
in March 2000. This code which was heavily influenced by the Cadbury Report 
and the Hampel Report in the United Kingdom (Finance Committee on Corporate 
Governance, 2000), empowered investors by providing them with information on 
 In addition to the audit committee, 
which had been mandatory since 1993, the MCCG recommended the board of 
directors appoint remuneration and nomination committees. Other committees, 
such as a risk management committee and corporate governance committee were 
also recommended (Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, 2000). The 
MCCG also recommended separation of roles between chief executive officer and 
chairman of the board of directors, though this was not required by the Listing 
Requirements of Bursa Malaysia. 
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system. The MCCG stressed that the board of directors should maintain a sound 
system of internal control. The Guide for Statement of Internal Control, 2000, 
noted various key areas that directors must pay attention to before they include the 
Statement of Internal Control in the annual reports. In reporting the corporate 
governance principles and best practices in annual corporate reports, all listed 
firms are required to provide information pertaining to internal control such as 
identifying principal risks and ensuring implementation of appropriate systems to 
manage risks.  
In January 2001, the MCCG came into full effect when an amendment was made 
to the Listing Requirements of the Bursa Malaysia. It is important to note that the 
MCCG is not mandatory for all listed firms, but the revision of the listing 
requirements creates strong demand for higher standards of conduct and a higher 
quality of financial reporting by public listed firms. The revision, for example, 
requires all public listed firms to include in their annual report a statement of 
corporate governance, a statement of internal control, the composition of the 
board of directors, the composition of and quorum for the audit committee (Kuala 
Lumpur Stock Exchange, 2001). Under the revamped listing requirements, all 
listed firms must include in their annual reports a narrative of the application of 
the principles and best practices set out in the MCCG. Reasons for areas of non-
compliance and alternative practices that were adopted must be justified and 
disclosed. In addition, directors of publicly listed firms are required to attend a 
known as the mandatory accreditation programme, 
which includes topics such as the Companies Act 1965, the Listing Requirements 
of Bursa Malaysia, risk management and internal control, and relevant securities 
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laws. 
In March 1998, the Malaysian Institute of Corporate Governance (MICG) was 
established by the High Level Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, with 
the objective, amongst others, of facilitating the development of corporate 
governance and strengthening corporate governance principles and compliance 
efforts. The MICG is a non-profit public firm limited by guarantee, with founding 
members from various bodies, including the Federation of Public Listed 
Companies (FPLC), the Malaysian Institute of Accountants (MIA), the Malaysian 
Association of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA), the Malaysian Institute of 
Chartered Secretaries and Administrators (MAICSA), and the Malaysian Institute 
of Directors (MID). The MICG seeks to provide an independent platform for 
various stakeholders to interact and debate corporate governance issues, in which 
it promotes continuous improvement in corporate governance best practices. 
Following a recommendation in the Report on Corporate Governance, the 
Minority Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) was established in August 2000. 
The MSWG is a special governing body set up as a 
mechanism to protect the interests of minority shareholders from being abused by 
the majority shareholders. The establishment of the MSWG is one strategy to 
enhance corporate governance and encourage independent and proactive 
shareholder participation in the listed firms. The MSWG comprises 
representatives from the five largest institutional funds in the country, including 
the Employee Provident Fund (EPF), Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), Social 
Security Organization (SOCSO), Lembaga Tabung Haji (LTH), and Lembaga 
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Tabung Angkatan Tentera (LTAT) (Abdul Wahab, How, & Verhoeven, 2007). 
In February 2001, the Securities Commission launched the Capital Market Master 
Plan (CMP) in response to the recommendations contained in the Report on 
Corporate Governance. The CMP contains 152 recommendations, of which 10 
deal with development of the institutional and regulatory framework for the 
capital market from 2001 to 2010. The focus is mainly on corporate governance 
issues. Later, in August 2003, the Corporate Law Reform Committee was 
established to spearhead the corporate law reform programme. This was perceived 
as another milestone for corporate governance reforms in Malaysia.  
Legal provision for whistle blowers was another aspect highlighted in the Report 
on Corporate Governance prepared by the Finance Committee. To address this 
matter, the Securities Industry Act 1983 (SIA) was amended by Parliament in 
September 2003 with effect from 5 January 2004. The SIA introduces provisions 
governing whistle blowers and enhances enforcement/investor redress 
mechanisms for breaches of securities laws. This amendment is crucial because it 
ensures that auditors can disclose information that is material to the regulators, 
and also deals with internal whistle blowers, usually the key officers dealing with 
the financial statements of the company.  
The efforts to improve corporate governance and protect investors and 
shareholders continued even after the issuance of the MCCG. Various initiatives 
to strengthen the existing mechanism were undertaken, including the issuance of 
the guideline Best Practice in Corporate Disclosure by Bursa Malaysia in August 
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2004. The objective of the guideline is to ensure compliance of public listed firms 
with disclosure obligations under the Listing Requirements and securities law. 
More importantly, the Best Practice guide is intended to inspire trust and 
confidence between investors and public listed firms by ensuring firms provide 
equal access to information in a timely, accurate, and complete manner.  
In October 2007, the MCCG was revised to strengthen the roles and 
responsibilities of boards of directors and audit committees. The revision provides 
guidelines for the appointment of directors, the role of nominating committees, 
the eligibility criteria for appointment as an audit committee member, the audit 
committee composition, the frequency of meetings and the need for continuous 
training. The 2007 Revised MCCG Code requires the audit committee to consist 
of at least three members (all of whom must be non-executive directors), and a 
majority of whom must be independent directors. Further, it is recommended that 
all audit committee members should be financially literate, with at least one 
member being a member of an accounting association or body. The Revised Code 
also enhances the role of the nomination committee by requesting that when 
candidates are recommended for directorships they should have the necessary 
skills, knowledge, expertise, experience, professionalism, and integrity to 
strengthen the board and to ensure the board discharges its roles and 
responsibilities effectively. The Revised Code also provides greater clarity to the 
roles in regard to compensation, monitoring, and replacement of 
management, and planning the succession of senior management. 
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3.3 Financial Reporting Reforms and Adoption of IFRS 
The introduction of the Financial Reporting Act 1997 (Act 558) (FRA 1997) was 
the most important development in financial reporting in Malaysia. The Act, 
which was gazetted on 6 March 1997, introduced and set out the first formal 
accounting framework for Malaysia in response to the rapid economic 
development and globalization of the commercial market that demanded a higher 
quality of financial reporting and accounting practices (Fadzly & Ahmad, 2004). 
Two bodies, the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) and the 
Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF), were established under FRA 1997.5 
MASB issued accounting standards for both public and private firms. This made 
Malaysia the first country in the Southeast Asia region to give legal status to 
accounting standards. At the same time, the FRA 1997 ended the long conflict 
between the Malaysia Institute of Accountants (MIA) and the Malaysian Institute 
of Certified Public Accountants (MICPA) on standards setting.  
The development of accounting standards in Malaysia began in the early 1970s. 
At the time, MICPA played the main role despite the existence of MIA which 
governed the accounting profession in the country. Standard setting in Malaysia 
began when the MICPA President received a letter from the governor of the 
Malaysian Central Bank6 highlighting the need for professional standards to guide 
financial reporting in Malaysia (Selvaraj, 1999). The letter also requested the 
                                               
5 FRF is a trustee body which is responsible for overseeing the MASB's performance, financial and 
funding arrangements. It acts as a sounding board for the MASB, insofar as the FRF is the first to 
 
 
6 Also known as Bank Negara Malaysia 
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MICPA to provide a statement of generally accepted accounting principles for its 
members (Selvaraj, 1999). In response to the letter, the MICPA set up a Technical 
Committee to review matters raised by the Central Bank. After 1976, the 
committee started to assess the International Accounting Standards (IAS) for local 
adoption and to conduct studies on accounting standards relating to industries of 
particular importance to the Malaysian economy (Selvaraj, 1999). Eventually, 
Malaysia selectively adopted the International Accounting Standards (IAS) in 
1978. 
From 1987 until 1992, both professional bodies, the MIA and the MICPA, had 
jointly developed accounting standards, especially on local issues. Examples of 
accounting standards developed from this collaboration are MAS 1 on Earnings 
Per Share, MAS 2 on Mergers and Acquisitions, and MAS 5 on Accounting for 
Aquaculture. However, the professional bodies failed to reach agreement on MAS 
6 on Goodwill, which then led to conflict and the dissolution of their 
collaboration. In this conflict, the MIA issued an exposure draft for MAS 67, 
which was based on the controversial UK ED 47. The MICPA, however, decided 
that adoption of MAS 6 should be deferred until the controversy surrounding the 
UK  ED 47 was determined or until the International Accounting Standards 
Committee (IASC) issued a revised standard on goodwill. According to Selvaraj 
(1999), the disagreement over MAS 6 triggered the dissolution of the Common 
Working Technical Committee and ended the MIA-MICPA collaboration. The 
two professional bodies then continues to develop separate accounting standards 
                                               
7 MAS requires goodwill to be amortised over 25 years 
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(Selvaraj, 1999). This created confusion among accounting practitioners and 
distorted the development of accounting standards in Malaysia. 
By 1997, in addition to eight customised Malaysian Accounting Standards 
(MAS), twenty-four International Accounting Standards (IAS) had been adopted 
in Malaysia. The IAS had become the model for Malaysian accounting standards, 
for several reasons. First, the early accounting professionals in Malaysia were 
trained overseas, particularly in the United Kingdom and Australia, thus, they 
gained a certain respect for the international accounting system. Second, the cost 
of adopting an existing set of accounting standards was lower than developing the 
standards from scratch. Adoption of international accounting standards requires 
less time and effort, and allows the local accounting profession to have a 
structured and strong set of accounting standards. Third, adoption of the IAS is 
also a strategy to gain international recognition. It would also ensure that financial 
statements produced by Malaysian companies were comparable and reliable. 
Even though the MIA and the MICPA both adopted IAS standards and issued 
local accounting standards, there was no regulatory body nor any statutory 
requirement to enforce compliance with accounting standards in Malaysia prior to 
the introduction of FRA 1997 (Saleh, Iskandar, & Rahmat, 2005). As a result, 
there were varying degrees of compliance with accounting standards among the 
Malaysian public listed firms. This scenario suggests a weak financial reporting 
environment in Malaysia compared to that in the United Kingdom and the United 
States. The empirical evidence from Ball et al. (2003) supports this notion. Ball et 
al. (2003) find low earnings quality in Malaysian financial reporting during the 
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period 1984 to 1996, which was attributed to the weak institutional foundation 
and legal environment.  
From 1997, the standards-setting roles no longer rested with the professional 
bodies. Under FRA 1997, the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB), 
together with the Financial Reporting Foundation (FRF), became the only 
standard-setting bodies. Standard-setting became more independent and more 
representative. It had representatives from all relevant parties including preparers, 
users, regulators, and the accounting profession. Section 7 of the FRA 1997, states 
the functions of the MASB as follows: 
...(a) to issue new accounting standards as approved accounting 
standards; (b) to review, revise or adopt existing accounting standards 
as approved accounting standards; (ba) to amend, substitute for, 
suspend, defer, withdraw or revoke any approved accounting 
standards in whole or in part; (c) to issue statements of principles for 
financial reporting; (d) to sponsor or undertake development of 
possible accounting standards; (e) to conduct such public consultation 
as may be necessary in order to determine the contents of accounting 
concepts, principles and standards; (f) to develop a conceptual 
framework for the purpose of evaluating proposed accounting 
standards; (g) to make such changes to the form and content of 
proposed accounting standards as it considers necessary; and (h) to 
perform such other function as the Minister may prescribe by order 
published in the Gazette. (p. 9 10) 
With the power provided under the Act, the MASB has reviewed, revised and 
adopted existing accounting standards and issued new standards as approved 
accounting standards, known collectively as MASB standards. By the end of 
2003, the Board had 32 approved accounting standards for publicly listed 
companies in Malaysia, including 28 standards adopted from the International 
Accounting Standards and 4 locally developed standards, as shown in Table 3.2.  
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Table 3.2  
List of MASB Standards as at 31 December 2003 
 
MASB Title (as in MASB standards) IAS Effective Date  
MASB 1 Presentation of Financial Statements IAS 1 1 July 1999 
MASB 2 Inventories IAS 2 1 July 1999 
MASB 3 Net Profit or Loss for the Period, Fundamental 
Errors and Changes in Accounting Policies 
IAS 8 1 July 1999 
MASB 4 Research and Development Costs IAS 9 1 July 1999 
MASB 5 Cash Flow Statement IAS 7 1 July 1999 
MASB 6 Effects of Changes on Foreign Exchange Rates IAS 21 1 July 1999 
MASB 7 Construction Contracts IAS 11 1 July 1999 
MASB 8 Related Parties IAS 24 1 January 2000 
MASB 9 Revenue IAS 18 1 January 2000 
MASB 10 Leases IAS 17 1 January 2000 
MASB 11 Consolidated Financial Statements and Investments 
in Subsidiaries 
IAS 27 1 January 2000 
MASB 12 Investment in Associates IAS 28 1 January 2000 
MASB 13 Earnings per Share IAS 33 1 January 2000 
MASB 14 Depreciation Accounting IAS 4 1 July 2000 
MASB 15 Plant, Property and Equipment IAS 16 1 July 2000 
MASB 16 Financial Reporting of Interest in Joint Ventures IAS 31 1 July 2000 
MASB 19 Events After the Balance Sheet Date IAS 10 1 July 2001 
MASB 20 Provisions, Contingent Liabilities and Contingent 
Assets 
IAS 37 1 July 2001 
MASB 21 Business Combinations IAS 22 1 July 2001 
MASB 22 Segment Reporting IAS 14 1 January 2002 
MASB 23 Impairment of Assets IAS 36 1 January 2002 
MASB 24 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and Presentations IAS 32 1 January 2002 
MASB 25 Income Taxes IAS 12 1 July 2002 
MASB 26 Interim Financial Reporting IAS 34 1 July 2002 
MASB 27 Borrowing Costs IAS 23 1 July 2002 
MASB 28 Discontinuing Operations IAS 35 1 January 2003 
MASB 29 Employee Benefits IAS 19 1 July 2003 
MASB 30 Accounting and Reporting by Retirement Benefits 
Plans 
IAS 26 1 July 2003 
 
 
Previously 
known as 
MASB Title (as in MASB standards) Effective Date  
MAS 3 MASB 17 General Insurance Business 1 July 2000 
MAS 4 MASB 18 Life Insurance Business 1 July 2000 
MAS 5 MAS 5 Accounting for Aquaculture 1 September 1998 
 MASBi-1 Presentation of Financial Statements of 
Islamic Financial Reporting 
1 January 2003 
Source: Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
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In 1998, a year after the Financial Reporting Act was enacted by the Parliament, 
the Companies Act 1965 was also amended to include a new provision8, which 
defined in Section 2 of FRA 1997. This amendment creates legally binding 
accounting standards, and thus requires compliance with the accounting standards 
issued by the MASB. To enforce the compliance of MASB standards, a number of 
regulatory bodies, including the Securities Commission, Bursa Malaysia (formerly 
known as the Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange), the Central Bank of Malaysia, and 
the Companies Commission of Malaysia, are responsible within their respective 
jurisdictions for ensuring compliance. In the event of non-compliance, the 
regulators have the power to direct the company to take the necessary rectifying 
actions, or make necessary announcements with respect to the non-compliance or 
required corrections. They also have powers to impose penalties for such offences 
committed by public listed firms.  
The Securities Commission (SC) enforces several aspects of compliance with the 
accounting standards for publicly listed companies through the issuance of its 
rules and policies. For example, the SC requires all listed firms to meet the terms 
in its Corporate Disclosure Policy, which demands firms maintain a high level of 
disclosure. The SC also issued Post Listing Obligations, requiring all submitted 
annual and interim corporate reports to be prepared in accordance with approved 
accounting standards. In addition, the SC frequently discusses and reviews issues 
relating to the minimum compliance with accounting standards and other statutory 
                                               
8 Section 166A of Companies Act 1965 [Act 125] 
54 
 
requirements for publicly listed firms in Malaysia. The SC also requires 
companies that seek to issue or offer securities to the public to submit the 
proposed issuance to the SC for approval. Companies that fail to submit the 
proposal, or that submit false and misleading information to the SC, may incur a 
fine of RM3 million or, in the case of directors of such companies, 10 years 
imprisonment.  
Bursa Malaysia also enforces the application of approved accounting standards 
among Malaysian listed firms. For listed firms, compliance with the accounting 
standards is made mandatory through the Bursa Malaysia listing requirements. 
The listing requirements require submission of corporate annual reports and the 
preparation of financial statements must be in accordance with approved 
accounting standards. Firms that fail to meet this requirement may, among other 
things, receive letters of caution, receive reprimands, be fined an amount not 
exceeding RM1 million, be given directions for rectification, face the non-
acceptance of applications or submissions, have conditions imposed for approval 
of submissions, face suspension of trading, and may be delisted by Bursa 
Malaysia. In the case of a breach of the listing requirements, Bursa Malaysia may 
also on application to the High Court, seek an order requiring a particular director 
to be removed from and barred from holding directorship in any 
other listed firm. 
The Companies Commission of Malaysia (CCM) is a government agency that is 
responsible for regulating matters relating to the incorporation of companies and 
business registration. In addition, CCM promotes good ethical conduct amongst 
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directors and managers. In terms of financial reporting, CCM is concerned with 
compliance with accounting standards in the financial statements of private 
companies. Yet, another agency, the Central Bank of Malaysia, deals with matters 
relating to banks and financial institutions. Besides ensuring that financial 
statements of banks and financial institutions comply with approved accounting 
standards, the Central Bank also provides specimen financial statements and 
guidelines on financial reporting for banks and financial institutions that deal 
specifically with non-performing loans and interest. 
A further development in financial reporting occurred in 2005. In that year, all 
listed firms in the European Union started to prepare financial statements using 
the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). Other countries around 
the world quickly followed suit. Malaysia adopted IFRS from 1 January 2006. In 
October 2005 the MASB published a notice of issuance of 18 of the 21 
new/revised MASB-approved accounting standards for application in relation to 
financial statements, including 11 Issues Committee Interpretations. These 
pronouncements were to be effective for financial periods beginning on or after 1 
January 2006. In 2005, MASB standards were renamed to Financial Reporting 
Standards (FRS), in line with International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS). 
In addition, MASB also changed the numbering of the standards to correspond to 
those of the relevant international standards. This move eliminated an anomaly 
whereby the numbering of MASB standards differed from their respective 
international standards. Table 3.3 shows the changes made to MASB standards in 
the process of IFRS adoption. 
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Table 3.3  
Change of name of MASB standards on January 1, 2005 
Standard New name Title Effective Date 
MASB 1 FRS 1012004 Presentation of Financial Statements 1 July 1999 
MASB 2 FRS 1022004 Inventories 1 July 1999 
MASB 3 FRS 1082004 Net Profit or Loss for the Period, 
Fundamental Errors and Changes in 
Accounting Policies  
1 July 1999 
MASB 4 FRS 1092004 Research and Development Costs 1 July 1999 
MASB 5 FRS 1072004 Cash Flow Statements 1 July 1999 
MASB 6 FRS 1212004 The Effects of Changes in Foreign 
Exchange Rates 
1 July 1999 
MASB 7 FRS 1112004 Construction Contracts 1 July 1999 
MASB 8 FRS 1242004 Related Party Disclosures 1 January 2000 
MASB 9 FRS 1182004 Revenue 1 January 2000 
MASB 10 FRS 1172004 Leases 1 January 2000 
MASB 11 FRS 1272004 Consolidated Financial Statements and 
Investments in Subsidiaries 
1 January 2000 
MASB 12 FRS 1282004 Investments in Associates 1 January 2000 
MASB 13 FRS 1332004 Earnings Per Share 1 January 2000 
MASB 14 FRS 1042004 Depreciation Accounting 1 July 1999 
MASB 15 FRS 1162004 Property, Plant and Equipment 1 July 2000 
MASB 16 FRS 1312004 Financial Reporting of Interest on Joint 
Ventures 
1 July 2000 
MASB 17 FRS 2022004 General Insurance Business 1 July 2001 
MASB 18 FRS 2302004 Life Insurance Business 1 July 2001 
MASB 19 FRS 1102004 Events After the Balance Sheet Date 1 July 2001 
MASB 20 FRS 1372004 Provision, Contingent Liabilities and 
Contingent Assets 
1 July 2001 
MASB 21 FRS 1222004 Business Combinations 1 July 2001 
MASB 22 FRS 1142004 Segment Reporting 1 January 2002 
MASB 23 FRS 1362004 Impairment of Assets 1 January 2002 
MASB 24 FRS 1322004 Financial Instruments: Disclosure and 
Presentations 
1 January 2002 
MASB 25 FRS 1122004 Income Taxes 1 July 2002 
MASB 26 FRS 1342004 Interim Financial Reporting 1 July 2002 
MASB 27 FRS 1232004 Borrowing Costs 1 July 2002 
MASB 28 FRS 1352004 Discontinuing Operations 1 January 2003 
MASB 29 FRS 1192004 Employee Benefits 1 January 2003 
MASB 30 FRS 1262004 Accounting and Reporting by 
Retirement Benefit Plans 
1 January 2003 
MASB 31 FRS 1202004 Accounting for Government Grants and 
Disclosures of Government Assistance 
1 January 2004 
MASB i-1 FRS i-12004 Presentation of Financial Statements of 
Islamic Financial Institutions 
1 January 2003 
Source: Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
It is important to note that the change of name from MASB standards to FRS in 
2005 did not actually change the content of the standard. The real adoption of 
IFRS was made effective starting from January 1, 2006. There are a number of 
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adoption of IFRS, as summarised in Appendix 2. Although standards are named 
as FRS, as at January 2006 Malaysian FRS are almost word-for-word identical to 
the corresponding IFRS issued by the IASB, except for some standards that have 
not yet as at 31 December 2008 been made effective, namely IFRS 7 Financial 
Instruments: Disclosures and IFRS 8 Operating Segments.  
The Financial Reporting Standards (FRS) also include one Islamic accounting 
standard and four local standards, which deal with matters that are not covered 
under IFRS or IAS. 9 These standards have been developed particularly to cater 
for the Malaysian environment. The local standards are FRS 2012004 Property 
Development Activities, FRS 2022004 General Insurance Business, FRS 2032004 
Life Insurance Business, FRS 2042004 Accounting for Aquaculture. According to 
the Financial Reporting Act 1997, compliance with these FRS is mandatory. As 
stated in Section 26D of the Act: 
Where financial statements are required to be prepared or lodged 
under any law administered by the Securities Commission, the Central 
Bank or the Registrar of Companies, such financial statements shall be 
deemed not to have complied with the requirements of such law 
unless they have prepared and are kept in accordance with the 
approved accounting standards. (p. 18) 
Malaysian Accounting Standards Board (MASB) adopted IFRS and made the 
standards effective from 1 January 2006. Therefore, the earliest financial 
statements reported by Malaysian companies under the mandated IFRS are dated 
31 December 2006. Taking into account the adoption of IFRS, the MASB has 
                                               
9 FRS i-12004 Presentation of Financial Statements of Islamic Financial Institutions. 
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currently produced a total of 208 technical pronouncements, comprising 85 
Standards (including interpretations), 2 Forewords, 1 Framework, 2 SOPs, 5 
Technical Releases, 19 Translations and 94 Exposure Drafts for both private and 
non-private entities. Appendix 2 summarises the principal differences between 
IFRS and MASB that have had a significant impact on financial reports after the 
adoption of IFRS10.  
Table 3.4 
IFRS adoption in Malaysia as at 31 December 2008 
Standard Title Effective Date Status 
IFRS 1 First-time Adoption of FRS Reporting 
Standards 
1 January 2006 Enacted 
IFRS 2 Share-based Payment 1 January 2006 Enacted 
IFRS 3 Business Combinations 1 January 2006 Enacted 
IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts - Exposure Draft 
issued 
IFRS 5 Non-current Assets Held for Sale and 
Discontinued Operations 
1 January 2006 Enacted 
IFRS 6 Exploration for and Evaluation of Mineral 
Resources 
1 January 2007 Enacted 
IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures - Exposure Draft 
issued 
IFRS 8 Operating Segments - Exposure Draft 
issued 
Note: The numbering of the FRSs corresponds to the IFRSs issued by the IASB. For example, 
IASs. Thus FR
Standard with no equivalent International Standard.  
As reported in Table 3.4, FRS 4, FRS 7 and FRS 8 have still not been adopted by 
the MASB. The full merging with the International Financial Reporting Standards 
is scheduled for 1 January 2012.  
In short, the financial reporting framework in Malaysia has experienced 
                                               
10 The purpose of the table is to highlight the main changes in accounting standards after the 
adoption of IFRS. It is highly summarized and does not provide complete requirements of the 
standards. 
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significant changes since 1997. The introduction of FRA 1997 led to the 
establishment of the MASB, which resolved long-standing conflicts between the 
MIA and MICPA. Since its establishment, the MASB has played a vital role in 
setting accounting standards, including adoption of IAS standards and the 
introduction of local standards. Another very important event in the development 
of financial reporting in Malaysia is the adoption of IFRS starting from 1 January 
2006. 
3.4 Ownership Structure of Malaysian Firms 
Dispersed ownership is common in most developed countries, such as the United 
States and the United Kingdom, but in Malaysia firms are insider-dominated with 
highly-concentrated shareholdings. World Bank (1999), based on a study 
conducted in 1998 of Malaysian firms, shows that the five largest shareholders of 
the firms in the sample owned 60.4% of the outstanding shares and more than half 
of the voting shares. Some 67.2% of shares were in family hands, 37.4% had only 
one dominant shareholder and 13.4% were state-controlled. A similar finding was 
reported by Capulong, Edwards, Webb, and Zhuang (2001), where the largest 
shareholder still possessed an average 30.3% of outstanding shares among all 
listed firms in Malaysia in 1998, with the top five shareholders owning an average 
58.8%.  
The highly-concentrated shareholdings have evolved historically from family-
owned enterprises and foreign firms, mainly from the United Kingdom and other 
European countries, as a result of British colonisation (Abdul Rahman, 2006). 
Despite , the concentrated structure has 
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not been diluted (Tam & Tan, 2007). licy in 
the 1980s attracted many investments from Japanese corporations via joint-
ventures with local partners, and also resulted in concentrated ownership. 
Furthermore, the initial public offerings by family-controlled companies and the 
privatisation of key state enterprises also led to highly-concentrated 
shareholdings. 
In addition, the pyramidal ownership structure is a common feature of firms in 
Malaysia and other East Asia countries (Claessens, Djankov, & Lang, 2000). 
Several factors have led to use of this structure, including: (i) to minimise the 
controlling stakeholder stake, (ii) to maximise the dilution of outside 
shareholdings by a reduction in the ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights 
(Burkart, Gromb, & Panunzi, 1997); and (iii) to use as a means of limiting the 
liability of the controlling shareholder (Akoi, 1999).  
Figure 3.1 illustrates an example of pyramidal structure in a Malaysian firm. Johor 
Corporation, a wholly owned subsidiary of the State Government of Johor, owns 
53.22% of Kulim Berhad, who owned 59.58% of shares in QSR Berhad. QSR 
Berhad controls of KFC Holdings Berhad, through a 50.25% shareholding. As 
such, Johor Corporation has established control over KFC Berhad, through their 
control of Kulim Berhad and QSR Berhad, even with only 15.93% of cash flow 
rights. The reduction in the ratio of voting rights to cash flow rights in a pyramidal 
structure allows the holding firm, i.e. family firms and state-controlled firms, to 
establish control with minimal capital investment by maximizing the dilution of 
outside shareholdings.  
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Figure 3.1 
Pyramidal structure of a Malaysian firm (Johor Corporation) 
 
Source: Annual reports of relevant firms 
To provide greater understanding of the ownership structure of Malaysian listed 
firms, the following subsections outline the characteristics of family firms and 
state-controlled firms. 
3.4.1 Family Firms  
The dominance of family firms in the Malaysian economy, especially those 
owned by Chinese families, started well before the independence of Malaysia. A 
survey by the World Bank (1999) found that 85% of the firms surveyed had 
owner-managers and that the post of CEO, chairman of the board or vice 
Johor 
Corporation 
KPJ  Healthcare 
Bhd (50.37%) 
Kulim Bhd 
(53.22%) 
QSR Brand 
Berhad (59.58%)  
KFC  Holdings 
(Malaysia) Bhd 
(50.25%) 
Sindora Berhad 
(78.61%)  
Damansara  
Realty Berhad 
(31.74%) 
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chairman belonged to a member or nominee of the controlling family. Another 
study by Claessens et al. (2000) found that around 40% of 238 sample firms in 
Malaysia were closely held by a single large shareholder, i.e. a family. Further, a 
joint survey by Shamsir Jasani Grant Thornton and Malaysia Institute of 
Management (2002) indicated that most of the businesses in Malaysia were 
managed by their founder (59%), while 30% were managed by the second 
generation, the majority of whom were the children of the founder.  
Table 3.5  
Ownership of YTL Corporation and its holding company 
 
Panel A: List of Five Largest Shareholders in YTL Corporation Berhad 
Name of shareholders Shareholdings % 
Yeoh Tiong Lay & Sons Holdings Sdn Bhd 790,362,611 52.83 
Employees Provident Fund Board 181,914,264 12.16 
Skim Amanah Saham Bumiputera 43,420,000 2.90 
Fidelity Contrafund 20,877,500 1.40 
Amanah Saham Wawasan 2020 17,018,600 1.14 
Total 1,053,592,975  70.43 
 
Panel B: List of Substantial Shareholders of Yeoh Tiong Lay & Sons Holdings Sdn Bhd 
Name of shareholders Shareholdings % 
Yeoh Tiong Lay (Founder of YTL Group) 8,220,004 20.18 
Francis Yeoh Sock Ping (son CEO of YTL Group) 5,000,000 12.28 
Yeoh Seok Kian 5,000,000 12.28 
Yeoh Soo Min 1,250,000 3.07 
Yeoh Seok Hong  5,000,000 12.28 
Michael Yeoh Sock Siong 5,000,000 12.28 
Yeoh Soo Keng 1,250,000 3.07 
Mark Yeoh Seok Kah  5,000,000 12.28 
Total 35,720,004 87.72 
Source: Annual report (2008) of YTL Corporation Berhad 
The Yeoh family, the owner of one of the biggest conglomerates in Malaysia, is a 
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prime example of this.11 Yeoh Tiong Lay founded the YTL Corporation Berhad, 
together with other listed subsidiaries such as YTL Power International Berhad, 
YTL Cement Berhad, YTL Land and Development Berhad, YTL E-Solutions 
Bhd, and YTL Industries Berhad. Using a private holding company, Yeoh Tiong 
Lay & Sons Holdings Sdn Bhd, the Yeoh family owns and controls 52.83% of 
shares in YTL Corporation Berhad (as reported in Panel A Table 3.5). Panel B 
Table 3.5 reports that the Yeoh family owned 35,720,004 shares, equivalent to 
87.72% of shares, of the private holding company, Yeoh Tiong Lay & Sons 
Holdings Sdn Bhd. The details are reported in Panel B Table 3.5. 
The growth in the number of family firms in Bursa Malaysia also relates to a 
change in the Listing Requirements of Bursa Malaysia in 1998, in which the 
minimum paid-up ordinary share capital was reduced to not less than MYR 40 
million (Salleh, 2009). This change led to a substantial number of new listings of 
small firms, predominantly family firms.12  
3.4.2 State-Controlled Firms 
Economic Policy in 1969, with the aim of eradicating poverty and reducing social 
inequality. Among the impacts of the policy was a significant shift of ownership 
                                               
11 In December 2008, the group record a total market capitalisation of about MYR 36.4 billion. 
12 Bursa Malaysia rules: (1) the company is incorporated in Malaysia, (2) the paid-up ordinary 
share capital is not less than MYR 40 million, (3) at least 25%, but not more than 50%, of the 
paid-up capital is in the hands of a minimum of 500 public shareholders holding not less than 1000 
shares each, (4) the company has five consecutive years of after-tax profit of at least MYR 1 
million and an aggregate after-tax profit of not less than MYR 12 million over the same five years, 
and (5) the company complies with the corporate disclosure requirements and other rules and by-
laws of the Bursa Malaysia. 
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and control from foreign companies to local entities, e.g. Guthrie, Sime Darby and 
example of a massive affirmative strategy to regain control of Malaysian assets 
from British interests. On September 7, 1981, Permodalan Nasional Berhad 
(PNB) made a successful take-over of 50.41% of shares of Guthrie Corporation, 
which was listed on the London Stock Exchange. The successful 'Dawn Raid', as 
it was commonly termed by the London brokers, enabled PNB to control Guthrie 
Corporation, a large plantation company in Malaysia controlling more than 76,000 
hectares of rubber, oil palm and cocoa. 
In 1983, the Malaysian government announced a privatization policy with the 
objectives of relieving the financial and administrative burden of the government 
and reducing the size of the public sector. In addition, the policy aimed to increase 
competition, efficiency, productivity, and economic growth through private 
entrepreneurship and investments (see Economic Planning Unit Prime Minister's 
Department of Malaysia, 1985, 1991). The privatization strategy resulted in the 
incorporation and listing of numerous state-controlled listed firms such as Tenaga 
Nasional Berhad (the national power generator and distributor), Malaysian Airline 
System Berhad (the national airline), and Telekom Malaysia Berhad (the national 
telecommunications provider). Several methods of privatization were employed, 
but the most significant were . Table 3.6 presents 
examples of privatized state-owned enterprise through share issue privatization.  
Even though the shares of these listed firms are made available to the public for 
investment, the Malaysian government, through the Ministry of Finance and other 
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Government-Linked Investment Companies (GLICs), owns substantial amounts 
of the shares, especially in firms of public importance. For instance, in the utility, 
plantation, and financial sectors, privatised firms remain in government control. In 
contrast, the government disposed entirely of its holdings in certain business 
entities to private investors. For example, Sports Toto Malaysia Sdn Bhd, which 
ran Toto betting, was privatised in 1985 when its Chief Executive Officer, 
Vincent Tan Chee Yioun, acquired 70% of the paid-up capital through his private 
company. 
Table 3.6  
Share Issue Privatization in Malaysia (1983 1999) 
No Company Prospectus Date Listing Date 
1. Bina Darulaman Bhd 23 December 1995 2 February1996 
2. Cahya Mata Sarawak Bhd 22 December 1988 2 February 1989 
3. Carpets International Malaysia Bhd 10 June 1992 27 July 1992 
4. Cement Industry of Malaysia Bhd 7 May 1984 26 June 1984 
5. Edaran Otomobil Nasional 8 June 1990 26 July 1990 
6. Far East Holdings Bhd 22 December 1990 31 January 1991 
7. Johore Tenggara Oil Palm Bhd Privatised in 1994 15 August 1996 
8. Kedah Cement Holdings Bhd 9 December 1991 29 January 1992 
9. Kelang Container Terminal Bhd 25 September 1992 23 November 1992 
10. KPJ Healthcare Bhd 18 October 1994 29 November 1994 
11. Malaysia International. Shipping Corp. Bhd 29 December 1986 27 February 1987 
12. Malaysian Airline System Bhd 18 September 1985 16 December 1985 
13. Padiberas Nasional Berhad 12 January 1996 25 August 1997 
14. Pasdec Holdings Bhd 5 September 1997 27 October 1997 
15. Pernas International Hotels & Properties Bhd 8 August 1990 25 September 1990 
16. Perusahaan Otomobil Nasional Bhd 21 January 1992 26 March 1992 
17. Petronas Dagangan Berhad 20 January 1994 8 March 1994 
18. Petronas Gas Bhd 14 July 1995 4 September 1995 
19. SAP Holdings Bhd 30 September 1994 7 November 1994 
20. Sindora Berhad 24 October 1995 7 December 1995 
21. Sports Toto Malaysia Bhd 1 August 1985 Listed in 1987 
22. Tenaga Nasional Berhad 29 February 1992 28 May 1992 
23. Telekom Malaysia Berhad 26 September 1990 7 November 1990 
24. Tradewinds (M) Bhd 28 January 1988 23 March 1988 
Note: There are a total of 38 Share Issue Privatizations in Malaysia during 1983 1999 in Malaysia. 
Source: Sun, Qian, and H. S. Tong Wilson. 'Malaysia Privatization: A Comprehensive Study', 
Financial Management Vol. 31, No. 4, 79 105, 2002. 
In certain cases, the government holds golden shares, which enable the holder 
(government) to outvote or veto all other shares (World Bank, 1999). For 
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example, certain matters require the express consent of the holder of the share or it 
may confer special rights in the appointment of the board of directors (World 
Bank, 1999). As such, the government has a power to appoint board members and 
senior management, and to make major decisions such as contract awards and 
restructuring and divestments, though in most cases it is not the ultimate 
beneficial owner. 
Government has significant participation in the economy. It is exercised by 
holding equity in the private sector; in particular in state-controlled firms, which 
are also known as Government-Linked Companies (GLC). Though the number of 
state-controlled firms is relatively small, representing less than 10% of the firms 
listed on Bursa Malaysia, these firms account for approximately MYR 260 billion 
in market capitalisation, or approximately 36% of the Bursa Malaysia market 
capitalisation. Table 3.7 shows the statistics for state-controlled firms in Bursa 
Malaysia. 
Table 3.7 
Government-Linked Companies in Bursa Malaysia 
Variable Statistic 
No of Companies 57 
Market Capitalisation (MYR billion) 261 
% Bursa Malaysia Composite Index 54 
% of Bursa Malaysia 36 
No of Employees estimate  400 
source: Putrajaya committee, high performance GLC, handbook of 
transformation plan (as at 26 July 2005) 
Government control of public firms is achieved using various agencies and 
investment entities. Khazanah Nasional (Khazanah) is an investment holding arm 
of the Government of Malaysia and has investments in over 50 major firms 
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covering a broad spectrum of industries. Khazanah is responsible for driving 
shareholder value creation and enhancing corporate governance in firms 
controlled by the government. Apart from Khazanah, Petroliam Nasional 
(Petronas), a national and wholly-owned oil company, has also invested a 
substantial amount of capital in the equity market.  
The Malaysian capital market also has significant investments from other 
government agencies and fund managers, such as the Employees Provident Fund, 
Kumpulan Wang Persaraan, Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera, Lembaga 
Tabung Haji, and Permodalan Nasional Berhad. The Employees Provident Fund 
(EPF), for example, was established under the Employees Provident Fund Act 
1991 (Act 452) to provide retirement benefits for its members. Current ly, 
employees contribute 11% of their pay, while employers contribute 12% to the 
fund. Kumpulan Wang Persaraan is a fund providing retirement benefits 
specifically for the public sector. In addition, Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera 
(LTAT) is a superannuation scheme for serving members of the Armed Forces. 
For officers, participation is voluntary, but other ranks are required to contribute 
10% of their monthly salary to LTAT, while the government, as employer, 
contributes 15%.13 The LTAT fund has invested in several areas, including retail 
business and cash investments such as bonds, fixed deposits and equities. In 
addition, Boustead Holdings Berhad, a subsidiary of LTAT, is invested in various 
businesses including plantations, heavy industries, properties, finance, 
                                               
13 For officers, participation is voluntary and the contributions are a minimum of RM 25 with a 
maximum of RM750 monthly. 
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pharmaceuticals, manufacturing, and trading.14  
On 17 March 1978, the Malaysian government established the Permodalan 
Nasional Berhad (PNB) to encourage share ownership among Bumiputera.15 
Initially, PNB catered for only one ethnic group. The PNB mutual fund, Amanah 
Saham Nasional, for instance, was entirely for members of the bumiputera ethnic 
group. Subsequently, the PNB introduced other mutual funds such as Amanah 
Saham Wawasan 2020, Amanah Saham Malaysia, Amanah Saham 1Malaysia, 
and Amanah Saham Gemilang, in which all Malaysians are eligible to invest. 
Currently, the PNB investments involve more than 360 firms in Malaysia. In 
addition, the PNB has gained control of Malayan Banking Berhad, NCB Holdings 
Berhad, MNI Holdings Berhad, and Sime Darby Berhad.16  
The Lembaga Tabung Haji (or Future Pilgrims Fund Corporation) was set up in 
1963 to help the Malaysian Muslim community in performing Hajj (pilgrimage). 
Previously, pilgrims from rural areas sold their livestock or properties to cover 
their hajj (pilgrimage) expenses. The establishment of Lembaga Tabung Haji 
helps them to plan their savings for the pilgrimage, and provides pilgrimage 
management services. In 1969, the Pilgrimage Fund Management Board was 
established under the Pilgrimage Fund and Management Board Act 1969 (Act no 
8), which marked significant investment of Lembaga Tabung Haji in the 
                                               
14 
http://www.ltat.org.my/ 
15 Bumiputera means in Malay "sons of the soil". It refers to Malays and other indigenous people 
as distinct from Chinese, Indians, and other non-indigenous residents. 
16 S
http://www.pnb.com.my/index.cfm. 
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Malaysian capital market. Currently, Lembaga Tabung Haji controls two public 
listed firms: TH Plantations Berhad and Bank Islam Malaysia Berhad, which is 
involved in the business of oil palm plantations and Islamic banking 
respectively.17 
ValueCap and Social Security Organization (SOCSO) also invested funds in 
Bursa Malaysia. Khazanah Nasional Bhd, Permodalan Nasional Bhd, and 
Kumpulan Wang Persaraan equally own ValueCap, which invests heavily in high-
growth stocks. On the other hand, SOCSO was established in 1971 under the 
Employees' Social Security Act 1969 (Act 4) and is responsible for social security 
schemes, namely the Invalidity Pension Scheme and the Employment Injury 
Insurance Scheme. Through these schemes, SOCSO protects workers against 
industrial accident, including accidents that occur while working, occupational 
diseases, becoming an invalid, or death due to any cause. Workers contribute 
monthly to SOCSO, which then invests in various instruments including the 
equity market. 
Other than the federal government, Malaysia has thirteen state governments. 
Every state government has established a State Economic Development 
Corporation (SEDC), which acts as the investment holding arm of the State. For 
example, Johor Corporation, an investment arm for the Johor State Government, 
has significant investments in the Malaysian economy, with more than 280 
member companies. These include several listed firms (as shown in Figure 3.1) 
                                               
17 . Available for access at 
www.tabunghaji.gov.my 
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such as KPJ Healthcare Bhd, Kulim Bhd, Damansara Realty Bhd, QSR Brand 
Bhd, Sindora Bhd, and KFC Holdings Bhd. 
Table 3.8 shows how the government has established control of Malayan Banking 
Berhad (Maybank), one of the biggest financial institutions in Malaysia. The 
largest shareholder in Maybank is Skim Amanah Saham Bumiputera, a mutual 
fund under Permodalan Nasional Berhad (PNB), which owns 44.67% of shares. 
The Employees Provident Fund holds another 10.25% of shares. In addition, PNB 
itself holds 6.57% of shares, while Kumpulan Wang Persaraan, the pension fund 
for civil servants, holds another 2.55% of shares. Finally, a government agency 
involved in development of land, FELDA, owns 124 million shares in Maybank, 
bringing Malaysian government investment in Maybank to 65.89% of shares.  
Table 3.8  
Substantial shareholders of Malayan Banking Berhad 
Name of shareholders Shareholdings % 
Skim Amanah Saham Bumiputra 2,180,681,634 44.67 
Employees Provident Fund Board 500,281,336 10.25 
Permodalan Nasional Berhad 320,776,808 6.57 
Kumpulan Wang Persaraan (Diperbadankan) 137,195,625 2.55 
Lembaga Kemajuan Tanah Persekutuan (FELDA) 124,622,156 1.85 
Total 3,263,557,559 65.89  
Source: 2008 Annual report of Maybank Berhad 
In January 2005, the government established the Putrajaya Committee on GLC 
High Performance (PCG) to develop comprehensive national policies and 
guidelines to transform GLCs into high-performing entities. A report issued by 
PCG shows that the performance of GLCs is below the market average (PCG, 
2005). A substantial number of GLCs were also removed from the official list of 
Bursa Malaysia because of poor performance. Table 3.9 presents the summary of 
71 
 
GLCs that were delisted from Bursa Malaysia over the period 2005 to 2009. PCG 
is responsible for implementing and overseeing the implementation of these 
policies and guidelines to transform GLCs into high-performing firms. To 
improve the performance of GLCs, several restructuring strategies have been 
undertaken, including the merger of Kumpulan Guthrie Bhd, Sime Darby Bhd, 
Golden Hope Plantations Bhd, and the bulk of their subsidiaries. 
In terms of corporate governance, PCG has undertaken various initiatives to 
strengthen the governance of state-controlled firms. On 29 July 2005, PCG 
introdu
programme covers comprehensive aspects of firm management, including 
guidelines and programmes to enhance the effectiveness of the board of directors 
and reinforce strong corporate governance in state-controlled firms. Section 2 of 
the Green Book specifies corporate governance aspects such as board 
composition, separation of the roles of the Chairman and CEO, a cap on the 
and Board performance and many others. In addition, on 23 March 2006, to 
promote financial transparency fifteen GLCs made public their key performance 
indicators (KPI) and financial and operational targets in local newspapers (New 
Straits Times, 23 March 2006).   
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Table 3.9 
Summary of government-linked companies delisted from Bursa Malaysia 
No Company Main shareholders Delisting Date 
1. Pelangi Bhd Perbadanan Nasional Bhd (49.42%)  
Skim Amanah Saham Bumiputera (25.33%) 
15 August 2005  
2. Tractors Malaysia 
Holdings Bhd 
Sime Darby Bhd (71.74%) 
Employees Provident Fund Board (5.32%) 
24 February 2006 
3. MNI Holdings Bhd Skim Amanah Saham Bumiputera (66.56%)  
Employees Provident Fund Board (9.19%) 
Permodalan Nasional Bhd (7.68%) 
23 March 2006 
4. CIMB Bank Commerce Asset-Holding Bhd (61.37%) 
Commerce Asset-Holding Bhd (9.92%)  
6 April 2006 
 
5. Johan Ceramics Bhd Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera 
(59.92%) 
Lembaga Tabung Haji (11.92 %) 
13 April 2007 
6. UDA Holdings Bhd Khazanah Nasional Bhd (50.01%) 31 May 2007 
7. Island & Peninsular 
Bhd 
Permodalan Nasional Bhd (79.94%) 
(nominees) 
Permodalan Nasional Bhd (16.72%) 
13 July 2007  
 
8. Opus Group Bhd UEM World Bhd (62.37%) 19 October 2007 
9. Malaysian Industrial 
Development Finance 
Bhd 
Skim Amanah Saham Bumiputera (48.78%) 
Permodalan Nasional Bhd (20.17%) 
30 October 2007 
10. Sime UEP Properties 
Bhd 
Sime Darby Bhd (51.15%) 
Skim Amanah Saham Bumiputera (23.19%) 
Employees Provident Fund Board (8.04%) 
30 November 2007 
11. Sime Engineering 
Services Bhd 
Sime Darby Bhd (70.03%) 
Employees Provident Fund Board (6.21%) 
30 November 2007 
12. Mentakab Rubber 
Company (Malaya) 
Bhd 
Chermang Development (Malaya) Sdn. Bhd. 
(a subsidiary of Golden Hope) (57.17%) 
Golden Hope Plantations Bhd (12.75%) 
30 November 2007 
13. Kumpulan Guthrie 
Bhd 
Permodalan Nasional Bhd (54.29%) 
Skim Amanah Saham Bumiputera (10.43%) 
Employees Provident Fund Board (7.08%) 
30 November 2007 
14. Golden Hope 
Plantations Bhd 
Skim Amanah Saham Bumiputera (38.35%) 
Permodalan Nasional Bhd (13.28%) 
Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen (12.08%) 
Employees Provident Fund Board (5.91%) 
30 November 2007 
15. Guthrie Ropel Bhd Kumpulan Guthrie Bhd (57.85%) 30 November 2007 
16. Highlands and 
Lowlands Bhd 
Kumpulan Guthrie Bhd (Guthrie) (54.53%) 
Skim Amanah Saham Bumiputera (12.94%) 
FELDA (6.79%) 
30 November 2007 
17. Negara Properties Bhd Golden Hope Plantations Bhd (56.48%) 6 December 2007 
18. Boustead Properties 
Bhd 
Boustead Holdings Bhd (65.01%) 
Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera (8.60%) 
Employees Provident Fund Board (5.18%) 
8 August 2008 
 
19. Cement Industries of 
Malaysia Bhd 
UEM World Bhd (50.56%) 13 November 2008 
20. UEM Builders Bhd UEM World Bhd (51.70%) 
Lembaga Tabung Haji (5.56%) 
21 November 2008 
21. UEM World Bhd Khazanah Nasional Bhd (57.90%) 18 February 2009 
22. Vads Bhd Telekom Malaysia Bhd (64.77%) 19 February 2009 
Source:  Bloomberg business news retrieved from http://investing.businessweek.com, company 
announcement and annual report of listed firms retrieved from http://www.klse.com.my 
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3.5 Chapter Summary 
This chapter has focussed on issues pertaining to institutional reforms, including 
corporate governance and financial reporting, in Malaysia following the 1997 
economic crisis. This chapter provides a brief explanation of the 1997 financial 
crisis, and a discussion of institutional reforms, in particular corporate governance 
and financial reporting. Finally, the chapter describes the unique ownership 
structure of Malaysian firms, in particular, family ownership and state-control. 
The next chapter sets out the objectives of the research and develops the 
hypotheses to be tested. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
RESEARCH OBJECTIVES AND HYPOTHESES 
DEVELOPMENT 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter explains the research objectives and develops the hypotheses of the 
study. The next subsection, Section 4.2, describes the purpose of this research. 
The development of the hypotheses is presented in the four subsections of Section 
4.3. Section 4.3.1 discusses the hypothesis on the level of earnings conservatism 
after the reforms; Section 4.3.2 discusses the hypothesis on the effect of the 
adoption of IFRS on earnings conservatism; Section 4.3.3 reviews the hypothesis 
on the influence of ownership structure, i.e. family firms and state-controlled 
firms, on earnings conservatism; and Section 4.3.4 develops the hypothesis on the 
relationship between corporate governance and earnings conservatism. A 
summary of this chapter is provided in Section 4.4. 
4.2 The Proposed Research 
Figure 4.1 presents a diagrammatic representation of the relationship examined in 
the study. First, this study examines the level of earnings conservatism after the 
reforms of corporate governance and financial reporting in Malaysia. Second, this 
study examines whether the adoption of new accounting standards, IFRS, has had 
any significant impact on the level of earnings conservatism. Third, this study 
investigates the effect of ownership structure on earnings conservatism. Finally, 
the relationship between corporate governance and earnings conservatism is 
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examined, which covers three main aspects, namely: the characteristics of boards 
of directors; the characteristics of the audit committee; and the quality of external 
auditors.  
Figure 4.1  
Relationships Examined 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Hypotheses Development 
The development of the hypotheses of the study is presented in the following 
sections. 
Ownership structure (family, state-
controlled, widely-held firms) 
Corporate governance 
(characteristics of board of 
directors; audit committee and the 
quality of external auditor) 
Post institutional reforms period 
(2003-2008) 
Pre- and post- IFRS adoption 
Earnings conservatism 
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4.3.1 Earnings Conservatism Following Institutional Reforms 
Despite the importance of earnings conservatism, empirical studies examining this 
issue in Malaysia remain sparse. The most significant study was carried out by 
Ball et al. (2003), who examine earnings conservatism in four East Asian 
countries (Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Hong Kong). Using a sample of 
2,726 firm-year observations from 1984 to 1996, they find that the four East 
Asian countries have low levels of earnings conservatism, hence a low quality of 
financial reporting. From this finding, Ball et al. (2003) argue that incentives 
appear to dominate accounting standards as a determinant of financial reporting in 
Hong Kong, Malaysia, Singapore and Thailand. In terms of accounting standards, 
these countries were substantially influenced in the past by UK or US accounting 
standards, and continued to be influenced by the International Accounting 
Standards (IAS), which are per standards. However, weak 
institutional structures appear to provide little incentives to prepare financial 
reports which report earnings conservatively. 
Another study, by Bushman and Piotroski (2006), also includes Malaysian firms 
in its sample. To examine the effect of country-level institutions, including a 
on 
conservative accounting practices, Bushman and Piotroski (2006) examine a final 
sample of 86,927 observations drawn from 38 countries. Of the total sample, 
Malaysian firms contribute 2,348 firm-year observations from 1992 to 2001. 
Bushman and Piotroski find that of country-level institutions, those such as 
judicial systems, strong public enforcement aspects of securities law, and lower 
state involvement in the economy, significantly influenced the financial reporting 
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incentives for conservative accounting. From the results reported in Bushman and 
Piotroski (2006), Malaysian firms recognise bad news in a more timely fashion 
than they recognise good news, which is in conflict with Ball et al.
findings. However, while the study periods overlap, the Bushman and Piotroski  
(2006) study period extends to a later date which includes the early post reform 
years. 
To complement both studies, this study examines the current state of earnings 
conservatism following the institutional reforms discussed earlier in this study. 
The sample covers the period 2003 2008 and is thus different from Ball et al. 
(2003), who examine the period prior to the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and also 
later than Bushman and Piotroski (2006) whose sample extends only to the year 
2001. Importantly, the results from this study will give better insight as to whether 
the period following the institutional reforms exhibits the presence of earnings 
conservatism.  
This study predicts that earnings conservatism is a pervasive feature of Malaysian 
financial reporting following reforms to corporate governance and financial 
reporting. There are several reasons for this prediction.  
First, after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, there were major reforms in the 
institutional structure governing Malaysian firms, including matters relating to 
corporate governance, securities laws, and financial reporting. Amongst the 
initiatives were (1) the introduction of the Financial Reporting Act (1997) in 
1997; (2) the establishment of the Malaysian Accounting Standards Board 
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(MASB) in 1997; (3) the establishment of the Malaysian Institute of Corporate 
Governance (MICG) in March 1998; (4) amendments to the Securities Industry 
Act (1983) in September 2003; (5) revision of the Malaysian Code of Takeovers 
and Mergers in 1999; (6) the issuance the Malaysian Code on Corporate 
Governance (MCCG) in March 2000; (7) the establishment of the Minority 
Shareholder Watchdog Group (MSWG) in August 2000; (8) the amendment of 
the listing requirements of the Bursa Malaysia to enable full effect to be given to 
the MCCG in January 2001; (9) the launch of Capital Market Master Plan (CMP) 
by Securities Commission in February 2001; (10) the issuance of the Best Practice 
in Corporate Disclosure by Bursa Malaysia in August 2004; (11) the adoption of 
IFRS in January 2006; (12) the introduction of the Green Book (Initiative on 
Board Effectiveness) by the Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance 
(PCG) to guide GLC transformation and upgrade the effectiveness of GLC Boards 
in April 2006; and (13) the revision of MCCG in 2007. These concerted initiatives 
by the regulators were undertaken to enhance public confidence in the Malaysian 
capital market and to strengthen the protection of investors.  
Secondly, the period examined in this study is associated with high demand for 
conservative reporting due to several high-profile corporate scandals, which 
include the alleged failure of auditors to detect and persuade their clients to make 
timely recognition of economic losses. The high-profile corporate scandals in US 
firms such as Enron and WorldCom eroded investors  confidence in the securities 
markets and caused a credibility crisis in the accounting profession (Wall Street 
Journal, 2002 February 6). The share prices of the affected firms plummeted and 
this cost investors billions of dollars, hence exerting greater demand for earnings 
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conservatism. Evidence from Lobo and Zhou (2006) shows an increase in 
conservatism in US -
Oxley Act, a regulatory measure introduced after the Enron scandal. In the 
Malaysian context, the failure of local firms such as Perwaja Steel, Technology 
Resources Industries, and Malaysian Airlines System, to name but a few, also 
eroded the confidence of the public in financial statements and thus created a 
strong demand for reporting that was more conservative.  
From the above arguments, it is predicted that the period following the 
institutional reforms will exhibit earnings conservatism, as shown by the timelier 
recognition of bad news as opposed to good news. I conjecture that reforms in 
institutional structure, especially in corporate governance and financial reporting, 
create strong incentives for corporate managers, account preparers, auditors and 
investors to favour reporting earnings conservatively. The hypothesis is stated as 
follows (stated in the null form): 
H01: Ceteris paribus, accounting earnings reported after the 
institutional reforms incorporate bad news (negative returns) 
and good news (positive returns) in the same way. 
4.3.2 IFRS Adoption and Earnings Conservatism 
Malaysia adopted the International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) from 1 
January 2006 and the process is planned to reach full convergence by 1 January 
2012. Since the adoption of IFRS represents a profound change in Malaysian 
financial reporting, it is appropriate to investigate whether the adoption of IFRS 
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has had a significant impact on the quality of accounting information, i.e. earnings 
conservatism. 
The adoption of IFRS could be expected to affect earnings conservatism in many 
ways. First, under IFRS, conservatism is no longer a desirable quality of financial 
statements. Previously, the need for conservatism was often linked to reliable 
reporting of past events, consistent with stewardship and the feedback function of 
accounting. Over time, international accounting standards have become 
increasingly future-oriented: their decision making function has assumed greater 
and greater importance (IASB, 2010), while conservatism as a governing principle 
has slipped in significance (Hellman, 2008). In the IASB (2010) Conceptual 
Framework, prudence (conservatism), which was one of the aspects of reliability 
in Concepts Statement 2 or the Framework (IASC, 1989), is not considered as an 
aspect of faithful representation. Prudence (conservatism) was removed because it 
is inconsistent with neutrality. This is a changed view compared with the 
prevailing IASB framework, but the change is not surprising given the de-
emphasis of conservatism in a number of standards issued by the International 
Accounting Standards Committee (IASC) and the IASB during the past decades. 
Second, IFRS is increasingly permitting or requiring use of fair value accounting, 
while in the previous standards MASB employed principally historical cost 
accounting. On this basis, it is expected that the financial statements prepared 
under MASB standards could report more conservative earnings than those 
prepared under the IFRS standards. Historical cost accounting is associated with 
the concept of prudence, where appropriate provisions must be made for any 
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potential losses; while for gains, only gains that meet the recognition criteria can 
be recorded, otherwise they are deferred until they are realisable. As such, the 
value of an asset would be impaired when its market value has fallen 
significantly; but the asset  value cannot be appreciated when the market value is 
higher than the purchase price. However, certain exceptions, such as the 
revaluation of assets, are permissible in Malaysia, thus allowing an increase in the 
value of property, plant, and equipment. 
One example of the changes made by IFRS standards relates to accounting for 
goodwill (or, indeed, all indefinite life intangibles). Prior to IFRS, goodwill was 
normally capitalised and amortised over a number of years.18 In IFRS standards, 
no amortisation of goodwill is permissible. FRS 3 requires goodwill to be 
for impairment annually, or more frequently if events or changes in circumstances 
 This rule prevents excessive 
understatement of assets caused by goodwill amortisation, thereby reducing 
unconditional and overall conservatism. In contrast, the impairment testing rule 
ensures timely recognition of economic losses associated with goodwill, though it 
does not permit recognition of an increase in the value of goodwill. 
Contrary to the above arguments, several studies argue that changes in accounting 
standards would not affect earnings conservatism. LaFond and Watts (2008) find 
that information asymmetry is positively related to conservatism. From the 
finding, LaFond and Watts (2008) argue that ... if the FASB was successful in 
                                               
18 There is no specific standard on goodwill in Malaysia prior to IFRS. 
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meeting its stated goal of eliminating conservatism, then it would increase 
information asymmetry between investors, not reduce it. This outcome is 
inconsistent with the objectives of the Securities Acts  (p. 447). This argument is 
consistent with Watts  (2003a) explanation that conservatism arises not only from 
regulation, but also from contracting, litigation and taxation. Changes in one 
explanation may produce a minimal impact on overall earnings conservatism. 
Consistent with this argument, several studies find that accounting standards have 
no influence on earnings conservatism. Ball and Shivakumar (2005), for example, 
find public and private firms in the United Kingdom have different levels of 
earnings conservatism, though subjected to similar accounting standards. 
Furthermore, Ball et al. (2003) find low earnings conservatism in Malaysia, 
Singapore, Thailand, and Hong Kong, although these countries adopted 
International Accounting Standards which were considered to be high-quality 
accounting standards.  
This study aims to provide insight as to whether IFRS adoption has had any 
impact on earnings conservatism by resolving these conflicting arguments on the 
effect of accounting standards. To this end, this study tests the following 
hypothesis (stated in the null form): 
Ho2: Ceteris paribus, there is no significant difference in the 
earnings conservatism level between pre- and post-IFRS 
adoption periods. 
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4.3.3 Ownership Structure and Earnings Conservatism 
The third objective of this study is to examine whether earnings conservatism 
varies accross different types of ownership structure. In contrast to developed 
countries where firms are typically widely-held, the ownership structure of 
Malaysian firms is highly concentrated, with control of many firms vested in 
either a family or government. The following section discusses the influence of 
family firms and state-controlled firms on earnings conservatism. 
4.3.3.1 Family Firms and Earnings Conservatism  
The relationship between family influence and earnings conservatism is closely 
related to the management entrenchment hypothesis and the convergence-of-
interest hypothesis (Morck, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1988). The two hypotheses offer 
different predictions on the impact of owner-manager ownership of shares on 
agency conflicts, and expectations about firm financial performance and corporate 
reporting behaviour. 
The management entrenchment hypothesis holds that higher levels of owner-
manager ownership lead to entrenchment of management (Fan & Wong, 2002; 
Morck, et al., 1988). The controlling shareholder, who has sufficient control over 
the board of directors, would pursue his own objectives without fear of 
disciplinary actions from other ownership interests; hence greater agency conflict 
between the controlling owner and minority shareholders (also known as Type II 
agency costs) is generated. That is, controlling shareholders are more likely to 
make decisions that maximise their wealth through expropriation of minority 
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shareholders (Fan & Wong, 2002). In term of earnings  reporting, the controlling 
shareholder has greater incentives to report earnings aggressively, as a means of 
channelling out the firm  wealth, i.e. via dividends, at the expense of other 
suppliers of funds.  
The convergence-of-interest hypothesis posits that agency conflicts (Type I) 
decrease as an owner-
investors also perceive that managers have greater incentive to maximise firm 
value when their shareholding is high (Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2004; Fan & 
Wong, 2002). A higher level of owner-manager ownership stake in the firm 
results in lesser divergence of interests, and therefore monitoring is less necessary 
(Menon & Williams, 1994). In short, convergence of interest between the owner-
manager and outside investors occurs (Feldmann & Schwarzkopf, 2003).  
With regard to this study, it is predicted that that the convergence-of-interest 
hypothesis provides better grounds for predicting the relationship between family 
firms and earnings conservatism. The prediction is based on several premises. 
First, the interests of managers, who are members of the controlling family, are 
more aligned to the interests of the shareholders (Wang, 2006). For instance, they 
would forgo short-term benefits from manipulating earnings that can damage the 
firm  reputation (Wang, 2006), thereby alleviating agency costs. It is suggested 
that managers in family firms are also less likely to delay the recognition of bad 
news because this could damage the firm  long-term performance, the family 
consistent with several 
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studies that find family firms produce higher quality earnings than widely-held 
firms (Ali, Chen, & Radhakrishnan, 2007; Claessens, et al., 2000; Wang, 2006). 
Second, managers in family firms have less incentive to report earnings 
aggressively because their compensation plan is not closely tied to reported 
earnings (Chen, 2005). In general, management compensation plans may trigger 
managers to performing aggressive reporting to maximise their benefits (Gaver, 
Gaver, & Austin, 1995; Guidry, Leone, & Rock, 1999; Healy, 1985), but this 
phenomenon is less prominent in family firms. With regards to family firms, the 
close relationship between managers and the controlling family leads to manager 
compensation that is less sensitive to changes in reported earnings because 
manager performance is more directly observable by the family (Brunello, 
Graziano, & Parigi, 2003; Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006). In addition, the 
appointment of managers in family firms is based on kinship ties; and in the area 
of employer-employee relationships, paternalism and unconditional loyalty take 
precedence over merit, experience, and educational qualifications (Yen, et al., 
2007). These factors provide less incentive for managers to manipulate earnings 
or delay the recognition of bad news.  
Third, I conjecture that family firms will report earnings conservatively to attract 
other investors and to maintain good relationships with lenders. Given that 
founders of family firms are long-term shareholders who view the firm as an asset 
to be passed along to heirs (Casson, 1999), they are less likely to issue new shares, 
since it might dilute their control. To finance new projects, family firms have to 
rely on banks or lenders as a source of capital. Thus, it is critical to have a good 
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long-term relationship with these parties. Based on this argument, I expect family 
firms would report earnings conservatively as demanded by the debtholders. 
Finally, large shareholdings in family firms leads to greater monitoring of 
managers by family members (Demsetz & Lehn, 1985; Villalonga & Amit, 2006), 
hence reducing the likelihood of aggressive reporting. Given that the controlling 
family has a long investment horizon (Anderson & Reeb, 2003a), this helps 
mitigate myopic investment decisions by managers (James, 1999). The longer 
investment horizon of the controlling family (Anderson, Mansi, & Reeb, 2003; 
Miller & Le Breton-Miller, 2006) drives managers to pursue positive net present 
value projects even if doing so reduces short-term earnings. Given that the 
controlling shareholder has a long experience with the firm, they acquire firm-
specific knowledge and industry-specific knowledge that enhances their 
monitoring effectiveness, especially in restraining opportunistic reporting by 
managers.  
My prediction is also consistent with evidence from empirical studies of family 
firms and their earnings quality. For instance, Wang (2006) finds that family firms 
report better-quality earnings in terms of lower absolute abnormal accruals, a 
larger earnings response coefficient and less persistence of transitory loss 
components in earnings. Further, Ali, Chen, and Radhakrishnan (2007) find that 
family firms have higher earnings response coefficients, lower discretionary 
accruals, greater predictability of cash flows, and provide more voluntary 
disclosure of bad news. There are also studies that have opposite findings. Fan 
and Wong (2002), who examine 977 companies in seven East Asian countries, 
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find that concentrated ownership and the associated pyramidal and cross holding 
structures create agency conflicts between controlling owners and outside 
investors, and are hence associated with low earnings informativeness. 
Furthemore, Francis et al. (2005) predict and find that earnings are generally less 
informative, and dividends are at least as (if not more) informative for dual class 
firms (from with two classes of stock with equal cash flow rights but different 
voting rights).  
In sum, based on the theoretical arguments and empirical evidence, it is predicted 
that family firms have greater incentives to report earnings conservatively. The 
hypothesis is stated as follows (stated in the null form): 
H03a: Ceteris paribus, in family firms, accounting earnings 
incorporate bad news and good news in the same way. 
4.3.3.2 State-Controlled Firms and Earnings Conservatism 
In this section, I conjecture that state-controlled firms have unique incentives and 
demand for conservative reporting of earnings compared to both family firms and 
widely-held firms. 
First, it is posited that state-controlled firms have poor monitoring mechanisms to 
curb aggressive earnings reporting. Compared to family firms and widely-held 
firms, the board of directors in state-controlled firms can be considered as weak 
and ineffective since the directors tend to be appointed from the set of persons 
who have a close relationship to the governing political party or who have served 
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as senior government officers. For example, in Sime Darby Berhad, a state-
controlled firm, six out of the twelve directors have political connections or have 
served as senior government officers. The detailed profiles are reported in Table 
4.1. Since the directors lack business experience, the board becomes ineffective 
and unable to monitor managers, especially when the business  operations are 
complex and diversified. Anecdotal evidence shows that state-controlled firms 
underperformed the broader Malaysian market in respect of all key financial 
indicators except for firm size (PCG, 2005). Recently, Sime Darby Berhad, 
Malaysia's second largest company by market value, lost MYR 964 million (US$ 
296m/EUR 240m) on four projects because of poor management decisions and 
control19. This shows poor performance by directors in overseeing the business 
operation; and this is exacerbated when the firm size is large and the firm has 
diversified business operations. 
Second, managers of state-controlled firms have a greater tendency to report 
aggressive earnings as a compensation maximisation strategy. Unlike in family 
firms, managers in state-controlled firms have greater incentives to delay the 
recognition of bad news to achieve higher reported earnings since their annual 
compensation is tied to the firm s financial performance. However, the difference 
in behaviour from other firms may not be significant. Anecdotal evidence shows 
that high-performance managers of state-controlled firms have greater 
opportunities for career development. For example, Tan Sri Amirsham Abdul 
                                               
19 Source: The Star Online News Portal (a Press company in Malaysia) 
http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2010/5/21/business/6307079&sec=business 
retrieved on 30 May 2010. 
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Aziz, a former CEO of Malayan Banking Berhad, was appointed as the Minister 
in charge of the Economic Planning Unit on March 18, 2008, while Dato' Sri Idris 
Jala, a former CEO of Malaysian Airlines System Berhad, was also appointed as a 
minister without portfolio in the Prime Minister's Department and the CEO of the 
Performance Management and Delivery Unit. Great opportunities for job 
promotion in state-controlled firms, including being appointed to a ministerial 
position, gives managers incentives to report higher reported earnings, in 
particular by delaying the recognition of bad news and accelerating the 
recognition of good news. 
Third, state-controlled firms have complex ownership structures and more severe 
agency problems may occur (Shleifer & Vishny, 1994) than in other firms. This 
prediction is based on the nature of GLCs, where the principal-agent relationship 
is broken down into two other agency relationships since the government acts 
simultaneously as the principal and agent. In relation to the managers of a 
government-owned company, the government is a principal, thus it must assign 
goals (Rodriguez, Espejo, & Cabrera, 2007). The government is also the agent in 
its relationship with the public, the ultimate owners of the resources invested in by 
the government-owned company (Ernst, 2004). It is thus posited that the boards of 
directors of state-controlled firms are weak and ineffective compared to family 
firms and widely-held firms because board members are appointed by and 
accountable to the government, which is also the agent for the public. Since the 
government and the board of directors are also the agent, they themselves have 
private incentives.  
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(1957) model of government, in the decision-making 
process government considers not only the interests of the public as voters, but 
also the plans or agendas of the opposition parties that compete for votes. 
Therefore, the government wants to control or monitor managers and managerial 
decisions so that the decisions are in line with its political interests.  
From the above arguments, it is posited that the managers and directors of state-
controlled firms have incentives to opportunistically report higher earnings, 
achieved by delaying the recognition of bad news. This study tests the following 
hypothesis, stated in the null form: 
H03b: Ceteris paribus, in state-controlled firms, accounting earnings 
incorporate bad news and good news in the same way. 
4.3.4 Corporate Governance and Earnings Conservatism 
Corporate governance has a crucial role in monitoring and controlling the 
behaviour of senior managers and protecting the interests of different parties in 
the firm (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 1983). Strong corporate governance is able 
to: (i) promote financial statement transparency; (ii) reduce accounting 
manipulation; (iii) limit the ability of managers to conceal bad news for a long 
period; (iv) enhance greater independence of the committees destined to monitor 
management; and (v) provide strong support to the expected bias of the auditor 
towards conservative reporting (García Lara, et al., 2007). 
It is posited that strong corporate governance has a significant role in enhancing 
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earnings conservatism. This assertion is made on the basis of several premises, as 
discussed below. 
First, a strong board of directors demands higher earnings conservatism because it 
provides an early warning signal, which triggers a prompt investigation of the 
origin of bad news (García Lara, et al., 2007). Earnings conservatism is a 
mechanism that facilitates good governance, in that it ensures that assets are 
invested and used efficiently and prevents the inappropriate distribution of assets 
to managers or other parties. Timely recognition of bad news, for example, 
prevents managers from hiding less favourable information, thereby reducing the 
agency costs of the monitoring of contracts. For this reason firms with good 
corporate governance opt for high earnings conservatism. 
Second, strong boards will force greater conservatism in order to reduce agency 
costs arising from asymmetric information between managers and other parties 
related to the firm, asymmetric payoff and limited liability (Watts, 2003a). In 
addition, stronger boards are likely to demand more conservative accounting since 
they are more proficient at efficient contracting and understand the benefits of 
conservatism (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007). Consistent with this argument, García 
Lara et al. (2007) find that firms with a strong board, where the CEO has limited 
influence over the functioning of the board, exhibit a greater degree of earnings 
conservatism. 
Third, conservative reporting of earnings in the financial statements helps the 
board of directors in evaluating managers  strategies. 
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Conservatism ensures any decrease in the future cash flow from a negative NPV 
investment is reported in a timely fashion, thus allowing immediate corrective 
measures to be made by the board of directors. Furthermore, conservatism is an 
essential 
reducing deadweight losses and moderating other sources of information, thereby 
increasing firm and equity values (Watts, 2003a). 
Finally, conservatism reduces the litigation risk to the auditor and board of 
directors. Since the shareholders and debtholders prefer a downward bias in 
earnings in order to constrain management from aggressive accounting, directors 
and auditors reduce the litigation risk when exerting greater earnings 
conservatism. Furthemore, courts are more likely to award damages for overstated 
earnings or assets (Kellogg, 1984). Thus, firms with strong corporate governance 
would demand greater earnings conservatism. 
In short, firms with good corporate governance will favour earnings conservatism. 
This is triggered by the roles and benefits of earnings conservatism, the demand of 
providers of funds to constrain aggressive accounting choices and practices, and 
the need of directors and auditors to reduce litigation risk. Based on the above 
arguments, A positive association is predicted between strong corporate 
governance and earnings conservatism. Thus, the fourth hypothesis is set as 
follows (stated in the null form): 
H04: Ceteris paribus, the degree of earnings conservatism is not 
related to the quality of corporate governance. 
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4.4 Conclusions 
This chapter has discussed the research objectives of the study and the 
development of four hypotheses. The first hypothesis tests whether bad news is 
recognised in earnings in a more timely fashion than is good news, following the 
institutional reforms. The second hypothesis tests whether there is a significant 
change in earnings conservatism as a result of IFRS adoption. The third 
hypothesis tests whether earnings conservatism varies according to ownership 
structure, in particular, family firms and state-controlled firms. The final 
hypothesis tests the relationship between corporate governance and earnings 
conservatism.  
The next chapter describes the research design and method, the sample used for 
the study, measurement of conservatism and other relevant variables, and the 
regression models to test the hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
5.1 Introduction 
The present chapter concentrates on the research design and research method. 
Section 5.2 discusses the sample selection process. The measure for earnings 
conservatism is discussed in Section 5.3. Section 5.4 describes the process used 
for classifying the financial statements into pre- and post-IFRS periods. The 
measures of ownership structure are outlined in Section 5.5. Section 5.6 explains 
the measures for corporate governance. Section 5.7 describes the regression 
models used in this study, while Section 5.8 discusses the robustness tests 
employed in the analyses. The chapter concludes with Section 5.9. 
5.2 Sample Selection and Data Collection 
This study examines earnings conservatism issues in Malaysian listed firms 
following the institutional reforms discussed in Chapter 3. Basically this study 
focuses on a sample from 2003 to 2008, but the calculation of certain variables 
such as earnings yield and stock returns requires one-year lag data. Figure 5.1 
presents the statistics for listed firms in Bursa Malaysia from 2002 to 2008.  
The sample selection process involves a number of steps. First, I identified all 
firms listed on Bursa Malaysia as at 31 December 2008. From the Worldscope 
database, I found a total of 977 listed firms as at that date. Second, I identified 
newly-listed firms from the years 2002 to 2008. These 349 firms were then 
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excluded from the sample. Third, I excluded 37 firms listed in the financial sector 
in Bursa Malaysia. Fourth, I excluded 36 inactive firms, including all firms 
suspended from trading. Finally, I excluded 34 firms with missing and incomplete 
data. This process results in a final sample of 521 firms for the six-year period. 
The sample selection process is summarised in Table 5.1.  
Figure 5.1 
Malaysian listed firms (2002 2008) 
 
Source: Bursa Malaysia 
Table 5.1  
Sample selection process 
Selection criteria Number 
Initial sample (as at 31 December 2008) 977  
Excludes: 
(i) Newly listed firms (2002 to 2008) (349) 
(ii) Financial sector (37) 
(iii) Inactive/suspended from trading (36) 
(iv) Missing and incomplete data (34) 
Final sample (per year) 521  
Total firm-year observations (521 firms x 6 years) 3,126 
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Table 5.2 
List of variables, sources and definitions 
Variable Symbol Source Definition/Formula 
Total assets TASSETS Worldscope Total current assets and noncurrent 
assets. 
Total liabilities TLIAB Worldscope Total short and long term liabilities. 
Earnings before 
interest and taxes 
EBIT Worldscope The earnings of a firm before interest 
expense and income taxes.  
Stock price PRICE Worldscope The closing price of the security. 
Earnings per share EPS Worldscope Earnings per share earnings as reported 
by the firms. 
Cash flow from 
operations 
CFO Worldscope The net cash receipts and 
disbursements resulting from the 
operations of the firm. 
Industry 
classification 
INDUSTRY Bursa 
Malaysia 
Dummy variables for industry, 
including construction, consumer 
product, hotel, IPC, industrial product, 
plantation, property, technology, and 
trading/services. 
Board size #BODSIZE Annual Report Total number of directors in the board 
of directors at financial year end. 
Non-executive 
directors 
#NONEXEC Annual Report Total number of non-executive 
directors at financial year end. 
Independent 
directors 
#BODINDP Annual Report Total number of independent directors 
at financial year end. 
Independent 
chairman 
INDCHRM Annual Report Dummy variable that takes value 1 if 
the chairman of board of directors is a 
non-executive independent director, 
otherwise 0. 
Board meeting #BODMEET Annual Report Total number of meetings held by the 
board of directors for the financial year. 
Audit committee 
size 
#ACSIZE Annual Report Total number of directors in the audit 
committee as at financial year end. 
Audit committee 
independence 
#ACINDP Annual Report Total number of independent directors 
on the audit committee. 
Audit committee 
financial expertise 
#ACEXPERT Annual Report Total number of directors in audit 
committee that have accounting or 
finance degree or professional 
qualification, or members of accounting 
professional bodies, or have experience 
working as chief financial officer. 
Audit committee 
meeting 
#ACMEET Annual Report Total number of meetings held by audit 
committee for the financial year. 
Size of Audit Firm BIG4 Annual Report Dummy variable that takes value 1 if 
the firms audited by Big Four auditors, 
otherwise 0. 
Number of Family 
Directors on 
Board of Directors 
FAMDIR Annual Report Total number of directors with family 
relationship with each other and/or 
major shareholders of the company. 
Family Ownership FAMOWN Annual Report Total percentage of shares owned by 
the controlling family. 
Government 
Ownership 
GOVOWN Annual Report Total percentage of shares owned by 
GLCs and GLICs. 
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For the data collection process, I extracted data from two sources: Worldscope 
electronic database and corporate reports.20 Firstly, I identified all variables 
required, as summarised in Table 5.2, and then performed a search in Worldscope. 
From the search, I found that financial and stock price data are downloadable 
from Worldscope, while corporate governance and ownership data are not 
available. As a solution, I downloaded 3,126 corporate reports from Bursa 
Malaysia website for all 521 firms for the six-year period. I then hand collected 
the corporate governance and ownership data from corporate reports. Description 
of the variables collected for this study are summarised in Table 5.2. 
For industry classification, I classified the industry based on Bursa Malaysia  
industry classification. I collected this information from Bursa Malaysia  official 
website. In addition, I also gathered information from various businesses  and 
organisations  websites, including the Khazanah Nasional and State Economic 
Development Corporation corporate websites. 
5.3 Measure of Earnings Conservatism 
Following the research design of Basu (1997), I use the asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings model as the primary measure for earnings conservatism. This measure 
has been widely used in many studies, for example Ball et al. (2000), Ball et al. 
(2003), Ball and Shivakumar (2005), Bushman and Piotroski (2006), Francis et al. 
(2004) and Roychowdury and Watts (2007). In this model, conservatism is 
                                               
20 
website 
(http://www.bursamalaysia.com/website/bm/listed_companies/company_announcements/annual_r
eports/index.jsp)  
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defined as the extent to which current period accounting earnings asymmetrically 
incorporate economic losses relative to economic gain. Stock return is used as a 
proxy for economic income as it is assumed that stock prices reflect all available 
information, consistent with the evidence that stock prices lead earnings 
information (Ball & Brown, 1968; Beaver, Lambert, & Morse, 1980; Kothari & 
Sloan, 1992). Following Ball, et al. (2000), Ball, et al. (2003), Bushman and 
Piotroski (2006), and Grambovas, et al. (2006), I use fiscal year return as a proxy 
for economic news. Accounting earnings imposes different verification standards 
for recognition of different types of economic news. For bad news (negative stock 
returns), lower verification standards are used, which results in the immediate 
recognition of losses. However, for good news (positive stock return), higher 
verification standards are imposed for gains to be recognised in accounting 
earnings. This approach results in a stronger positive association between bad 
news and earnings, which suggests the timelier reporting of bad news relative to 
that of good news. 
Following Basu (1997), I estimate a linear regression of accounting earnings on 
stock returns as follows: 
Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it (5.1) 
where Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in 
fiscal year t; RDit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 
otherwise; and it is the error term. 
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In equation (5.1), 1 measures the response of earnings to returns when returns are 
positive, and 1 + 3 measures the response of earnings to negative returns. If 
1+ 3> 1 or 3>0 then earnings reflect bad news more quickly than they reflect 
good news, that is, earnings conservatism. 
5.4 Classification For Pre- and Post-IFRS Adoption 
Since this study aims to compare earnings conservatism before and after adoption 
of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS), it is crucial to determine 
the cut-off point for the date of IFRS adoption. The IFRS became effective and 
mandatory in Malaysia starting from 1 January 2006; hence the earliest published 
annual reports using these standards are financial statements dated 31 December 
2006. Table 5.3 presents the breakdown of the observations based on the 
accounting standards. 
Table 5.3  
IFRS adoption and period classification 
Year Financial Year End N IFRS Period 
2004 
1 January 2004 to 
30 December 2004 
227  
 
31 December 2004 294  
Two-year prior to IFRS adoption 
2005 
1 January 2005 to 
30 December 2005 
227  
31 December 2005 294  
One-year prior to IFRS adoption 
2006 
1 January 2006 to 
30 December 2006 
227  
31 December 2006 294  
First year of IFRS adoption 
2007 
1 January 2007 to 
30 December 2007 
227  
31 December 2007 294  
Second year of IFRS adoption 
2008 
1 January 2008 to 
30 December 2008 
227  
31 December 2008 294   
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I compare earnings conservatism for the short-horizon periods of one year and 
two years before and after IFRS adoption. For the main analysis, I examine two 
samples: (i) 1,042 firm-year observations for one year pre- and post-IFRS 
adoption for all firms; and (ii) 2,084 firm-year observations for two year pre- and 
post-IFRS adoption for all firms. I also conducted additional tests by limiting the 
sample to firms with a financial year end dated 31 December, which involve a 
sample of (i) 588 firm-year observations for one year pre- and post-IFRS 
adoption; and (ii) 1,176 firm-year observations for two year pre- and post-
adoption of IFRS. 
5.5 Measurement of Ownership Structure  
Previous studies refer to ownership structure as the distribution of equity and also 
the identity of the equity owners (Claessens, et al., 2000; Francis, Schipper, & 
Vincent, 2005; Wang, 2006). Most of the studies of ownership structure focus on 
immediate ownership, such as equity directly owned by individuals or institutions. 
However, Fan and Wong (2002) argue that immediate ownership is not sufficient 
for characterising the ownership and control structure of East Asian firms, as 
these firms are generally associated with complicated indirect ownership. This 
study therefore focuses on ultimate ownership. I used data from various sources, 
including annual reports, corporate websites, and business magazines to identify 
the ultimate owners of Malaysian listed firms.  
Following La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), I defined an ultimate 
owner as the shareholder who has the determining voting rights of the firm and 
who is not controlled by anybody else. This definition suits the pyramidal 
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ownership structure which is a common feature of firms in Malaysia and other 
East Asia countries (Claessens, et al., 2000). If a firm does not have an ultimate 
owner, it is classified as widely held. For firms with an ultimate owner, I divide 
those firms into family or state-controlled firms 
Identification of state-controlled firms was made on the basis of two sources. 
First, I used the list of firms announced by the Putrajaya Committee on GLC High 
Performance as being government-linked companies (GLCs), or their subsidiaries 
or affiliates, or government-linked investment companies (GLICs). This list 
includes firms in which the Federal Government of Malaysia has a direct or 
indirect controlling stake.21 This definition includes subsidiaries and affiliates of 
GLCs or GLICs.22 Second, I broadened the scope of state-controlled firms to 
include firms which are under direct or indirect control of any of the thirteen State 
Governments.23 For instance, Kumpulan Perangsang Selangor Berhad is a firm 
over which the State Government of Selangor has direct control; hence I classified 
this firm as a state-controlled firm. In Section 3.5.2, I discussed various examples 
of state-controlled firms, including firms which are controlled by state 
governments. 
I followed Jaggi et al. (2009), Ho and Wong (2001) and Anderson and Reeb 
                                               
21 irect controlling stake  
to appoint board members, senior management and make strategic decisions (e.g. award contract, 
strategy, restructuring and financing, acquisitions and divestments etc.). 
22 There are seven GLICs in Malaysia, namely Employees Provident Fund, Khazanah Nasional 
Bhd, Kumpulan Wang Amanah Pencen, Lembaga Tabung Angkatan Tentera, Lembaga Tabung 
Haji, Menteri Kewangan Diperbadankan, and Permodalan Nasional Bhd. 
23 Apart from the federal government, Malaysia has thirteen state governments: Perlis, Kedah, 
Pulau Pinang, Perak, Selangor, Melaka, Negeri Sembilan, Johor, Pahang, Terengganu, Kelantan, 
Sabah, and Sarawak. 
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(2003b), where family firms were indentified based on the presence of family 
members on the board of directors. If two or more members of the controlling 
family are present on the board, the firm would be classified as a family firm.24 A 
family relationship includes: father/mother, son/daughter, husband and wife, 
father/mother-in-law, son/daughter-in-law, brothers and sisters, nieces and 
nephews. However, I noticed one weakness when using this definition of family 
firms in relation to Malaysia. Certain firms in Malaysia have only one member of 
the controlling family sitting on the board of directors. Genting Berhad, for 
example, is a business controlled by the family of the late Lim Goh Tong through 
a private firm (Kien Huat Realty Sdn Berhad). His son, Lim Kok Thay, is the only 
member of Li on the board of directors, but he also acts as the CEO 
and Chairman of the board. To reduce the classification bias, I also classified a 
firm as a family firm when a member of the controlling family (largest 
shareholder) holds the top executive position, either chief executive officer, 
managing director, president, or chairman of the board of directors.  
5.6 Measurement of Corporate Governance 
Corporate governance encompasses the various mechanisms available to constrain 
the opportunistic behaviour of management and, consequently, results in more 
credible and relevant accounting information for users. Extending previous studies 
(for example Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; Beekes, et al., 2004; García Lara, et al., 
                                               
24 s with other 
directors and major shareholders that were disclosed in the 
annual reports. This information was publicly available since Bursa Malaysia requires all public 
firms to disclose the profile of all directors, including their family relationship with other directors 
and major shareholders.  
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2007, 2009), I used various aspects of corporate governance including the board 
of directors, audit committee, and external auditor as indicators of corporate 
governance quality. Gompers, Ishii, and Metrick (2003) and Davila and Penalva 
(2006) argue that the use of indexes which aggregate several governance measures 
allow better classification of firms in accordance with the strength of their 
governance. This is consistent with the concept of corporate governance as a set 
of mechanisms that work together. 
Following the approach of García Lara et al. (2007), who developed Gov6 and 
Gov8 scores from six and eight corporate governance variables respectively, I 
constructed a corporate governance index (CGINDEX) by using an unweighted 
aggregate of measurement on 11 corporate governance variables. In addition, I 
categorised the observations into three groups: (i) good governance sample (if 
CGINDEX is in the top third of the pooled sample), (ii) poor governance sample 
(if CGINDEX is in the bottom third of the pooled sample), and (iii) average 
governance sample (if CGINDEX is in the middle group of the pooled sample). 
The use of a broader set of variables enables each variable to complement the 
others and provide a better means to discriminate between strong and weak 
governance structures (García Lara, et al., 2007). The corporate governance 
variables employed in this study are as follows: 
(i) Board Size 
Board size is an important mechanism in ensuring board effectiveness. Prior 
studies, for example Yermack (1996), Conyon and Peck (1998), and 
105 
 
Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells (1998), suggest that larger boards negatively 
impact on firm value and performance. In a report about corporate governance 
issued by the Finance Committee on Corporate Governance (FCCG) in 1999, 
Malaysian listed firms are reported to have an average of eight directors 
(Finance Committee on Corporate Governance, 1999). The Malaysian Code of 
Corporate Governance (2000, 2007) made no recommendation in respect to 
board size, but the Code suggests that every board should examine its size, 
with a view to determining the impact of the number of directors upon 
effectiveness. Jensen (1993) suggests that the optimal board size is between 
seven and eight members. 
However, a recent study by Coles, Daniel, and Naveen (2008) argues that 
board size is a more complicated issue and find that the relationship between 
-shaped. Furthermore, Linck, Netter, and Yang 
(2008) find that firms choose board structure on the basis of the costs and 
benefits of monitoring and advising. Nevertheless, this study has followed 
(1993) recommendation. I use eight as the optimal point for board 
size. Thus, BODSIZE takes the value of 1 (good governance) if the number of 
directors is eight or fewer; 0 otherwise.  
(ii) Non-Executive Directors 
The role of non-executive directors may be crucial for the resolution of agency 
problems between managers and shareholders (Fama, 1980; Fama & Jensen, 
1983). Having a high proportion of non-executive directors on the board is 
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linked to a lower influence by the CEO and other executive directors. The 
careers of executive directors are primarily related to allegiance to the CEO, 
but non-executive directors include independent directors and other directors 
representing institutional investors. Thus, the presence of non-executive 
directors may be vital to enforcing strong monitoring of managers (Beekes, et 
al., 2004). The Cadbury Committee (1992) suggests that there should be at 
least three non-executive directors on the board, of which a majority should be 
independent. On the other hand, the Hampel Committee (1998) on corporate 
governance was of the opinion that if non-executive directors are to be 
effective on the board, they should make up not less than one third of the 
board, again a majority of which should be independent. 
Byrd and Hickman (1992) and Rosenstein and Wyatt (1990) argue that outside 
directors play an important part in protecting shareholders  wealth in 
situations where the interests of managers and outside owners diverge. In most 
cases, outside directors hold senior management positions in other large firms 
and they are familiar with the financial reporting process (Fama & Jensen, 
1983). This enables them to exert greater monitoring on firm financial 
reporting. Consistent with this argument, several studies find that firms with a 
high proportion of outside directors report more conservative earnings than 
firms with a low proportion of outside directors (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007; 
Beekes, et al., 2004). To measure the influence and strength of non-executive 
directors, NONEXEC takes the value of 1 (good governance) if non-executive 
directors constitute more than half of the board, otherwise 0. 
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(iii) Board Independence 
The importance of board independence in strengthening corporate governance 
has been advanced in the previous literature for at least two reasons. First, the 
existence of independent directors exerts 
decisions and activities by corporate boards (Fama, 1980). This is crucial to 
avoid an abuse of power by managers in order to maximise their own wealth 
(Roe, 1991). Fama and Jensen (1983) argue that a higher proportion of 
independent directors on corporate boards would result in more effective 
monitoring of boards and would limit managerial opportunism. Second, 
independent directors provide advice to corporate boards on strategic 
(Fama, 1980). Realising the importance of independent directors in 
strengthening corporate governance, MCCG (2000, 2007) recommends that 
independent directors comprise at least one third of the corporate board.  
With regard to earnings conservatism, independent directors have greater 
, such as accelerating the 
recognition of good news in earnings or delaying the recognition of bad news. 
Given that independent directors do not share the benefits of opportunistic 
reporting, they risk their reputation in the professional labour market without 
gain from permitting opportunistic reporting (Fama, 1980). Therefore, in this 
study, board independence (BODIND) takes value 1 if the proportion of 
independent directors to the total number of directors is more than the median 
value, otherwise 0.  
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(iv) Independent Chairman 
MCCG (2000, 2007) recommends separation of roles between the CEO and 
the chairman of the board of directors as such separation improves the board  
monitoring function. According to Hermalin and Weisbach (2003), a 
effectiveness is heavily determined by board independence from the CEO. 
When a CEO has excessive power over board matters, reported earnings could 
easily be manipulated (Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali, 2006). If the 
Chairman is appointed from among the independent directors, the CEO has no 
influence on director nomination and election, thus giving greater 
independence to the board (Jensen, 1993).  
Chau and Gray (2010) argue that a chairman who is not independent has the 
freedom to manage a firm without constraint as he possesses a great amount of 
power and authority. According to Jensen (1993), the presence of chairman 
that is also the chief executive of the firm could override the advantage of 
having independent directors on the board and weaken the function of the 
board of directors. Since an independent chairman enhances the functions of 
the board with improved monitoring of the CEO and firm management, thus 
mitigating any tendency to delay the recognition of bad news. In this study, I 
assign a value 1 to INDCHRM if the chairman is an independent director, and 
0 otherwise.  
(v) Board Meetings 
The number of board meetings held during the financial year is used as a 
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proxy for the level of real monitoring and control exerted by directors (Vafeas, 
1999). More frequent board meetings should indicate a more effective board 
because it suggests more active and close monitoring of managers to enable 
more timely corrective action if necessary. In this study, BODMEET takes the 
value 1 if the number of board meetings during the year is more than the 
median value, otherwise 0.  
(vi) Size of Audit Committee 
Many empirical studies support the argument that the size of the audit 
committee positively affects earnings quality. A plausible explanation is that a 
larger audit committee has greater capacity and resources to perform its duties, 
including detection and curbing of earnings manipulation; hence having a 
larger committee results in a higher level of earnings quality. For example, Lin 
et al. (2006) find a negative association between the size of an audit 
committee and the occurrence of earnings restatements, implying that the size 
of an audit committee is a significant factor in mitigating earnings 
manipulation. In the Malaysian context, MCCG (2007) suggests that an audit 
committee should comprise at least three members. Following this 
recommendation, ACSIZE takes value 1 if the size of the audit committee is 
more than three, otherwise 0.  
(vii) Audit Committee Independence 
Given that audit committee independence is crucial to exert effective 
monitoring of managers and to promote high standards of financial reporting, 
110 
 
MCCG (2007) recommends that independent directors should dominate, that 
is, constitute more than half, of the audit committee. This recommendation is 
consistent with much of the empirical evidence of a positive association 
between audit committee independence and earnings quality. For example, 
Abbott et al. (2004) report that firms with an independent audit committee that 
meets at least four times a year have a lower number of financial restatements. 
In addition, Carcello and Neal (2000) find that financially distressed firms 
with independent audit committees are more likely to receive a going-concern 
qualification and are less likely to terminate their external auditors. This 
evidence implies that audit committee independence implies effective control 
rtunistic reporting by 
management. Hence, I predict that having an independent audit committee 
would result in more timely recognition of bad news. To measure audit 
committee independence, ACINDP takes the value 1 if all members of the 
audit committee are independent directors, otherwise 0. 
(viii) Number of Audit Committee Meetings 
MCCG (2007) suggests that the audit committee should meet regularly. The 
code recommends that the meeting should be attended by the finance director, 
the head of internal audit, and the firm external auditor. Other board members 
may only attend the meeting upon invitation. The code states that the audit 
committee should have a meeting with the external auditor at least twice a 
year without the prescence of executive directors as to promote more 
independent discussions.  
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Given that the frequency of the audit committee meetings represents the time 
devoted by the audit committee in monitoring firm management and financial 
affairs, prior studies use this variable to measure firm governance. Abbot et al. 
(2004) used a binary variable that takes value 1 if the audit committee held 
more than four meetings a year, otherwise 0. Other studies, for example 
Bédard, Chtourou, and Courteau (2004) and David, Scott, and Irem (2007), 
measure the frequency of audit committee meetings based on the total number 
of meetings held in a year. In this study, ACMEET takes value 1 if the number 
of the audit committee meetings is more than the median value of the sample, 
and 0 otherwise. 
(ix) Financial Expertise of Audit Committee 
The appointment of audit committee members with a finance and/or 
accounting background helps to strengthen the functioning of the audit 
committee, particularly in monitoring and enhancing the quality of financial 
reporting. I identify the financial expertise of the audit committee based on the 
number of members of the audit committees with prior education and working 
experience in accounting, auditing, or finance, and holding a membership of 
any professional accounting body. The revised MCCG Code 2007 requires at 
least one audit committee member to be a member of an accounting 
association or body. The presence of a financial expert on the audit committee 
is expected to facilitate better monitoring of managers and to ensure a high 
quality of financial reporting. Thus, I assign value 1 for ACEXPERT if the 
audit committee has two or more members with financial expertise, and 0 
otherwise. 
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(x) Size of Audit Firm 
In general, big audit firms are expected to provide superior audit quality 
relative to small audit firms, for a number of reasons. Dopuch and Simunic 
(1980), for example, argue that investors associate Big Six (currently known 
as Big Four) auditors with higher quality audits because of observable 
characteristics such as specialized training, greater resources, and peer review. 
In addition, Big Four auditors have more invested in their reputation and face 
substantially higher litigation costs (Chung, et al., 2003).  
These arguments are supported by significant empirical evidence. For 
instance, previous studies find that big audit firms have lesser earnings 
management (Becker, et al., 1998; Francis, Maydew, & Sparks, 1999) and a 
higher earnings response coefficient (Teoh & Wong, 1993). Furthermore, Gul, 
Tsui, and Dhaliwal (2006) find big audit firms are more effective in mitigating 
the adverse effect of non-audit services on the value relevance of earnings. 
With regard to earnings conservatism, Chung et al. (2003) find that Big Six 
auditors have stronger influence than do non-Big Six auditors in persuading 
their clients to adopt more conservative accounting, particularly where the 
clients' financial performance is worse than expected.  
In term of size of audit firms in Malaysia, big firms constitute only around 
1.1% of the total number of firms (Abu-Bakar & Ahmad, 2009), but they audit 
around 60% of the listed firms (Arens, Loebbecke, Iskandar, Susela, & Isa, 
1999). Around 91.4% of Malaysian audit firms are small, with one to two 
113 
 
partners; while medium-size audit firms, with three to eight partners, 
constitute 7.5% of audit firms (Abu-Bakar & Ahmad, 2009). To measure the 
size of audit firms, I use a dummy variable of BIG4 that takes value 1 if the 
observation is audited by a Big Four audit firm, otherwise 0. 
(xi) Auditor Industry Specialization 
Auditor industry specialization is also argued playing a significant role in 
promoting earnings conservatism. Krishnan (2005a) find that industry 
specialists report more conservative earnings than non-specialists, suggesting 
that auditors' industry specialization moderates the tendency of the client to 
delay the recognition of economic losses in earnings. Furthermore, clients of 
industry specialists have significantly lower discretionary accruals than clients 
of non-specialist auditors (Krishnan, 2003). Consistent with prior literature 
(for e.g. Balsam, Krishnan, & Yang, 2003; Krishnan, 2003), I identify industry 
specialists (SPECIALIST) using an industry leader approach. Under this 
approach, an industry specialist is the audit firm with the largest market share 
(based on the total sales of the companies audited) in the industry. I calculate 
industry market shares as follows:  
 
where Sales is total sales/revenues, and the numerator is the total sales of all 
Jik clients of audit firm i in industry k. The value of i represents the audit 
firms. I use four-digit GICS codes to identify industry categories. The 
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denominator in the above model is the total sales for all clients of audit firm i 
summed over all k industries. To measure auditor industry specialisation, I 
use a dummy variable for SPECIALIST that takes value 1 if the observation is 
audited by an industry specialist and 0 otherwise. 
5.7 Regression Models 
This study employs ordinary least squares regression (OLS) to estimate the model 
used to examine the relationship between earnings conservatism and other 
variables such as a change in accounting standards, corporate governance and 
different types of ownership structure. The detailed applications of the model are 
discussed in the next subsections. 
5.7.1 Earnings Conservatism in Malaysia 
The first objective of this study is to examine the extent of earnings conservatism 
in Malaysia in 2003 to 2008. To test whether earnings are more timely in 
recognising bad news compared to good news, 
asymmetric timeliness of earnings model, as stated below. 
Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it (5.1) 
where Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in 
fiscal year t; RDit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 
otherwise; and it is the error term. 
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The coefficient for the interaction variable of RET*RD, 3, captures the 
incremental response to negative news relative to positive news. If a firm adopts 
conservative accounting practices, 3 is expected to be positive. The ratio 
( 1+ 3)/ 1 ratio measures the sensitivity of earnings to bad news relative to their 
sensitivity to good news. If a firm practices conservative accounting, ( 1 3)/ 1 
is expected to be greater than one. 
To ensure the robustness of the results, I employed various sensitivity tests 
including (1) Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression estimation; (2) control 
for industry and year effects; (3) control for firm specific factors; (4) restricting 
the observation to firms with Big Four auditors; (5) controlling for market return; 
(6) using announcement date returns; and (7) excluding firms with share price less 
than one Ringit (MYR). I also used the Basu time-series test of timeliness in loss 
recognition as an alternative measure for earnings conservatism. Detailed 
discussions of the robustness tests are provided. 
5.7.2 IFRS Adoption and Earnings Conservatism 
The second objective of this study is to examine whether there is a significant 
change in earnings conservatism after the adoption of IFRS in Malaysia. To 
conduct the test, I estimate equation (5.2), which tests the significance of the 
difference in earnings conservatism between pre- and post-IFRS adoption periods. 
For the main analysis, I examine two samples: (i) 1,042 firm-year observations for 
one-year pre- and post-IFRS adoption; and (ii) 2,084 firm-year observations for 
two-year pre- and post-IFRS adoption. For the additional tests, I limit the sample 
to firms with financial year-end dated 31 December. This test involves a sample 
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of (i) 588 firm-year observations for one year pre- and post-IFRS adoption for 
firms with financial year end 31 December; and (ii) 1,176 firm-year observations 
for two year pre- and post-IFRS adoption. 
Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4IFRSit  
5IFRSit*RETit 6IFRSit*RDit 7IFRSit*RETit*RDit  
it 
(5.2) 
where IFRS is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the financial statements are 
prepared according to IFRS standards, and 0 otherwise; and the other variables are 
as defined above. 
Equation (5.2) is an adaptation of the Basu (1997) model. I estimate this equation 
to allow the coefficients 3 to differ across pre- and post-IFRS periods. This 
modification enables this study to test for differences in conservatism across these 
two periods. The coefficient 3 measures the level of conservatism in the pre-
IFRS period. The corresponding measure in the post-IFRS period is 3 7. 
Therefore, the difference in conservatism between the pre- and post-IFRS periods 
is given by 7. If the coefficient is positive (negative), it would indicate that 
financial statements prepared under the new accounting standards (IFRS) are 
more (less) conservative than under the old standards (MASB standards). The 
coefficient 1 measures how quickly good news is reflected in reported earnings in 
the pre-IFRS period. The corresponding measure in the post-IFRS period is 1 + 
5. Therefore, the difference between the pre- and post-IFRS periods with regard 
to earnings incorporating good news is given by 5.  
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To ensure the robustness of the results, various sensitivity analyses are conducted 
including (1) using different samples and time frames; (2) Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) annual regression estimation; (3) controlling for industry and year effects; 
(4) restricting the observation to firms with Big Four auditors; (5) concentrating 
on firms audited by an industry specialist; and (6) using the Basu (1997) time-
series test of timeliness in loss recognition as an alternative measure for earnings 
conservatism. Detailed discussions of the robustness tests are provided. 
5.7.3 Ownership Structure and Earnings Conservatism  
The third objective of this study is to examine whether earnings conservatism is 
influenced by ownership structure, in particular, family firms and state-controlled 
firms. I also include widely-held firms to enable comparison. In doing so, I 
estimate equation (5.1) for different types of firms. For robustness analysis, I 
employ various sensitivity tests including (1) Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual 
regression estimation; (2) controlling for industry and year effects; (3) alternative 
definition for family firms and government-linked companies; (4) employing a 
time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition as an alternative measure for 
earnings conservatism. 
5.7.4 Corporate Governance and Earnings Conservatism 
The fourth objective of this study is to examine the relationship between earnings 
conservatism and corporate governance. I estimate equations (5.3a) and (5.3b) to 
test the relationship between corporate governance and earnings conservatism. 
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Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4CGINDEXit  
5CGINDEXit*RETit 6CGINDEXit*RDit  
7CGINDEXit*RETit*RDit it 
(5.3a) 
Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4DUMCGit  
5DUMCGit*RETit 6DUMCGit*RDit  
7DUMCGit*RETit*RDit it 
(5.3b) 
where CGINDEX is an unweighted aggregate of 11 corporate governance 
variables; and DUMCG is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if CGINDEX is in 
the top third of the pooled sample, and 0 if CGINDEX is in the bottom third. The 
other variables are as defined above. 
To ensure the robustness of the result, I perform several sensitivity tests such as 
(1) estimating the Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression; (2) controlling 
for industry and year effects; (3) using continuous variables rather than dummy 
variables; (4) employing a time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition as an 
alternative measure for earnings conservatism. Detailed discussions of the 
robustness tests are provided in the relevant section. 
5.8 Robustness Tests 
This study includes various robustness tests for every hypothesis. In this section, I 
provide the general sensitivity tests that were conducted for all the hypotheses. 
Sensitivity analyses which are unique to a particular hypothesis are discussed 
separately in the data analysis section. 
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5.8.1 Alternative Measure for Earnings Conservatism 
As noted in Section 2.4.1, the Basu asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure is 
subject to a number of criticisms. However, as also noted, Ryan (2006) concludes 
that asymmetric timeliness of earnings is still the best measure of earnings 
conservatism. Nevertheles, Ryan encourages the use of multiple measures. To 
ameliorate the above concerns, I also employed the time-series test of timeliness 
in loss recognition, equation (1.2), as described in Section 2.4.2. 
Khan and Watts (2009) estimate a firm-year measure for earnings conservatism 
(C_Score) by allowing the coefficient for RET*RD in the Basu (1997) asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings model to vary across firms and over time. An explanation 
of this model is provided in Section 2.4.5 above. Despite the robust estimation of 
C_Score in the United States, Khan and Watts (2009) suggest several caveats on 
the application of this model. First, the development of C_Score is motivated from 
the four Watts (2003a) determinants of conservatism in the US. Hence, for non-
US samples, this may not be an appropriate measure since the institutional 
features differ from those in the United States. In certain countries, there are weak 
legal enforcement regimes, in which contracts are more easily vitiated and 
litigation (and litigation liabilities) more easily circumvented. Second, the 
C_Score has not been developed by solving for equilibrium conditions in an 
analytical model, thus it is not necessarily the optimal measure of conservatism. 
Finally, there are possibilities of a correlated omitted variable problem if C_Score 
is used as an independent variable in a multiple regression. Considering the 
caveats made by Khan and Watts (2009), I do not employ the firm-year measure. 
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5.8.2 Fama and MacBeth (1973) Annual Regression  
I use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression estimate technique to cope 
with potential cross-sectional dependence problems, particularly since the data are 
concentrated over a small number of years. OLS standards errors from pooled 
regressions are biased and result in incorrect inferences in the presence of cross-
sectional dependence (Bernard, 1989). This problem is especially acute in 
regressions using annual stock returns because the common time-series variation 
in observations drawn from the same year induces cross-sectional dependence, 
and biases the pooled cross-sectional standard errors (Basu, 1997). Estimating the 
regression separately for each year partially controls this problem. The 
coefficients for the parameters are obtained as the simple average from the cross-
sectional regression. The t-statistics are the ratios of the mean estimated 
coefficients to the standard deviation of the distribution of the annual estimated 
slope coefficients, divided by the square root of the number of years. 
5.8.3 Control for Firm-Specific Variables 
To ascertain the validity of the results, this study controls for firm-specific 
variables, particularly firm size, leverage and market to book ratio. These 
variables influence Watts  explanations for conservatism, including contracting, 
litigation, taxation and regulation (Khan & Watts, 2009). Thus, in this study I 
include these variables as controls. 
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(i) Firm Size 
This study controls for firm size (SIZE) as it affects the demand for 
conservatism. Given that larger firms are more mature and have richer 
information environments, the information asymmetry and the overall 
uncertainty of the business is low, which causes lower contracting demands 
for conservatism (Khan & Watts, 2009). Large firms also have lower 
information asymmetry than small firms, though their business operations are 
more complex, with many segments (Easley, Hvidkjaer, & O'Hara, 2002). On 
the other hand, larger firms have higher litigation demand for conservatism 
because these firms attract more litigation due to higher expected recovery 
costs. Khan and Watts (2009) argue that larger firms have lower taxation 
demand for conservatism since they have more divisions and segments, which 
permit the aggregation of gains with losses across divisions, and greater 
flexibility to smooth (or defer) high earnings, hence reducing the present value 
of their tax liability. The study measures size as the natural logarithm of a 
 
(ii) Leverage  
This study controls for firm leverage (LEV) because firms with higher 
leverage have higher contracting, litigation, and taxation demands for 
conservatism (Khan & Watts, 2009). Furthemore, the potential for agency 
conflicts between shareholders and debtholders is high when leverage is high 
(Barclay & Smith, 1995; Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Myers, 1977). In addition, 
high-leverage firms have a higher likelihood of financial distress and a higher 
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likelihood of being sued, thus generating greater demand for conservatism. 
High-leveraged firms are more likely to be mature firms with higher taxable 
earnings thereby generating a higher taxation demand for conservatism (Khan 
& Watts, 2009). In short, high-leverage firms are more likely to have a higher 
demand for conservatism as conservatism triggers debt covenant violations in 
a timely fashion and constrains opportunistic diversion of resources (Khan & 
Watts, 2009). The study measures leverage as the ratio of total debt to total 
assets. 
(iii) Market to Book Ratio  
Finally, the study controls for the market to book ratio (MTB), a proxy for 
growth options. This is crucial because firms with high growth options are 
more likely to have a higher probability of litigation, lower taxable earnings, 
and be free of regulation (Khan & Watts, 2009). Given that growth options are 
positively linked to agency costs (Smith & Watts, 1992), firms with a high 
levels of growth options (high MTB) would demand higher conservatism. 
Furthermore, high MTB firms have a higher litigation demand for 
conservatism because their stock returns are more volatile, since a large 
proportion of their market value is due to risky growth options (Khan & 
Watts, 2009). However, firms with high MTB are less likely to be regulated, 
and thus have a lower regulation demand for conservatism (Khan & Watts, 
2009). 
Application of earnings conservatism, or the asymmetric verification 
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requirements for gains versus losses, generates cumulative understatement of 
net assets relative to market values; hence it results in higher MTB. 
Roychowdury and Watts (2007), however, state that the positive relationship 
between conservatism and MTB 
They argue that in a short-horizon period, beginning MTB is 
negatively correlated with conservatism flows due to prior unrecognised 
increases in asset values reducing the necessity to recognise asset value losses. 
Given that ending MTB is a function of beginning MTB, this induces a 
negative relation between ending MTB and conservatism at the annual horizon 
(Roychowdury & Watts, 2007). However, for longer horizons (three years or 
more), Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) find the effect of the beginning MTB 
is minimised and ending MTB is positively correlated with conservatism. 
5.9 Conclusions 
The present chapter has described the research design and method adopted for the 
study. The sample is described, and the chapter then discussed the measues for the 
variables used in the study. Finally, the chapter explains the regression models 
employed in testing the hypotheses. The next chapter presents the data analysis 
and findings of the study. 
 
  
124 
 
CHAPTER SIX 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
6.1 Introduction  
This chapter presents and discusses the findings of this study. The chapter is 
organised as follows. Section 6.2 presents the descriptive statistics for the 
continuous and dichotomous variables, and the correlation matrix. It also provides 
a review of the econometric issues. The results for the test of Hypothesis 1 on 
earnings conservatism following the institutional reforms discussed in Chapter 3 
are reported in Section 6.3. Section 6.4 presents the results for the test of 
Hypothesis 2 on the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings conservatism. The results 
for the test of Hypothesis 3 on how the level of earnings conservatism varies 
across different types of ownership structure are reported in Section 6.5. Section 
6.6 presents the findings for the test of hypothesis 4 on the relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings conservatism. Each section includes the 
relevant sensitivity analyses. Finally, Section 6.7 summarises the findings. 
6.2 Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Analysis 
6.2.1 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 6.1 provides the characteristics of the sample. Panel A shows the 
breakdown of the sample according to the financial year end. More than half 
(56.46%) of the sample has a financial year end of 31 December, while 12.35% 
and 13.63% of the sample have a financial year end of 31 March and 30 June, 
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respectively. Only a few firms close their accounts on months other than 
December, March and June.  
Table 6.1 
Sample characteristics 
 
Panel A: Sample according to financial year end 
Month N  Pct (%)  
January 124            3.97  
February 12            0.38  
March 386          12.35  
April 90            2.88  
May 73            2.34  
June 426          13.63  
July 53            1.70  
August 54            1.73  
September 72            2.30  
October 53            1.70  
November 18            0.58  
December 1,765          56.46  
Total 3,126        100.00  
 
Panel B: Sample according to industry classifications 
Sector Symbol N Pct (%) 
Construction CSTRUCT 33            6.33  
Consumer Product CONS 87          16.70  
Hotel HOTEL 4            0.77  
IPC IPC 5            0.96  
Industrial Product IPROD 169          32.44  
Plantation PLANT 33            6.33  
Property PROP 67          12.86  
Technology TECH 17            3.26  
Trading/Services TDG 106          20.35  
Total  521        100.00  
 
Panel C: Sample according to ownership structure 
Ownership N Pct (%) 
Family firms 1,770          56.62  
State-controlled firms 234            7.49  
Widely-held firms 1,122          35.89  
Total 3,126        100.00  
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Panel D: Sample according to auditor size 
Auditor N Pct (%) 
Big Four 2063 65.99 
Non-Big Four 1063 34.01 
Total 3,126        100.00  
 
Panel E: Sample according to auditor industry specialisation 
Auditor N Pct (%) 
Industry specialist 854 27.32 
Non-industry specialist 2272 72.68 
Total 3,126        100.00  
 
Panel B of Table 6.1 shows the classification of the sample according to industry. 
Almost one third of the sample (32.44%) comes from the industrial product 
sector, while the consumer product sector provides 16.70% of the sample. This is 
consistent with the general economy of Malaysia, where manufacturing sectors 
dominate the economy. The trading/services and property sectors are also 
significant in the sample, with 106 firms (20.35%) and 67 firms (12.86%) 
respectively. Thirty-three firms (6.33%) in the sample come from the construction 
sector. The plantation sector has only 33 firms (6.33%) in the total sample, which 
is quite a small proportion compared to the economic contribution of that sector 
and its importance to the Malaysian economy. This phenomenon is due to the 
large number of mergers among plantation firms, including firms under the 
control of the Malaysian government.  
Panel C provides a breakdown of the ownership structure of the firms in the 
sample. More than half of the sample (56.62%) are family firms, followed by 
widely-held firms (35.89%) and state-controlled firms (7.49%). Even though the 
number of state-controlled firms is small, state-controlled firms constitute around 
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36% of the total market capitalisation (PCG, 2005), indicating there is significant 
influence by state-controlled firms in the Malaysian economy. Panel D and Panel 
E denote firm classification according to auditor size and specialisation. The Big 
Four auditors audited almost two-thirds (65.99%) of the sample, while the 
remaining firm-year observations (34.01%) were audited by non-Big Four 
auditors. An industry specialist audited more than a quarter (27.32%) of the total 
population, while the remaining firm-year observations (72.68%) were audited by 
non-specialist auditors. 
Table 6.2  
Descriptive statistics 
Variable Mean SD Min Q1 Median Q3 Max 
E/P 0.044 0.286 -1.655 0.007 0.070 0.135 1.197 
RET 0.179 0.824 -0.746 -0.250 -0.005 0.305 5.370 
SIZE 8.561 0.580 7.465 8.132 8.485 8.900 10.313 
LEV 0.411 0.209 0.043 0.249 0.405 0.560 0.899 
MTB 1.025 0.822 0.152 0.495 0.771 1.253 4.205 
BODSIZE 7.444 1.841 3.000 6.000 7.000 9.000 15.000 
NONEXEC 0.621 0.172 0.200 0.500 0.600 0.750 1.000 
BODIND 0.420 0.108 0.143 0.333 0.400 0.500 0.857 
BODMEET 5.341 2.067 0.000 4.000 5.000 6.000 30.000 
ACSIZE 3.457 0.677 2.000 3.000 3.000 4.000 10.000 
ACIND 0.741 0.122 0.250 0.670 0.670 0.750 1.000 
ACMEET 4.841 1.187 1.000 4.000 5.000 5.000 21.000 
ACEEXPERT 0.370 0.182 0.000 0.250 0.333 0.400 1.000 
CGINDEX 0.452 0.154 0.000 0.364 0.455 0.545 1.000 
Note: All variables are truncated at 1% level (upper and bottom). 
 
Table 6.2 summarises the descriptive statistics for the variables included in this 
study. For earnings yield (E/P), the mean is 0.044 with a maximum (minimum) 
value of 1.197 (-1.655). The stock return (RET) has a mean of 0.179, while the 
maximum (minimum) value is 5.370 (-0.746). Firm size (SIZE), measured using 
the natural logarithm of total assets, ranges between 7.465 and 10.313, with a 
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mean of 8.561. For leverage (LEV), the ratio of total debt to total assets is between 
0.043 and 0.899, with a mean value of 0.411. The MTB ratio ranges between 
0.152 and 4.205 with a mean value of 1.025. The mean value for board size 
(BODSIZE) is 7.444; board size ranges between 3 to 15 directors. For board 
composition, on average 62.1% of board members are non-executive directors 
(NONEXEC) and 42.0% are independent non-executive directors (BODIND), 
showing a high degree of compliance with the MCCG (2000) recommendations. 
For board meetings (BODMEET), on average five meetings were held every 
financial year, with a range between 0 and 30 meetings. In terms of the audit 
 on average 3.457 members 
(ACSIZE), of whom 74.1% are independent non-executive directors (ACIND); the 
committee held an average of 4.841 meetings per financial year (ACMEET), and 
37% of the audit committee members have an accounting and/or finance 
background and are members of professional accounting bodies (ACEXPERT). 
Finally, the unweighted corporate governance index (CGINDEX) is on average 
0.452, with a range between 0.00 and 1.00. 
6.2.2 Correlation Analysis 
A correlation analysis was performed to test the strength of the relationships 
among the variables used in this study. Table 6.3 provides Pearson and Spearman 
correlations among all variables. In general, the analysis shows no suggestion of 
collinearity between the variables.  
As reported in Table 6.3, earnings yield (E/P) and stock returns (RET) is 
positively correlated at the 1% level (Pearson = 0.305; Spearman = 0.405), which 
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is consistent with the theory on earnings-return relationship. Board size 
(BODSIZE) and audit committee size (ACSIZE) are positively correlated with 
earnings yield (E/P), while board independence (BODIND), board meeting 
(BODMEET), and audit committee meeting (ACMEET) are negatively correlated 
with earnings yield (E/P). The correlation between stock returns (RET) and other 
variables is low, with a Spearman correlation value between -0.050 and 0.073 and 
a Pearson correlation value between -0.038 and 0.043.  
All variables other than earnings yield (E/P) and (RET) are significantly correlated 
with the corporate governance index (CGINDEX). This is consistent with the fact 
that the variables are used to develop the corporate governance score. The 
proportion of non-executive directors (NONEXEC) and board independence 
(BODIND) have moderate correlation with the corporate governance score. The 
Pearson (Spearman) correlation between the proportion of non-executive directors 
(NONEXEC) and corporate governance index (CGINDEX) is 0.523 (0.523), while 
the Pearson (Spearman) correlation between board independence (BODIND) and 
corporate governance index is 0.477 (0.497). The correlations for other variables 
fall between 0.368 and 0.114. 
Overall, all variables have a correlation of less than 0.50, except for the 
correlation between CGINDEX and NONEXEC. The results from Table 6.3 
suggest there is no serious multi-collinearity among the independent variables, 
since none of the correlations exceed 0.7 (Pallant, 2007). 
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6.2.3 Econometric Issues 
This section discusses several potential econometric issues associated with the 
estimation of the earnings conservatism model. The issues include outliers, 
normality, heteroscedasticity and multicollinearity assumptions. These issues are 
related to the procedure for the estimation of the parameters of the ordinary least 
squares (OLS) regression. To ensure that the interpretation of the regression 
estimates is valid, the assumptions about the variables and the error term of OLS 
must be satisfied. 
Firstly, I examined the issue of outliers or unusual observations. It is crucial to 
consider the undue influence of outliers because outliers can distort the 
interpretation of data and may lead to incorrect inferences. Some studies delete 
outliers (e.g. Ball & Shivakumar, 2006; Basu, 1997), while other studies truncate 
the outliers (e.g. García Lara & Mora, 2004). In this study, I truncated the upper 
and lower 1% of extreme value. 
Table 6.4 summarises the basic statistics for stock return (RET) and earnings yield 
(E/P) truncated at 0% and 1%. The 0% truncation represents the unadjusted data 
that is, no truncation. The truncation at the 1% level indicates that the upper and 
lower 1% of extreme values are not eliminated but drawn at the tail of the 
distribution. For example, in the 1% level of truncation of stock return (RET), 
98% of the values range from -0.746 to 5.370. Furthermore the extreme lower 1% 
of the value range is from -0.937 to -0.746 and the extreme upper 1% of the value 
range is from 5.370 to 37.775. Truncation at the 1% level forces the extreme 
lower firm-year observations to assume the value of -0.746 (at 1% lower) and the 
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extreme upper firm-year observations to assume the value of 5.370 (at 1% upper). 
Thus, the extreme values are drawn with the upper and lower tails of the 
distribution. 
Table 6.4 
Analysis for unusual observation and normality 
Variable Stock Return (RET) Earnings Yield (E/P) 
Truncation Level 0 Percent 1 Percent 0 Percent 1 Percent 
Min -0.937 -0.746 -14.315 -1.655 
Maximum 37.775 5.370 10.123 1.197 
Mean 0.245 0.179 0.037 0.044 
Standard Deviation 1.550 0.824 0.600 0.286 
Skewness  12.442 3.522 -7.437 -1.887 
Kurtosis 223.054 19.494 244.910 15.483 
Kolmogorov-Smirnov test  
(p-value) (p<0.01) (p<0.01) (p<0.01) (p<0.01) 
Skewness/Kurtosis tests for  
Normality (p-value) (p<0.01) (p<0.01) (p<0.01) (p<0.01) 
 
The measure of skewness indicates the symmetry in the data. As reported in Table 
6.4, I find that the measure of skewness decreases as the level of truncation 
increases. For example, the level of skewness at the 0% truncation level for stock 
returns equals (RET) 12.442, but it decreases to 3.522 at the 1% truncation level. 
For earnings yield (E/P), the skewness at the 0% truncation level is -7.437, 
decreases to -1.887 at the 1% truncation level. These results of the skewness of 
earnings yield and stock returns are consistent with evidence of conservatism. As 
reported in previous studies, for example Kwon, Yin and Han (2006), negative 
skewness of earnings is evidence of earnings conservatism.  
Kurtosis statistics indicate the extent to which the distribution departs from a bell 
shape or normal curve due to fat tails. I find that the measure of kurtosis is very 
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high at the 0% truncation level but decreases at the higher truncation level. The 
analysis presented in Table 6.4 shows that the level of kurtosis for stock return is 
223.054 at the 0% truncation level, and decreases substantially to 19.494 at the 
1% truncation level. The level of kurtosis for the earnings yield variable acts in 
similar fashion. At the 0% truncation level, the kurtosis statistic for earnings yield 
is equal to 244.910 and then decreases to 15.483 at the 1% truncation level. 
Secondly, I tested the assumption of normality for the dependent and independent 
variables by conducting a Kolmogorov-Smirnov test and Skewness/Kurtosis tests 
for normality. In addition, I drew the P-P Plots for Residuals and Dotplots of 
Residuals. Testing for normality (i.e., skewness and kurtosis) is important because 
it tells the researcher about the distribution of the sample data used for statistical 
inference. Non-normal data may lead to incorrect conclusions in inferential 
statistical analyses or may have a bias effect on correlation coefficients 
(Schroeder, Sjoquist, & Stephan, 1986). 
The results in Table 6.4 show that the p-values for the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test 
and Skewness/Kurtosis tests for normality are less than 0.01 for both variables, 
showing a non-normally distributed population. Figure 6.1 and Figure 6.2 also 
depict the problem of normality. However, this problem is common in most 
market-based accounting studies. These studies find that earnings and stock 
returns data are skewed to the right, which indicates larger positive values than 
negative values. Hair, Black, Babin, Anderson, and Tatham (2006) contend that 
researchers can be less concerned with non-normal variables as the sample size 
become larger. In this study, the sample, with more than 3,100 observations, can 
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be considered large. 
Figure 6.1 
P-P Plots for residuals 
 
Figure 6.2 
Dotplots of residuals 
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Thirdly, I tested for heteroscedasticity when estimating the regression model by 
OLS. The problem of heteroscedastic disturbances arises from the fact that large 
(small) firms tend to produce large (small) disturbances. Gujarati (2004) argued 
that if heteroscedasticity is present, then the OLS estimators no longer exhibit 
minimum variance among all linear unbiased estimators. 
I conducted a Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test and White's test on various 
samples to test the heteroscedasticity assumption. The results for both diagnostic 
tests are presented in Table 6.5. The results show that the p-values for the 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test and White's test for heteroscedasticity are less 
than 0.01 for both variables, indicating a problem of heteroscedasticity. To 
overcome this problem, all regression estimates were reported using t-statistics 
with White (1980) adjustment to correct for the possibility of heteroscedasticity. 
Table 6.5 
Diagnostic tests for Heteroscedasticity assumption 
Sample Breusch-Pagan/ Cook-Weisberg test White's test 
CHSQ p-value CHSQ p-value 
Pooled sample 242.73 0.000 65.2 0.000 
Family Firms 117.09 0.000 72.14 0.000 
State-Controlled firms 8.65 0.000 9.5 0.000 
Widely-Held firms 50.68 0.000 32.61 0.000 
 
Finally, I did not find any suggestion of multicollinearity among the regressors 
included in the regression model. Gujarati (2004) states that the term 
multicollinearity  is used where the variables are intercorrelated (perfect or non-
perfect). This issue was discussed in the previous section. The Spearman and 
Pearson correlation reported in Table 6.3 do not indicate any serious collinearity 
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issues between the variables. 
6.3 Earnings Conservatism Following the Reforms 
6.3.1 Introduction  
As noted earlier, the first objective of this study is to examine earnings 
conservatism in Malaysian financial reporting following the institutional reforms 
discussed in Chapter 3, particularly in respect of corporate governance and 
financial reporting. The following section (Section 6.3.2) presents the main 
empirical results, while Section 6.3.3 reports the results from the robustness 
analyses. Section 6.3.4 discusses the overall results for the first objective.  
6.3.2 Main Analysis: Earnings Conservatism in Malaysia 
This study employs the Basu (1997) reverse earnings-return regression to examine 
earnings conservatism, by the asymmetric timeliness of earnings measure. To 
provide greater insight into the differences in timeliness of earnings between good 
news and bad news samples, I partitioned the sample into good news and bad 
news subsamples, and then estimated the basic earnings-return regression to 
capture the timeliness of earnings in both samples. The regression estimates are 
reported in Column 1 and Column 2 of Table 6.6. I then estimated equation (5.1), 
the Basu (1997) reverse earnings-return regression, to test for significant 
difference between the asymmetric timeliness of earnings for the two subsamples. 
The regression estimates are summarised in Column 3. In Column 4, the 
regression estimates of Ball et al. (2003) on earnings conservatism in Malaysia 
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prior to the 1997 financial crisis are presented for comparison purposes. 
The results reported in Column 1 and Column 2 of Table 6.6 show that the 
coefficients for RET in both good news and bad news subsamples are positive and 
significant at a 1% level. These results show evidence of the timeliness of 
earnings in response to economic news. The coefficient for RET in the good news 
sample is 0.071, which is lower than the coefficient for RET in the bad news 
sample, which is 0.260. These results indicate a higher timeliness of earnings in 
relation to bad news relative to good news. 
Table 6.6 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
Sample Good News Bad News Pooled Ball et al. (2003) 
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.052* (5.900) 0.062* (5.234) 0.052* (5.900) Not reported 
RET 0.071* (5.010) 0.260* (7.387) 0.071* (5.010) Not reported 
RD     0.009 (0.637) 0.01** (2.44) 
RET*RD     0.189* (4.975) 0.00 (0.20) 
Adj.R2 0.05  0.03  0.08 0.09  
N 1558  1568  3126 768  
F-stat 25.100  54.575  59.249 Not reported 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 3,126 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; and it is the error term. 
 
Column 3 reports the regression estimates from the Basu (1997) model, which 
tests whether there is significant difference between the timeliness of earnings for 
the good news and bad news subsamples as reported in Column 1 and Column 2. 
The result shows that the coefficient for RET*RD, 3, is positive (0.189) and 
significant at the 1% level, implying that earnings reflect bad news in a more 
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timely manner than they reflect good news. The estimation results also show that 
1+ 3> 1, equivalent to (0.071+0.189)>0.071, indicates evidence of earnings 
conservatism. The value of ( 1+ 3)/ 1 is 3.66, showing that earnings are three 
times more sensitive to bad news than to good news. With respect to the validity 
of the models, all F-statistics are significant at the 1% level, while the adjusted-R2 
for equation (5.1) is 8%, but is slightly lower than the result in Ball et al. (2003). 
For the good news and bad news subsamples, the adjusted-R2s are 5% and 3%. 
To illustrate the evidence of earnings conservatism, I exhibit the relationship 
between stock returns and accounting earnings in Figure 6.3. This figure depicts 
all observations in the sample, with separate regression lines for good news and 
bad news samples. The slope directions for both lines show a positive relationship 
between stock return and earnings. As predicted, the slope for bad news in the 
second (Q2) and third quadrants (Q3) are higher than the slope coefficient for 
good news in the first quadrant (Q1), showing earnings are more sensitive to bad 
news relative to good news. This figure depicts evidence of earnings 
conservatism, in which earnings anticipate economic losses more quickly than 
economic gains, so that stock prices reflect bad news in the form of 
contemporaneous market losses earlier than good news in the form of market 
gains. 
The findings as reported in Table 6.6 and illustrated in Figure 6.3 document 
evidence on earnings conservatism in Malaysia. Regression estimates for 3,126 
firm-year observations, in the period following the institutional reforms, show that 
negative news is registered in earnings more promptly than positive news; hence 
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providing evidence to reject the first null hypothesis. 
 
Figure 6.3 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
 
This result differs from the result documented by Ball et al. (2003) for 768 firm-
year observations from 1984 to 1996. Ball et al. Find that the coefficient for 
RET*RD is 0.00 and not significant (p>0.10), showing no evidence for earnings 
conservatism, or no significant difference in the timeliness of earnings between 
good news and bad news. In an environment of weak institutional structure, Ball 
et al. (2003) suggest that preparers of financial reports have less incentive to 
report high quality earnings, even though the accounting standards are of high 
quality. Complementing Ball et al. (2003) and Bushman and Piotroski (2006), this 
study shows evidence of earnings conservatism in the period following the 
institutional reforms, implying that managers and preparers of financial reports 
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have higher expectations to meet in reporting and thus report earnings 
conservatively. In short, our results suggest that the strong institutional factors 
give greater incentives for managers to report earnings conservatively. 
6.3.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
This section reports the results from sensitivity tests on the findings in Section 
6.3.2. Eight sensitivity analyses were conducted: Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
annual regression estimation (Section 6.3.3.1), controlling for industry and year 
effects (Section 6.3.3.2), controlling for firm-specific variables (Section 6.3.3.3), 
restricting the sample to firms with Big Four auditors (Section 6.3.3.4), 
controlling for market return (Section 6.3.3.5), employing an alternative measure 
of economic news using inter-announcement period stock returns (Section 
6.3.3.6), excluding observation with share prices less than MYR 1.00 (Section 
6.3.3.7), and employing the time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition 
model as an alternative measure of earnings conservatism (Section 6.3.3.8). 
6.3.3.1 Fama and MacBeth (1973) Annual Regression 
I estimated a Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression to address the 
possibility of the earlier results being influenced by cross-sectional dependence 
problems.25 The regression estimates for a good news sample, a bad news sample 
and a pooled sample using Fama and MacBeth (1973) are reported in Table 6.7.  
                                               
25 The results obtained from estimating the Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression should be 
interpreted with caution since it assumes that the relationship between variables is stationary over 
time. Basu et al. (2001) raises concern about the results from this analysis when applied in capital-
market-based accounting research. 
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Table 6.7 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings: Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression 
Sample 
Good News Bad News Pooled 
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.068** (3.845) 0.074** (3.954) 0.068** (3.845) 
RET 0.054** (2.649) 0.373* (5.609) 0.054** (2.649) 
RD     0.006 (0.616) 
RET*RD     0.319** (3.973) 
Adj.R2 0.06  0.06  0.11 
N 1558  1568  3126 
F-stat 7.016  31.458  33.088 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 3,126 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. I use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology to cope with the possible cross-sectional 
dependence problems. The coefficients of the parameters have been obtained as the simple average 
from the cross-sectional regression. The t-statistics are the ratios of the mean estimated 
Coefficients to the standard deviation of the distribution of the annual estimated slope 
Coefficients, divided by the square root of the number of years. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. Variable definitions: Eit is 
the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per share at the beginning of the 
fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; and it is the error term. 
 
Table 6.7 shows the coefficients for RET, 1, in all samples are significant, 
showing evidence of the timeliness of earnings. The coefficient for RET in the bad 
news sample is 0.373 and significant at the 1% level. This is substantially higher 
than the good news sample, where the coefficient for RET is only 0.054 (p<0.05). 
The coefficient for RET*RD, which measures the asymmetric timeliness of 
earnings between the two samples, is positive (0.319) and significant at the 5% 
level, implying that bad news is recognised significantly faster than good news. In 
essence, the results in Table 6.7 are consistent with the earlier findings that 
earnings conservatism is a pervasive feature of Malaysian financial reporting in 
the period following the institutional reforms.  
6.3.3.2 Industry and Year Effects 
In this section, I control for the serial correlation problems of the residuals of 
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panel data by incorporating industry and year dummies in the regression model. 
Using the Bursa Malaysia industry classifications, I created eight industry 
dummies: consumer (CONS); hotel (HOTEL); infrastructure project company 
(IPC); industrial product (IPROD); plantation (PLANT); property (PROP); 
technology (TECH); and trading and services (TDG).26  
Table 6.8 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings: Controlling for industry and year effects 
Industry Effect Year Effect Industry & Year Effects 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.027 (1.109) 0.027** (2.015) 0.001 (0.052) 
RET 0.071* (4.946) 0.068* (4.769) 0.068* (4.703) 
RD 0.009 (0.601) 0.003 (0.192) 0.002 (0.142) 
RET*RD 0.191* (4.983) 0.265* (6.724) 0.269* (6.747) 
CONS 0.023 (0.879) 0.021 (0.830) 
HOTEL -0.034 (-0.632) -0.038 (-0.702) 
IPC 0.024 (0.697) 0.022 (0.628) 
IPROD 0.039 (1.566) 0.041*** (1.661) 
PLANT 0.033 (1.069) 0.027 (0.909) 
PROP 0.009 (0.320) 0.011 (0.399) 
TECH  0.034 (0.919) 0.038 (1.047) 
TDG 0.028 (1.087) 0.028 (1.123) 
Y2004 0.014 (0.798) 0.014 (0.805) 
Y2005 0.067* (3.944) 0.068* (3.982) 
Y2006 -0.008 (-0.448) -0.008 (-0.448) 
Y2007 0.049* (3.096) 0.049* (3.099) 
Y2008 0.115* (6.587) 0.116* (6.564) 
Adj.R2 0.08 0.09 0.09 
N 3126 3126 3126 
F-stat 16.901 27.355 14.056 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 3,126 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; Industry are dummy variables 
for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy variables for fiscal years; and it is the error 
term. 
                                               
26 The Construction sector is not included in the model to avoid the perfect multi-collinearity 
problem. 
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For year variables, I created five dummy variables from 2004 to 2008, while year 
2003 was used as a base variable. I then re-estimated equation (5.2) with industry 
and year effects. Table 6.8 summarises the regression estimates including: 
industry effect (column 1), year effect (column 2), and both industry and year 
effects (column 3).  
The result reported in table 6.8 shows that earnings conservatism is a strong 
feature of Malaysian financial reporting even after controlling for industry and 
year effects. The coefficient values for RET*RD after controlling for industry 
effect, year effect, and both industry and year effects, are 0.191, 0.265, and 0.269 
respectively, which are all significant at the 1% level. These results imply robust 
evidence of earnings conservatism in Malaysia in the period following the 
institutional reforms. At the same time, the results in Table 6.8 show that the 
coefficients for RET are positive and significant at the 1% level, suggesting that 
earnings are timely in the recognition of good news.  
6.3.3.3 Control for Firm-Specific Variables  
This section examines whether the main result is robust after controlling for firm-
specific variables such as firm size (SIZE), firm leverage (LEV), and growth 
(MTB). Khan and Watts (2009) find these variables have significant influence on 
earnings conservatism. Discussion of these factors was provided in Section 5.8.3. 
Following LaFond and Watts (2008), I included the interaction variables of SIZE, 
LEV, and MTB with RET, RD and RET*RD in equation (5.1). I then estimated the 
modified equation using pooled regression, Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual 
regression, and fixed-effects regression. The results are presented in Table 6.9.  
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The regression estimates reported in Table 6.9 show qualitatively similar results to 
those reported in the main analysis. The coefficients for RET*RD are positive and 
significant (p<0.01) in all models, implying a more timely recognition of 
economic losses than economic gains in Malaysia even after controlling the effect 
of SIZE, LEV, and MTB.  
For the control variables, the results in Table 6.9 show that all the control 
variables have significant influence on earnings conservatism. Firm size (SIZE) 
has a negative relationship with earnings conservatism, where the coefficients for 
SIZE*RET*RD are negative and significant (p<0.10). These results provide 
support for the argument that large firms have lower information asymmetry, thus 
reducing the contracting demands for conservatism (Khan and Watts, 2009).  
For firm leverage (LEV), the results show a positive relationship between LEV and 
earnings conservatism. The coefficient for LEV*RET*RD for the pooled 
regression and the Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression are positive and 
significant (p<0.10), suggesting that high-leverage firms have higher agency costs 
and higher financial distress costs, hence creating greater demand for 
conservatism to alleviate the problems. However, the regression estimates that 
control for industry effect and year effects do not find any significant association 
between LEV and conservatism. A plausible explanation is that the risks 
associated with a specific industry and time period have been captured by the 
fixed-effect variables.  
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Table 6.9 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings: Controlling for firm-specific variables 
Model Pooled Fama-MacBeth  Fixed Effects  
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept -0.355* (-3.064) -0.396** (-3.741) -0.475* (-3.881) 
RET -0.230 (-1.481) -0.257 (-1.296) -0.206 (-1.283) 
RD 0.223 (1.212) 0.258 (1.240) 0.253 (1.355) 
RET*RD 1.071** (2.298) 1.073*** (2.251) 1.062** (2.180) 
SIZE 0.060* (4.251) 0.064* (5.009) 0.073* (4.966) 
SIZE*RET 0.033*** (1.823) 0.040 (1.610) 0.029 (1.573) 
SIZE*RD -0.026 (-1.169) -0.029 (-1.136) -0.032 (-1.384) 
SIZE*RET*RD -0.124** (-2.241) -0.117*** (-2.024) -0.110*** (-1.906) 
LEV -0.294* (-5.081) -0.213** (-3.856) -0.311* (-5.123) 
LEV*RET 0.064 (0.869) -0.035 (-0.300) 0.066 (0.902) 
LEV*RD 0.031 (0.313) -0.009 (-0.165) 0.035 (0.354) 
LEV*RET*RD 0.421*** (1.803) 0.694** (3.398) 0.360 (1.548) 
MTB 0.002 (0.163) -0.016 (-0.826) -0.005 (-0.486) 
MTB*RET -0.002 (-0.128) 0.018 (0.886) 0.001 (0.076) 
MTB*RD -0.003 (-0.166) 0.005 (0.381) 0.002 (0.109) 
MTB*RET*RD -0.126* (-2.866) -0.238** (-3.383) -0.143* (-3.150) 
CONS 0.008 (0.333) 
HOTEL -0.091*** (-1.829) 
IPC -0.042 (-1.078) 
IPROD 0.028 (1.210) 
PLANT -0.052*** (-1.732) 
PROP -0.032 (-1.247) 
TECH  0.022 (0.623) 
TDG 0.002 (0.102) 
Y2004 0.007 (0.420) 
Y2005 0.058* (3.625) 
Y2006 -0.012 (-0.704) 
Y2007 0.034** (2.169) 
Y2008 0.092* (5.506) 
Adj.R2 0.15 0.18 0.16 
N 3126 3126 3126 
F-stat 28.366 19.538 17.124 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4SIZEit 5SIZEit*RETit  
+ 6SIZEit*RDit 7SIZEit*RETit*RDit 8LEVit 9LEVit*RETit  
10LEVit*RDit 11LEVit*RETit*RDit 12MTBit 13MTBit*RETit  
14MTBit*RDit 15MTBit*RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 3,126 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; Industry are dummy variables 
for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy variables for fiscal years; SIZEit is the 
natural logarithm of total assets for firm i in fiscal year t; LEVit is the ratio of total debts to total 
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assets for firm i in fiscal year t; MTBit is the market to book ratio for firm i in fiscal year t;  and it 
is the error term. 
 
For growth (MTB), the results show a strong negative relationship between MTB 
and earnings conservatism. The coefficients of MTB*RET*RD are negative and 
significant in all models, indicating that high-growth firms report more 
conservative earnings. This finding is consistent with the explanation given by 
Roychowdhury and Watts (2007) that the short horizon MTB is negatively 
correlated with conservatism flows due to prior unrecognised increases in asset 
values reducing the necessity to recognise asset value losses.  
In short, the estimation results after controlling for firm-specific variables provide 
support for the main finding that earnings conservatism is a pervasive feature of 
Malaysian financial reporting following the institutional reforms. In addition, the 
analysis also provides evidence that SIZE, LEV and MTB have significant 
influence on earnings conservatism. 
6.3.3.4 Restricted Sample - Firm Audited by Big Four Auditors 
In this section, I control for the difference in audit quality of the Big Four and 
non-Big Four auditors. Previous studies assert that Big Four auditors (previously 
known as Big Five/Six/Eight) have a higher audit quality than non-Big Four 
auditors (DeAngelo, 1981; Francis & Simon, 1987; Palmrose, 1988). Becker et al. 
(1998) and Francis et al. (1999) find that the clients of Big Six auditors report low 
discretionary accruals compared to the clients of non-Big Six auditors, even 
though clients of Big Six auditors have high levels of total accruals. These results 
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aggressive accounting, thus increasing the quality of earnings. Jeong and Rho 
(2004) state that the Big Four interpret GAAP conservatively and take a strong 
negotiating stance with clients who require more adjustments to the financial 
statements. Chung et al. (2003) find that Big Six auditors influence their clients to 
adopt more conservative accounting when the clients' financial performance is 
worse than expected.  
To control for the differential quality of audit, I reduced the sample to firms 
audited by Big Four firms. I then re-estimated equation (5.1) using basic pooled 
regression, Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression, and fixed-effects 
regression controlling for industry and year effects. The results are presented in 
Table 6.10. 
Table 6.10 shows that the regression estimates for equation (5.1) denote a 
qualitatively similar result as results in the main analysis. The coefficients for 
RET are positive and significant in all three models, suggesting that earnings are 
timely in recognition of good news. The coefficients for RET*RD, which measure 
earnings conservatism, are positive and significant at the 1% level. Specifically, 
the coefficient values for pooled regression, Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual 
regression, and fixed-effects regression are 0.196, 0.284, and 0.251 respectively; 
implying negative news is registered in earnings more promptly than positive 
news. All F-statistics are significant at the 1% level, indicating the validity of the 
models.  
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Table 6.10 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings: Firms audited by Big Four auditors 
Model Pooled Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.067* (6.435) 0.079* (5.207) 0.073* (3.395) 
RET 0.070* (4.097) 0.053*** (2.307) 0.066* (3.859) 
RD 0.012 (0.845) 0.007 (0.932) 0.007 (0.436) 
RET*RD 0.196* (4.949) 0.284* (4.429) 0.251* (6.044) 
CONS -0.027 (-1.400) 
HOTEL -0.100*** (-1.914) 
IPC -0.044 (-1.214) 
IPROD -0.011 (-0.598) 
PLANT -0.024 (-0.836) 
PROP -0.031 (-1.425) 
TECH  -0.005 (-0.118) 
TDG -0.029 (-1.491) 
Y2004 0.004 (0.227) 
Y2005 0.047* (2.782) 
Y2006 -0.015 (-0.762) 
Y2007 0.051* (3.191) 
Y2008 0.078* (4.443) 
Adj.R2 0.10 0.13 0.11 
N 2063 2063 2063 
F-stat 46.084 54.078 12.539 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 3,126 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; Industry are dummy variables 
for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy variables for fiscal years; and it is the error 
term. 
 
6.3.3.5 Market-Adjusted Return 
A study by Morck et al. (2000) reported that the systematic component of returns 
variation is larger in emerging markets compared to the United States and other 
developed countries. In Malaysia, and other developing countries, the stock 
returns variation appears unrelated to fundamentals  co-movement, while in the 
United States, high firm-specific returns variation was documented. To control for 
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this problem, time-series non-stationarity in the returns processes, I employed 
market-adjusted returns as an alternative proxy for economic news. In addition, 
the use of market-adjusted returns provides a useful robustness check because it 
can be argued that market-adjusted returns may provide a more reliable indicator 
for good versus bad news (Pope & Walker, 1999).  
To calculate the market-adjusted return, RET(MKT), I used the Bursa Malaysia 
Composite Index as a proxy for market return. I then calculated a dummy variable 
RD(MKT), and RET(MKT)*RD(MKT) before re-estimating equation (5.1) using 
the basic pooled regression, Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression, and 
fixed-effects regression. The results are summarised in Table 6.11. 
The results reported in Table 6.11 show qualitatively similar results to those 
reported in the main results, in which earnings conservatism is a strong feature of 
Malaysian financial reporting. The coefficients for RET(MKT)*RD(MKT) are 
positive and significant (p<0.01) in all models, implying a more timely 
recognition of economic losses than economic gains in Malaysia. 
Specifically, the estimated value for ( 1 3)/ 1 in the pooled regression is 4.03, 
implying that earnings are four times more sensitive to bad news than to good 
news. In other estimation models, higher estimated values for ( 1 3)/ 1 were 
found, showing qualitatively similar results. With respect to the validity of the 
models, all F-statistics are significant at the 1% level, while the values for 
adjusted-R2 are between 8% and 10%, consistent with other studies on earnings 
conservatism. 
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Table 6.11 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings: Alternative measure for news (market 
adjusted return) 
Model Pooled Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.071* (6.999) 0.079* (5.149) 0.006 (0.228) 
RET(MKT) 0.069* (4.348) 0.053*** (2.490) 0.065* (4.058) 
RD(MKT) 0.003 (0.216) 0.010 (0.798) 0.010 (0.717) 
RET(MKT)*RD(MKT) 0.209* (6.021) 0.306** (3.727) 0.271* (7.317) 
CONS 0.029 (1.118) 
HOTEL -0.044 (-0.813) 
IPC 0.020 (0.548) 
IPROD 0.044*** (1.787) 
PLANT 0.025 (0.822) 
PROP 0.008 (0.300) 
TECH  0.043 (1.188) 
TDG 0.031 (1.202) 
Y2004 0.039** (2.216) 
Y2005 0.059* (3.592) 
Y2006 0.007 (0.379) 
Y2007 0.104* (6.202) 
Y2008 0.042* (2.707) 
1 3  4.03 6.77 5.17 
Adj.R2 0.08 0.10 0.09 
N 3126 3126 3126 
F-stat 65.942 27.964 15.013 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RET(MKT)it 2RD(MKT)it 3RET(MKT)it*RD(MKT)it +Industry  
it 
The sample comprises 3,126 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RET(MKT)it is the market adjusted return of firm i in 
fiscal year t; RD(MKT)it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if RET(MKT)it is negative, and 0 
otherwise; Industry are dummy variables for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy 
variables for fiscal years; and it is the error term. 
 
6.3.3.6 Inter-Announcement Period Stock Return 
In this section, I use inter-announcement period stock returns, RET(ANC), as an 
alternative measure for economic news. RET(ANC) is calculated based on the 
period of three months after the end of the previous fiscal year to three months 
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after the current fiscal year. I re-estimated equation (5.1) using the pooled 
regression model, Fama and Macbeth (1973) estimation, and the estimation 
controlling for industry and year effects. The results are reported in Table 6.12. 
Table 6.12 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings: Alternative measure for news (inter-
announcement date return) 
Model Pooled Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.067* (6.828) 0.072* (4.112) 0.001 (0.044) 
RET(ANC) 0.050* (2.762) 0.070** (3.280) 0.059* (3.199) 
RD(ANC) 0.015 (0.989) 0.016 (1.438) 0.003 (0.168) 
RET(ANC)*RD(ANC) 0.242* (5.512) 0.325* (5.779) 0.311* (6.851) 
CONS 0.009 (0.334) 
HOTEL -0.042 (-0.749) 
IPC 0.004 (0.112) 
IPROD 0.034 (1.335) 
PLANT 0.031 (1.001) 
PROP 0.000 (0.017) 
TECH  0.037 (1.023) 
TDG 0.021 (0.811) 
Y2004 0.066* (3.556) 
Y2005 0.074* (4.194) 
Y2006 -0.004 (-0.232) 
Y2007 0.093* (5.397) 
Y2008 0.142* (7.730) 
Adj.R2 0.04 0.07 0.07 
N 3124 3124 3124 
F-stat 37.886 106.921 12.186 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RET(ANC)it 2RD(ANC)it 3RET(ANC)it*RD(ANC)it +Industry  
it 
The sample comprises 3,126 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RET(ANC)it is the announcement date return of firm i in 
fiscal year t; RD(ANC)it is a dummy variable that equals 1 if RET(ANC)it is negative, and 0 
otherwise; Industry are dummy variables for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy 
variables for fiscal years; and it is the error term. 
 
With regard to earnings conservatism, the results reported in Table 6.12 show that 
the coefficients for RET(ANC)*RD(ANC) are positive and significant at the 1% 
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level in all models, implying that bad news is recognised in a more timely fashion 
than is good news. In short, the results support the prediction managers and 
preparers of financial reports have higher incentives to report earnings 
conservatively in order to meet higher market demand for quality accounting 
information following the institutional reforms. 
6.3.3.7 Reduced Sample: Stock Price Higher than MYR 1.00 
In this section, I reduce my set of firm-year observations to include only firms 
with stock prices higher than MYR 1.00. This procedure was undertaken to avoid 
the creation of artificial scale problems that could lead to the nonlinearity of the 
model (Kothari & Zimmerman, 1995). In addition, smaller firms have, on 
average, less liquid stocks, greater information asymmetry and higher 
idiosyncratic uncertainty (Khan & Watts, 2009). For this reason many studies do 
not include those observations where the deflator (price at the beginning of the 
period) is smaller than one dollar. For example, García Lara and Mora (2004) 
exclude observations with stock prices less than one Euro, while Lobo and Zhou 
(2006) and Khan and Watts (2009) exclude observations with stock prices below 
US$ 1.00.  
As a result of excluding all observation with stock price less than MYR 1.00., the 
number of sample reduces to 1,312 firm-year observations. I then re-estimated 
equation (5.1) using basic pooled regression, Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual 
regression, and fixed-effects regression controlling for industry and year effects. 
The regression estimates are summarised in Table 6.13.  
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Table 6.13 
Asymmetric timeliness of earnings: Sample with stock price greater than MYR 
1.00 
Sample Pooled Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.075* (8.834) 0.083* (8.999) 0.019 (0.730) 
RET 0.070* (5.714) 0.057* (4.713) 0.067* (5.567) 
RD 0.016 (1.073) 0.027*** (2.036) 0.011 (0.746) 
RET*RD 0.185* (2.969) 0.361** (3.536) 0.249* (3.778) 
CONS 0.028 (1.114) 
HOTEL 0.026 (0.925) 
IPC 0.041 (1.345) 
IPROD 0.028 (1.094) 
PLANT 0.000 (0.003) 
PROP 0.030 (1.080) 
TECH  0.042 (1.515) 
TDG 0.010 (0.362) 
Y2004 0.013 (0.664) 
Y2005 0.052** (2.506) 
Y2006 0.011 (0.470) 
Y2007 0.080* (4.714) 
Y2008 0.115* (5.098) 
Adj.R2 0.10 0.14 0.14 
N 1312 1312 1312 
F-stat 24.331 70.483 7.715 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 1,312 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; Industry are dummy variables 
for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy variables for fiscal years; and it is the error 
term. 
 
Consistent with the earlier results, I find robust evidence for earnings 
conservatism in Malaysia. The coefficients for RET*RD, which measure earnings 
conservatism, are positive and significant at the 1% level, hence providing 
evidence of earnings conservatism in Malaysia following the institutional reforms. 
Specifically, the coefficient values for pooled regression, Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) annual regression, and fixed-effects regression are 0.185, 0.361, and 0.249 
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respectively. These results imply that earnings reflect bad news in a more timely 
manner than they reflect good news. All F-statistics are significant at the 1% 
level, while adjusted-R2s are between 10% and 14%, indicating the validity of the 
models.  
6.3.3.8 Time-series Test of Timeliness in Loss Recognition 
Several studies, for example Dietrich et al. (2007), criticise the application of 
Basu (1997) reverse regression as a measure for earnings conservatism. The 
detailed criticisms have been provided in Section 5.8.4. To overcome these 
criticisms, I followed the suggestion made by Ryan (2006) on the use of multiple 
measures for earnings conservatism. Similar to Basu (1997) and Ball et al. (2000), 
I use the time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition as an alternative measure 
for earnings conservatism. 
In the time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition model, I examine the 
persistence of changes in earnings, a function of the sign of the past-period 
change, as an alternative measure for earnings conservatism. Economic income is 
assumed to be completely transitory or independent across time. When earnings 
reflect economic gains and losses in a timely manner, it will incorporate transitory 
components. To the extent that earnings smoothes economic income over time, 
primarily by awaiting the realization of changes in cash flows, it will exhibit 
persistence. If earnings are asymmetrically conservative in the Basu (1997) sense, 
primarily by anticipating decreases but not increases in expected future cash 
flows, it will exhibit larger transitory decreases than increases. 
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To examine the persistence of changes in earnings, I re-estimated equation (1.2) 
using basic pooled regression, a Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression, and 
fixed-effects regression. The results are reported in Table 6.14. Consistent with 
the results reported in 
evidence of earnings conservatism in Malaysia following the institutional reforms. 
The results from the time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition show that 
earnings decreases are much less persistent (more transitory) than earnings 
increases. The coefficient for Iit-1 Iit-1, 3, is -0.701 (p<0.01) which is 
incremental with respect to the 1 with coefficient of -0.116 (p<0.05). This result 
implies accounting income reflects economic losses more quickly than economic 
profits in the period after the corporate governance and financial reporting reforms 
in Malaysia. 
The regression estimates from the Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression 
and estimation controlling for industry and year effects shows similar results. For 
the Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression, the coefficient for Iit-1, 1, -
0.104 (p>0.10), shows no evidence of reversal of prior earnings increase, while 
the coefficient for Iit-1 Iit-1 is -0.741 (p<0.01), indicating significant 
evidence that earnings decreases are more transitory than earnings increases. The 
evidence from the estimation results after controlling for industry effects and year 
effects also reaches a similar conclusion: the coefficient for Iit-1 Iit-1 is -
0.704 (p<0.01), suggesting that Malaysian firms report earnings conservatively. 
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Table 6.14 
Time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition: Various specifications 
Sample Pooled Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.006* (-2.674) 0.006 (-1.983) 0.003 (-0.417) 
t-1 -0.116** (-2.184) -0.104 (-1.312) -0.115* (-5.710) 
t-1 -0.017* (-4.259) -0.018** (-2.981) -0.017* (-4.596) 
t-1 t-1 -0.701* (-6.707) -0.741* (-6.185) -0.704* (-15.555) 
CONS -0.002 (-0.282) 
HOTEL 0.001 (-0.048) 
IPC -0.005 (-0.344) 
IPROD 0.001 (-0.080) 
PLANT 0.014*** (-1.671) 
PROP -0.002 (-0.342) 
TECH  -0.006 (-0.625) 
TDG 0.000 (-0.065) 
Y2004 0.002 (-0.357) 
Y2005 0.000 (-0.081) 
Y2006 0.002 (-0.441) 
Y2007 0.016* (-3.154) 
Y2008 -0.001 (-0.264) 
Adj.R2 0.14 0.16 0.15 
N 3105 3105 3105 
F-stat 33.33   47.732   33.131   
Model: it = 0 1 it-1 2 it-1 3 it-1 it-1 it 
The sample comprises 3,105 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: NIit is the change in earnings for firm i from year t-1 to year t, standardised by total 
assets at end of year t-1; D NIit-1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if NIit-1 if negative, and 0 
otherwise; Industry are dummy variables for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy 
variables for fiscal years; and it is the error term. 
 
In short, the results from the time-series test of timeliness in the loss recognition 
model are consistent with those reported in the main results. Earnings reported in 
Malaysia, following the institutional reforms, is timely in recognising losses 
compared to gains, and thus provides evidence to reject the first null hypothesis. 
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6.3.4 Discussion of the Results 
In the first hypothesis, I predict that earnings conservatism is pervasive in 
Malaysia following the institutional reforms because of the high demand and 
incentives to produce high-quality reporting of earnings. Previously, Ball et al. 
(2003) found no evidence of earnings conservatism in a sample from 1984 to 
1996, and concluded that Malaysian financial reporting is of low quality. In this 
study, I argue that institutional reforms have provided strong demand and 
incentives for high-quality reporting.  
The results show that there is robust evidence of earnings conservatism following 
the institutional reforms, in which economic losses are recognised in a more 
timely way than are economic gains. Specifically, earnings are at least three times 
more sensitive to negative stock returns than to positive stock returns. These 
results are also robust to various sensitivity tests, including: (1) estimation of 
Fama Macbeth t-statistics; (2) estimation controlling for industry and year 
effects; (3) estimation controlling for firm size, leverage and market to book ratio; 
(4) controlling for differential audit quality; (5) controlling the effect of market 
return; (6) employing inter-announcement stock returns as proxy for economic 
news; (7) reducing the observation to firms with a share price greater than MYR 
1.00; and (8) estimation of the time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition 
model. All the results support the prediction concerning earnings conservatism 
(that bad news is recognised in a more timely way than is good news); hence the 
results provide enough evidence to reject the first null hypothesis. 
This finding provides support to the arguments made by Bushman and Piotroski 
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(2006) and Ball et al. (2003) that country-
incentives have significant influence in earnings conservatism. Evidence of 
earnings conservatism in the post-reform period shows that firms have greater 
incentives and demands to report high quality earnings, in particular by more 
timely recognition of bad news compared to good news. Contrary to the period 
before the economic crisis where the weak institutional structures resulted in less 
incentive to preparers to report earnings conservatively (Ball, et al., 2003).  
6.4 IFRS Adoption and Earnings Conservatism 
6.4.1 Introduction 
The second objective of this study concentrates on the effect of IFRS adoption on 
earnings conservatism. The main empirical results are reported in Section 6.4.2, 
which includes comparison of earnings conservatism levels before and after 
adoption of IFRS, based on one-year and two-year horizons. Section 6.4.3 
presents various sensitivity tests, including control for industry and year effects; 
restricting the sample to observations with a financial year end dated 31 
December; limiting the analysis to firms with Big Four auditors; and restricting 
the observations to firms audited by an industry specialist. In addition, the 
sensitivity tests also include the time-series test in loss recognition. Section 6.4.4 
summarises the findings.  
6.4.2 Main Analysis: The Effect of IFRS Adoption on Earnings Conservatism 
To examine the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings conservatism, I estimated the 
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Basu (1997) reverse earnings-return regression, equation (5.1), for two 
subsamples: (i) one year before and after IFRS adoption, and (ii) two years before 
and after IFRS adoption. Panel A Table 6.15 reports the regression estimates for 
the sample for the one-year period before and after IFRS, while Panel B reports 
the results based on the sample for two years before and after IFRS adoption. 
The result in Column 1 Panel A presents regression estimates for equation (5.1) 
for a sample of 521 firms before the adoption of IFRS (the MASB accounting 
standards), while Column 2 Panel A reports the regression estimates for the first 
year after the adoption (the IFRS accounting standards). The coefficients for 
RET*RD are positive and significant in both columns, showing evidence of 
earnings conservatism in both periods.  
I further regressed equation (5.2) to test for significant difference between the 
level of earnings conservatism during the MASB and IFRS financial reporting 
regimes. The results are summarised in Column 3. In equation (5.2), the 
coefficient for IFRS*RET*RD measures the incremental earnings conservatism 
for the post-IFRS period. If the coefficient for IFRS*RET*RD is negative 
(positive) and significant, the post-IFRS period has lower (higher) earnings 
conservatism than pre-IFRS period. The results summarised in Column 3 Panel A 
show that the coefficient for IFRS*RET*RD is not significant (p>0.10), 
suggesting no evidence for any significant difference in the level of earnings 
conservatism between the two financial regimes. 
Given that the effect of IFRS on earnings conservatism may not be clearly 
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observed in the first year after IFRS adoption, I extended the horizon to two years 
before and after IFRS adoption. The regression estimates are reported in Panel B.  
Table 6.15 
IFRS adoption and earnings conservatism 
 
Panel A: One year before and after IFRS adoption 
Sample Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.083*** (1.704) 0.053** (2.390) 0.083*** (1.704) 
RET -0.066 (-0.419) 0.056 (1.496) -0.066 (-0.419) 
RD -0.014 (-0.251) -0.007 (-0.178) -0.014 (-0.251) 
RET*RD 0.410** (2.254) 0.505** (2.251) 0.410** (2.254) 
IFRS -0.030 (-0.566) 
IFRS*RET 0.122 (0.751) 
IFRS*RD 0.007 (0.099) 
IFRS*RET*RD 0.095 (0.328) 
Adj.R2 0.05 0.07 0.06 
N 521 521 1042 
F-stat 8.399 7.787 8.063 
 
Panel B: Two years before and after IFRS adoption 
Sample Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.068* (3.769) 0.065* (4.637) 0.068* (3.769) 
RET 0.061*** (1.749) 0.076* (3.574) 0.061*** (1.749) 
RD 0.003 (0.100) 0.006 (0.249) 0.003 (0.100) 
RET*RD 0.274* (3.941) 0.207* (2.909) 0.274* (3.941) 
IFRS -0.004 (-0.161) 
IFRS*RET 0.015 (0.369) 
IFRS*RD 0.003 (0.095) 
IFRS*RET*RD -0.067 (-0.674) 
Adj.R2 0.08 0.09 0.09 
N 1042 1042 2084 
F-stat 25.151 20.807 21.813 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4IFRSit 5IFRSit*RETit  
6IFRSit*RDit 7IFRSit*RETit*RDit  it 
The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; IFRS is a dummy variable 
that takes value 1 if the financial statements are prepared according to IFRS standards, and 0 
otherwise; and it is the error term. 
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The results presented in column 1 and column 2 show that earnings conservatism 
is pervasive in both periods. In the pre-IFRS adoption period, column 1, the 
coefficient for RET*RD is positive (0.274) and statistically significant (p<0.01), 
while in the period after the adoption of IFRS, column 2, the coefficient for 
RET*RD is positive (0.207) and significant (p<0.01), showing evidence of 
earnings conservatism in both financial reporting regimes. In column 3, the result 
shows that the coefficient for IFRS*RET*RD is -0.067 which suggests that the 
post-IFRS period has lower earnings conservatism than the pre-IFRS period. 
However, this coefficient is not significant (p>0.10) and therefore there is no 
significant difference in earnings conservatism between the two periods. 
Overall, the results presented in Table 6.15 suggest that there is no significant 
difference in the levels of earnings conservatism between the pre- and post-IFRS 
adoption period; hence the results fail to provide enough evidence to reject the 
second hypothesis. This implies that though the new standards (IFRS) are linked 
to more relevant and less prudent (conservative) financial reports, managers and 
auditors strongly perceived that earnings conservatism is a financial reporting 
attribute that should be preserved. 
6.4.3 Sensitivity Tests 
To test the strength of the main results, several robustness tests were carried out. 
First, I controlled for industry and year effects. Second, I limited my observations 
to firms with financial year end dated 31 December. Third, I restricted the sample 
to firms audited by Big Four auditors. Fourth, I concentrated on firms audited by 
an industry specialist. Finally, I employed the time-series test in the loss 
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recognition model as an alternative measure for earnings conservatism. 
6.4.3.1 Control for Industry and Year Effects 
This section presents the regression estimates for equation (5.2) incorporating the 
control for industry and year effects. The regression estimates on both samples, 
one year and two years before and after IFRS adoption, are presented in Table 
6.16. 
Similarly to the earlier results, the results reported in Table 6.16 show no 
significant changes in earnings conservatism between pre- and post-IFRS 
adoption periods even after controlling for industry and year effects. Neither of 
the regression models has statistically significant coefficients for IFRS*RET*RD 
for both samples, of one year and two years before and after IFRS. I could thus 
conclude that there is no difference in the degrees of earnings conservatism as a 
result of IFRS adoption.  
Overall, the results imply that managers and preparers of financial reports have a 
higher tendency to ensure timely recognition of unfavourable economic news than 
to ensure timely recognition of favourable economic news, though the IFRS 
standards demands relevance and neutral (unbiased) information. In terms of the 
validity of the results, all F-statistics are significant at the 1% level, while the 
adjusted-R2 for the model is between 10% and 11%.  
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Table 6.16 
IFRS adoption and earnings conservatism: Controlling the effect of industry and 
year effects 
Sample One Year Two Years 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.086 (1.011) -0.016 (-0.277) 
RET -0.108 (-0.641) 0.030 (0.502) 
RD -0.033 (-0.524) 0.002 (0.050) 
RET*RD 0.543* (2.729) 0.354* (3.645) 
IFRS -0.061 (-1.023) 0.039 (1.011) 
IFRS*RET 0.073 (0.411) 0.042 (0.639) 
IFRS*RD 0.052 (0.584) 0.002 (0.031) 
IFRS*RET*RD 0.643 (1.502) 0.159 (0.809) 
CONS 0.038 (0.500) 0.074 (1.372) 
HOTEL 0.071 (0.959) 0.084 (1.594) 
IPC 0.075 (0.747) 0.048 (0.689) 
IPROD 0.105 (1.485) 0.115** (2.214) 
PLANT 0.043 (0.602) 0.096*** (1.713) 
PROP -0.019 (-0.231) 0.006 (0.108) 
TECH  0.076 (0.766) 0.118 (1.599) 
TDG 0.105 (1.482) 0.119** (2.325) 
Y2005 0.029 (1.192) 
Y2006 -0.082* (-3.210) 
Adj.R2 0.10 0.11 
N 588 1176 
F-stat 4.464 7.994 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4IFRSit 5IFRSit*RETit  
6IFRSit*RDit 7IFRSit*RETit*RDit it 
The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; IFRS is a dummy variable 
that takes value 1 if the financial statements are prepared according to IFRS standards, and 0 
otherwise; Industry are dummy variables for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy 
variables for fiscal years; and it is the error term. 
6.4.3.2 Sample of Firms with Financial Year Ended 31 December 
For the testing reported in this section, the observations are restricted to firms with 
a financial year ended 31 December. This procedure was undertaken to control for 
time effects that might influence the measurement for economic news. I re-
estimated equation (5.1) on the sample of one year and two years before and after 
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IFRS adoption. For the pooled sample, I re-estimated equation (5.2) to test for 
significant difference in earnings conservatism between the pre and post-IFRS 
periods. The results are presented in Table 6.17, which includes the results for: (i) 
pre-IFRS period (Column 1); post-IFRS period (Column 2); and pooled sample 
(Column 3). 
Table 6.17 
IFRS Adoption and earnings conservatism: Sample with financial year end dated 
31 December 
Panel A: One year before and after IFRS adoption 
Sample Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.162* (3.195) 0.093* (3.070) 0.162* (3.195) 
RET -0.112 (-0.664) -0.031 (-0.518) -0.112 (-0.664) 
RD -0.047 (-0.752) 0.019 (0.284) -0.047 (-0.752) 
RET*RD 0.528* (2.642) 1.151* (2.957) 0.528* (2.642) 
IFRS -0.070 (-1.184) 
IFRS*RET 0.081 (0.450) 
IFRS*RD 0.066 (0.727) 
IFRS*RET*RD 0.624 (1.426) 
Adj.R2 0.10 0.08 0.09 
N 294 294 588 
F-stat 13.272 5.145 7.985 
 
Panel B: Two years before and after IFRS adoption 
Sample Pre-IFRS Post-IFRS Pooled 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.089* (3.682) 0.067* (3.739) 0.089* (3.682) 
RET 0.031 (0.533) 0.072** (2.452) 0.031 (0.533) 
RD -0.008 (-0.212) 0.002 (0.054) -0.008 (-0.212) 
RET*RD 0.326* (3.301) 0.428** (2.401) 0.326* (3.301) 
IFRS -0.022 (-0.722) 
IFRS*RET 0.041 (0.637) 
IFRS*RD 0.010 (0.188) 
IFRS*RET*RD 0.102 (0.501) 
Adj.R2 0.08 0.09 0.09 
N 588 588 1176 
F-stat 20.066 10.380 14.104 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4IFRSit 5IFRSit*RETit  
6IFRSit*RDit 7IFRSit*RETit*RDit it 
The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
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Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; IFRS is a dummy variable 
that takes value 1 if the financial statements are prepared according to IFRS standards, and 0 
otherwise; and it is the error term. 
 
The results reported in Panel A and Panel B show that the coefficients for 
RET*RD are positive and significant at the 1% level, indicating evidence of 
earnings conservatism in Malaysia in both periods. However, the coefficients for 
IFRS*RET*RD in both samples, one year and two years, are positive but 
insignificant (p>0.10), suggesting that there is no significant difference in 
earnings conservatism between the MASB and IFRS reporting periods. 
Overall, the findings reported in Table 6.17 are qualitatively similar to the main 
results. The analyses find no evidence of significant difference in the levels of 
earnings conservatism between the MASB and IFRS reporting periods, and thus 
fail to provide evidence to reject the second hypothesis.  
6.4.3.3 Firms with Big Four Auditors 
Given the evidence from prior studies that Big Four auditors have higher audit 
quality, it is important to control for differential audit quality. Detailed discussion 
was provided in Section 6.3.3.4. 
 To control for audit quality, I re-estimated equation (5.2) on a restricted sample 
of firms with Big Four auditors. The regression estimates for equation (5.2) are 
reported in Table 6.18, including samples of one year and two years before and 
after IFRS adoption.  
166 
 
Table 6.18 
IFRS Adoption and earnings conservatism: Sample of firms with Big 4 auditors 
Sample One Year Two Years 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.096*** (1.825) 0.074* (3.541) 
RET -0.135 (-0.941) 0.056 (1.498) 
RD 0.021 (0.367) 0.023 (0.840) 
RET*RD 0.523* (3.196) 0.303* (4.309) 
IFRS -0.033 (-0.563) 0.012 (0.439) 
IFRS*RET 0.194 (1.289) 0.011 (0.226) 
IFRS*RD -0.001 (-0.016) -0.039 (-1.051) 
IFRS*RET*RD -0.048 (-0.171) -0.128 (-1.260) 
Adj.R2 0.08 0.10  
N 694 1381  
F-stat 6.340 16.596  
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4IFRSit 5IFRSit*RETit  
6IFRSit*RDit 7IFRSit*RETit*RDit it 
The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; IFRS is a dummy variable 
that takes value 1 if the financial statements are prepared according to IFRS standards, and 0 
otherwise; and it is the error term. 
 
The results reported in Table 6.18 are qualitatively similar to the main findings. 
The coefficients for RET*RD are positive and significant (p<0.01) for both 
samples, showing evidence of earnings conservatism in Malaysia. However, the 
coefficients for IFRS*RET*RD for both samples are insignificant (p>0.10), 
implying there were no significant changes in the level of earnings conservatism 
after the adoption of IFRS. All F-statistics are significant at the 1% level, 
indicating the validity of the models, while adjusted-R2s are between 8% and 
10%, which are identical to the previous analysis. In short, the result fails to 
provide evidence to infer that the adoption of IFRS reduces or increases the 
earnings conservatism level, even after reducing the sample to firms with Big 
Four auditors. 
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6.4.3  
specialization has been found to have significant influence on 
the quality of earnings, in particular earnings conservatism. Krishnan (2005a), for 
example, finds that firms audited by industry specialists report more conservative 
earnings than do firms with non-specialist auditors, suggesting that auditors' 
industry specialization moderates the tendency of the client to delay the 
recognition of economic losses. In addition, Krishnan (2003) finds clients of 
industry specialists have significantly lower discretionary accruals than clients of 
non-specialist auditors.  
Given that industry specialists have superior knowledge and resources, it is to be 
expected they would facilitate a smoother transition to IFRS accounting standards. 
I restricted the observation to firms audited by industry specialists to control the 
effect of auditor industry specialization on earnings conservatism.27 I re-estimated 
equation (5.1) on samples of one year and two years before and after IFRS 
adoption. The results are reported in Table 6.19. 
Similar to the main results, the coefficients for RET*RD are positive and 
significant (p<0.01) for both samples, showing evidence of earnings conservatism 
in Malaysia. The coefficient for IFRS*RET*RD, which measures significant 
difference in the levels of earnings conservatism between the pre- and post-IFRS 
periods, shows mixed results. For the sample of observations one year before and 
                                               
27 Industry specialist was identified using an industry leader approach, which is identified based on 
the percentage of total sales audited per total sales of the companies that are listed in the 
industry (Krishnan, 2003). 
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after IFRS adoption, the coefficient for IFRS*RET*RD is -0.426 but is 
insignificant (p>0.10), showing no significant difference in earnings conservatism 
between the two periods. However, the sample of observations two years before 
and after IFRS adoption, the coefficient for IFRS*RET*RD is -0.403 and 
significant at the 5% level (p>0.10). These results show mixed but weak evidence 
that in firms audited by an industry specialist, earnings conservatism declines after 
the adoption of IFRS.  
Table 6.19 
IFRS Adoption and earnings conservatism: Sample of firms audited by industry 
specialist 
Sample One Year Two Years 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.157* (4.997) 0.093* (3.494) 
RET -0.310* (-5.491) -0.028 (-0.401) 
RD 0.008 (0.142) 0.021 (0.448) 
RET*RD 0.801* (4.519) 0.461* (3.284) 
IFRS -0.110** (-2.380) -0.017 (-0.502) 
IFRS*RET 0.430* (6.149) 0.135*** (1.818) 
IFRS*RD 0.008 (0.103) -0.047 (-0.783) 
IFRS*RET*RD -0.426 (-1.543) -0.403** (-2.428) 
Adj.R2 0.23 0.14  
N 291 575  
F-stat 8.808 10.063  
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4IFRSit 5IFRSit*RETit  
6IFRSit*RDit 7IFRSit*RETit*RDit it 
The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; IFRS is a dummy variable 
that takes value 1 if the financial statements are prepared according to IFRS standards, and 0 
otherwise; and it is the error term. 
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6.4.3.5 Time-Series Test of Timeliness in Loss Recognition 
Following Basu (1997) and Ball et al. (2000), I use the time-series test of 
timeliness in loss recognition as an alternative measure for earnings 
conservatism.28 This model focuses on the extent to which earnings changes 
reverse, and the extent to which the probability of reversal differs according to 
whether the previous earnings change was positive or negative. To investigate the 
impact of IFRS adoption on earnings conservatism, I modified the time-series test 
of timeliness in loss recognition model to allow examination of incremental 
reversal of earnings changes from previous year changes of earnings due to IFRS. 
The modified model is as follows: 
NIit = 0 1 it-1 2 it-1 3 it-1 it-1 4IFRSit-1  
5IFRSit-1 it-1 6IFRSit-1 it-1  
7IFRSit-1 it-1 it-1 it 
(6.1) 
where NIit is the change in earnings for firm i from year t-1 to year t, 
standardised by total assets at end of year t-1; D NIit-1 is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if NIit-1 if negative, and 0 otherwise; IFRS is a dummy variable that 
takes value 1 if the financial statements are prepared according to IFRS standards, 
and 0; and it is the error term. 
Equation (6.1) is the extension for the time-series test of timeliness in loss 
recognition employed by Basu (1997), which allows IFRS to interact with all 
                                               
28 This test was conducted to overcome this criticism towards the Basu (1997) asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings model, which was discusses in Section 5.8.1. 
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variables in the basic model. The coefficient for IFRS* NIit-1 NIit-1 tests 
whether there is a significant difference of the coefficient for NIit-1 NIit-1, 
between the pre- and post-adoption of IFRS. The coefficient of NIit-1 NIit-1 
measures the transitory nature of earnings decreases compared to earnings 
increases, which is a measure for earnings conservatism. 
Table 6.20 
Time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition: Pre- and post-IFRS adoption 
Sample One Year Two Years 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept -0.000 (-0.079) 0.002 (0.578) 
NIit-1 -0.279* (-3.012) -0.139** (-2.199) 
it-1 -0.015*** (-1.735) -0.016** (-2.528) 
NIit-1 it-1 -0.535** (-2.048) -0.583* (-2.992) 
IFRSit-1 0.004 (0.703) 0.009 (1.597) 
IFRSit-1 it-1 0.293** (2.378) 0.137 (1.104) 
IFRSit-1 it-1 0.012 (0.965) 0.002 (0.173) 
IFRSit-1 it-1 it-1 -0.321 (-0.977) -0.376 (-1.494) 
Adj.R2 0.20 0.15  
N 1040 2079  
F-stat 10.611 17.925  
Model: it = 0 1 it-1 2 it-1 3 it-1 it-1 4IFRSit-1 5IFRSit-1 it-1  
6IFRSit-1 it-1 7IFRSit-1 it-1 it-1 it 
The sample comprises 2,079 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: NIit is the change in earnings for firm i from year t-1 to year t, standardised 
by total assets at end of year t-1; D NIit-1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if NIit-1 if negative, 
and 0 otherwise; IFRS is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the financial statements are 
prepared according to IFRS standards, and 0; and it is the error term. 
 
The regression estimates of equation (6.1) are presented in Table 6.20. The results 
show that earnings conservatism is a pervasive feature in Malaysian financial 
reporting. The coefficients for NIit-1 NIit-1 are negative and significant in both 
samples, suggesting that the overall negative serial correlation in earnings changes 
is driven by a reversal of negative earnings changes. However, no significant 
evidence was found on differences between earnings conservatism for the two 
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samples. The coefficients for IFRS* NIit-1 NIit-1 are negative but not 
significant (p>0.10), implying there are no significant changes in the extent to 
which positive earnings changes are more persistent than negative earnings 
changes after the adoption of IFRS. Thus, the results from the alternative measure 
for earnings conservatism fails to provide support for the prediction that the 
adoption of IFRS would affect earnings conservatism. 
6.4.4 Discussion of the Results 
The second objective of this study was to examine the effect of IFRS adoption on 
earnings conservatism in Malaysia. Given that IFRS standards were made 
effective from 1 January 2006, this study compares the level of earnings 
conservatism for one-year and two-year horizons pre- and post-IFRS adoption. 
Employing the modified Basu (1997) reverse earnings-return regression, I find no 
significant difference in the level of earnings conservatism between the pre- and 
post-IFRS adoption periods. To ascertain the sensitivity of the results, various 
sensitivity analyses were conducted including: (i) controlling for industry and year 
effects; (ii) reducing the sample to firms with financial year ended 31 December; 
(iii) restricting the sample to firms with Big Four auditors; (iv) limiting the sample 
to firms audited by an industry specialist; and (v) employing the time-series test of 
timeliness in loss recognition model as an alternative measure for earnings 
conservatism.  
This study conjectures that IFRS adoption would affect the level of earnings 
conservatism since  is to provide 
more relevant and neutral information. Given that earnings conservatism, or 
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application of higher verification standards in recognising economic losses than 
economic gains, biases reporting, conservatism is no longer a desirable qualitative 
characteristic of earnings under IFRS. Contrary to this prediction, the results from 
the main analysis and the various sensitivity tests show no significant difference 
in the level of earnings conservatism between pre- and post-IFRS adoption 
periods.  
However, these results provide support for explanations for conservatism such as 
contracting, litigation, taxation, and regulation factors (Watts, 2003a, 2003b). Any 
attempt to reduce earnings conservatism would increase the agency cost and the 
litigation risk, thus market-based mechanisms would require firms to exercise 
higher verification standards in recognising economic gains than economic losses. 
Furthermore, these results may be due to the feature of IFRS that limits 
discretion in choosing accounting alternatives (Devalle, Onali, & Magarini, 2010). 
The lack of flexibility in the range of available accounting alternatives may impair 
the ability of managers to report accounting measures that reflect the underlying 
economic conditions of a firm (Barth, et al., 2008). Therefore, a priori, it is 
difficult to determine the effect of IFRS adoption on earnings conservatism.  
Overall, this study does not find evidence that IFRS adoption has a significant 
impact on earnings conservatism. A plausible explanation is that earnings 
conservatism plays important roles in debt-contracting, minimizing the litigation 
risk, and enhancing greater monitoring; hence managers, preparers of financial 
reports, and auditors have greater incentives to report earnings conservatively 
though the accounting standards warranted unbiased information. As such, this 
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study provides evidence for debates on the roles of conservatism, and whether it 
should indeed be eliminated from financial reporting. 
6.5 Ownership Structure and Earnings Conservatism 
6.5.1 Introduction  
This section discusses the results of my tests to investigate whether earnings 
conservatism is influenced by ownership structure. Ownership structure is 
classified into family firms, state-controlled firms, and widely-held firms. Section 
6.5.2 examines differences in earnings conservatism for each type of ownership 
structure, measured using the timeliness of earnings in recognising good news and 
bad news. Section 6.5.3 reports the sensitivity analyses such as Fama and 
MacBeth (1973) estimation, fixed-effects regression, and time-series test of 
timeliness in loss recognition. In addition, the sensitivity tests include alternative 
measures for family ownership/control and classification of state-controlled firms 
into firms under control of the Federal Government of Malaysia and those under 
the control of States  Governments. Section 6.5.4 reports two additional tests. 
First, Section 6.5.4.1 reports the test for difference between the earnings 
conservatism levels of family and widely-held firms. Second, Section 6.5.4.2 
reports tests of the relation between strategic control of a family of a 
management and corporate board influences earnings conservatism. Finally, the 
overall results for the third hypothesis are summarised in Section 6.5.5 
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6.5.2 Main Analysis: Ownership Structure and Earnings Conservatism 
To examine differences between earnings conservatism for firms with different 
ownership structure, I estimated equation (5.1) on three samples: family firms, 
state-controlled firms and widely-held firms. The regression estimates are 
reported in Table 6.21. Panel A (Panel B) presents the regression estimates for the 
timeliness of good news (bad news), while Panel C reports the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings between the good news and bad news samples.  
The results reported in Panel A show that the coefficients for RET in family firms 
and state-controlled firms are positive and significant at the 1% level, implying 
that both types of firms recognise good news in a timely manner. For widely-held 
firms, the coefficient for RET is not significant (p>0.10), showing no evidence of 
timeliness of earnings in recognising good news in those firms. 
For the bad news sample, the results reported in Panel B show that bad news is 
recognised in a timely fashion in family firms and widely-held samples, but not in 
state-controlled firms. The coefficient values for RET in family firms and widely-
held firms are 0.292 and 0.213, both significant at the 1% level, implying 
evidence of timely recognition of bad news. However, the coefficient for RET in 
state-controlled firms is not significant (p>0.10), suggesting that state-controlled 
firms delay the recognition of bad news. From both Panel A and Panel B, the 
results show that family firms are timely in recognising both types of economic 
news, while widely-held firms are timely in recognition of bad news but not good 
news. Contrary to family firms and widely-held firms, good news appears to be 
recognised in a more timely fashion than is bad news in state-controlled firms, 
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showing no evidence of conservatism. 
 
Table 6.21 
Ownership structure and earnings conservatism 
 
Panel A: Timeliness of earnings in good news sample 
Sample Family State-Controlled Widely-Held 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.059* (5.232) 0.086* (7.230) 0.040** (2.358) 
RET 0.091* (6.053) 0.074* (3.918) 0.028 (0.933) 
Adj.R2 0.09 0.10 0.01 
N 854 136 568 
F-stat 36.636 15.354 0.870 
 
Panel B: Timeliness of earnings in bad news sample 
Sample Family State-Controlled Widely-Held 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.074* (4.485) 0.081* (3.167) 0.034*** (1.770) 
RET 0.292* (5.678) 0.163 (1.538) 0.213* (4.097) 
Adj.R2 0.03 0.03 0.02 
N 916 98 554 
F-stat 32.241 2.364 16.786 
 
Panel C: The asymmetric timeliness of earnings 
Sample Family State-Controlled Widely-Held 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.059* (5.232) 0.086* (7.221) 0.040** (2.357) 
RET 0.091* (6.053) 0.074* (3.914) 0.028 (0.933) 
RD 0.014 (0.724) -0.005 (-0.166) -0.006 (-0.247) 
RET*RD 0.201* (3.747) 0.089 (0.826) 0.185* (3.093) 
Adj.R2 0.10 0.14 0.04 
N 1770 234 1122 
F-stat 43.233 11.749 15.240 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 3,126 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; and it is the error term. 
 
The results for difference between the timeliness of earnings in recognition of 
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good news and bad news are reported in Panel C. The regression estimates, from 
the Basu (1997) reverse earnings-return regression, contain evidence of earnings 
conservatism in family firms and widely-held firms. The coefficient for RET*RD, 
which measures the difference or the increment in the timeliness of earnings in 
recognising bad news compared to good news, are 0.201 and 0.185 in family 
firms and widely-held firms respectively, and significant at the 1% level. These 
results imply evidence of earnings conservatism in family firms and wide-held 
firms. For state-controlled firms, the coefficient for RET*RD is not significant 
(p>0.10), and no evidence of earnings conservatism was found. 
Overall, the results show that ownership structure has a significant influence on 
the level of earnings conservatism. A plausible explanation is that the incentives 
and demands for conservative reporting vary due to the different levels of agency 
costs and information asymmetry applicable to each type of ownership structure. 
With regard to family firms, the findings support the proposition that significant 
family control of a firm exerts greater monitoring and provides greater incentive 
to produce high-quality earnings, i.e. earnings conservatism. The evidence is 
consistent with Wang (2006), who documents that founding family ownership in 
the United States is associated with higher earnings quality, in particular lower 
abnormal accruals, greater earnings informativeness, and less persistence of 
transitory loss components in earnings. Indirectly, this study provides evidence of 
alignment effects in family firms. For state-controlled firms, the evidence from 
this study is consistent with Bushman and Piotroski (2006), where in common-law 
countries firms facing high state involvement in the economy tend to speed the 
recognition of good news and slow the recognition of bad news relative to firms in 
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countries with less state involvement. The plausible explanation is that the 
government might intervene in poorly-performing state-controlled firms, and 
managers are inclined to avoid such interference by exploiting reporting discretion 
to portray an optimistic outlook (Bushman & Piotroski, 2006). Furthermore, state-
controlled firms were pressured by the government to upwardly tilt their reporting 
decisions (Bushman & Piotroski, 2006).  
6.5.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
I performed various robustness tests to test the robustness of the main results. 
First, in Section 6.5.3.1, I use the Fama and MacBeth estimation. Second, I 
control for industry and year effects in Section 6.5.3.2. Third, I employed time-
series test of loss recognition, the results of which are reported in Section 6.5.3.3. 
Fourth, I use different definitions for family firms; and the regression estimates 
are reported in Section 6.5.3.4. Finally, in Section 6.5.3.5, I partition the state-
controlled firms into Federal-Government-controlled firms and non-Federal-
Government-controlled firms.  
6.5.3.1 Fama and MacBeth (1973)  
I re-estimated the Basu (1997) reverse earnings-return regression using Fama and 
MacBeth  (1973) procedure on family firms, state-controlled firms, and widely-
held firms to control for cross-sectional dependence problems. The estimation 
results are presented in Table 6.22.  
Consistent with the main results, regression estimates in Table 6.22 show 
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evidence of earnings conservatism in family firms and widely-held firms. The 
coefficient for RET*RD in family firms is 0.313 and significant at the 1% level, 
implying more timely recognition of economic losses and economic gains. The 
coefficient for RET is also positive and significant (p<0.01), suggesting timely 
recognition of good news. These results show that in family firms, both bad news 
and good news are recognised in a timely way in earnings, but the recognition 
speed is faster in the case of bad news.  
Table 6.22 
Ownership structure and earnings conservatism: Fama and MacBeth (1973) 
annual regression 
Sample Family State-Controlled Widely-Held 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.077* (4.057) 0.085* (7.993) 0.047*** (2.185) 
RET 0.075* (4.306) 0.082*** (2.422) 0.026 (0.914) 
RD 0.008 (0.428) -0.008 (-0.152) 0.006 (0.304) 
RET*RD 0.313* (4.971) 0.116 (0.649) 0.343*** (2.464) 
Adj.R2 0.14 0.21 0.08 
N 1770 234 1122 
F-stat 56.592 36.999 10.253 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 3,126 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. I use the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology to cope with the possible cross-sectional 
dependence problems. The coefficients of the parameters have been obtained as the simple average 
from the cross-sectional regression. The t-statistics are the ratios of the mean estimated 
Coefficients to the standard deviation of the distribution of the annual estimated slope 
Coefficients, divided by the square root of the number of years. Asterisks denote statistical 
significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. Variable definitions: Eit is 
the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per share at the beginning of the 
fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is a dummy variable that equals 
1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; and it is the error term. 
With regard to the widely-held sample, the results show a qualitatively similar 
result to the earlier analysis. The coefficient for RET*RD is positive (0.343) and 
significant at the 10% level, showing little evidence of earnings conservatism in 
widely-held firms. However, the coefficient for RET is not significant, implying 
no evidence of the timeliness of earnings towards good news. For state-controlled 
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firms, the results from Fama and MacBeth estimation show that the coefficient for 
RET is positive and significant (p<0.10), implying timely recognition of good 
news; however, the coefficient of RET*RD is not significant, indicating lack of 
evidence to assert the presence of earnings conservatism in state-controlled firms. 
In short, the results reported in Table 6.22, based on Fama and MacBeth (1973), 
support the main results. 
6.5.3.2 Industry and Year Effects 
In this section, I re-estimated equation (5.1) using fixed-effects regression that 
incorporated industry and year dummies. This procedure was undertaken to 
control the serial correlation problem of the residual of panel data in the Basu 
(1997) reverse earnings-return regression. The regression estimates for family 
firms, state-controlled firms, and widely-held firms are summarised in Table 6.23. 
The results show that the coefficients for RET for all types of firms are positive 
and significant, implying timely recognition of good news. However, the 
incremental timeliness of bad news, earnings conservatism, is found only in 
family firms and widely-held firms. The coefficients for RET*RD in family firms 
and widely-held firms are 0.285 and 0.264, respectively, and significant at the 1% 
level, implying evidence for earnings conservatism in both family firms and 
widely-held firms. For state-controlled firms, no evidence of earnings 
conservatism is documented since the coefficient for RET*RD is not significant 
(p>0.10). All F-statistics are significant at the 1% level, showing the validity of 
the results. In short, the main findings are robust even after controlling for 
industry and year effects. 
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Table 6.23 
Ownership structure and earnings conservatism: Estimation controlling for 
industry and year effects 
Sample Family State-Controlled Widely-Held 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.029 (0.960) 0.167* (4.912) -0.049 (-1.240) 
RET 0.088* (9.427) 0.057* (2.794) 0.025*** (1.864) 
RD 0.005 (0.247) -0.009 (-0.370) -0.011 (-0.408) 
RET*RD 0.285* (5.171) 0.106 (1.365) 0.264* (4.166) 
CONS -0.001 (-0.031) -0.104* (-3.039) 0.055 (1.369) 
HOTEL -0.145*** (-1.698) 0.109 (1.267) 
IPC 0.067 (0.788) -0.351* (-6.473) 0.116 (1.349) 
IPROD 0.027 (1.002) -0.100* (-3.053) 0.077** (2.116) 
PLANT -0.027 (-0.739) 0.100** (2.110) 
PROP -0.034 (-1.122) -0.094* (-2.746) 0.086** (2.027) 
TECH  0.043 (0.935) 0.060 (1.161) 
TDG -0.023 (-0.770) -0.089* (-3.053) 0.103* (2.738) 
Y2004 0.021 (0.902) -0.007 (-0.274) 0.002 (0.059) 
Y2005 0.091* (3.808) 0.021 (0.770) 0.037 (1.275) 
Y2006 0.003 (0.121) 0.024 (0.921) -0.032 (-1.119) 
Y2007 0.051** (2.178) 0.028 (1.099) 0.043 (1.512) 
Y2008 0.123* (5.035) 0.042 (1.432) 0.107* (3.545) 
Adj.R2 0.13 0.26 0.05 
N 1770 234 1122 
F-stat 16.898 7.425 5.077 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 3,126 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; Industry are dummy variables 
for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy variables for fiscal years; and it is the error 
term. 
 
6.5.3.3 Time-Series Test of Timeliness in Loss Recognition 
In this section, I estimated the time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition as 
an alternative measure for earnings conservatism, in order to ascertain the 
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robustness of the earlier results.29 Table 6.24 presents the regression estimates 
from the time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition for family firms, state-
controlled firms, and widely-held firms.  
Table 6.24 
Ownership structure and time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition 
Sample Family State-Controlled Widely-Held 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.008* (2.822) 0.005 (0.669) 0.005 (1.130) 
 it-1 -0.166* (-2.783) -0.254 (-1.084) -0.042 (-0.439) 
 it-1 -0.016* (-3.238) -0.008 (-0.737) -0.020* (-2.808) 
 it-1  it-1 -0.608* (-4.506) -0.578 (-1.484) -0.836* (-4.781) 
Adj.R2 0.14 0.20 0.13 
N 1762 229 1114 
F-stat 19.098 4.254 12.631 
Model: it = 0 1 it-1 2 it-1 3 it-1 it-1 it 
The sample comprises 3,105 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: NIit is the change in earnings for firm i from year t-1 to year t, standardised by total 
assets at end of year t-1; D NIit-1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if NIit-1 if negative, and 0 
otherwise; and it is the error term. 
 
The regression estimates for family firms and widely-held firms denote that 
earnings decreases are much less persistent (more transitory) than their increases. 
The coefficients for NIit-1 NIit-1 for family firms and widely-held firms are -
0.608 and -0.836 respectively, and both are significant at the 1% level. This shows 
that earnings reflect economic losses more quickly than it reflects economic 
profits in family firms and widely-held firms. For state-controlled firms, no 
evidence of earnings conservatism was found as the coefficient for NIit-1 NIit-
1 is not significant, suggesting that earnings decreases are much less persistent 
                                               
29 The sample sizes are reduced because of the additional data requirements to calculate income 
changes in two consecutive years.  
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(more transitory) than earnings increases. These results are also consistent with 
the main result based on the asymmetric timeliness of earnings model. 
Furthermore, the F-statistics in all sub-samples are significant at the 1% level, 
showing the validity of the model.  
6.5.3.4 Alternative Measures for Family Firms 
In this section, I employ two alternative measures for family firms to test whether 
the evidence of earnings conservatism in family firms in the analysis above is 
sensitive to altewrnative definitions. For the first measure, family firms can be 
either (i) firms with at least two members of the controlling family on the board of 
directors; or (ii) firms in which the largest shareholder, either an individual, a 
family, or a private firm, owns more than 20% of the shares. This definition is 
based on Faccio and Lang (2002), Arosa, Iturralde, and Maseda (2010), La Porta 
et al. (1999) and Villalonga and Amit (2006).  
For the second measure, I employed a stricter definition for family firms by 
increasing the minimum threshold for the largest shareholder, whether an 
individual, a family, or a private firm, to 30. In addition, the board of directors 
must comprise at least two members from the controlling family. In terms of 
sample size, the number of observations increases from 1,770 in the main sample 
to 2,310 firm-year observations in the first alternative measure for family firms; 
while for the second measure, the number of firm-year observations in the sample 
decreases to 1,176 firm-year observations.  
I re-estimated equation (5.1) using the basic pooled regression, Fama and 
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MacBeth (1973) annual regression, and fixed-effects regression. The results are 
summarised in Table 6.25(a) and 6.25(b).  
Table 6.25(a) 
Ownership structure and earnings conservatism: Alternative definitions for family 
firms and various specifications (Board presence or more than 20% shares) 
Model Basic Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.051* (6.321) 0.066** (3.830) 0.009 (0.453) 
RET 0.081* (5.958) 0.066** (2.848) 0.078* (8.183) 
RD 0.018 (1.408) 0.010 (0.821) 0.012 (0.925) 
RET*RD 0.168* (4.879) 0.259* (5.026) 0.231* (6.562) 
CONS 0.007 (0.361) 
HOTEL -0.062 (-1.254) 
IPC 0.088 (1.478) 
IPROD 0.026 (1.523) 
PLANT 0.032 (1.408) 
PROP 0.007 (0.393) 
TECH  0.008 (0.312) 
TDG 0.012 (0.653) 
Y2004 0.026*** (1.814) 
Y2005 0.067* (4.479) 
Y2006 0.002 (0.130) 
Y2007 0.044* (3.052) 
Y2008 0.097* (6.342) 
Adj.R2 0.10 0.13 0.12 
N 2310 2310 2310 
F-stat 61.076   59.950   20.469   
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 2,310 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; Industry are dummy variables 
for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy variables for fiscal years; and it is the error 
term. 
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Table 6.25(b) 
Ownership structure and earnings conservatism: Alternative definitions for family 
firms and various specifications (Board Presence and More than 30% shares) 
Model Basic Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects 
Statistics Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.076* (8.052) 0.084* (5.675) 0.013 (0.519) 
RET 0.093* (5.441) 0.095* (7.280) 0.095* (7.974) 
RD 0.017 (1.078) 0.015 (1.097) 0.009 (0.550) 
RET*RD 0.175* (3.470) 0.238** (3.545) 0.215* (4.689) 
CONS 0.038 (1.561) 
HOTEL 0.027 (0.351) 
IPC 0.071 (0.944) 
IPROD 0.056** (2.369) 
PLANT 0.011 (0.353) 
PROP 0.027 (1.049) 
TECH  -0.008 (-0.165) 
TDG 0.003 (0.113) 
Y2004 0.021 (1.163) 
Y2005 0.066* (3.588) 
Y2006 0.024 (1.329) 
Y2007 0.033*** (1.846) 
Y2008 0.086* (4.596) 
Adj.R2 0.14 0.17 0.16 
N 1176 1176 1176 
F-stat 39.414   24.616   14.972   
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 1,176 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; Industry are dummy variables 
for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy variables for fiscal years; and it is the error 
term. 
 
Table 6.25(a) presents regression estimates on the sample derived from the first 
alternative measure of family firms. The results denote qualitatively similar 
results to those in the main analysis. The coefficients for RET are positively 
significant in all three models, suggesting that earnings are timely in the 
recognition of good news. The coefficients for RET*RD for the basic pooled 
regression, Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression, and fixed-effects 
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regression are 0.168, 0.259, and 0.231, respectively, and significant at the 1% 
level, implying earnings reflect bad news in a more timely manner than good 
news.  
The results reported in Table 6.25(b) also show qualitatively similar results to 
those reported in the main analysis, in which earnings conservatism is a pervasive 
feature in family firms. The coefficients for RET*RD are positive and significant 
(p<0.01) in all models, implying a more timely recognition of economic losses 
than economic gains in family firms.  
6.5.3.5 State-Controlled Firms: Federal and States  Firms 
In the main results, I find no evidence of earnings conservatism in state-controlled 
firms. Specifically, state-controlled firms are timely in the recognition of good 
news but not in the recognition of bad news; hence the results do not provide 
evidence of earnings conservatism in state-controlled firms. In this section, I 
further examine whether the main results differ when the sample is divided into 
firms under control of the Federal Government of Malaysia on the one hand and 
State Governments on the other. I employed this classification because the 
monitoring mechanisms for state-controlled firms vary according to firm 
ownership. For firms under the control of the Federal Government, Khazanah 
Nasional monitors and assesses the performance of directors. In addition, the 
Putrajaya Committee on GLC High Performance (PCG) conducts the 
transformation plan to enhance the performance of these firms. Firms under the 
control of State Governments are managed and controlled through the State 
Economic Development Corporation (SEDC), which has limited resources 
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compared to the Khazanah Nasional. 
Table 6.26(a) 
Earnings conservatism in Firms under control of the Federal Government of 
Malaysia: Various specifications  
Basic Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects 
Variable Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.075* (6.940) 0.074* (6.028) -0.213* (-4.578) 
RET 0.098* (3.307) 0.099** (3.518) 0.086* (3.380) 
RD -0.005 (-0.130) -0.014 (-0.272) -0.017 (-0.656) 
RET*RD 0.100 (0.513) 0.085 (0.300) -0.022 (-0.233) 
CONS 0.276* (6.167) 
HOTEL 
IPC 
IPROD 0.257* (5.903) 
PLANT 0.383* (6.828) 
PROP 
TECH  
TDG 0.268* (6.297) 
Y2004 0.027 (0.957) 
Y2005 0.042 (1.468) 
Y2006 0.038 (1.318) 
Y2007 0.017 (0.596) 
Y2008 0.020 (0.687) 
Adj.R2 0.19 0.37 0.41 
N 132 132 132 
F-stat 7.314 5.243 8.479 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 132 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; Industry are dummy variables 
for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy variables for fiscal years; and it is the error 
term. 
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Table 6.26(b) 
Earnings conservatism in Firms under control of State Governments: Various 
specifications  
Basic Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects 
Variable Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.099* (3.822) 0.062 (1.846) 0.028 (0.447) 
RET 0.053** (2.035) 0.143 (1.740) 0.021 (0.631) 
RD 0.014 (0.383) 0.085 (1.735) 0.040 (0.760) 
RET*RD 0.143 (1.223) 0.233 (1.120) 0.278** (2.014) 
CONS 
HOTEL 
IPC 
IPROD 0.088 (1.327) 
PLANT 0.160** (2.383) 
PROP 0.077 (1.300) 
TECH  
TDG 0.083 (1.420) 
Y2004 -0.073 (-1.459) 
Y2005 -0.037 (-0.621) 
Y2006 -0.004 (-0.084) 
Y2007 0.044 (0.953) 
Y2008 0.053 (0.823) 
Adj.R2 0.09 0.13 0.15 
N 102 102 102 
F-stat 4.864 5.212 2.473 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 102 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; Industry are dummy variables 
for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy variables for fiscal years; and it is the error 
term. 
 
To examine whether reporting of earnings conservatism varies between different 
types of state-controlled firms, I estimated the basic pooled regression, the Fama 
and MacBeth (1973) annual regression, and fixed-effects regression. Table 6.26(a) 
reports regression estimates for firms under the control of the Federal Government 
of Malaysia, while Table 6.26(b) reports the results for firms under the control of 
State Governments. In Table 6.26(a), the coefficients for RET*RD in all 
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estimation models are not significant, implying that firms under the control of the 
Federal Government do not report earnings conservatively. For Table 6.26(b), the 
coefficients for RET*RD are not significant in the basic and Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) regressions but the coefficient is weakly significant in the fixed-effects 
regression. These results show that, in general, state-controlled firms do not report 
earnings conservatively.  
The situation might result from the complex principal-agent relationship and poor 
monitoring mechanisms in state-controlled firms. As discussed in Section 6.5.2, 
the government has a higher tendency to intervene in poorly-performing state-
controlled firms, the managers of these firms are more likely to avoid such 
interference, that is by exploiting reporting discretion in order to portray an 
optimistic outlook (Bushman & Piotroski, 2006). Furthermore, state-controlled 
firms were pressured by the government to upwardly tilt their reporting decisions 
(Bushman & Piotroski, 2006).  
6.5.4 Additional Analysis  
This section extends the analysis of the relationship between ownership structure 
and earnings conservatism in two ways. First, this study examines whether there is 
a significant difference between the levels of earnings conservatism of family 
firms and widely-held firms. Second, this study examines whether strategic 
control by a family of the board of directors, that is by holding the positions of 
both CEO and chairman of the board, influences earnings conservatism. 
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6.5.4.1 Difference in Earnings Conservatism between Family Firms and 
Widely-Held Firms. 
This section further examines systematic differences between the level of earnings 
conservatism of family firms and widely-held firms. A new variable, named 
FAMILY, which takes value 1 for family firms and 0 for widely-held firms, was 
established. Other interaction variables, FAMILY*RET, FAMILY*RD and 
FAMILY*RET*RD, were also introduced and included in the equation below. 
Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4FAMILYit  
5FAMILYit*RETit 6FAMILYit*RDit  
7FAMILYit*RETit*RDit it 
(6.2) 
where Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in 
fiscal year t; RDit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 
otherwise; FAMILY is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if the observation is 
family firm, 0 if widely-held firms; and it is the error term. 
I estimated equation (6.2) using the basic pooled regression, Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) annual regression, and fixed-effects regression. The results are presented in 
Table 6.27. The regression estimates for all models show no significant difference 
between earnings conservatism for family firms and widely-held firms. The 
coefficients for FAMILY*RET*RD in all models are not significant (p>0.10), 
suggesting no evidence that family firms have higher or lower earnings 
conservatism compared to widely-held firms. The F-statistics are significant at the 
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1% level in all models, while adjusted-R2s are between 8% and 10%, indicating 
the validity of the models. 
Table 6.27 
Earnings Conservatism: Family firms versus widely-held firms 
Pooled Regression Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects 
Variable Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.040** (2.370) 0.047*** (2.191) -0.009 (-0.331) 
RET 0.028 (0.932) 0.026 (0.913) 0.026*** (1.916) 
RD -0.006 (-0.252) 0.005 (0.289) -0.018 (-0.705) 
RET*RD 0.185* (3.102) 0.342*** (2.469) 0.259* (4.111) 
FAMILY 0.019 (0.914) 0.030*** (2.131) 0.018 (1.005) 
FAMILY*RET 0.063*** (1.906) 0.049 (1.838) 0.062* (3.804) 
FAMILY*RD 0.021 (0.647) 0.003 (0.101) 0.028 (0.859) 
FAMILY*RET*RD 0.016 (0.197) -0.029 (-0.256) 0.028 (0.340) 
CONS 0.018 (0.758) 
HOTEL -0.032 (-0.524) 
IPC 0.078 (1.289) 
IPROD 0.042*** (1.925) 
PLANT 0.018 (0.613) 
PROP 0.005 (0.198) 
TECH  0.041 (1.196) 
TDG 0.026 (1.130) 
Y2004 0.014 (0.759) 
Y2005 0.071* (3.791) 
Y2006 -0.011 (-0.597) 
Y2007 0.048* (2.655) 
Y2008 0.117* (6.150) 
Adj.R2 0.08 0.12 0.10 
N 2892 2892 2892 
F-stat 26.723 39.807 17.578 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4FAMILYit 5FAMILYit*RETit  
6FAMILYit*RDit 7FAMILYit*RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 2,892 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; FAMILY is a dummy variable 
that takes value 1 if the observation is family firm, 0 if widely-held firms; Industry are dummy 
variables for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy variables for fiscal years; and it is 
the error term. 
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6.5.4.2 Strategic Control of Controlling Family and Earnings Conservatism 
Prior studies of the separation of the roles of CEO and chairman have focused on 
managerial compensation (Boyd, 1994), earnings restatement (Abbott, et al., 
2004), fraudulent financial reporting (Beasley, Carcello, Hermanson, & Lapides, 
2000), and audit committees in the UK/US setting (Collier, 1993; Pincus, 
Rusbarsky, & Wong, 1989; Turpin & DeZoort, 1998), but no study has considered 
how CEO duality in family firms influences earnings conservatism. 
Hence, I include in this study an examination of this issue. I posit that when a 
controlling shareholder has strong control over the management and the corporate 
board, these firms have lower agency costs and less incentive for opportunistic 
reporting; hence these firms report more conservative earnings than other family 
firms. I assume that a family firm is under the strong influence of the controlling 
family when the CEO is appointed from that family and he also acts as the 
chairman of the corporate board.  
To conduct the test, firstly, I restricted the sample to family firms. Secondly, I 
created a dummy variable, DUALITY, that takes the value of 1 when a member of 
the controlling family holds both the positions of CEO and chairman of the board 
of directors, otherwise 0. Thirdly, I estimated equation (6.3), modified from the 
Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings model, to test for significant 
differences in the earnings conservatism level between family firms with strong 
family influence and family firms with less or no influence of a controlling 
family. 
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Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4DUALITYit  
5DUALITYit*RETit 6DUALITYit*RDit  
7DUALITYit*RETit*RDit it 
(6.3) 
where Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in 
fiscal year t; RDit is a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 
otherwise; DUALITY is 
CEO also acts as the chairman for the board of directors, and 0 otherwise; and it 
is the error term. 
I predict that the dual roles of CEO and chairman in a family firm would result in 
less incentive to manipulate earnings, hence leading to reporting of more 
conservative earnings. The argument is that the CEO  duality in family firms 
alleviates the agency cost, because the CEO  compensation is less likely to be 
influenced by earnings numbers. My prediction is that family firms in which the 
CEO also acts as the chairman of the board are more likely to report more 
conservative earnings than other family firms. 
The estimation results based on the basic pooled regression, Fama and MacBeth 
(1973) annual regression, and fixed-effects regression controlling for industry and 
year effects are presented in Table 6.28. The results show higher earnings 
conservatism if a member of the controlling family acts as CEO and chairman of 
the board of directors. The coefficient for DUALITY*RET*RD in the pooled 
regression is 0.434 and significant at the 5% level. Similar results are found when 
using Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression and fixed-effects regression, 
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in which the coefficient for DUALITY *RET*RD is 0.376 and 0.387, and 
significant at the 10% and 5% levels respectively. 
Table 6.28 
CEO duality in family firms and earnings conservatism  
Sample/ Pooled regression Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects 
Variable Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.051* (4.081) 0.071** (3.632) 0.024 (0.789) 
RET 0.101* (6.998) 0.087* (7.282) 0.097* (9.700) 
RD 0.008 (0.367) -0.000 (-0.002) -0.001 (-0.067) 
RET*RD 0.145* (2.672) 0.261* (4.650) 0.234* (3.976) 
DUALITY 0.061*** (1.857) 0.041 (1.008) 0.046 (1.425) 
DUALITY*RET -0.072 (-1.097) -0.068 (-0.650) -0.068** (-2.484) 
DUALITY*RD 0.059 (1.011) 0.073 (1.458) 0.058 (0.987) 
DUALITY*RET*RD 0.434** (2.240) 0.376*** (2.419) 0.387** (2.474) 
CONS -0.004 (-0.122) 
HOTEL -0.143*** (-1.676) 
IPC 0.069 (0.816) 
IPROD 0.024 (0.874) 
PLANT -0.028 (-0.761) 
PROP -0.034 (-1.137) 
TECH  0.044 (0.953) 
TDG -0.022 (-0.741) 
Y2004 0.021 (0.913) 
Y2005 0.091* (3.784) 
Y2006 0.003 (0.122) 
Y2007 0.052** (2.228) 
Y2008 0.121* (4.959) 
Adj.R2 0.11 0.16 0.13 
N 1770 1770 1770 
F-stat 21.994 54.346 14.119 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4DUALITYit 5DUALITYit*RETit  
6DUALITYit*RDit 7DUALITYit*RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 2,892 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; DUALITY is a dummy 
variable that takes value 1 if a member of the controlling family holds both the positions of CEO 
and chairman of the board of directors, and 0 otherwise; Industry are dummy variables for Bursa 
Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy variables for fiscal years; and it is the error term. 
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These results imply that the strategic control of a family of the positions of CEO 
and chairman gives greater incentive to the managers to report more conservative 
earnings so as to minimise 
controlling shareholder and other shareholders. Furthermore managers have lower 
incentives to opportunistically report earnings because the compensation of family 
members is not tied to earnings numbers. 
To examine the robustness of these results, I estimated the following equation, 
modified from the time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition model, on the 
basic pooled model, Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression, and fixed-
effects regression. The results are presented in Table 6.29. 
NIit = 0 1 it-1 2 it-1 3 Iit-1 it-1 4DUALITYit-1 
5DUALITYit-1 it-1 6DUALITYit-1 it-1  
7DUALITYit-1 it-1 it-1 it 
(6.4) 
where NIit is the change in earnings for firm i from year t-1 to year t, 
standardised by total assets at end of year t-1; D NIit-1 is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if NIit-1 if negative, and 0 otherwise; DUALITY is a dummy variable that 
takes value 1 if a member of the controlling family holds both the positions of 
CEO and chairman of the board of directors, and 0 otherwise; and it is the error 
term. 
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Table 6.29 
Time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition: Strategic control of family firms 
Sample Pooled regression Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects 
 Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.006** (2.074) 0.006 (1.205) -0.001 (-0.075) 
it-1 -0.150* (-5.380) -0.140 (-1.836) -0.149* (-5.327) 
it-1 -0.013* (-2.636) -0.013 (-1.868) -0.012* (-2.585) 
it-1 it-1 -0.551* (-8.686) -0.556* (-5.653) -0.558* (-8.733) 
DUALITYit-1 0.009 (1.264) 0.008 (1.173) 0.009 (1.242) 
DUALITYit-1* NIit-1 -0.117 (-1.516) -0.065 (-0.335) -0.121 (-1.568) 
DUALITYit-1* it-1 -0.019 (-1.550) -0.012 (-1.062) -0.020 (-1.583) 
DUALITYit-1* it-1 it-1 -0.297*** (-1.899) -0.072 (-0.155) -0.301*** (-1.926) 
CONS     -0.002 (-0.302) 
HOTEL     -0.002 (-0.074) 
IPC     -0.004 (-0.156) 
IPROD     0.002 (0.276) 
PLANT     0.025* (2.606) 
PROP     -0.001 (-0.141) 
TECH      -0.000 (-0.026) 
TDG     0.005 (0.626) 
Y2004     0.006 (0.997) 
Y2005     0.001 (0.212) 
Y2006     0.004 (0.614) 
Y2007     0.017* (2.641) 
Y2008     -0.004 (-0.616) 
Adj.R2 0.15  0.21  0.15 
N 1762  1762  1762 
F-stat 44.935  23.881  17.130 
Model: it = 0 1 it-1 2 it-1 3 it-1 it-1 4DUALITYit-1  
5DUALITYit-1 it-1 6DUALITYit-1 it-1 7DUALITYit-1 it-
1 it-1 it 
The sample comprises 2,876 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: NIit is the change in earnings for firm i from year t-1 to year t, standardised 
by total assets at end of year t-1; D NIit-1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if NIit-1 if negative, 
and 0 otherwise; DUALITY is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if a member of the controlling 
family holds both the positions of CEO and chairman of the board of directors, and 0 otherwise; 
Industry are dummy variables for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy variables for 
fiscal years; and it is the error term. 
 
Given that the prediction is that a family firm in which the CEO also acts as the 
chairman of the board will have substantially different financial reporting, I am 
interested in the incremental coefficient 7. Consistent with the earlier analysis, 
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the results in Table 6.29 show weak evidence that the strategic control of a family 
on the positions of CEO and chairman is associated with higher earnings reversal 
when incorporating transitory losses in earnings than other family firms, since the 
coefficients for DUALITY* NIit-1 NIit-1 ( 7) are negatively significant at the 
10% level in the pooled regression model and estimation controlling for industry 
and year effects, coefficients of -0.297 and -0.301, respectively. These results 
show evidence that holding the dual role of CEO and chairman of the board 
alleviates the agency costs in family firms, and reduces their incentives to report 
earnings aggressively. However, the coefficient for DUALITY* NIit-1 NIit-1 is 
not significant when estimated using Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual 
regression. In general, the results show that earnings conservatism is more 
pervasive in firms in which the CEO also holds the role of chairman of the board. 
6.5.5 Discussion of the Results 
The third objective of this study was to examine whether ownership structure has 
significant influence on earnings conservatism. Given that family firms and state-
controlled firms are dominant in the Malaysian economy, this provides 
opportunities for examining how earnings conservatism levels vary according to 
ownership structure. 
Employing the Basu (1997) asymmetric timeliness of earnings model, I find that 
earnings reflect bad news more quickly than good news in family firms and 
widely-held firms, indicating evidence of earnings conservatism. With regard to 
state-controlled firms, the results show that good news is recognised in a timely 
way but recognition of bad news is delayed, implying evidence of aggressive 
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accounting. Various sensitivity tests were conducted, including Fama and 
Macbeth estimation, estimation controlling for industry and year effects, 
alternative definitions of family firms, classification of state-controlled firms into 
firms under the control of Federal and State governments. In all the tests, I find 
robust evidence of earnings conservatism in family firms and widely-held firms, 
but not in state-controlled firms. 
These results suggest that ownership structure has a significant influence on 
earnings conservatism. The different levels of agency costs and of information 
asymmetry in each type of firm create varying incentives and demands regarding 
conservative earnings reporting. In family firms, the results provide support for 
alignment effects family firms exert greater monitoring and 
which provides higher incentives to report earnings conservatively. This is 
consistent with the evidence provided by Wang (2006), where family firms in the 
United States have higher earnings quality, in particular lower abnormal accruals, 
greater earnings informativeness, and less persistence of transitory loss 
components in earnings.  
For state-controlled firms, the result is consistent with Bushman and Piotroski 
(2006), who find firms in common-law countries that face high state involvement 
in the economy tend to slow the recognition of bad news and speed the 
recognition of good news. As such, a high tendency to government intervention in 
poorly-performing state-controlled firms motivates managers to avoid such 
interference by reporting aggressive earnings (Bushman & Piotroski, 2006). On 
the other hand, Bushman and Piotroski (2006) argued that state-controlled firms 
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were pressured by the government to report higher earnings.  
I further examined systematic differences in the level of earnings conservatism 
between family firms and widely-held firms. The results from the pooled 
regression, Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression, and fixed effect 
regression show no significant difference of earnings conservatism between 
family firms and widely-held firms. This result shows no evidence that widely-
held firms are different from family firms in respect of earnings conservatism. 
 I also conducted additional tests of whether strategic control by a controlling 
family is associated with higher earnings conservatism. The analysis shows that 
when a member of the controlling family acts as both CEO and chairman of the 
board of directors, the family firm reports earnings more conservatively than other 
family firms. This implies that holding the dual role of CEO and chairman of the 
board alleviates the agency costs in family firms and reduces incentives to report 
earnings aggressively. Another possible explanation is that these family firms 
employ earnings conservatism as a strategy to minimise the perceived high 
agency conflicts between the controlling shareholder and other shareholders.  
6.6 Corporate Governance and Earnings Conservatism 
6.6.1 Introduction  
The final objective of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and earnings conservatism. The following section, Section 6.6.2, 
presents and discusses the main empirical results, while Section 6.6.3 reports the 
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sensitivity analyses. Discussions on the overall results are provided in Section 
6.6.4.  
6.6.2 Corporate Governance Mechanism and Earnings Conservatism 
This section reports the regression estimates for equation (5.3a) and (5.3b), which 
tests the relationship between earnings conservatism and the corporate governance 
index, developed from 11 corporate governance variables. 
Table 6.30 
Corporate governance and earnings conservatism 
CGINDEX   DUMCG 
Variable Coeff t-stat  Variable Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.015 (0.616)  Intercept 0.034** (2.209) 
RET 0.083* (2.779)  RET 0.087* (4.280) 
RD 0.081*** (1.840)  RD 0.032 (1.161) 
RET*RD 0.287** (2.550)  RET*RD 0.210* (2.949) 
CGINDEX 0.082 (1.636)  DUMCG 0.029 (1.374) 
CGINDEX*RET -0.026 (-0.467)  DUMCG*RET -0.016 (-0.519) 
CGINDEX*RD -0.159*** (-1.813)  DUMCG*RD -0.071*** (-1.870) 
CGINDEX*RET*RD -0.214 (-0.976)  DUMCG*RET*RD -0.124 (-1.349) 
Adj.R2 0.08  Adj.R2 0.08 
N 3126  N 2084 
F-stat 26.770  F-stat 21.873 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4CGINDEXit 5CGINDEXit*RETit + 
6CGINDEXit*RDit 7CGINDEXit*RETit*RDit it 
 Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4DUMCGit 5DUMCGit*RETit  
6DUMCGit*RDit 7DUMCGit*RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 3,126 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; CGINDEX is an unweighted 
aggregate of 11 corporate governance variables; DUMCG is a dummy variable that takes value 1 if 
CGINDEX is in the top third of the pooled sample, and 0 if CGINDEX  is in the bottom third; 
Industry are dummy variables for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy variables for 
fiscal years; and it is the error term. 
 
I employed two measures for corporate governance. First, I used CGINDEX, 
200 
 
which is based on an unweighted corporate governance score from 11 corporate 
governance variables. Second, I used a DUMCG, which is a dummy variable that 
takes value 1 if CGINDEX is in the top third of the pooled sample, and 0 if 
CGINDEX is in the bottom third. The regression estimates are reported in Table 
6.30. 
The results show that the coefficients for RET*RD are positively significant in 
both estimation models, suggesting evidence of earnings conservatism. However, 
the coefficients for CGINDEX*RET*RD and DUMCG*RET*RD are not 
significant, suggesting no link from corporate governance to earnings 
conservatism.  
6.6.3 Sensitivity Analysis 
To examine the robustness of the main results discussed in section 6.6.2, I 
conducted several sensitivity analyses which included (i) the use of an alternative 
measure for CGINDEX; (ii) individual measures for corporate governance 
variables; and (iii) time-series test of timeliness in loss recognition. 
6.6.3.1 Alternative Measure for CGINDEX  
I re-calculated CGINDEX using nine internal corporate governance variables such 
as board size (BODSIZE), non-executive directors (NONEXEC), board 
independence (BODIND), independent chairman (INDCHRM), board meetings 
(BODMEET), size of audit committee (ACSIZE), audit committee independence 
(ACINDP), number of audit committee meetings (ACMEET), and financial 
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expertise of audit committee (ACEXPERT). I then re-estimated equation (5.3a) 
using basic pooled regression, Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression, and 
fixed-effects regression to test the relationship between earnings conservatism and 
corporate governance. The results are reported in Table 6.31. 
Table 6.31 
Corporate governance and earnings conservatism: An alternative measurement 
Basic Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects 
Variable Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.041*** (1.726) 0.041 (1.700) -0.003 (-0.084) 
RET 0.075** (2.477) 0.065 (1.592) 0.069** (2.263) 
RD 0.073*** (1.738) 0.070 (1.168) 0.071*** (1.688) 
RET*RD 0.281* (2.580) 0.186 (1.234) 0.354* (3.259) 
CGINDEX 0.025 (0.536) 0.056 (0.858) 0.004 (0.079) 
CGINDEX*RET -0.009 (-0.158) -0.025 (-0.316) -0.004 (-0.063) 
CGINDEX*RD -0.142 (-1.610) -0.135 (-1.069) -0.155*** (-1.750) 
CGINDEX*RET*RD -0.207 (-0.926) 0.306 (0.859) -0.195 (-0.869) 
CONS 0.023 (0.909) 
HOTEL -0.040 (-0.743) 
IPC 0.020 (0.584) 
IPROD 0.042*** (1.734) 
PLANT 0.032 (1.049) 
PROP 0.015 (0.549) 
TECH  0.038 (1.039) 
TDG 0.032 (1.269) 
Y2004 0.013 (0.779) 
Y2005 0.068* (3.994) 
Y2006 -0.009 (-0.483) 
Y2007 0.050* (3.116) 
Y2008 0.119* (6.613) 
Adj.R2 0.08 0.12 0.10 
N 3126 3126 3126 
F-stat 26.084 59.581 11.511 
Model: Eit/Pit-1 = 0 1RETit 2RDit 3RETit*RDit 4CGINDEXit 5CGINDEXit*RETit + 
6CGINDEXit*RDit 7CGINDEXit*RETit*RDit it 
The sample comprises 3,126 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: Eit is the earnings per share for firm i in fiscal year t; Pit-1 is the price per 
share at the beginning of the fiscal year; RETit is the annual return of firm i in fiscal year t; RDit is 
a dummy variable that equals 1 if RETit is negative, and 0 otherwise; CGINDEX is an unweighted 
aggregate of nine corporate governance variables; Industry are dummy variables for Bursa 
Malaysia industry sectors; Year are dummy variables for fiscal years; and it is the error term. 
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Table 6.31 shows qualitatively similar results as results reported in the previous 
section. As in the previous results of the study, the coefficients for RET*RD are 
positively significant in both estimation models, suggesting evidence of earnings 
conservatism. However, the coefficients for CGINDEX*RET*RD are not 
significant (p>0.10), suggesting that there is no evidence link corporate 
governance and earnings conservatism. With respect to the validity of the models, 
all F-statistics are significant at the 1% level, while the values for adjusted-R2 are 
8%, which is similar to the earlier findings. 
6.6.3.2 Individual Measures for Corporate Governance 
In this section, I report the analyses on the relationship between earnings 
conservatism and individual corporate governance mechanisms by comparing the 
levels of earnings conservatism between subsamples of firms with good and bad 
governance based on 11 proxies. I modified equation (5.3a) by replacing 
CGINDEX with individual corporate governance variables such as BODSIZE, 
NONEXEC, BODIND, INDCHRM, BODMEET, ACSIZE, ACIND, ACMEET, 
ACEXPERT, BIG4, and SPECIALIST. These variables are dummy variables 
which take value 1 for good governance firms and 0 for poor governance firms. 
Explanations about the dummy variables were provided in Section 5.6. I then re-
estimated the modified equation (5.2) to examine the relationship between 
individual corporate governance mechanisms and earnings conservatism. The 
results are presented in Table 6.32. 
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Overall results reported in Table 6.32 show that the only case of significant 
difference between earnings conservatism for firms with good and poor corporate 
governance is related to audit committee size. The coefficient for 
ACSIZE*RET*RD is negative (-1.161) and significant at the 5% level, suggesting 
evidence of lower earnings conservatism in firms with a bigger audit committee.  
This result is contrary to prior studies, for example Ahmed and Duellman (2007) 
and García Lara and Mora (2004), who find evidence that corporate governance 
measures have significant association with earnings conservatism. For instance, 
the proportion of outside directors is found to be associated with earnings 
conservatism in the United Kingdom (Beekes, et al., 2004) and in the United 
States (Ahmed & Duellman, 2007), where the percentage of outside directors is 
positively related to conservatism. Furthermore, García Lara et al. (2007) find that 
firms where the CEO has a low influence over the functioning of the board of 
directors show a greater degree of accounting conservatism. However, these 
studies relate to developed markets with fewer family firms. My results for family 
firms which show a high levels of conservatism regardless of governance quality, 
suggests that perhaps corporate governance mechanisms that are relevant for firms 
in developed countries are not relevant for family firms in developing countries. 
6.6.3.3 Time-Series Test of Timeliness in Loss Recognition 
I modified equation (1.2) in order to investigate further the relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings conservatism. This modification enables an 
examination of the incremental reversal of earnings changes from previous year 
changes of earnings as a result of corporate governance. The modified model is as 
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follows: 
NIit = 0 1 it-1 2 it-1 3 it-1 it-1 4CGINDEXit-1 
5CGINDEXit-1 it-1 6CGINDEXit-1 it-1  
7CGINDEXit-1 it-1 it-1 it 
(6.5) 
where NIit is the change in earnings for firm i from year t-1 to year t, 
standardised by total assets at end of year t-1; D NIit-1 is a dummy variable that 
equals 1 if NIit-1 if negative, and 0 otherwise; CGINDEX is an unweighted 
corporate governance score developed from 11 corporate governance variables; 
and it is the error term. 
I estimated the above equation, which tests for significant differences between 
earnings conservatism for firms with good and poor corporate governance using 
the unweighted corporate governance index (CGINDEX) developed from 11 
corporate governance variables. The regression estimates are summarised in Table 
6.33. 
Consistent with the earlier analysis, the results in Table 6.33 show that firms with 
good corporate governance are not likely to have higher earnings reversal when 
incorporating transitory losses in income, compared with firms with poor 
corporate governance, since the coefficients for CGINDEX* Iit-1 Iit-1 ( 6) 
are not statistically significant (p>0.10) for all estimation models (coefficients of 
0.554, 0.265, and 0.557).  
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Table 6.33 
Corporate governance score and the time-series test of timeliness in loss 
recognition: Pooled regression, Fama and MacBeth (1973) annual regression, 
estimation controlling for industry and year effects 
Sample Pooled regression Fama-MacBeth Fixed Effects 
Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat Coeff t-stat 
Intercept 0.010 (1.626) 0.012 (1.609) 0.007 (0.754) 
it-1 -0.209 (-1.311) -0.250 (-1.274) -0.211 (-1.320) 
it-1 -0.025** (-2.218) -0.024 (-1.664) -0.024** (-2.209) 
it-1 it-1 -0.959* (-3.096) -0.874* (-5.290) -0.964* (-3.108) 
CGINDEXit-1 -0.008 (-0.656) -0.013 (-0.927) -0.011 (-0.876) 
CGINDEXit-1* it-1 0.204 (0.676) 0.326 (0.963) 0.212 (0.699) 
CGINDEXit-1* it-1 0.017 (0.752) 0.013 (0.505) 0.017 (0.791) 
CGINDEXit-1* it-1 it-1 0.554 (0.924) 0.265 (1.445) 0.557 (0.930) 
CONS     -0.002 (-0.262) 
HOTEL     0.000 (0.022) 
IPC     -0.005 (-0.357) 
IPROD     0.001 (0.147) 
PLANT     0.015*** (1.819) 
PROP     -0.002 (-0.234) 
TECH      -0.006 (-0.435) 
TDG     0.000 (0.016) 
Y2004     0.002 (0.407) 
Y2005     0.000 (0.034) 
Y2006     0.003 (0.502) 
Y2007     0.017* (3.071) 
Y2008     -0.001 (-0.096) 
Adj.R2 0.14  0.18  0.14 
N 3105  3105  3105 
F-stat 15.040  38.864  7.186 
 
Model: it = 0 1 it-1 2 it-1 3 it-1 it-1 4CGINDEXit-1  
5CGINDEXit-1 it-1 6CGINDEXit-1 it-1  
7CGINDEXit-1 it-1 it-1 it 
The sample comprises 3,105 firm-year observations from firms in Bursa Malaysia during 2003
2008. The reported t-statistics are in parentheses and adjusted for heteroscedasticity (White, 1980). 
Asterisks denote statistical significance at the 1% (*), 5% (**), or 10% (***) level, respectively. 
Variable definitions: NIit is the change in earnings for firm i from year t-1 to year t, standardised by total 
assets at end of year t-1; D NIit-1 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if NIit-1 if negative, and 0 
otherwise; CGINDEX is the unweighted corporate governance score developed from 11 corporate 
governance variables; Industry are dummy variables for Bursa Malaysia industry sectors; Year are 
dummy variables for fiscal years; and it is the error term. 
 
208 
 
6.6.4 Discussion of the Results 
The final objective of this study is to examine the relationship between corporate 
governance and earnings conservatism. Using 11 corporate governance variables, 
I estimated the modified Basu (1997) reverse regression model, the results of 
which show no significant evidence linking corporate governance and earnings 
conservatism. For robustness tests, I employed three procedures: (i) alternative 
measure for CGINDEX and DUMCG; (ii) individual measures for corporate 
governance; and (iii) estimation based on time-series test of timeliness in loss 
recognition. All these tests failed to find a significant relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings conservatism. 
6.7 Summary of Results 
This chapter presents the findings of this study based on various analyses 
conducted in accordance with the research objectives and hypotheses. Four main 
findings can be concluded from this study. 
Firstly, this study finds robust evidence that earnings conservatism is a strong 
feature of Malaysian financial reporting following the institutional reforms of 
corporate governance and financial reporting. Specifically, earnings reflect bad 
news in a more timely manner than they reflect good news. The plausible 
explanation from this finding is that firms have greater incentives and demands to 
report high-quality earnings, in particular by more timely recognition of bad news 
compared to good news, when the institutional structure is strong. In contrast, the 
weak institutional structures in the period before the 1997 economic crisis resulted 
209 
 
in less incentive for preparers of financial reports to report earnings conservatively 
(Ball, et al., 2003). The results of this study provide support for arguments made 
by Bushman and Piotroski (2006) and Ball et al. (2003) that institutional 
structures have significant influence on earnings conservatism. 
Secondly, this study finds no significant difference between the degree of earnings 
conservatism in the periods before and after the adoption of IFRS. The main 
analysis and various sensitivity tests fail to find any evidence showing 
significantly higher or lower earnings conservatism in the post-IFRS period 
relative to the pre-IFRS period. The plausible explanation is that managers, 
preparers of financial reports and auditors have greater incentives to report 
earnings conservatively, though the accounting standards warranted unbiased 
information. This provides support to the role of earnings conservatism in 
improving debt-contracting, minimizing litigation risk, and enhancing greater 
monitoring. This result is consistent with (2008) prediction, 
in which any initiatives to reduce earnings conservatism would increase the 
agency cost and the litigation risk, hence forcing market-based mechanisms to 
require firms to report more conservative earnings. 
Thirdly, this study finds that bad news is recognised in a more timely fashion than 
good news in family firms and widely-held firms, showing evidence of earnings 
conservatism. In state-controlled firms, the results show that good news is 
recognised in a timely way but recognition of bad news is delayed, implying 
evidence of aggressive accounting. In all tests, I find robust evidence of earnings 
conservatism in family firms and widely-held firms, but not in state-controlled 
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firms. These results suggest that ownership structure has a significant influence on 
earnings conservatism. The levels of agency costs and information asymmetry are 
varied between ownership structures, thereby creating varying incentives and 
demands towards conservative earnings reporting. In family firms, the results 
provide support for alignment effects family firms exert greater 
monitoring and provide higher incentives to report earnings conservatively. In 
addition, the results show evidence that one person holding the dual role of CEO 
and chairman of the board alleviates agency costs in family firms, and reduces 
incentives to report earnings aggressively. Another possible explanation is family 
firms report more conservative earnings in order to minimise the perceived high 
agency conflict between the controlling shareholder and other shareholders.  
Finally, this study fails to find any significant relationship between corporate 
governance and earnings conservatism. None of the tests show a significant 
relationship between the corporate governance index and earnings conservatism. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
CONCLUSIONS 
7.1 Introduction  
This chapter provides a summary of the study. Section 7.2 discusses the findings 
and contributions of this study while Section 7.3 highlights several limitations of 
this study.  
7.2 Summary  
The purpose of this study was to investigate the issues relating to earnings 
conservatism in an emerging market. Motivated by the work of Basu (1997), Ball 
et al. (2003), and Bushman and Piotroski (2006), this study aims to provide 
empirical evidence on earnings conservatism in Malaysia. Using a sample of 
3,126 firm-year observations, this study examines four main hypotheses.  
First, this study examines earnings conservatism in Malaysian financial reporting 
following the corporate governance and financial reporting reforms. Contrary to 
Ball et al. (2003), who find no evidence of earnings conservatism in a Malaysian 
sample from 1984 to 1996, this study finds earnings conservatism is a strong 
feature of Malaysian financial reporting following the corporate governance and 
financial reporting reforms. The study finds that earnings reflect bad news 
received contemporaneously, but delay in the recognition of good news. These 
results imply that the reforms in corporate governance and financial reporting give 
strong incentives for Malaysian firms to practise conservative earnings reporting. 
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Second, this study investigates the effect of IFRS adoption on the level of 
earnings conservatism. The results show no systematic difference in the level of 
earnings conservatism for the short period of one to two years before and after 
adoption, suggesting that the change from MASB standards to IFRS standards has 
had no effect on the level of earnings conservatism in Malaysian financial 
reporting. This finding supports the argument of Ball et al. (2003) that accounting 
standards have had limited impact on earnings conservatism in financial reporting. 
In addition, it is apparent that the attempt to eliminate conservatism from financial 
statements failed because it increases rather than reduces information asymmetry. 
According to LaFond 
incentives and ability to manipulate earnings and thus reduce information 
asymmetry and the deadweight losses that information asymmetry generates. In 
short, conservatism is an ineradicable and an indispensable quality of financial 
reports, even though it is criticised by the standard setters.  
Third, this study extends prior studies by examining how the levels of earnings 
conservatism varies across different types of ownership structures, namely family 
firms, state-controlled firms, and widely-held firms. Since different types of 
ownership are subject to different level and types of agency conflict, the 
incentives to report earnings conservatively may also vary. For state-controlled 
firms, this study fails to find evidence of earnings conservatism. The results 
indicate aggressive accounting. For family firms and widely-held firms, bad news 
is recognised in earnings on a more timely basis than is good news. The test for 
difference between family firms and widely-held firms reveals no statistical 
difference in the levels of earnings conservatism of the two groups. 
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Indirectly, this study provides evidence in support of the convergence of interest 
hypothesis, in so far it finds no evidence that family firms produce less 
conservative earnings compared to widely-held firms. This study further tests the 
effect of the strategic control of the controlling families on earnings conservatism. 
The results show firms that are strategically controlled by a family, that is, where 
a member of the controlling family acts as CEO and chairman of the corporate 
board, report significantly higher earnings conservatism than other family firms. 
This result implies that managers of firms that are strategically controlled by a 
family are more likely to have less incentive for opportunistic reporting and are 
more likely to have greater demand for conservative reporting. Overall, the results 
show that ownership structure has significant influence on 
reporting incentives to report earnings conservatively. 
Finally, this study examines whether firms with strong corporate governance 
report more conservative earnings. The analysis fails to find any significant 
relationship between corporate governance and earnings conservatism, even 
though a comprehensive set of corporate governance variables was employed. 
This result is in conflict with evidence from developed markets, such as the 
United States and the United Kingdom, where firms with good governance are 
more timely in recognising bad news. A plausible explanation is that the corporate 
governance model, which is based on an Anglo-Saxon model, is inappropriate to 
emerging markets with a substantial number of family-firms. For instance, the 
appointment of independent  directors in family firms is likely to be influenced 
by the management's close relationship with the prospective directors and the 
likelihood of their support for the management's philosophy and policies (Chen & 
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Jaggi, 2000). This situation leads to ineffective corporate governance since 
independent directors are no longer capable of performing their duties 
independently. Thus family management sets out to ensure conservatism in 
earnings. 
7.3 Limitations 
Notwithstanding an extensive set of sensitivity analyses, the results of this study 
are subject to certain limitations and need to be interpreted with caution. 
First, the construction of the sample has consequences for the generalisability of 
the results. All firms that existed from the year 2002 to 2008 have been included 
as long as the data concerned was consistent with the requirement of the study. 
Selecting the sample on this basis might lead to survivorship bias because it 
excludes newly-listed firms and firms that were delisted from the official list of 
Bursa Malaysia during the study period.  
Second, the primary measure for earnings conservatism, the asymmetric 
timeliness of earnings, is exposed to potential measurement error and bias 
(Dietrich, et al., 2007) as a result of incorrect inferences. 
Third, with regard to the adoption of IFRS, full convergence is scheduled for 1 
January 2012. For the period under study, IFRS 4 Insurance Contracts, IFRS 7 
Financial Instruments: Disclosures and IFRS 8 Operating Segments were still not 
effective. Thus extra caution is necessary when interpreting the effect of IFRS on 
earnings conservatism. The findings of no systematic difference of earnings 
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conservatism between the period under the MASB standards and the period under 
IFRS standards may be a reflection of this overlap.  
Fourth, due to the complex ownership structure of Malaysian firms, this study 
uses a dichotomous variable as the identifier of family firm. The pyramidal and 
cross-sectional control and the use of nominees make the determination of the 
 of shares owned by the controlling shareholder a daunting task. 
The use of nominee accounts by Malaysian investors could also create a 
measurement bias. Likewise, the lack of a continuous measure for family control 
might also create a bias. 
Fifth, although the alternative measure of family firms includes the percentage of 
shares owned by the controlling family, some families are nevertheless able to 
exert control with only a minimal shareholdings, while others require a larger 
stakes for the same level of control due to differences in firm size, industry, 
business practices, and product placement (Anderson & Reeb, 2003b). 
Sixth, this study uses corporate governance metrics to identify whether firms have 
good or poor governance structure. It is important to highlight the note of caution 
by Armstrong, Guay, and Weber (2010). The authors assert that when classifying 
governance structure into good or bad, researchers have to ensure that 
being called a bad  structure is not instead a good  
208). They argue that studies, which identify firms with a relatively higher 
proportion of outside directors as having a good  governance structure, ignore 
the extensive economic arguments and empirical evidence ome 
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firms that are labelled as having bad  governance might, in fact, have 
appropriately (endogeneously) selected a board with relatively few outside 
directors  (Armstrong, et al., 2010, p. 208). Future research should look into the 
potential interrelationships among various corporate governance mechanisms 
which would render different mixes of corporate governance mechanism equally 
effective.  
Finally, the analysis has not tested for endogeneity in the relationship between 
corporate governance and earnings conservatism. This may bias the coefficient 
estimates and the conclusions that are derived therefrom. To address the 
endogeneity issue, future studies could employ two-stage least squares estimation 
of the regression equations (e.g., Heckman, 2000; Imbens & Wooldridge, 2009). 
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(2
00
5)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
ea
rn
in
gs
 q
ua
lit
y,
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
by
 ti
m
el
y 
lo
ss
 
re
co
gn
iti
on
, b
et
w
ee
n 
U
K
 
pr
iv
at
e 
an
d 
pu
bl
ic
 fi
rm
s. 
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
of
 U
K
 
pr
iv
at
e 
an
d 
pu
bl
ic
 
fir
m
s/ 
pe
rio
d 
19
89
19
99
. 
So
ur
ce
: 
A
na
ly
si
s M
ad
e 
da
ta
ba
se
. 
 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (
Ba
su
, 
19
97
) 
an
d 
ac
cr
ua
ls
-
ca
sh
 
flo
w
 
m
od
el
 
(B
al
l 
&
 
Sh
iv
ak
um
ar
, 2
00
5)
. 
Th
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 s
ho
w
s 
th
at
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
re
po
rte
d 
by
 p
riv
at
e 
fir
m
s 
ar
e 
of
 l
ow
er
 q
ua
lit
y 
co
m
pa
re
d 
to
 p
ub
lic
 f
irm
s, 
de
sp
ite
 b
ei
ng
 p
re
pa
re
d 
un
de
r 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
. T
he
 
pl
au
si
bl
e 
ex
pl
an
at
io
n 
is
 p
riv
at
e 
fir
m
s h
av
e 
lo
w
er
 q
ua
lit
y 
du
e 
to
 d
iff
er
en
t m
ar
ke
t d
em
an
d.
 
Ba
ll 
an
d 
Sh
iv
ak
um
ar
 
(2
00
6)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
ro
le
 o
f a
cc
ru
al
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
in
 th
e 
as
ym
m
et
ric
al
ly
 ti
m
el
y 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 (i
nc
or
po
ra
tio
n 
in
 
re
po
rte
d 
ea
rn
in
gs
) o
f g
ai
ns
 
an
d 
lo
ss
es
. 
In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
sa
m
pl
e 
as
 in
 B
al
l, 
K
ot
ha
ri,
 a
nd
 
R
ob
in
 (2
00
0)
 
fr
om
 1
98
7 
to
  
20
03
. 
A
cc
ru
al
s 
m
od
el
s
us
in
g 
m
ar
ke
t a
nd
 
no
n-
m
ar
ke
t 
ba
se
d 
pr
ox
ie
s 
fo
r 
ga
in
s 
an
d 
lo
ss
es
 
(B
al
l 
&
 
Sh
iv
ak
um
ar
, 2
00
6)
.
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 f
in
ds
 t
ha
t 
no
nl
in
ea
r 
ac
cr
ua
ls
 m
od
el
s
th
at
 
in
co
rp
or
at
e 
th
e 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 in
 g
ai
n 
an
d 
lo
ss
 r
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
of
fe
r 
a 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t 
th
an
 
eq
ui
va
le
nt
 li
ne
ar
 s
pe
ci
fic
at
io
ns
. T
he
co
nv
en
tio
na
l l
in
ea
r 
ac
cr
ua
ls
 
m
od
el
s, 
w
hi
ch
 
om
it 
th
e 
lo
ss
 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 
as
ym
m
et
ry
, 
ex
hi
bi
t 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
l 
at
te
nu
at
io
n 
bi
as
 
an
d 
of
fe
r 
a 
co
m
pa
ra
tiv
el
y 
po
or
 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 
th
e 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
ac
cr
ua
l 
pr
oc
es
s. 
In
 
ad
di
tio
n,
 
lin
ea
r 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
ns
 a
ls
o 
un
de
rs
ta
te
 t
he
 a
bi
lit
y 
of
 c
ur
re
nt
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 to
 p
re
di
ct
 fu
tu
re
 c
as
h 
flo
w
s.
 
 
Ba
lk
ris
hn
a,
 C
ou
lto
n,
 
an
d 
Ta
yl
or
 (2
00
7)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s 
of
 lo
ss
es
, t
he
 e
xt
en
t o
f 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
, 
an
d 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 to
 w
hi
ch
 
lo
ss
es
 re
fle
ct
 in
cr
em
en
ta
lly
 
gr
ea
te
r c
on
di
tio
na
l 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
.  
A
us
tra
lia
 (1
99
3
20
03
). 
 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (
Ba
su
, 
19
97
) 
an
d 
ac
cr
ua
ls
-
ca
sh
 
flo
w
 
m
od
el
 
(B
al
l 
&
 
Sh
iv
ak
um
ar
, 2
00
5)
. 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 f
in
ds
 t
ha
t 
lo
ss
 i
nc
id
en
ce
 i
n 
A
us
tra
lia
 i
s 
fr
eq
ue
nt
, 
af
fe
ct
in
g 
ar
ou
nd
 4
0%
 o
f 
th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
fir
m
-
ye
ar
s. 
Th
e 
lo
ss
es
 a
re
 a
ls
o 
pe
rs
ist
en
t, 
an
d 
th
e 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 
of
 lo
ss
 re
ve
rs
al
 d
ec
lin
es
 m
on
ot
on
ic
al
ly
 a
s 
th
e 
hi
st
or
y 
of
 
lo
ss
es
 e
xt
en
ds
. 
Fi
na
lly
, 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 i
s 
a 
pe
rv
as
iv
e 
as
pe
ct
 o
f 
A
us
tra
lia
n 
G
A
A
P,
 a
nd
 m
or
e 
ev
id
en
t 
am
on
g 
lo
ss
 o
bs
er
va
tio
ns
. 
  
 
23
7 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
1:
 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 st
ud
ie
s o
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
e(
s)
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 M
ea
su
re
(s
) 
M
ai
n 
Em
pi
ric
al
 R
es
ul
ts
 
Ba
su
 (1
99
7)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 p
rin
ci
pl
e 
on
 th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
t; 
de
ve
lo
p 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 m
ea
su
re
s; 
an
d 
pr
ov
id
e 
em
pi
ric
al
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
ba
se
d 
fr
om
 th
e 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
m
od
el
s. 
 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
96
3
19
90
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 
(B
as
u,
 
19
97
) 
an
d 
tim
e-
se
rie
s 
te
st
 o
f 
tim
el
in
es
s 
in
 l
os
s 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 sh
ow
 th
at
 e
ar
ni
ng
s a
re
 tw
o 
to
 si
x 
tim
es
 m
or
e 
se
ns
iti
ve
 t
o 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
re
tu
rn
s 
th
an
 t
o 
po
si
tiv
e 
re
tu
rn
s. 
Th
e 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
ha
ng
es
 a
ls
o 
ar
e 
le
ss
 p
er
si
st
en
t 
th
an
 p
os
iti
ve
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
ch
an
ge
s. 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
, 
po
si
tiv
e 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
ch
an
ge
s 
ha
ve
 
hi
gh
er
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
re
sp
on
se
 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s t
ha
n 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
ha
ng
es
. 
Ba
su
, H
w
an
g,
 a
nd
 Ja
n 
(2
00
1)
 
In
ve
st
ig
at
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 in
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 in
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 re
po
rte
d 
in
 B
ig
 
Ei
gh
t c
lie
nt
s a
nd
 n
on
-B
ig
 
Ei
gh
t c
lie
nt
s. 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e.
 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 f
in
ds
 th
at
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
in
 th
e 
tim
el
in
es
s 
of
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 b
et
w
ee
n 
go
od
 n
ew
s 
an
d 
ba
d 
ne
w
s 
is
 g
re
at
er
 
fo
r 
Bi
g 
Ei
gh
t 
cl
ie
nt
s 
th
an
 n
on
-B
ig
 E
ig
ht
 c
lie
nt
s. 
Th
e 
re
su
lt 
ho
ld
s 
ev
en
 
af
te
r 
m
at
ch
in
g 
cl
ie
nt
s 
by
 
ye
ar
, 
in
du
str
y,
 a
nd
 f
irm
 s
iz
e.
 T
hi
s 
re
su
lt 
su
gg
es
ts
 t
ha
t 
Bi
g 
Ei
gh
t 
au
di
to
rs
 a
re
m
or
e 
co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
th
an
 n
on
-B
ig
 
Ei
gh
t a
ud
ito
rs
.  
 
Ba
rth
, L
an
ds
m
an
, a
nd
 
La
ng
 (2
00
8)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 In
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
St
an
da
rd
s (
IA
S)
 
re
su
lts
 in
 h
ig
he
r a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
qu
al
ity
, m
ea
su
re
d 
us
in
g 
ea
rn
in
gs
 m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
tim
el
y 
lo
ss
 re
co
gn
iti
on
, a
nd
 v
al
ue
-
re
le
va
nc
e 
of
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
of
 fi
rm
s 
fr
om
 2
1 
co
un
tri
es
 
th
at
 a
do
pt
ed
 IA
S 
fr
om
 1
99
4 
to
 
20
03
. 
Fr
eq
ue
nc
y 
of
 l
ar
ge
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
ne
t 
in
co
m
e 
(L
an
g,
 R
ae
dy
, 
&
 W
ils
on
, 
20
06
; 
La
ng
, 
Ra
ed
y,
 &
 Y
et
m
an
, 
20
03
). 
 
Fi
rm
s 
th
at
 
ad
op
t 
IA
S 
sh
ow
 
an
 
im
pr
ov
em
en
t 
in
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
qu
al
ity
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
pr
e-
 a
nd
 p
os
t-a
do
pt
io
n 
pe
rio
ds
, i
n 
te
rm
s 
of
 lo
w
er
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
m
or
e 
tim
el
y 
lo
ss
 r
ec
og
ni
tio
n,
 a
nd
 m
or
e 
va
lu
e-
re
le
va
nc
e 
of
 
ac
co
un
tin
g.
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 A
pp
en
di
x 
1:
 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 st
ud
ie
s o
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
e(
s)
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 M
ea
su
re
(s
) 
M
ai
n 
Em
pi
ric
al
 R
es
ul
ts
 
Be
ek
es
, P
op
e,
 a
nd
 
Y
ou
ng
 (2
00
4)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 a
nd
 th
e 
co
m
po
si
tio
n 
of
 th
e 
bo
ar
d 
of
 
di
re
ct
or
s. 
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
fr
om
 U
K
-
lis
te
d 
no
n-
fin
an
ci
al
 fi
rm
s 
fr
om
 1
99
3 
to
 
19
95
.  
 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Fi
rm
s 
w
ho
se
 p
ro
po
rti
on
 o
f 
ou
ts
id
e 
bo
ar
d 
m
em
be
rs
 a
re
 
ab
ov
e 
th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
m
ed
ia
n 
ha
ve
 
hi
gh
er
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
tim
el
in
es
s 
w
ith
 r
es
pe
ct
 t
o 
ba
d 
ne
w
s, 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 f
irm
s 
w
ho
se
 b
oa
rd
 c
om
po
si
tio
n 
is
 b
el
ow
 t
he
 m
ed
ia
n.
 T
hi
s 
re
su
lt 
su
gg
es
ts
 th
at
 th
e 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 o
ut
si
de
 d
ire
ct
or
s i
s 
po
si
tiv
el
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
qu
al
ity
. 
 
Br
ow
n,
 H
e,
 a
nd
 T
ei
te
l 
(2
00
6)
 
In
ve
st
ig
at
e 
w
he
th
er
 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 
af
fe
ct
s t
he
 v
al
ue
-r
el
ev
an
ce
 o
f 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
ea
rn
in
gs
.
Sa
m
pl
e 
fr
om
 2
0 
co
un
tri
es
 fr
om
 
19
93
 to
 2
00
4.
 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (
Ba
su
, 
19
97
) 
an
d 
ac
cr
ua
ls
-
ca
sh
 
flo
w
 
m
od
el
 
(B
al
l 
&
 
Sh
iv
ak
um
ar
, 
20
05
). 
M
ar
ke
t 
to
 
bo
ok
 
ra
tio
 
is
 
us
ed
 
to
 
m
ea
su
re
 
un
co
nd
iti
on
al
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
.  
 
Th
e 
fin
di
ng
s 
sh
ow
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
co
un
try
-s
pe
ci
fic
 l
ev
el
 o
f 
ac
cr
ua
l 
in
te
ns
ity
 i
nf
lu
en
ce
s 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 a
nd
 t
he
 v
al
ue
-r
el
ev
an
ce
 o
f 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
ea
rn
in
gs
. 
In
 c
ou
nt
rie
s 
w
ith
 h
ig
he
r 
ac
cr
ua
l 
in
te
ns
ity
, 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
is
 
po
si
tiv
el
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 t
he
 v
al
ue
 r
el
ev
an
ce
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
gs
. 
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
fin
ds
 t
ha
t 
th
is
 e
ffe
ct
 i
s 
in
cr
em
en
ta
l 
to
 t
ha
t 
of
 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
on
 
th
e 
va
lu
e-
re
le
va
nc
e 
of
 
ea
rn
in
gs
. 
 
Bu
sh
m
an
 a
nd
 P
io
tro
sk
i 
(2
00
6)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
in
flu
en
ce
 o
f 
in
st
itu
tio
na
l s
tru
ct
ur
e,
 su
ch
 
as
 le
ga
l/j
ud
ic
ia
l s
ys
te
m
, 
se
cu
rit
ie
s l
aw
s, 
po
lit
ic
al
 
ec
on
om
y,
 ta
x 
re
gi
m
e,
 a
nd
 
do
m
ic
ile
d 
co
un
try
, o
n 
th
e 
re
po
rti
ng
 o
f e
ar
ni
ng
s. 
Sa
m
pl
e 
fr
om
 3
8 
co
un
tri
es
 fr
om
 
19
92
 to
 2
00
1.
 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (
Ba
su
, 
19
97
) 
an
d 
ac
cr
ua
ls
-
ca
sh
 
flo
w
 
m
od
el
 
(B
al
l 
&
 
Sh
iv
ak
um
ar
, 2
00
5)
. 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 d
oc
um
en
t 
hi
gh
er
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 i
n 
fir
m
s 
fr
om
 c
ou
nt
rie
s 
th
at
 h
av
e 
hi
gh
 q
ua
lit
y 
ju
di
ci
al
 
sy
st
em
s, 
w
ea
k 
pu
bl
ic
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t, 
an
d 
hi
gh
 r
is
k 
of
 
ex
pr
op
ria
tio
n 
of
 a
ss
et
s. 
In
 c
om
m
on
-la
w
 c
ou
nt
rie
s, 
fir
m
s 
fa
ci
ng
 h
ig
h 
sta
te
 i
nv
ol
ve
m
en
t 
in
 t
he
 e
co
no
m
y 
ha
ve
 
hi
gh
er
 e
ar
ni
ng
s c
on
se
rv
at
ism
. 
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 A
pp
en
di
x 
1:
 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 st
ud
ie
s o
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
e(
s)
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 M
ea
su
re
(s
) 
M
ai
n 
Em
pi
ric
al
 R
es
ul
ts
 
C
ah
an
 a
nd
 Z
ha
ng
 
(2
00
6)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 su
cc
es
so
r 
au
di
to
rs
 a
fte
r t
he
 d
em
is
e 
of
 
A
rth
ur
 A
nd
er
se
n 
re
qu
ire
d 
m
or
e 
co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
fr
om
 th
ei
r e
x-
A
nd
er
se
n 
cl
ie
nt
s. 
 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(2
00
1
 2
00
2)
. 
 
U
na
dj
us
te
d 
(J
on
es
, 
19
91
) 
an
d 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
-a
dj
us
te
d 
(F
ra
nc
is
 
et
 
al
., 
20
05
) 
m
ea
su
re
s 
of
 a
bn
or
m
al
 
ac
cr
ua
ls
. 
Th
e 
ex
-A
nd
er
se
n 
cl
ie
nt
s 
ha
ve
 l
ar
ge
r 
de
cr
ea
se
s 
an
d 
lo
w
er
 l
ev
el
s 
of
 a
bn
or
m
al
 a
cc
ru
al
s 
in
 2
00
2 
th
an
 o
th
er
 
fir
m
s. 
Th
is
 r
es
ul
t 
im
pl
ie
s 
th
at
 t
he
 s
uc
ce
ss
or
 a
ud
ito
rs
 
re
qu
ire
 
m
or
e 
co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
fr
om
 
ex
-
A
nd
er
se
n 
cl
ie
nt
s 
be
ca
us
e 
th
ey
 p
er
ce
iv
e 
an
 A
nd
er
se
n 
au
di
t a
s a
 u
ni
qu
e 
so
ur
ce
 o
f l
iti
ga
tio
n 
ris
k.
 
C
al
le
n,
 S
eg
al
, a
nd
 
H
op
e 
(2
01
0)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
re
la
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
eq
ui
ty
 p
ric
es
 a
nd
 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
; 
an
d 
in
tro
du
ce
 a
 n
ew
 m
ea
su
re
 
of
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 a
t t
he
 fi
rm
-
ye
ar
 le
ve
l. 
 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
96
2
20
06
). 
Th
is
 
stu
dy
 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
a 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 r
at
io
 (
C
R)
, a
 ra
tio
 o
f 
th
e 
cu
rr
en
t 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
sh
oc
k 
to
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 n
ew
s. 
C
R 
m
ea
su
re
s 
th
e 
pr
op
or
tio
n 
of
 t
he
 t
ot
al
 s
ho
ck
 t
o 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 
cu
rr
en
t 
an
d 
fu
tu
re
 
ea
rn
in
gs
re
co
gn
is
ed
in
 c
ur
re
nt
 y
ea
r 
ea
rn
in
gs
. 
 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 sh
ow
 th
at
 fi
rm
s w
ith
 h
ig
h 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 ra
tio
 
(C
R)
 h
av
e 
a 
gr
ea
te
r i
nc
id
en
ce
 o
f l
os
se
s, 
m
or
e 
le
ve
ra
ge
, 
m
or
e 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
ac
cr
ua
ls,
 a
nd
 i
nc
re
as
ed
 v
ol
at
ili
ty
 
of
 
re
tu
rn
s, 
ea
rn
in
gs
, a
nd
 a
cc
ru
al
s.
C
ha
nd
ra
, W
as
le
y,
 a
nd
 
W
ay
m
ire
 (2
00
4)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 U
S 
te
ch
no
lo
gy
 fi
rm
s h
av
e 
hi
gh
er
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 th
an
 
ot
he
r U
S 
fir
m
s, 
an
d 
w
he
th
er
 
th
e 
re
su
lts
 a
re
 su
bj
ec
t t
o 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r l
iti
ga
tio
n 
ris
k 
an
d 
co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
st
an
da
rd
s. 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
98
2
20
01
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 
(B
as
u,
 
19
97
) 
an
d 
tim
e-
se
rie
s 
te
st
 o
f 
tim
el
in
es
s 
in
 l
os
s 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
e 
re
su
lt 
sh
ow
s t
ha
t t
ec
hn
ol
og
y 
fir
m
s e
xh
ib
it 
a 
hi
gh
er
 
le
ve
l o
f e
ar
ni
ng
s c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 th
an
 o
th
er
 U
S 
fir
m
s. 
Th
e 
ad
di
tio
na
l a
na
ly
si
s s
ho
w
s t
ha
t t
hi
s r
es
ul
t i
s b
ec
au
se
 o
f 
th
e 
co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
ru
le
s f
or
 R
&
D
 e
xp
en
sin
g 
ra
th
er
 th
an
 sh
ar
eh
ol
de
r l
iti
ga
tio
n 
ris
k.
 
  
 
24
0 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
1:
 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 st
ud
ie
s o
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
e(
s)
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 M
ea
su
re
(s
) 
M
ai
n 
Em
pi
ric
al
 R
es
ul
ts
 
C
hu
ng
, F
irt
h,
 a
nd
 K
im
 
(2
00
3)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 a
ud
ito
rs
 
fo
rc
e 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 o
n 
th
ei
r 
cl
ie
nt
s; 
an
d 
w
he
th
er
 th
e 
le
ve
l 
of
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 is
 in
flu
en
ce
d 
by
 th
e 
fir
m
s
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 
an
d 
th
e 
ty
pe
 o
f a
ud
it 
fir
m
.  
 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
98
8
19
97
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 s
ho
w
 t
ha
t 
Bi
g 
Si
x 
au
di
to
rs
 h
av
e 
st
ro
ng
er
 
in
flu
en
ce
 o
n 
th
ei
r 
cl
ie
nt
s 
to
 a
do
pt
 m
or
e 
co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
th
an
 n
on
-B
ig
 S
ix
 a
ud
ito
rs
 w
he
n 
th
e 
cl
ie
nt
s' 
fin
an
ci
al
 p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 is
 w
or
se
 th
an
 e
xp
ec
te
d.
 
D
in
g 
an
d 
St
ol
ow
y 
(2
00
6)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
ch
an
ge
s i
n 
th
e 
pr
op
er
tie
s o
f e
ar
ni
ng
s. 
Th
e 
an
al
ys
is
 in
cl
ud
es
 th
e 
im
pa
ct
 
of
 c
er
ta
in
 c
or
po
ra
te
 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s s
uc
h 
as
 si
ze
, 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l f
in
an
ci
ng
, a
nd
 
au
di
t f
irm
, o
n 
su
ch
 c
ha
ng
es
.
 
Fr
an
ce
 sa
m
pl
e 
(1
99
0
19
99
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
is
 
st
ud
y 
fin
ds
 
Fr
en
ch
 
fir
m
s 
re
po
rt 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tiv
el
y.
 T
he
 re
su
lt 
is 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
ith
 th
e 
up
w
ar
d 
tre
nd
 i
n 
th
e 
le
ve
l 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
as
 a
 w
ho
le
. 
In
 a
dd
iti
on
, 
th
is
 s
tu
dy
 f
in
ds
 t
ha
t 
sm
al
l 
fir
m
s 
sh
ow
 
a 
hi
gh
er
 
de
gr
ee
 
of
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 th
an
 la
rg
e 
fir
m
s. 
Ea
st
on
 a
nd
 P
ae
 (2
00
4)
 
Id
en
tif
y 
tw
o 
fo
rm
s o
f 
co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
by
 
m
od
ify
in
g 
th
e 
Ea
st
on
 a
nd
 
H
ar
ris
 (1
99
1)
 m
od
el
, a
nd
 
ex
am
in
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 in
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 a
cr
os
s s
am
pl
es
 
w
ith
 d
iff
er
en
t m
ar
ke
t t
o 
bo
ok
 
ra
tio
s, 
st
oc
k 
re
tu
rn
, l
os
s 
fir
m
s, 
an
d 
in
du
str
y,
 R
&
D
, 
ad
ve
rti
sin
g,
 in
ve
nt
or
y 
va
lu
at
io
n.
 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
98
8
20
02
). 
M
od
ifi
ed
 E
as
to
n 
an
d 
H
ar
ris
 (1
99
1)
 
m
od
el
 
w
hi
ch
 
in
cl
ud
es
 
la
gg
ed
 
op
er
at
in
g 
as
se
ts
, 
to
 
ca
pt
ur
e 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
du
e 
to
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
ru
le
s 
(a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
va
lu
e 
ad
de
d)
, 
an
d 
ch
an
ge
 in
 c
as
h 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
, t
o 
ca
pt
ur
e 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 
w
ith
 i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
 i
n 
po
si
tiv
e 
ne
t 
pr
es
en
t 
va
lu
e 
pr
oj
ec
ts
 (
ec
on
om
ic
 
va
lu
e 
ad
de
d)
. 
A
no
th
er
 m
ea
su
re
 i
s 
m
ar
ke
t t
o 
bo
ok
 ra
tio
. 
Th
is
 
st
ud
y 
fin
ds
 
ev
id
en
ce
 
of
 
bo
th
 
fo
rm
s 
of
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
, w
he
re
 th
e 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
s 
fo
r 
th
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 
ca
sh
 i
nv
es
tm
en
ts 
an
d 
th
e 
ch
an
ge
 i
n 
la
gg
ed
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
as
se
ts
 a
re
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t. 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 a
ls
o 
ex
hi
bi
t 
hi
gh
er
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 in
 fi
rm
s 
w
ith
 h
ig
he
r m
ar
ke
t t
o 
bo
ok
 r
at
io
. 
In
 
ad
di
tio
n,
 
th
e 
re
su
lts
 
sh
ow
 
va
ry
in
g 
de
gr
ee
s 
of
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 a
cr
os
s i
nd
us
tri
es
. 
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1 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
1:
 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 st
ud
ie
s o
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
e(
s)
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 M
ea
su
re
(s
) 
M
ai
n 
Em
pi
ric
al
 R
es
ul
ts
 
Fr
an
ci
s, 
La
Fo
nd
, 
O
ls
so
n,
 S
ch
ip
pe
r 
(2
00
4)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
co
st
 o
f e
qu
ity
 a
nd
 
se
ve
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 a
ttr
ib
ut
es
, 
m
ar
ke
t- 
an
d 
no
n-
m
ar
ke
t-
ba
se
d 
pr
ox
ie
s. 
U
.S
 sa
m
pl
e 
(1
97
5
19
81
). 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 a
 f
irm
-y
ea
r 
m
ea
su
re
 
fo
r 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
by
 
ro
lli
ng
 
fir
m
-s
pe
ci
fic
 
te
n-
ye
ar
 
w
in
do
w
s 
of
 
Ba
su
 
as
ym
m
et
ric
 
tim
el
in
es
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
gs
 m
od
el
. 
Fo
r 
ro
bu
st
ne
ss
, 
th
is
 
st
ud
y 
us
ed
 
C
-
Sc
or
e 
m
ea
su
re
 
us
ed
 
in
 
Pe
nm
an
 
an
d 
Zh
an
g 
(2
00
0)
.  
 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 s
ho
w
 t
he
 r
el
at
io
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
eq
ui
ty
 
an
d 
ac
cr
ua
l 
qu
al
ity
, 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
pe
rs
is
te
nc
e,
 
sm
oo
th
ne
ss
, a
nd
 v
al
ue
-r
el
ev
an
ce
. N
ei
th
er
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 
no
r 
tim
el
in
es
s 
is
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
eq
ui
ty
 i
n 
th
e 
pr
es
en
ce
 o
f v
al
ue
-r
el
ev
an
ce
. 
 
Fr
an
ci
s a
nd
 W
an
g 
(2
00
8)
Ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 in
ve
st
or
 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t a
nd
 
th
e 
ch
oi
ce
 o
f a
ud
ito
r j
oi
nt
ly
 
af
fe
ct
 th
e 
qu
al
ity
 o
f e
ar
ni
ng
s, 
m
ea
su
re
d 
us
in
g
th
e 
m
ag
ni
tu
de
 o
f s
ig
ne
d 
ab
no
rm
al
 a
cc
ru
al
s, 
th
e 
lik
el
ih
oo
d 
of
 re
po
rti
ng
 a
 lo
ss
, 
an
d 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
. 
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
of
 fi
rm
s 
fr
om
 4
2 
co
un
tri
es
 
ov
er
 th
e 
pe
rio
d 
19
94
 to
 2
00
4.
 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
.
Th
is
 st
ud
y 
fin
ds
 e
ar
ni
ng
s c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 is
 h
ig
h 
w
he
n 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
is
 st
ro
ng
, b
ut
 o
nl
y 
fo
r f
irm
s w
ith
 B
ig
 
Fo
ur
 a
ud
ito
rs
. 
Fo
r 
ot
he
r 
pr
ox
ie
s, 
th
e 
sig
ne
d 
ab
no
rm
al
 
ac
cr
ua
ls
 a
re
 s
m
al
le
r 
an
d 
th
e 
lik
el
ih
oo
d 
of
 a
 l
os
s 
is
 
gr
ea
te
r a
s 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 p
ro
te
ct
io
n 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t b
ec
om
es
 
st
ro
ng
er
; b
ut
 fo
r f
irm
s 
w
ith
 n
on
-B
ig
 F
ou
r a
ud
ito
rs
, b
ot
h 
pr
ox
ie
s 
ar
e 
un
af
fe
ct
ed
 
by
 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
in
 
in
ve
st
or
 
pr
ot
ec
tio
n.
 
G
ar
cí
a 
La
ra
 a
nd
 M
or
a 
(2
00
4)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t a
nd
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 a
cr
os
s 
ei
gh
t E
ur
op
ea
n 
co
un
tri
es
, 
an
d 
as
se
ss
 th
e 
sta
tis
tic
al
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nc
e 
of
 th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 a
m
on
g 
th
em
.  
Sa
m
pl
e 
fr
om
 
Ita
ly
, G
er
m
an
y,
 
Fr
an
ce
, B
el
gi
um
, 
Sp
ai
n,
 
Sw
itz
er
la
nd
, t
he
 
N
et
he
rla
nd
s a
nd
 
th
e 
U
K
 o
ve
r t
he
 
pe
rio
d 
19
87
 to
 
20
00
. 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (
Ba
su
, 
19
97
), 
an
d 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
m
od
el
 
(F
el
th
am
 &
 O
hl
so
n,
 1
99
5)
. 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 
sh
ow
 
ev
id
en
ce
 
of
 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t 
an
d 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 i
n 
al
l 
co
un
tri
es
 u
nd
er
 s
tu
dy
. 
C
on
tin
en
ta
l 
co
un
tri
es
 
ha
ve
 
hi
gh
er
 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
, b
ut
 n
o 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
sa
m
pl
es
 a
re
 fo
un
d,
 e
xc
ep
t f
or
 
th
e 
U
K
, 
w
hi
ch
 
ha
s 
hi
gh
er
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
. 
Fu
rth
er
, 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 i
s 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 
re
du
ce
d 
le
ve
ls
 o
f e
ar
ni
ng
s c
on
se
rv
at
ism
. 
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2 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
1:
 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 st
ud
ie
s o
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
e(
s)
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 M
ea
su
re
(s
) 
M
ai
n 
Em
pi
ric
al
 R
es
ul
ts
 
G
ar
cí
a 
La
ra
, G
ar
cí
a 
O
sm
a,
 a
nd
 M
or
a 
(2
00
5)
 
In
ve
st
ig
at
e 
w
he
th
er
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
an
ag
em
en
t a
ffe
ct
s t
he
 
m
ea
su
re
s o
f e
ar
ni
ng
s 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 in
 F
ra
nc
e,
 
G
er
m
an
y,
 a
nd
 th
e 
U
K
. 
Sa
m
pl
e 
fr
om
 
Fr
an
ce
, G
er
m
an
, 
an
d 
th
e 
U
K
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
19
90
 
to
 2
00
1.
  
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 s
ho
w
 n
o 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
le
ve
ls
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
th
re
e 
co
un
tri
es
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
af
te
r 
co
nt
ro
lli
ng
 f
or
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 l
ev
el
s 
in
 G
er
m
an
y 
an
d 
Fr
an
ce
 
de
cr
ea
se
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
tly
 a
nd
 t
he
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
in
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
U
K
 
(c
om
m
on
-la
w
) 
an
d 
Fr
an
ce
 a
nd
 G
er
m
an
y 
(c
od
e-
la
w
) b
ec
om
e 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
. 
 
G
ar
cí
a 
La
ra
, G
ar
cí
a 
O
sm
a,
 a
nd
 P
en
al
va
 
(2
00
7)
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
ch
ar
ac
te
ris
tic
s a
nd
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 in
 S
pa
in
. 
Sp
ai
n 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
99
7
20
02
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (
Ba
su
, 
19
97
) 
an
d 
ac
cr
ua
ls
-
ca
sh
 
flo
w
 
m
od
el
 
(B
al
l 
&
 
Sh
iv
ak
um
ar
, 2
00
5)
. 
Th
is
 st
ud
y 
fin
ds
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
th
at
 S
pa
ni
sh
 fi
rm
s w
ith
 st
ro
ng
 
bo
ar
ds
 u
se
 c
on
se
rv
at
iv
e 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
as
 a
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
to
ol
, t
ho
ug
h 
th
e 
lit
ig
at
io
n 
ris
k 
is
 lo
w
. I
n 
ad
di
tio
n,
 fi
rm
s 
w
he
re
 th
e 
C
EO
 h
as
 a
 l
ow
 i
nf
lu
en
ce
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
bo
ar
d 
of
 
di
re
ct
or
s 
sh
ow
 
a 
gr
ea
te
r 
de
gr
ee
 
of
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
.
 
G
ar
cí
a 
La
ra
, G
ar
cí
a 
O
sm
a,
 a
nd
 P
en
al
va
 
(2
00
9)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
as
so
ci
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
co
rp
or
at
e 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 a
nd
 th
e 
in
ci
de
nc
e 
of
 c
on
di
tio
na
l 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
. 
 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
99
2
20
03
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (
Ba
su
, 1
99
7)
, a
cc
ru
al
s-
ca
sh
 
flo
w
 m
od
el
 (
Ba
ll 
&
 S
hi
va
ku
m
ar
, 
20
05
), 
an
d 
th
re
e-
ye
ar
 a
ve
ra
ge
 to
ta
l 
ac
cr
ua
ls
 (G
iv
ol
y 
&
 H
ay
n,
 2
00
0)
. 
Th
is
 st
ud
y 
fin
ds
 fi
rm
s w
ith
 st
ro
ng
 c
or
po
ra
te
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
ha
ve
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 
hi
gh
er
 
le
ve
ls
 
of
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
. T
he
 c
au
sa
lit
y 
di
re
ct
io
n 
is
 c
on
si
st
en
t w
ith
 
th
e 
pr
ed
ic
tio
n 
th
at
 t
he
 f
lo
w
 i
s 
fr
om
 g
ov
er
na
nc
e 
to
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 a
nd
 n
ot
 v
ic
e 
ve
rs
a.
 T
hi
s 
im
pl
ie
s 
th
at
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 a
nd
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 a
re
 n
ot
 s
ub
st
itu
te
s. 
In
 
ad
di
tio
n,
 
th
e 
re
su
lts
 
sh
ow
 
th
at
 
fir
m
s 
w
ith
 
st
ro
ng
 
go
ve
rn
an
ce
 a
pp
ea
r 
to
 u
se
 d
is
cr
et
io
na
ry
 a
cc
ru
al
s 
to
 
in
fo
rm
 i
nv
es
to
rs
 a
bo
ut
 b
ad
 n
ew
s 
in
 a
 m
or
e 
tim
el
y 
m
an
ne
r. 
 
 
24
3 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
1:
 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 st
ud
ie
s o
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
e(
s)
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 M
ea
su
re
(s
) 
M
ai
n 
Em
pi
ric
al
 R
es
ul
ts
 
G
iv
ol
y 
an
d 
H
ay
n 
(2
00
0)
 
A
na
ly
se
 th
e 
ex
te
nt
 o
f 
re
po
rti
ng
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 in
 th
e 
U
S 
ov
er
 th
e 
la
st
 fo
ur
 
de
ca
de
s. 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
95
0
19
98
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (
Ba
su
, 1
99
7)
, t
he
 le
ve
l a
nd
 
ra
te
 o
f 
ac
cu
m
ul
at
io
n 
of
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
no
n-
op
er
at
in
g 
ac
cr
ua
ls
, 
th
e 
m
ea
su
re
s 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
tim
e-
se
rie
s 
pr
op
er
tie
s 
of
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 a
nd
 
ca
sh
 
flo
w
s 
(i.
e.
, 
th
e 
sk
ew
ne
ss
 o
f 
th
e 
ea
rn
in
gs
 d
is
tri
bu
tio
n 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 th
e 
ca
sh
 
flo
w
s 
di
st
rib
ut
io
n 
an
d 
th
e 
va
ria
bi
lit
y 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 
ca
sh
 fl
ow
s)
, a
nd
 th
e 
M
TB
.
 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 f
in
ds
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
fo
r 
an
 in
cr
ea
se
 o
ve
r 
tim
e 
in
 
th
e 
de
gr
ee
 o
f 
re
po
rti
ng
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
. S
pe
ci
fic
al
ly
, 
th
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 s
ho
w
s:
 a
 m
or
e 
tim
el
y 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f b
ad
 n
ew
s 
co
m
pa
re
d 
to
 g
oo
d 
ne
w
s;
 a
 d
ec
lin
e 
in
 r
ep
or
te
d 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
ov
er
 t
he
 l
as
t 
fo
ur
 d
ec
ad
es
; 
a 
m
as
si
ve
 a
cc
um
ul
at
io
n 
of
 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
no
n-
op
er
at
in
g 
ac
cr
ua
ls
 o
ve
r 
th
is
 p
er
io
d;
 a
nd
 a
 
m
or
e 
di
sp
er
se
d 
an
d 
ne
ga
tiv
el
y 
sk
ew
ed
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
di
str
ib
ut
io
n 
re
la
tiv
e 
to
 c
as
h 
flo
w
s.
 
 
G
as
se
n,
 F
ül
bi
er
, a
nd
 
Se
llh
or
n 
(2
00
6)
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
un
co
nd
iti
on
al
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
, c
on
di
tio
na
l 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
, a
nd
 in
co
m
e 
sm
oo
th
in
g,
 a
nd
 in
ve
st
ig
at
e 
de
te
rm
in
an
ts
 o
f t
he
se
 
at
tri
bu
te
s. 
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
fr
om
 2
3 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
m
ar
ke
ts 
(1
99
0
20
03
). 
Tr
ig
on
om
et
ric
 m
ea
su
re
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
as
ym
m
et
ric
 
tim
el
in
es
s 
of
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
m
od
el
 
(B
as
u,
 
19
97
); 
M
TB
; 
an
d 
ac
cu
m
ul
at
ed
 a
cc
ru
al
s 
ov
er
 
tim
e,
 
ex
cl
ud
in
g 
co
nt
em
po
ra
ne
ou
s a
cc
ru
al
s. 
Th
e 
fin
di
ng
s 
ar
e 
as
 
fo
llo
w
s:
 
(1
) 
un
co
nd
iti
on
al
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 a
nd
 in
co
m
e 
sm
oo
th
in
g 
ar
e 
as
so
ci
at
ed
w
ith
 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
; (
2)
 in
co
m
e 
sm
oo
th
in
g 
is
 o
nl
y 
w
ea
kl
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 t
hi
s 
fir
m
-s
pe
ci
fic
 m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
; 
(3
) 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 
an
d 
in
co
m
e 
sm
oo
th
in
g 
ar
e 
w
ea
kl
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 f
or
 a
 
br
oa
d 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l s
am
pl
e.
 In
co
m
e 
sm
oo
th
in
g 
ex
pl
ai
ns
 
in
te
rn
at
io
na
l 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 i
n 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
; 
an
d 
(4
) 
un
co
nd
iti
on
al
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
an
d 
in
co
m
e 
sm
oo
th
in
g 
ar
e 
dr
iv
en
 b
y 
di
ff
er
en
t 
ex
pl
an
at
or
y 
fir
m
-
le
ve
l 
fa
ct
or
s. 
C
on
di
tio
na
l 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 i
nc
re
as
es
 w
ith
 
th
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e 
of
 
de
bt
 
fin
an
ci
ng
, 
w
hi
le
 
in
co
m
e 
sm
oo
th
in
g 
in
cr
ea
se
s w
ith
 th
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e 
of
 d
iv
id
en
ds
. 
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 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 st
ud
ie
s o
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
e(
s)
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 M
ea
su
re
(s
) 
M
ai
n 
Em
pi
ric
al
 R
es
ul
ts
 
G
in
er
 a
nd
 R
ee
s (
20
01
) 
In
ve
st
ig
at
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 in
 
co
un
tri
es
 fr
om
 th
re
e 
di
sti
nc
t 
le
ga
l t
ra
di
tio
ns
: F
re
nc
h 
co
de
/c
iv
il 
la
w
, G
er
m
an
 
co
de
-la
w
 a
nd
 E
ng
lis
h 
co
m
m
on
 la
w
.  
Fr
an
ce
, G
er
m
an
, 
an
d 
th
e 
U
K
 
(1
99
0
19
98
). 
 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s o
f e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
e 
an
al
ys
is
 
sh
ow
s 
a 
sm
al
l 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
of
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 b
et
w
ee
n 
G
er
m
an
y,
 F
ra
nc
e,
 a
nd
 t
he
 U
K
. 
A
dd
iti
on
al
 a
na
ly
si
s 
us
in
g 
pr
io
r 
ye
ar
s
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
an
d 
pr
io
r 
ye
ar
s
 
ec
on
om
ic
 
ne
w
s, 
ho
w
ev
er
, 
fin
ds
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
is
 
hi
gh
er
 
in
 
th
e 
U
K
 
(a
 
co
m
m
on
-la
w
 
co
un
try
) 
th
an
 
in
 
Fr
an
ce
 
or
 
G
er
m
an
y 
(c
od
e-
la
w
 
co
un
tri
es
). 
 
G
ra
m
bo
va
s, 
G
in
er
, 
an
d 
Ch
ris
to
do
ul
ou
 
(2
00
6)
Ex
am
in
e 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 in
 th
e 
U
ni
te
d 
St
at
es
an
d 
th
e 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 
U
ni
on
 c
ou
nt
rie
s. 
EU
 c
ou
nt
rie
s a
nd
 
a 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
98
9
20
04
).
M
od
ifi
ed
 
as
ym
m
et
ric
 
tim
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 fr
om
 th
e 
pa
ne
l d
at
a 
sh
ow
 th
at
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
ha
ve
 
be
co
m
e 
m
or
e 
co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
in
 th
e 
EU
 w
he
n 
ta
ke
n 
as
 a
 
w
ho
le
. T
hi
s 
is
 a
ls
o 
th
e 
ca
se
 in
 th
e 
U
S.
 F
ur
th
er
, t
he
re
 i
s 
lit
tle
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
of
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 i
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
tw
o 
sa
m
pl
es
. 
H
ui
jg
en
 a
nd
 
Lu
bb
er
in
k 
(2
00
5)
 
C
om
pa
re
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 o
f t
he
 U
K
 
fir
m
s c
ro
ss
-li
st
ed
 in
 th
e 
U
S 
w
ith
 th
e 
U
K
 fi
rm
s w
ith
ou
t a
 
U
S 
lis
tin
g 
U
K
 sa
m
pl
e 
(1
99
3
20
02
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s o
f e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 
in
 
th
e 
U
K
 
cr
os
s-
lis
te
d 
fir
m
s 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
th
an
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
of
 U
K
 f
irm
s 
w
ith
ou
t 
a 
U
S 
lis
tin
g.
 T
he
 c
ro
ss
-li
st
ed
 f
irm
s 
sh
ow
 a
 h
ig
h 
le
ve
l 
of
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
ea
rly
 y
ea
rs
 o
f t
he
ir 
cr
os
s-
lis
tin
g,
 
su
gg
es
tin
g 
th
at
 
th
es
e 
fir
m
s 
em
pl
oy
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
to
 
si
gn
al
 
hi
gh
-q
ua
lit
y 
re
po
rti
ng
 
to
 
in
ve
st
or
s. 
 
Ji
nd
ric
ho
vs
ka
 a
nd
 
M
cL
ea
y 
(2
00
5)
 
In
ve
st
ig
at
es
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 in
 th
e 
C
ze
ch
 
m
ar
ke
t. 
C
ze
ch
 sa
m
pl
e 
(1
99
3 
to
 1
99
9)
. 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s o
f e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
is
 st
ud
y 
fin
ds
 n
o 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f e
ar
ni
ng
s 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 in
 
th
e 
C
ze
ch
 m
ar
ke
t, 
sin
ce
 p
ro
fit
s 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
pe
rs
is
te
nt
 th
an
 
lo
ss
es
. 
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
ar
gu
ed
 
th
at
 
th
e 
in
ce
nt
iv
es
 
fo
r 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 in
 th
e 
Cz
ec
h 
Re
pu
bl
ic
 a
re
 lo
w
 b
ec
au
se
 o
f 
th
e 
tra
ns
iti
on
al
 n
at
ur
e 
of
 th
e 
ec
on
om
y,
 th
e 
re
str
ic
tiv
e 
ta
x 
re
gu
la
tio
ns
, 
an
d 
th
e 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 e
nv
iro
nm
en
t, 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
cl
os
e 
to
 st
ak
eh
ol
de
r c
or
po
ra
tis
m
. 
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pp
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x 
1:
 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 st
ud
ie
s o
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
e(
s)
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 M
ea
su
re
(s
) 
M
ai
n 
Em
pi
ric
al
 R
es
ul
ts
 
Je
nk
in
s a
nd
 V
el
ur
y 
(2
00
8)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
re
la
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
au
di
to
r t
en
ur
e 
an
d 
th
e 
re
po
rti
ng
 o
f c
on
se
rv
at
iv
e 
ea
rn
in
gs
.  
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
98
0
20
04
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 
(B
as
u,
 
19
97
) 
an
d 
tim
e-
se
rie
s 
te
st
 o
f 
tim
el
in
es
s 
in
 l
os
s 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 s
ho
w
 a
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 b
et
w
ee
n 
sh
or
t 
an
d 
m
ed
iu
m
 
te
nu
re
 
an
d 
th
at
 
th
e 
ex
te
nt
 
of
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 d
oe
s 
re
du
ce
 o
ve
r 
lo
ng
 te
nu
re
. F
ro
m
 th
es
e 
re
su
lts
, 
th
is
 
st
ud
y 
im
pl
ie
s 
th
at
 
m
an
da
tin
g 
au
di
to
r 
ro
ta
tio
n 
m
ay
 
ha
ve
 
an
 
ad
ve
rs
e 
af
fe
ct
 
on
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
. 
 
K
ha
n 
an
d 
W
at
ts
 (2
00
9)
 
D
ev
el
op
 a
 fi
rm
-y
ea
r m
ea
su
re
 
of
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
, 
an
d 
ill
us
tra
te
 th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
ns
 
by
 te
st
in
g 
se
ve
ra
l 
hy
po
th
es
es
. 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
96
2
20
05
). 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 a
 f
irm
-y
ea
r 
m
ea
su
re
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 
(C
_S
co
re
) 
fr
om
 t
he
 B
as
u 
(1
99
7)
 
as
ym
m
et
ric
 t
im
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
. 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 f
in
ds
 t
he
 C
_S
co
re
 c
ap
tu
re
s 
va
ria
tio
n 
in
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 a
nd
 is
 a
bl
e 
to
 p
re
di
ct
 a
sy
m
m
et
ric
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
tim
el
in
es
s 
at
 h
or
iz
on
s 
of
 u
p 
to
 t
hr
ee
 y
ea
rs
 a
he
ad
. T
he
 
fin
di
ng
s 
sh
ow
 th
at
 fi
rm
s 
w
ith
 lo
ng
er
 in
ve
st
m
en
t c
yc
le
s, 
hi
gh
er
 id
io
sy
nc
ra
tic
 u
nc
er
ta
in
ty
, a
nd
 h
ig
he
r i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 h
av
e 
hi
gh
er
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
. T
he
se
 
re
su
lts
 
ar
e 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 
w
ith
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
be
in
g 
a 
re
sp
on
se
 
to
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 
an
d 
lit
ig
at
io
n,
 
ra
th
er
 th
an
 a
 fa
ct
or
 in
du
ci
ng
 th
os
e 
at
tri
bu
te
s. 
 
K
ris
hn
an
 (2
00
5a
) 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
au
di
to
r i
nd
us
try
 
ex
pe
rti
se
 a
nd
 th
e 
as
ym
m
et
ric
 
tim
el
in
es
s o
f e
ar
ni
ng
s. 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
98
9
19
98
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 f
in
ds
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
cl
ie
nt
s 
of
 s
pe
ci
al
is
t 
au
di
to
rs
 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
tim
el
y 
in
 re
fle
ct
in
g 
ba
d 
ne
w
s 
in
 th
ei
r e
ar
ni
ng
s 
th
an
 
cl
ie
nt
s 
of
 
no
ns
pe
ci
al
ist
 
au
di
to
rs
. 
Th
is
 
re
su
lt 
im
pl
ie
s 
th
at
 
th
e 
te
nd
en
cy
 
of
 
cl
ie
nt
s 
to
 
de
la
y 
th
e 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f e
co
no
m
ic
 lo
ss
es
 in
 e
ar
ni
ng
s i
s i
nf
lu
en
ce
d 
y 
ex
pe
rti
se
. 
 
K
ris
hn
an
 (2
00
5b
) 
Ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 e
ar
ni
ng
s o
f 
A
nd
er
se
n'
s H
ou
st
on
-b
as
ed
 
cl
ie
nt
s a
re
 ti
m
el
y 
in
 re
po
rti
ng
 
ba
d 
ne
w
s a
bo
ut
 fu
tu
re
 c
as
h 
flo
w
s. 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
99
6
20
00
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
 
Th
e 
re
su
lt 
sh
ow
s 
th
at
 t
he
 c
lie
nt
s 
fr
om
 A
nd
er
se
n'
s 
H
ou
st
on
-b
as
ed
 o
ffi
ce
 a
re
 l
es
s 
tim
el
y 
in
 r
ep
or
tin
g 
ba
d 
ne
w
s 
th
an
 n
on
-A
nd
er
se
n 
cl
ie
nt
s. 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 s
ug
ge
sts
 
th
at
 th
e 
cl
ie
nt
s o
f A
nd
er
se
n'
s H
ou
st
on
 o
ffi
ce
 e
ng
ag
ed
 in
 
ag
gr
es
si
ve
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
pr
ac
tic
es
, i
nc
lu
di
ng
 d
el
ay
in
g 
th
e 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f p
ub
lic
ly
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
ba
d 
ne
w
s.
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x 
1:
 S
um
m
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y 
of
 st
ud
ie
s o
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
e(
s)
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 M
ea
su
re
(s
) 
M
ai
n 
Em
pi
ric
al
 R
es
ul
ts
 
K
ris
hn
an
 (2
00
7)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 h
as
 in
cr
ea
se
d 
fo
r a
 sa
m
pl
e 
of
 fo
rm
er
 
A
rth
ur
 A
nd
er
se
n 
cl
ie
nt
s t
ha
t 
w
er
e 
fo
rc
ed
 to
 sw
itc
h 
au
di
to
rs
 in
 2
00
2.
  
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(2
00
1
20
02
). 
(i)
 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 
tim
el
in
es
s 
of
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 m
od
el
 (
Ba
su
, 
19
97
); 
(ii
) 
tim
e-
se
rie
s 
te
st
 
of
 
tim
el
in
es
s 
in
 
lo
ss
 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 
m
od
el
 
(B
as
u,
 
19
97
); 
(ii
i) 
ac
cr
ua
ls
-c
as
h 
flo
w
 
m
od
el
 (B
al
l &
 S
hi
va
ku
m
ar
, 2
00
5)
; 
an
d 
(iv
) 
ea
rn
in
gs
 s
ke
w
ne
ss
 (
Ba
su
, 
19
95
). 
 
Th
e 
st
ud
y 
fin
ds
 a
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 o
f e
ar
ni
ng
s 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 in
 
fo
rm
er
 A
nd
er
se
n 
cl
ie
nt
s 
w
he
n 
th
ey
 s
w
itc
he
d 
to
 a
 B
ig
 
Fo
ur
 a
ud
ito
r. 
Fo
rm
er
 A
nd
er
se
n 
cl
ie
nt
s 
ha
ve
 a
 h
ig
he
r 
le
ve
l 
of
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 in
 2
00
2 
th
an
 th
e 
sa
m
pl
e 
of
 n
on
-
A
nd
er
se
n 
cl
ie
nt
s 
th
at
 d
id
 n
ot
 s
w
itc
h 
au
di
to
rs
. 
Th
es
e 
re
su
lts
 i
m
pl
y 
th
at
 B
ig
 F
ou
r 
au
di
to
rs
 e
m
pl
oy
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 a
s a
 ri
sk
 m
an
ag
em
en
t s
tra
te
gy
 in
 th
e 
po
st
-
A
nd
er
se
n 
pe
rio
d.
 
K
w
on
, Y
in
, a
nd
 H
an
 
(2
00
6)
Ex
am
in
es
 sy
st
em
at
ic
 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 in
 th
e 
le
ve
l o
f 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 
be
tw
ee
n 
hi
gh
-te
ch
 a
nd
 lo
w
-
te
ch
 fi
rm
s.
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
99
0
19
98
).
(i)
 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 
tim
el
in
es
s 
of
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 m
od
el
 (
Ba
su
, 
19
97
); 
(ii
) 
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
no
no
pe
ra
tin
g 
ac
cr
ua
ls
 
(G
iv
ol
y 
&
 
H
ay
n,
 
20
00
); 
(ii
i) 
di
str
ib
ut
io
n 
of
 
ea
rn
in
gs
an
d 
di
sc
re
tio
na
ry
 a
cc
ru
al
s 
(G
iv
ol
y 
&
 
H
ay
n,
 2
00
0)
. 
 
H
ig
h-
te
ch
 
fir
m
s 
ha
ve
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 
hi
gh
er
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 c
om
pa
re
d 
to
 lo
w
-te
ch
 fi
rm
s. 
Th
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 
sh
ow
s 
th
at
 h
ig
h-
te
ch
 f
irm
s 
ha
ve
 m
or
e 
cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
no
n-
op
er
at
in
g 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s, 
hi
gh
er
 a
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 
ea
rn
in
gs
, 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
sk
ew
ne
ss
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
gs
 d
ist
rib
ut
io
n,
 
an
d 
an
 
in
co
m
e 
re
du
ci
ng
 
pa
tte
rn
 
fo
r 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
m
an
ag
em
en
t. 
La
i a
nd
 T
ay
lo
r (
20
08
) 
V
al
id
at
e 
th
e 
C-
Sc
or
e 
m
ea
su
re
 o
f K
ha
n 
&
 W
at
ts 
(2
00
7)
 a
nd
 se
ve
ra
l f
ac
to
rs
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 v
ar
ia
tio
n 
in
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
. 
 
A
us
tra
lia
n 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
99
3
20
06
). 
C
-S
co
re
 
fir
m
-y
ea
r 
m
ea
su
re
 
of
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
(K
ha
n 
&
 
W
at
ts,
 
20
09
). 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 fi
nd
s 
th
at
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 is
 a
 s
tro
ng
 fe
at
ur
e 
of
 
th
e 
A
us
tra
lia
n 
fin
an
ci
al
 r
ep
or
tin
g 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t. 
Th
e 
an
al
ys
is
 
sh
ow
s 
a 
po
si
tiv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 a
nd
 s
to
ck
 r
et
ur
n 
vo
la
til
ity
, 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
cy
cl
e 
le
ng
th
 a
nd
 p
rio
r 
pe
rio
d 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
, 
bu
t 
is
 
ne
ga
tiv
el
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 f
irm
 a
ge
, 
fir
m
 s
iz
e,
 a
nd
 
le
ve
ra
ge
. 
 
La
Fo
nd
 a
nd
 
R
oy
ch
ow
du
ry
 (2
00
8)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
re
po
rti
ng
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
. 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
99
4
20
04
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 
sh
ow
 
a 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
an
d 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
, 
ro
bu
st
 
to
 
va
rio
us
 
co
nt
ro
ls,
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
op
po
rtu
ni
ty
 s
et
. 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f 
a  
24
7 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
1:
 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 st
ud
ie
s o
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
e(
s)
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 M
ea
su
re
(s
) 
M
ai
n 
Em
pi
ric
al
 R
es
ul
ts
 
La
i a
nd
 T
ay
lo
r (
20
08
) 
V
al
id
at
e 
th
e 
C-
Sc
or
e 
m
ea
su
re
 o
f K
ha
n 
&
 W
at
ts 
(2
00
7)
 a
nd
 se
ve
ra
l f
ac
to
rs
 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 v
ar
ia
tio
n 
in
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
. 
 
A
us
tra
lia
n 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
99
3
20
06
). 
C
-S
co
re
 
fir
m
-y
ea
r 
m
ea
su
re
 
of
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
(K
ha
n 
&
 
W
at
ts,
 
20
09
). 
Th
is
 st
ud
y 
fin
ds
 th
at
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 is
 a
 p
er
va
si
ve
 fe
at
ur
e 
of
 t
he
 A
us
tra
lia
n 
fin
an
ci
al
 r
ep
or
tin
g 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t. 
Th
e 
an
al
ys
is
 
sh
ow
s 
a 
po
si
tiv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 a
nd
 s
to
ck
 r
et
ur
n 
vo
la
til
ity
, 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
cy
cl
e 
le
ng
th
 a
nd
 p
rio
r 
pe
rio
d 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
. I
n 
ad
di
tio
n 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 i
s 
ne
ga
tiv
el
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 f
irm
 a
ge
, 
fir
m
 si
ze
, a
nd
 le
ve
ra
ge
. 
 
La
Fo
nd
 a
nd
 
R
oy
ch
ow
du
ry
 (2
00
8)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
re
po
rti
ng
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
. 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
99
4
20
04
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 
sh
ow
 
a 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
an
d 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
, 
ro
bu
st
 
to
 
va
rio
us
 
co
nt
ro
ls,
 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
op
po
rtu
ni
ty
 s
et
. 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
ev
id
en
ce
 o
f 
a  
La
Fo
nd
 a
nd
 W
at
ts 
(2
00
8)
 
Ex
am
in
e h
ow
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 re
la
te
s t
o 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
.  
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
98
3
 2
00
1)
. 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
is
 
st
ud
y 
fin
ds
 
a 
po
si
tiv
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 a
nd
 t
he
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 
be
tw
ee
n 
in
sid
er
 a
nd
 o
ut
si
de
r. 
Fu
rth
er
 a
na
ly
si
s 
sh
ow
s 
th
at
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
as
ym
m
et
ry
 b
et
w
ee
n 
eq
ui
ty
 
in
ve
st
or
s l
ea
ds
 to
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
. 
 
Li
n 
an
d 
Ch
en
 (1
99
9)
 
Su
rv
ey
 th
e 
ap
pl
ic
ab
ili
ty
 o
f 
th
e 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
co
nv
en
tio
n 
in
 C
hi
na
. 
C
hi
na
 sa
m
pl
e 
(1
99
8)
. 
Su
rv
ey
 
th
e 
pe
rc
ep
tio
n 
of
 
ac
co
un
ta
nt
s, 
m
an
ag
em
en
t, 
go
ve
rn
m
en
t 
of
fic
ia
ls
, 
ba
nk
 
lo
an
 
of
fic
er
s, 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
an
al
ys
ts
, 
an
d 
au
di
to
rs
. 
Th
is
 s
ur
ve
y 
fin
ds
 th
at
, i
n 
ge
ne
ra
l, 
th
e 
re
sp
on
de
nt
s 
he
ld
 
no
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
at
tit
ud
es
 t
o 
th
e 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 c
on
ve
nt
io
n 
un
de
r 
th
e 
ch
an
gi
ng
 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
en
vi
ro
nm
en
t 
in
 
th
e 
co
un
try
. T
he
re
 is
 c
le
ar
 e
vi
de
nc
e 
th
at
 v
ar
io
us
 in
te
re
st
ed
 
pa
rti
es
 
of
 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
w
ou
ld
 
su
pp
or
t 
an
 
ac
co
un
tin
g.
 
 
  
 
24
8 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
1:
 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 st
ud
ie
s o
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
e(
s)
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 M
ea
su
re
(s
) 
M
ai
n 
Em
pi
ric
al
 R
es
ul
ts
 
Lo
bo
 a
nd
 Z
ho
u 
(2
00
6)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
ch
an
ge
 in
 
m
an
ag
er
ia
l d
is
cr
et
io
n,
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
us
in
g 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 a
nd
 
di
sc
re
tio
na
ry
 a
cc
ru
al
s, 
ov
er
 
fin
an
ci
al
 re
po
rti
ng
 fo
llo
w
in
g 
th
e 
Sa
rb
an
es
-O
xl
ey
 A
ct
.  
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
ov
er
 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
of
 tw
o 
ye
ar
s p
re
- a
nd
 
po
st
-S
O
X
. 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
.  
Th
is
 st
ud
y 
fin
ds
 a
n 
in
cr
ea
se
 in
 e
ar
ni
ng
s c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 in
 
fin
an
ci
al
 r
ep
or
tin
g 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
SO
X
. 
In
 t
he
 p
os
t-S
O
X
 
pe
rio
d,
 f
irm
s 
in
co
rp
or
at
e 
lo
ss
es
 m
or
e 
qu
ic
kl
y 
th
an
 
ga
in
s. 
Fu
rth
er
m
or
e,
 f
irm
s 
re
po
rt 
lo
w
er
 d
is
cr
et
io
na
ry
 
ac
cr
ua
ls
 a
fte
r 
SO
X
 th
an
 in
 th
e 
pe
rio
d 
pr
ec
ed
in
g 
SO
X
. 
Th
es
e 
re
su
lts
 sh
ow
 th
at
 th
e 
in
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 S
O
X
 a
lte
re
d 
ur
 to
w
ar
d 
m
or
e 
co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
re
po
rti
ng
. 
 
M
as
on
 (2
00
4)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
Fe
lth
am
 a
nd
 
19
95
) a
ss
er
tio
n 
on
 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 a
nd
 
th
e 
di
ffe
re
nt
ia
l r
es
po
ns
e 
to
 
op
er
at
in
g 
ac
cr
ua
ls
. 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
97
5
19
96
).
M
ar
ke
t 
to
 
bo
ok
 
ra
tio
; 
an
d 
ac
co
un
tin
g-
ba
se
d 
m
ea
su
re
s 
to
 
pr
ox
y 
fo
r 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
w
hi
ch
 
in
cl
ud
e 
un
re
co
rd
ed
 
in
ve
nt
or
y 
as
se
ts
, 
un
re
co
rd
ed
 
R&
D
 
as
se
ts
,
un
re
co
rd
ed
 
ad
ve
rti
sin
g,
 
un
re
co
rd
ed
 
ga
in
s 
or
 
lo
ss
es
 
on
 
pe
ns
io
n 
pl
an
 
as
se
ts
, 
un
re
co
rd
ed
 
ac
co
un
t 
re
ce
iv
ab
le
 
as
se
ts
, 
an
d 
un
re
co
rd
ed
 d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n.
 
 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 f
in
ds
 a
 p
os
iti
ve
 a
ss
oc
ia
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
va
lu
at
io
n 
of
 m
ul
tip
le
 o
n 
op
er
at
in
g 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 a
gg
re
ga
te
 
sc
or
e 
of
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
an
d 
va
rio
us
 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s 
of
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
sc
or
es
, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n,
 
ad
ve
rti
sin
g,
 a
nd
 R
&
D
.T
he
 r
es
ul
t, 
fr
om
 p
ar
tit
io
ni
ng
 th
e 
fir
m
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
, i
s 
co
ns
is
te
nt
 w
ith
 F
el
th
am
 
an
d 
O
hl
so
n'
s 
(1
99
5)
 p
re
di
ct
io
n 
th
at
 t
he
 m
ag
ni
tu
de
 o
f 
th
e 
re
sp
on
se
 
co
ef
fic
ie
nt
 
on
 
op
er
at
in
g 
ac
cr
ua
ls
 
is
 
po
si
tiv
el
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
. 
 
Pa
e,
 T
ho
rn
to
n,
 a
nd
 
W
el
ke
r (
20
05
) 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
re
la
tio
ns
hi
p 
be
tw
ee
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 a
nd
 m
ar
ke
t-t
o-
bo
ok
 ra
tio
 (M
TB
). 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
97
0
20
01
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Fi
rm
s 
w
ith
 l
ow
er
 M
TB
 r
at
io
s 
ha
ve
 g
re
at
er
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 t
ha
n 
fir
m
s 
w
ith
 h
ig
he
r 
M
TB
 r
at
io
s. 
In
 
ad
di
tio
n,
 t
he
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
as
so
ci
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 a
nd
 th
e 
M
TB
 ra
tio
 s
te
m
s 
fr
om
 th
e 
ac
cr
ua
l 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
gs
, 
no
t 
th
e 
op
er
at
in
g 
ca
sh
 f
lo
w
 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 o
f e
ar
ni
ng
s. 
 
  
 
24
9 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
1:
 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 st
ud
ie
s o
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
e(
s)
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 M
ea
su
re
(s
) 
M
ai
n 
Em
pi
ric
al
 R
es
ul
ts
 
Po
pe
 a
nd
 W
al
ke
r 
(1
99
9)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 in
 th
e 
tim
el
in
es
s o
f i
nc
om
e 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f e
ar
ni
ng
s 
be
fo
re
 a
nd
 a
fte
r 
ex
tra
or
di
na
ry
 it
em
s, 
be
tw
ee
n 
U
S 
an
d 
U
K
 G
A
A
P 
fir
m
s. 
 
U
S 
an
d 
U
K
 
sa
m
pl
es
 (1
97
6
 
19
96
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
, 
di
sp
la
ye
d 
by
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
be
fo
re
 
ex
tra
or
di
na
ry
 i
te
m
s, 
un
de
r 
U
S 
G
A
A
P 
w
as
 h
ig
he
r 
th
an
 
un
de
r 
U
K
 
G
A
A
P.
 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
e 
ex
am
in
at
io
n 
of
 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
af
te
r 
ex
tra
or
di
na
ry
 
ite
m
s 
re
ve
al
s 
th
at
 
th
e 
se
ns
iti
vi
ty
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
gs
 t
o 
ba
d 
ne
w
s 
w
as
 h
ig
he
r 
un
de
r 
U
K
 G
A
A
P 
th
an
 u
nd
er
 U
S 
G
A
A
P.
  
Q
ia
ng
 (2
00
7)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 th
e 
ex
pl
an
at
io
n 
fo
r c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 
(c
on
tra
ct
in
g,
 li
tig
at
io
n,
 
re
gu
la
tio
n,
 a
nd
 ta
xa
tio
n)
, 
ap
pl
ie
s t
o 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
, u
nc
on
di
tio
na
l 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
, o
r b
ot
h.
 
 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e.
 
(1
98
8
19
99
). 
B
oo
k-
va
lu
e-
ba
se
d 
m
ea
su
re
s 
of
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
(B
ea
ve
r 
&
 
R
ya
n,
 
20
00
) 
an
d 
ac
cr
ua
ls
-b
as
ed
 
m
ea
su
re
s 
of
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 (
G
iv
ol
y 
&
 H
ay
n,
 2
00
0)
. 
Th
es
e 
fin
di
ng
s 
ar
e 
as
 f
ol
lo
w
s:
 (
i) 
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g 
in
du
ce
s 
co
nd
iti
on
al
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
; 
(ii
) 
lit
ig
at
io
n 
in
du
ce
s 
bo
th
 
fo
rm
s;
 
an
d 
(ii
i) 
re
gu
la
tio
n 
an
d 
ta
xa
tio
n 
in
du
ce
 
un
co
nd
iti
on
al
 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
. 
O
ve
ra
ll,
 
th
e 
ev
id
en
ce
 
sh
ow
s 
th
at
 c
on
di
tio
na
l a
nd
 u
nc
on
di
tio
na
l c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 
pl
ay
 
di
st
in
ct
 
ro
le
s 
in
 
co
nt
ra
ct
in
g,
 
re
gu
la
tio
n,
 
an
d 
ta
xa
tio
n,
 a
s w
el
l a
s i
n 
lit
ig
at
io
n.
Ra
on
ic
, M
cL
ea
y,
 a
nd
 
A
si
m
ak
op
ou
lo
s (
20
04
) 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
im
pa
ct
 o
f 
co
un
try
-le
ve
l d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
re
gi
m
es
, l
eg
al
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t 
an
d 
th
e 
im
po
rta
nc
e 
of
 e
qu
ity
 
m
ar
ke
ts 
on
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
. 
Eu
ro
pe
an
 sa
m
pl
e 
(1
98
7
 1
99
9)
. 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 f
in
ds
 t
ha
t 
fir
m
s 
do
m
ic
ile
d 
an
d 
lis
te
d 
in
 
di
ffe
re
nt
 m
ar
ke
ts 
ex
hi
bi
t 
gr
ea
te
r 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
. 
Eq
ui
ty
 
m
ar
ke
t 
ex
po
su
re
 a
pp
ea
rs
 t
o 
be
 p
os
iti
ve
ly
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 g
re
at
er
 t
im
el
in
es
s 
in
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
re
co
gn
iti
on
, 
w
hi
le
 
re
gu
la
to
ry
 e
nf
or
ce
m
en
t i
s 
po
si
tiv
el
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 th
e 
bi
as
 to
w
ar
ds
 c
on
se
rv
at
is
m
. 
  
Ru
dd
oc
k,
 T
ay
lo
r, 
an
d 
Ta
yl
or
 (2
00
6)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
of
 n
on
-a
ud
it 
se
rv
ic
es
 b
y 
in
cu
m
be
nt
 
au
di
to
rs
 is
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 
im
pa
irm
en
t o
f a
ud
ito
r 
in
de
pe
nd
en
ce
, o
r a
 re
du
ct
io
n 
in
 e
ar
ni
ng
s c
on
se
rv
at
ism
. 
 
A
us
tra
lia
n 
sa
m
pl
e.
 (1
99
3
20
01
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 
(B
as
u,
 
19
97
) 
an
d 
tim
e-
se
rie
s 
te
st
 o
f 
tim
el
in
es
s 
in
 l
os
s 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 m
od
el
 (B
as
u,
 1
99
7)
. 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 c
on
si
st
en
tly
 s
ho
w
 th
at
 h
ig
he
r t
ha
n 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 
le
ve
ls
 o
f 
no
n-
au
di
t 
se
rv
ic
es
 a
re
 n
ot
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
d 
w
ith
 
re
du
ce
d 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
. 
 
25
0 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
1:
 S
um
m
ar
y 
of
 st
ud
ie
s o
n 
ea
rn
in
gs
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 (c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
A
ut
ho
r(
s)
 
O
bj
ec
tiv
e(
s)
 
Sa
m
pl
e 
C
on
se
rv
at
is
m
 M
ea
su
re
(s
) 
M
ai
n 
Em
pi
ric
al
 R
es
ul
ts
 
W
an
g 
(2
00
6)
 
Ex
am
in
e 
th
e 
re
la
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
fo
un
di
ng
 
fa
m
ily
 
ow
ne
rs
hi
p 
an
d 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
qu
al
ity
 u
si
ng
 d
at
a 
fr
om
 t
he
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
.  
 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
99
4,
 
20
02
). 
Ti
m
e-
se
rie
s 
te
st
 o
f 
tim
el
in
es
s 
in
 
lo
ss
 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 
m
od
el
 
(B
as
u,
 
19
97
). 
Th
e 
re
su
lts
 s
ho
w
 t
ha
t 
fo
un
di
ng
 f
am
ily
 o
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
is
 
po
si
tiv
el
y 
as
so
ci
at
ed
 w
ith
 e
ar
ni
ng
s q
ua
lit
y.
 S
pe
ci
fic
al
ly
, 
fo
un
di
ng
 
fa
m
ily
 
fir
m
s 
ha
ve
 
gr
ea
te
r 
ea
rn
in
gs
 
in
fo
rm
at
iv
en
es
s, 
lo
w
er
 
ab
no
rm
al
 
ac
cr
ua
ls
, 
an
d 
le
ss
 
pe
rs
is
te
nc
e 
of
 t
ra
ns
ito
ry
 l
os
s 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s 
in
 e
ar
ni
ng
s. 
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 a
ls
o 
su
gg
es
ts
 a
 n
on
lin
ea
r 
re
la
tio
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
fa
m
ily
 o
w
ne
rs
hi
p 
an
d 
ea
rn
in
gs
 q
ua
lit
y.
 
 
Zh
an
g 
(2
00
8)
 
Th
is
 p
ap
er
 e
xa
m
in
es
 th
e 
ex
-
po
st
 a
nd
 e
x-
an
te
 b
en
ef
its
 o
f 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 
to
 
le
nd
er
s 
an
d 
bo
rr
ow
er
s 
in
 th
e 
de
bt
 c
on
tra
ct
in
g 
pr
oc
es
s. 
 
U
S 
sa
m
pl
e 
(1
99
4
20
03
). 
A
sy
m
m
et
ric
 ti
m
el
in
es
s 
of
 e
ar
ni
ng
s 
m
od
el
 
(B
as
u,
 
19
97
); 
th
e 
ac
cu
m
ul
at
ed
 
no
n-
op
er
at
in
g 
ac
cr
ua
ls
 
an
d 
th
e 
tim
e-
se
rie
s 
sk
ew
ne
ss
 o
f 
ea
rn
in
gs
 (
G
iv
ol
y 
&
 
H
ay
n,
 2
00
0)
.
Th
is
 s
tu
dy
 s
ho
w
s 
th
at
 c
on
se
rv
at
ism
 b
en
ef
its
 le
nd
er
s 
ex
-
po
st
 th
ro
ug
h 
th
e 
tim
el
y 
si
gn
al
lin
g 
of
 d
ef
au
lt 
ris
k,
 w
he
re
 
m
or
e 
co
ns
er
va
tiv
e 
bo
rr
ow
er
s 
ar
e 
m
or
e 
lik
el
y 
to
 v
io
la
te
 
de
bt
 
co
ve
na
nt
s 
fo
llo
w
in
g 
a 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
pr
ic
e 
sh
oc
k.
 
Fu
rth
er
, 
co
ns
er
va
tis
m
 g
iv
es
 b
en
ef
its
 t
o 
bo
rr
ow
er
s 
ex
-
an
te
 th
ro
ug
h 
lo
w
er
 in
te
re
st
 ra
te
s.
 
 
25
1 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s  
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
Bu
si
ne
ss
 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
an
d 
go
od
w
ill
 
FR
S 
3 
Bu
si
ne
ss
 C
om
bi
na
tio
ns
 (e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 2
1 
Bu
si
ne
ss
 C
om
bi
na
tio
ns
, r
en
am
ed
 t
o 
FR
S 
12
2 2
00
4 
Bu
si
ne
ss
 C
om
bi
na
tio
ns
 (e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ju
ly
 1
, 2
00
0)
. 
M
et
ho
d 
al
lo
w
ed
 
fo
r 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
co
m
bi
na
tio
ns
 
FR
S 
3 
do
es
 n
ot
 a
llo
w
 th
e 
m
er
ge
r 
m
et
ho
d 
fo
r 
bu
sin
es
s 
co
m
bi
na
tio
ns
. 
O
nl
y 
th
e 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 m
et
ho
d 
is
 a
llo
w
ed
 u
nd
er
 t
hi
s 
st
an
da
rd
. 
Th
is 
ap
pl
ie
s 
fr
om
 t
he
 a
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
da
te
, 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
th
e 
da
te
 t
he
 a
cq
ui
re
r 
ef
fe
ct
iv
el
y 
ob
ta
in
ed
 c
on
tro
l (
pa
ra
 1
4)
. 
M
A
SB
 2
1 
pe
rm
itt
ed
 b
us
in
es
s 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
to
 b
e 
ac
co
un
te
d 
fo
r u
sin
g 
ei
th
er
 th
e 
m
er
ge
r m
et
ho
d 
or
 th
e a
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
m
et
ho
d.
 
 
Re
co
gn
iti
on
 
of
 
th
e 
id
en
tif
ia
bl
e 
as
se
ts
 
ac
qu
ire
d,
 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
an
d 
co
nt
in
ge
nt
 li
ab
ili
tie
s 
FR
S 
3 
re
qu
ire
s 
(1
) t
he
 li
ab
ili
tie
s 
fo
r 
te
rm
in
at
in
g 
or
 r
ed
uc
in
g 
ac
tiv
iti
es
 
of
 t
he
 a
cq
ui
re
e 
an
d 
(2
) 
co
nt
in
ge
nt
 l
ia
bi
lit
ie
s 
of
 t
he
 a
cq
ui
re
e 
to
 b
e 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 se
pa
ra
te
ly
 a
t t
he
 a
cq
ui
si
tio
n 
da
te
 (p
ar
a 
36
, 3
7)
; a
nd
 c
la
rif
ie
s 
th
e 
cr
ite
ria
 to
 s
ep
ar
at
el
y 
re
co
gn
is
e
t 
of
 th
e 
pr
oc
es
s 
of
 a
llo
ca
tin
g 
th
e 
co
st 
of
 b
us
in
es
s c
om
bi
na
tio
ns
 (p
ar
a
45
, 
46
). 
su
bs
um
ed
 w
ith
in
 t
he
 a
m
ou
nt
 r
ec
og
ni
se
d 
as
 g
oo
dw
ill
 o
r 
ne
ga
tiv
e 
go
od
w
ill
. 
Ex
ce
ss
 o
f 
th
e 
ne
t 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
of
 
fia
bl
e 
as
se
ts
, 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s a
nd
 c
on
tin
ge
nt
 li
ab
ili
tie
s 
ov
er
 
th
e 
co
st
 
of
 
bu
si
ne
ss
 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
co
nt
in
ge
nt
 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
bu
sin
es
s 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
ex
ce
ed
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f c
om
bi
na
tio
n,
 F
RS
 3
 re
qu
ire
s t
he
 a
cq
ui
re
r t
o 
re
as
se
ss
 
co
nt
in
ge
nt
 li
ab
ili
tie
s 
an
d 
th
e 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t o
f t
he
 c
os
t o
f c
om
bi
na
tio
n.
 
A
ny
 e
xc
es
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 i
m
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 i
n 
th
e 
pr
of
it 
an
d 
lo
ss
 
(p
ar
a 
56
). 
Th
er
e 
is
 n
o 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
sta
nd
ar
d 
re
ga
rd
in
g 
th
is
 m
at
te
r 
in
 
M
A
SB
 2
1.
 A
lth
ou
gh
 M
A
SB
 2
1 
is
 e
qu
iv
al
en
t 
to
 I
A
S 
22
, i
t 
ex
cl
ud
ed
 a
ll 
of
 t
he
 s
ec
tio
ns
 r
el
at
in
g 
to
 g
oo
dw
ill
. 
IA
S 
22
 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
ex
ce
ss
 to
 b
e 
ac
co
un
te
d 
fo
r 
as
 n
eg
at
iv
e 
go
od
w
ill
, 
bu
t t
hi
s i
s n
ot
 in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 M
A
SB
 2
1.
  
   
 
25
2 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
Re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f g
oo
dw
ill
 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 3
, g
oo
dw
ill
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
in
 a
 b
us
in
es
s 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 a
s 
an
 a
ss
et
. 
G
oo
dw
ill
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 i
ni
tia
lly
 m
ea
su
re
d 
at
 i
ts
 
co
st
, 
w
hi
ch
 i
s 
th
e 
ex
ce
ss
 o
f 
co
st
 o
f 
bu
si
ne
ss
 c
om
bi
na
tio
ns
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
an
d 
co
nt
in
ge
nt
 li
ab
ili
tie
s (
pa
ra
 5
1)
. 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
st
an
da
rd
 f
or
 t
he
 r
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
an
d 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t o
f g
oo
dw
ill
 in
 M
al
ay
sia
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
of
 
FR
S 
3.
  
A
lth
ou
gh
 M
A
SB
 2
1B
us
in
es
s 
C
om
bi
na
tio
ns
 is
 e
qu
iv
al
en
t 
to
 
IA
S 
22
, t
he
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
ex
cl
ud
ed
 th
e 
se
ct
io
n 
on
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
fo
r 
go
od
w
ill
. 
Th
er
e 
w
er
e 
a 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
pr
ac
tic
es
 
re
la
te
d 
to
 g
oo
dw
ill
 i
n 
M
al
ay
si
a 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
(1
) 
go
od
w
ill
 w
as
 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 w
rit
te
n 
of
f 
ag
ai
ns
t 
re
se
rv
es
, 
(2
) 
go
od
w
ill
 w
as
 
tre
at
ed
 a
s a
 o
ne
-ti
m
e 
ex
pe
ns
e,
 (3
) g
oo
dw
ill
 w
as
 c
ap
ita
lis
ed
 a
s 
an
 i
nt
an
gi
bl
e 
as
se
t 
an
d 
w
rit
te
n 
do
w
n 
w
he
n 
im
pa
ire
d3
0 , 
an
d 
(4
) 
go
od
w
ill
 w
as
re
co
gn
is
ed
 a
s 
an
 i
nt
an
gi
bl
e 
as
se
t 
an
d 
am
or
tiz
ed
 o
ve
r i
ts 
us
ef
ul
 li
fe
.31
G
oo
dw
ill
 a
m
or
tis
at
io
n 
FR
S 
3 
do
es
 n
ot
 a
llo
w
 g
oo
dw
ill
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
fr
om
 b
us
in
es
s 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
to
 
be
 
am
or
tiz
ed
. 
Th
e 
sta
nd
ar
d 
re
qu
ire
s 
go
od
w
ill
 
to
 
be
 
te
st
ed
 
fo
r 
im
pa
irm
en
t 
an
nu
al
ly
, 
or
 m
or
e 
fr
eq
ue
nt
ly
 i
f 
ev
en
ts
 o
r 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
ci
rc
um
sta
nc
es
 in
di
ca
te
 th
at
 it
 m
ig
ht
 b
e 
im
pa
ire
d 
(p
ar
a 
55
). 
Im
pa
irm
en
t o
f A
ss
et
s 
FR
S 
13
6 
Im
pa
irm
en
t o
f A
ss
et
s (
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
fro
m
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 2
3 
Im
pa
irm
en
t 
of
 A
ss
et
s, 
re
na
m
ed
 t
o 
FR
S 
13
6 2
00
4 
Im
pa
irm
en
t o
f A
ss
et
s (
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
2)
. 
G
oo
dw
ill
 im
pa
irm
en
t 
FR
S 
3 
(p
ar
a 
55
) 
an
d 
FR
S 
13
6 
(p
ar
a 
10
(b
))
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
go
od
w
ill
 t
o 
be
 
te
st
ed
 fo
r i
m
pa
irm
en
t a
nn
ua
lly
, o
r m
or
e 
fr
eq
ue
nt
ly
 if
 e
ve
nt
s o
r c
ha
ng
es
 
in
 c
irc
um
st
an
ce
s i
nd
ic
at
e 
th
at
 it
 m
ig
ht
 b
e 
im
pa
ire
d.
 
M
A
SB
 2
3 
re
qu
ire
d 
th
e 
re
co
ve
ra
bl
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f a
n 
as
se
t t
o 
be
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
w
he
ne
ve
r 
th
er
e 
is
 in
di
ca
tio
n 
th
at
 th
e 
as
se
t m
ay
 b
e 
im
pa
ire
d.
 
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
   
30
 G
oo
dw
ill
 c
ap
ita
lis
ed
 u
nd
er
 th
is 
m
et
ho
d 
w
as
 u
su
al
ly
 r
ev
ie
w
ed
 p
er
io
di
ca
lly
 t
o 
as
se
ss
 i
ts
 i
m
pa
irm
en
t. 
Th
e 
im
pa
irm
en
t t
es
ts
 o
f 
go
od
w
ill
 w
er
e 
pr
es
cr
ib
ed
 i
n 
M
A
SB
 2
3 
Im
pa
irm
en
t o
f A
ss
et
s. 
31
 T
he
 in
co
ns
is
te
nt
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
tre
at
m
en
t f
or
 g
oo
dw
ill
 in
 M
al
ay
si
a 
w
as
 h
ig
hl
ig
ht
ed
 b
y 
th
e 
M
A
SB
 c
ha
irm
an
, R
aj
a 
D
at
uk
 A
rs
ha
d 
Ra
ja
 T
un
 U
da
 in
 a
 p
re
ss
 c
on
fe
re
nc
e 
on
 1
4 
N
ov
em
be
r 2
00
0,
 w
he
n 
he
 a
nn
ou
nc
ed
 th
at
 th
e 
Bo
ar
d 
w
ou
ld
 is
su
e 
Ex
po
su
re
 D
ra
ft 
28
, G
oo
dw
ill
 b
y 
th
e 
en
d 
of
 th
e 
ye
ar
 2
00
0.
  
25
3 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
Im
pa
irm
en
t o
f I
nt
an
gi
bl
e 
A
ss
et
s 
FR
S 
13
6 
(p
ar
a 
10
(a
))
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
th
e 
in
ta
ng
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s 
to
 b
e 
te
st
ed
 f
or
 
im
pa
irm
en
t 
an
nu
al
ly
, 
or
 m
or
e 
fr
eq
ue
nt
ly
 i
f 
ev
en
ts
 o
r 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
ci
rc
um
sta
nc
es
 in
di
ca
te
 th
at
 it
 m
ig
ht
 b
e 
im
pa
ire
d.
  
FR
S 
13
6 
pr
ov
id
es
 
cl
ar
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 e
le
m
en
ts
 t
o 
be
 c
on
si
de
re
d 
in
 
de
te
rm
in
in
g 
va
lu
e 
in
 u
se
 (
pa
ra
 3
0)
 a
nd
 g
ui
da
nc
e 
on
 e
st
im
at
io
n 
of
 
fu
tu
re
 c
as
h 
flo
w
s (
pa
ra
 3
3)
. 
FR
S 
13
6 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
at
 c
as
h 
flo
w
s 
fro
m
 a
ny
 a
ss
et
s 
or
 c
as
h 
ge
ne
ra
tin
g 
un
its
 a
ffe
ct
ed
 b
y 
in
te
rn
al
 t
ra
ns
fe
r 
pr
ic
in
g 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
es
tim
at
ed
 u
sin
g 
va
lu
e 
in
 a
rm
s-
le
ng
th
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
. 
M
A
SB
 2
3 
re
qu
ire
d 
th
e 
re
co
ve
ra
bl
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f a
n 
as
se
t t
o 
be
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
w
he
ne
ve
r 
th
er
e 
w
as
 i
nd
ic
at
io
n 
th
at
 th
e 
as
se
t m
ay
 
be
 im
pa
ire
d.
  
M
A
SB
 2
3 
di
d 
no
t p
ro
vi
de
 su
ch
 c
la
rif
ic
at
io
ns
 a
nd
 g
ui
da
nc
e.
  
M
A
SB
 2
3 
re
qu
ire
d 
an
 a
ss
et
 o
r g
ro
up
 o
f a
ss
et
s t
o 
be
 id
en
tif
ie
d 
as
 a
 c
as
h 
ge
ne
ra
tin
g 
un
it 
if 
an
 a
ct
iv
e 
m
ar
ke
t e
xi
st
ed
 f
or
 th
e 
ou
tp
ut
 p
ro
du
ce
d 
by
 t
he
 a
ss
et
, 
ev
en
 i
f 
th
e 
ou
tp
ut
 w
as
 u
se
d 
es
tim
at
es
 o
f 
fu
tu
re
 m
ar
ke
t 
pr
ic
es
 f
or
 t
he
 o
ut
pu
t 
w
as
 t
o 
be
 
us
ed
 in
 e
sti
m
at
in
g 
th
e
fu
tu
re
 c
as
h 
flo
w
s.
In
ta
ng
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s
FR
S 
13
6 
In
ta
ng
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s (
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
.
N
o 
st
an
da
rd
 fo
r i
nt
an
gi
bl
e 
as
se
ts
. 
FR
S 
13
8 
su
pe
rs
ed
es
 M
A
SB
 4
 (
FR
S 
10
9 2
00
4)
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t C
os
ts
Sc
op
e 
of
 In
ta
ng
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s 
FR
S 
13
8 
in
cl
ud
es
 a
 w
id
er
 s
co
pe
 o
f 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
fo
r 
in
ta
ng
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s 
w
hi
ch
 is
 n
ot
 d
ea
lt 
w
ith
 in
 o
th
er
 st
an
da
rd
s (
pa
ra
 1
3)
. 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
sta
nd
ar
d 
fo
r 
in
ta
ng
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s 
in
 
M
al
ay
si
a 
be
fo
re
 t
he
 a
do
pt
io
n 
of
 F
RS
 1
38
. 
M
A
SB
 d
id
 n
ot
 
ad
op
t I
A
S 
38
 In
ta
ng
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s. 
Th
e 
on
ly
 s
ta
nd
ar
ds
 t
ha
t 
re
la
te
d 
to
 i
nt
an
gi
bl
e 
as
se
ts
 w
as
 
M
A
SB
 4
 R
es
ea
rc
h 
an
d 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t C
os
ts
 (r
en
am
ed
 to
 F
R
S 
10
9 2
00
4 
Re
se
ar
ch
 a
nd
 D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
C
os
ts
), 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 
Ju
ly
 1
, 1
99
9.
  
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
an
d 
Re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f 
In
ta
ng
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s  
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
38
, 
th
e 
pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 r
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
cr
ite
ria
 f
or
 i
nt
an
gi
bl
e 
as
se
ts
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 o
r a
cq
ui
re
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
bu
sin
es
s 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
is
 
al
w
ay
s c
on
si
de
re
d 
to
 b
e 
sa
tis
fie
d 
(p
ar
a 
33
). 
FR
S 
13
8 
pr
ov
id
es
 th
at
 if
 a
n 
in
ta
ng
ib
le
 a
ss
et
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
in
 a
 b
us
in
es
s 
co
m
bi
na
tio
n 
ha
s 
a 
fin
ite
 u
se
fu
l 
lif
e,
 t
he
re
 i
s 
a 
re
bu
tta
bl
e 
pr
es
um
pt
io
n 
th
at
 i
ts
 f
ai
r 
va
lu
e 
ca
n 
be
 
m
ea
su
re
d 
re
lia
bl
y 
(p
ar
a 
35
41
). 
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M
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ffe
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es
 b
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w
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FR
S 
an
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M
A
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 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
Su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 
Re
co
gn
iti
on
 
of
 
In
ta
ng
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s 
FR
S 
13
8 
al
lo
w
s 
in
ta
ng
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s 
to
 b
e 
ca
rr
ie
d 
at
 a
 r
ev
al
ue
d 
am
ou
nt
 
af
te
r 
in
iti
al
 r
ec
og
ni
tio
n,
 w
hi
ch
 i
s 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
le
ss
 a
ny
 s
ub
se
qu
en
t 
ac
cu
m
ul
at
ed
 a
m
or
tis
at
io
n 
an
d 
an
y 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 a
cc
um
ul
at
ed
 im
pa
irm
en
t 
lo
ss
es
. T
he
 f
ai
r 
va
lu
e 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 b
y 
re
fe
re
nc
e 
to
 a
n 
ac
tiv
e 
m
ar
ke
t (
pa
ra
 7
5)
. 
FR
S1
38
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 t
o 
as
se
ss
 t
he
 u
se
fu
l 
lif
e 
of
 a
n 
in
ta
ng
ib
le
 
as
se
t; 
an
 i
nt
an
gi
bl
e 
as
se
t 
w
ith
 f
in
ite
 u
se
fu
l 
lif
e 
is
 a
m
or
tiz
ed
, 
an
d 
an
 
in
ta
ng
ib
le
 a
ss
et
 w
ith
 in
de
fin
ite
 u
se
fu
l l
ife
 is
 te
st
ed
 f
or
 im
pa
irm
en
t i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 to
 F
RS
 1
36
 (p
ar
a 
88
-1
10
). 
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
R
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 
fo
r 
In
ta
ng
ib
le
 A
ss
et
s
FR
S1
38
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
ad
di
tio
na
l 
di
sc
lo
su
re
s 
fo
r 
in
ta
ng
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s 
w
ith
 
in
de
fin
ite
 u
se
fu
l 
lif
e,
 i
nc
lu
di
ng
 j
us
tif
ic
at
io
ns
 f
or
 t
he
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t 
of
 
in
de
fin
ite
 u
se
fu
l l
ife
 (p
ar
a 
12
2(
a)
). 
FR
S 
13
8 
re
qu
ire
s 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
n 
th
e 
ex
is
te
nc
e 
an
d 
ca
rr
yi
ng
 a
m
ou
nt
s 
of
 
in
ta
ng
ib
le
s 
w
hi
ch
 h
av
e
re
str
ic
te
d 
tit
le
s 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
ca
rr
yi
ng
 
am
ou
nt
s 
of
 i
nt
an
gi
bl
es
 w
hi
ch
 a
re
 p
le
dg
ed
 a
s 
se
cu
rit
y 
fo
r 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
(p
ar
a 
12
2(
d)
). 
FR
S 
13
8 
re
qu
ire
s 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
on
 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 
of
 
co
nt
ra
ct
ua
l 
co
m
m
itm
en
ts 
fo
r t
he
 a
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
of
 in
ta
ng
ib
le
 a
ss
et
s (
pa
ra
 1
22
(e
))
. 
FR
S 
13
8 
re
qu
ire
s 
ad
di
tio
na
l 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
if 
in
ta
ng
ib
le
 
as
se
ts
 
ar
e 
ac
co
un
te
d 
fo
r a
t r
ev
al
ue
d 
am
ou
nt
s (
pa
ra
 1
22
). 
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M
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n 
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ffe
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w
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FR
S 
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M
A
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an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
A
m
or
tis
at
io
n 
of
 
D
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
C
os
ts
 
Si
m
ila
r t
o 
M
A
SB
 4
, F
RS
13
8 
re
qu
ire
s 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 to
 r
ec
og
ni
se
 re
se
ar
ch
 
co
st
s 
as
 e
xp
en
se
s 
in
 th
e 
pr
of
it 
an
d 
lo
ss
, a
nd
 c
ap
ita
lis
e 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
co
st
s a
s a
n 
as
se
t. 
FR
S 
13
8 
re
qu
ire
s 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 t
o 
de
te
rm
in
e 
w
he
th
er
 t
he
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
co
st
 th
at
 w
as
 re
co
gn
is
ed
 a
s a
n 
as
se
t h
as
 e
ith
er
 fi
ni
te
 o
r i
nd
ef
in
ite
 u
se
fu
l 
lif
e.
 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
38
, 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
co
st
 t
ha
t 
ha
s 
fin
ite
 u
se
fu
l 
lif
e 
is
 
am
or
tiz
ed
, a
nd
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t c
os
t w
ith
 in
de
fin
ite
 u
se
fu
l l
ife
 is
 te
st
ed
 fo
r 
im
pa
irm
en
t i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 to
 F
RS
 1
36
 (p
ar
a 
88
11
0)
. 
Si
m
ila
r 
to
 
FR
S1
38
, 
M
A
SB
 
4 
re
qu
ire
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
to
 
re
co
gn
is
e 
re
se
ar
ch
 c
os
ts
 a
s 
ex
pe
ns
es
 i
n 
th
e 
pr
of
it 
an
d 
lo
ss
, 
an
d 
ca
pi
ta
lis
e 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t c
os
ts
 a
s a
n 
as
se
t. 
M
A
SB
 4
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t 
co
st
 t
ha
t 
w
as
 r
ec
og
ni
se
d 
as
 
as
se
ts
 t
o 
be
 a
m
or
tiz
ed
 a
nd
 r
ec
og
ni
se
d 
as
 a
n 
ex
pe
ns
e 
on
 a
 
sy
st
em
at
ic
 b
as
is
, 
so
 a
s 
to
 r
ef
le
ct
 t
he
 p
at
te
rn
 i
n 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
 
re
la
te
d 
ec
on
om
ic
 b
en
ef
it 
is 
re
co
gn
is
ed
.  
If 
th
e 
de
ve
lo
pm
en
t c
os
t c
ea
se
d 
to
 m
ee
t r
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
cr
ite
ria
 a
s 
st
at
ed
 in
 p
ar
a 
17
 o
f t
he
 st
an
da
rd
, t
he
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t c
os
t s
ho
ul
d 
be
 w
rit
te
n 
do
w
n 
or
 w
rit
te
n 
of
f a
s a
n 
ex
pe
ns
e.
Sh
ar
e-
ba
se
d 
pa
ym
en
ts
FR
S 
2 
Sh
ar
e-
ba
se
d 
Pa
ym
en
ts
 (e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
.
N
o 
st
an
da
rd
 fo
r s
ha
re
-b
as
ed
 p
ay
m
en
ts
. 
Re
co
gn
iti
on
 a
nd
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
of
 
sh
ar
e-
ba
se
d 
pa
ym
en
ts
FR
S 
2 
co
ve
rs
 t
he
 r
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
an
d 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
ts
 o
f 
sh
ar
es
 o
r 
sh
ar
e 
op
tio
ns
 g
ra
nt
ed
 to
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s a
nd
 o
th
er
 p
ar
tie
s.
  FR
S 
2 
se
ts
 o
ut
 th
e 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t p
rin
ci
pl
es
 a
nd
 s
pe
ci
fic
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 
fo
r 
th
re
e 
ty
pe
s 
of
 s
ha
re
-b
as
ed
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
(a
) 
eq
ui
ty
-s
et
tle
d,
 (
b)
 c
as
h-
se
ttl
ed
 a
nd
 (
c)
 th
e 
ch
oi
ce
 o
f 
eq
ui
ty
-s
et
tle
d 
or
 
ca
sh
-s
et
tle
d 
tra
ns
ac
tio
ns
. 
FR
S 
2 
re
qu
ire
s 
ex
pe
ns
e 
to
 b
e 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 w
he
n 
an
 e
nt
ity
 r
ec
ei
ve
s 
se
rv
ic
es
 o
r g
oo
ds
 a
s c
on
si
de
ra
tio
n 
fo
r i
ts 
eq
ui
ty
 c
on
si
de
ra
tio
n.
 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
st
an
da
rd
 o
n 
sh
ar
e-
ba
se
d 
pa
ym
en
ts
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
of
 F
RS
 2
. 
Th
e 
on
ly
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
th
at
 w
as
re
la
te
d 
to
 
sh
ar
e-
ba
se
d 
pa
ym
en
ts
 w
as
 M
A
SB
 2
9 
Em
pl
oy
ee
 B
en
ef
its
 
(r
en
am
ed
 to
 F
RS
 1
19
20
04
 E
m
pl
oy
ee
 B
en
ef
its
), 
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
3.
  
M
A
SB
 
29
 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 
th
at
 
eq
ui
ty
 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s 
in
cl
ud
es
 b
en
ef
its
 in
 s
uc
h 
fo
rm
s 
as
 (
1)
 s
ha
re
s, 
sh
ar
e 
op
tio
ns
, 
an
d 
ot
he
r e
qu
ity
 in
str
um
en
ts
 is
su
ed
 to
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
s 
at
 le
ss
 th
an
 
th
e 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
at
 w
hi
ch
 th
os
e 
in
str
um
en
ts
 w
ou
ld
 b
e 
is
su
ed
 to
 a
 
th
ird
 p
ar
ty
; 
an
d 
(b
) 
ca
sh
 p
ay
m
en
ts
 w
hi
ch
 d
ep
en
de
d 
on
 t
he
 
M
A
SB
 2
9 
di
d 
no
t 
sp
ec
ify
 r
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
an
d 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 fo
r e
qu
ity
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s. 
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on
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ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 o
f 
sh
ar
e-
ba
se
d 
pa
ym
en
ts
 
FR
S 
2 
do
es
 n
ot
 o
nl
y 
re
qu
ire
 t
he
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
to
 e
na
bl
e 
us
er
s 
of
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 t
o 
un
de
rs
ta
nd
 t
he
 n
at
ur
e 
an
d 
ex
te
nt
 o
f 
sh
ar
e-
ba
se
d 
pa
ym
en
ts
 th
at
 e
xi
st
ed
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
an
d 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
sh
ar
e-
ba
se
d 
pa
ym
en
t t
ra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 
pe
rf
or
m
an
ce
 
(I
N
8(
a)
, 
(c
))
. 
FR
S 
2 
al
so
 
re
qu
ire
s 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
of
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
to
 u
nd
er
sta
nd
 h
ow
 fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
of
 th
e 
go
od
s 
an
d 
se
rv
ic
es
, o
r 
th
e 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
of
 th
e 
eq
ui
ty
 in
str
um
en
ts
 g
ra
nt
ed
 d
ur
in
g 
th
e 
pe
rio
d,
 w
as
 
de
te
rm
in
ed
 (I
N
8 
(b
))
. 
M
A
SB
 
29
 
re
qu
ire
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
to
 
di
sc
lo
se
 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 t
he
 e
m
pl
oy
ee
 c
om
pe
ns
at
io
n 
be
ne
fit
s 
to
 e
na
bl
e 
us
er
s 
of
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
sta
te
m
en
ts
 
to
 
as
se
ss
 
its
 
ef
fe
ct
 
on
 
os
iti
on
, p
er
fo
rm
an
ce
 a
nd
 c
as
h 
flo
w
s.
 
N
on
-c
ur
re
nt
 A
ss
et
s 
H
el
d 
fo
r 
Sa
le
 
an
d 
D
is
co
nt
in
ue
d 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
FR
S 
5 
N
on
-c
ur
re
nt
 A
ss
et
s 
H
el
d 
fo
r 
Sa
le
 a
nd
 D
isc
on
tin
ue
d 
O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 
(e
ff
ec
tiv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 2
8 
D
is
co
nt
in
ui
ng
 O
pe
ra
tio
ns
, r
en
am
ed
 to
 F
RS
 1
35
20
04
 
D
is
co
nt
in
ui
ng
 O
pe
ra
tio
ns
 (e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
3)
. 
Sc
op
e 
of
 n
on
-c
ur
re
nt
 a
ss
et
s 
he
ld
 
fo
r 
sa
le
 
an
d 
di
sc
on
tin
ue
d 
op
er
at
io
ns
 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 5
, 
no
n-
cu
rr
en
t 
as
se
ts
 h
el
d 
fo
r 
sa
le
 a
nd
 d
isc
on
tin
ue
d 
op
er
at
io
ns
 
in
cl
ud
es
 
su
bs
id
ia
rie
s, 
in
ve
stm
en
t 
in
 
as
so
ci
at
es
 
an
d 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 i
n 
jo
in
tly
-c
on
tro
lle
d 
as
se
ts
 i
nt
en
de
d 
to
 b
e 
di
sp
os
ed
 o
f 
w
ith
in
 1
2 
m
on
th
s.
FR
S 
5 
in
tro
du
ce
s 
th
e 
co
nc
ep
t o
f a
 d
is
po
sa
l g
ro
up
, w
hi
ch
 is
 a
 g
ro
up
 o
f 
as
se
ts
 to
 b
e 
di
sp
os
ed
 o
f i
n 
a 
sin
gl
e 
tra
ns
ac
tio
n 
(I
N
6 
(b
))
. 
U
nd
er
 M
A
SB
 2
8,
 a
 d
is
co
nt
in
ui
ng
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
w
as
a 
re
la
tiv
el
y 
la
rg
e 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 o
f 
an
 e
nt
er
pr
is
e 
 s
uc
h 
as
 a
 b
us
in
es
s 
or
 
ge
og
ra
ph
ic
al
 s
eg
m
en
t t
ha
t t
he
 e
nt
er
pr
is
e,
 p
ur
su
an
t t
o 
a 
sin
gl
e 
pl
an
, 
ei
th
er
 w
as
di
sp
os
in
g 
of
 s
ub
st
an
tia
lly
 i
n 
its
 e
nt
ire
ty
 o
r 
w
as
 te
rm
in
at
in
g 
th
ro
ug
h 
ab
an
do
nm
en
t o
r p
ie
ce
m
ea
l s
al
e.
 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
an
d 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f 
no
n-
cu
rr
en
t 
as
se
ts
 h
el
d 
fo
r 
sa
le
 
an
d 
di
sc
on
tin
ue
d 
op
er
at
io
ns
 
FR
S 
5 
re
qu
ire
s 
as
se
ts
 h
el
d 
fo
r 
sa
le
 o
r 
a 
di
sp
os
al
 g
ro
up
 h
el
d 
fo
r 
sa
le
 to
 
be
 m
ea
su
re
d 
at
 th
e 
lo
w
er
 o
f c
ar
ry
in
g 
am
ou
nt
 a
nd
 fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
le
ss
 c
os
t t
o 
se
ll 
(p
ar
a 
15
). 
M
A
SB
 2
8 
di
d 
no
t e
st
ab
lis
h 
an
y 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 a
nd
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
pr
in
ci
pl
es
. 
Th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 
re
qu
ire
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
to
 
fo
llo
w
 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 a
nd
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t p
rin
ci
pl
es
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
in
 o
th
er
 
re
le
va
nt
 s
ta
nd
ar
ds
, s
uc
h 
as
 M
A
SB
 2
0 
Pr
ov
is
io
ns
, C
on
tin
ge
nt
 
Li
ab
ili
tie
s 
an
d 
C
on
tin
ge
nt
 A
ss
et
s 
(r
en
am
ed
 F
RS
 1
37
20
04
) a
nd
 
M
A
SB
 2
3 
Im
pa
irm
en
t o
f A
ss
et
s (
re
na
m
ed
 F
RS
 1
36
20
04
). 
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7 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
Su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t o
f a
ss
et
s 
he
ld
 fo
r s
al
e 
FR
S 
5 
sp
ec
ifi
es
 t
ha
t 
an
 a
ss
et
 c
la
ss
ifi
ed
 a
s 
he
ld
 f
or
 s
al
e,
 o
r 
in
cl
ud
ed
 
w
ith
in
 a
 d
is
po
sa
l 
gr
ou
p 
he
ld
 f
or
 s
al
e,
 s
ho
ul
d 
no
t 
be
 d
ep
re
ci
at
ed
 
(I
N
6(
d)
). 
FR
S 
5 
re
qu
ire
s 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 t
o 
re
co
gn
is
e 
an
y 
in
iti
al
 o
r 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 
im
pa
irm
en
t 
lo
ss
es
 o
f 
th
e 
as
se
ts
 (
or
 d
is
po
sa
l 
gr
ou
p)
 t
o 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
le
ss
 
co
st
 to
 s
el
l. 
FR
S 
5 
al
so
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 to
 r
ec
og
ni
se
 g
ai
n 
fo
r 
an
y 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 in
cr
ea
se
 in
 fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
le
ss
 c
os
t t
o 
se
ll 
of
 th
e 
as
se
ts
, b
ut
 n
ot
 
in
 e
xc
es
s o
f t
he
 c
um
ul
at
iv
e 
im
pa
irm
en
t l
os
s t
ha
t h
as
 b
ee
n 
re
co
gn
is
ed
. 
M
A
SB
 2
8 
di
d 
no
t s
pe
ci
fy
 th
at
 a
n 
as
se
t c
la
ss
ifi
ed
 a
s 
he
ld
 fo
r 
sa
le
, o
r i
nc
lu
de
d 
w
ith
in
 a
 d
is
po
sa
l g
ro
up
 h
el
d 
fo
r s
al
e,
 sh
ou
ld
 
no
t b
e 
de
pr
ec
ia
te
d.
 
M
A
SB
 2
8 
re
qu
ire
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 t
o 
es
tim
at
e 
th
e 
re
co
ve
ra
bl
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
ea
ch
 a
ss
et
 o
f 
th
e 
di
sc
on
tin
ui
ng
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
(th
e 
hi
gh
er
 o
f t
he
 a
ss
et
's 
ne
t s
el
lin
g 
pr
ic
e 
an
d 
its
 v
al
ue
 in
 u
se
) a
nd
 
re
co
gn
is
e 
an
 
im
pa
irm
en
t 
lo
ss
 
or
 
re
ve
rs
al
 
of
 
a 
pr
io
r 
im
pa
irm
en
t l
os
s, 
if 
an
y.
 
Ti
m
in
g 
of
 t
he
 c
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
n 
op
er
at
io
n 
as
 d
is
co
nt
in
ue
d
FR
S 
5 
cl
as
si
fie
s 
an
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
as
 d
is
co
nt
in
ue
d 
at
 th
e 
da
te
 th
e 
op
er
at
io
n 
m
ee
ts
 th
e 
cr
ite
ria
 to
 b
e 
cl
as
sif
ie
d 
as
 h
el
d 
fo
r s
al
e 
or
 w
he
n 
th
e 
en
tit
y 
ha
s 
di
sp
os
ed
 o
f t
he
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
(I
N
6(
f)(
i))
.
FR
S 
5 
pr
oh
ib
its
 
re
tro
ac
tiv
e 
cl
as
si
fic
at
io
n 
of
 
an
 
op
er
at
io
n 
as
 
di
sc
on
tin
ue
d,
 w
he
n 
th
e 
cr
ite
ria
 fo
r 
th
at
 c
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
ar
e 
no
t m
et
 u
nt
il 
af
te
r t
he
 b
al
an
ce
 sh
ee
t d
at
e 
(I
N
6(
f)(
iii
)).
M
A
SB
 2
8 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
an
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
as
 d
is
co
nt
in
ui
ng
 b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
oc
cu
rr
en
ce
 o
f 
on
e 
of
 t
he
 f
ol
lo
w
in
g,
 w
hi
ch
ev
er
 o
cc
ur
re
d
ea
rli
er
:
(1
) 
th
e 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
ha
s 
en
te
re
d 
in
to
 a
 b
in
di
ng
 s
al
e 
ag
re
em
en
t f
or
 su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 a
ll 
of
 th
e 
as
se
ts
 a
ttr
ib
ut
ab
le
 to
 th
e 
di
sc
on
tin
ui
ng
 o
pe
ra
tio
n;
 o
r 
(2
) 
th
e 
di
re
ct
or
s 
or
 s
im
ila
r 
go
ve
rn
in
g 
bo
dy
 h
as
 b
ot
h 
(i)
 a
pp
ro
ve
d 
a 
de
ta
ile
d,
 fo
rm
al
 p
la
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
di
sc
on
tin
ua
nc
e 
an
d 
(ii
) m
ad
e 
an
 
an
no
un
ce
m
en
t o
f t
he
 p
la
n.
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 
di
sc
on
tin
ue
d 
op
er
at
io
n 
FR
S 
5 
re
qu
ire
s 
an
 a
ss
et
 c
la
ss
ifi
ed
 a
s 
he
ld
 fo
r 
sa
le
, a
nd
 th
e 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
in
cl
ud
ed
 i
n 
a 
di
sp
os
al
 g
ro
up
 h
el
d 
fo
r 
sa
le
, t
o 
be
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 in
 th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t. 
Th
e 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 li
ab
ili
tie
s 
in
 a
 d
is
po
sa
l 
gr
ou
p 
sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 o
ffs
et
 e
ac
h 
ot
he
r, 
or
 b
e 
pr
es
en
te
d 
as
 a
 s
in
gl
e 
am
ou
nt
 
(p
ar
a 
38
). 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 5
, 
no
n-
cu
rr
en
t 
as
se
ts
 s
ha
ll 
be
 c
la
ss
ifi
ed
 a
s 
cu
rr
en
t w
he
n 
th
ey
 
-fo
r-
pa
ra
 3
). 
FR
S 
5 
al
so
 
sp
ec
ifi
es
 th
at
 th
e 
re
su
lts
 o
f d
is
co
nt
in
ue
d 
op
er
at
io
ns
 (p
ro
fit
/lo
ss
) s
ho
ul
d 
be
 sh
ow
n 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 in
 th
e 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t (
pa
ra
 3
3(
a)
). 
M
A
SB
 
28
 
on
ly
 
re
qu
ire
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
to
 
di
sc
lo
se
 
th
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 a
 d
is
co
nt
in
ui
ng
 o
pe
ra
tio
n 
in
 t
he
 
fin
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
; i
t c
ou
ld
 b
e 
pr
es
en
te
d 
ei
th
er
 in
 th
e 
no
te
s 
to
 t
he
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 o
r 
on
 t
he
 f
ac
e 
of
 t
he
 f
in
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts.
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 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
St
at
em
en
ts 
FR
S 
10
1 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 F
in
an
ci
al
 S
ta
te
m
en
ts
 (e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 J
an
ua
ry
 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 1
 P
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
of
 F
in
an
ci
al
 S
ta
te
m
en
ts,
 r
en
am
ed
 t
o 
FR
S 
10
1 2
00
4 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 F
in
an
ci
al
 S
ta
te
m
en
ts 
(e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ju
ly
 1
, 1
99
9)
 
Fa
ir 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts 
re
su
lt 
in
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
th
at
 a
ch
ie
ve
 a
 fa
ir 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
(p
ar
a 
13
). 
M
A
SB
 1
 s
pe
ci
fie
d 
th
at
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 s
ho
ul
d 
fa
irl
y 
pr
es
en
t a
 fi
rm
ca
sh
 f
lo
w
s;
 a
nd
 t
he
 a
pp
ro
pr
ia
te
 a
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 t
he
 M
A
SB
 
st
an
da
rd
s 
re
su
lte
d 
in
 v
irt
ua
lly
 a
ll 
ci
rc
um
sta
nc
es
 i
n 
fin
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts 
th
at
 a
ch
ie
ve
d 
a 
fa
ir 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n.
 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 f
or
 c
ur
re
nt
 a
nd
 n
on
-
cu
rr
en
t i
te
m
s
FR
S 
10
1 
sp
ec
ifi
es
 ti
gh
te
r r
eq
ui
re
m
en
ts
 fo
r c
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
of
 c
ur
re
nt
 a
nd
 n
on
-c
ur
re
nt
 it
em
s 
on
 th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t (
pa
ra
51
, 5
7-
67
). 
Fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 F
RS
 1
01
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 t
o 
cl
as
si
fy
 a
nd
 p
re
se
nt
 
cu
rr
en
t a
nd
 n
on
-c
ur
re
nt
 a
ss
et
s, 
an
d 
cu
rr
en
t a
nd
 n
on
-c
ur
re
nt
 li
ab
ili
tie
s 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 in
 th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t, 
un
le
ss
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
ba
se
d 
on
 li
qu
id
ity
 
w
ou
ld
 p
ro
vi
de
 m
or
e 
re
le
va
nt
 a
nd
 re
lia
bl
e 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
U
nd
er
 M
A
SB
 1
, c
om
pa
ni
es
 w
er
e 
gi
ve
n 
th
e 
ch
oi
ce
 o
f w
he
th
er
 
or
 n
ot
 to
 p
re
se
nt
 a
nd
 c
la
ss
ify
 c
ur
re
nt
 a
nd
 n
on
-c
ur
re
nt
 a
ss
et
s 
an
d 
cu
rr
en
t 
an
d 
no
n-
cu
rr
en
t 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 i
n 
th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t, 
ba
se
d 
on
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f 
th
ei
r 
op
er
at
io
n.
 I
f 
th
e 
fir
m
 c
ho
se
 n
ot
 to
 c
la
ss
ify
 c
ur
re
nt
 a
nd
 n
on
-c
ur
re
nt
 a
ss
et
s 
an
d 
cu
rr
en
t 
an
d 
no
n-
cu
rr
en
t 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
, 
th
e 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
w
er
e 
to
 b
e 
pr
es
en
te
d 
br
oa
dl
y 
in
 o
rd
er
 o
f 
th
ei
r 
liq
ui
di
ty
. 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t f
or
 m
in
or
ity
 in
te
re
st
 
FR
S 
10
1 
sp
ec
ifi
es
 t
ha
t 
m
in
or
ity
 i
nt
er
es
t 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
pr
es
en
te
d 
w
ith
in
 
eq
ui
ty
 in
 th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t (
pa
ra
 6
8(
o)
). 
U
nd
er
 M
A
SB
 1
, 
th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n 
fo
r 
m
in
or
ity
 
in
te
re
st
s t
o 
be
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 w
ith
in
 e
qu
ity
 in
 th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t. 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t f
or
 b
io
lo
gi
ca
l a
ss
et
s 
FR
S 
10
1 
sp
ec
ifi
es
 th
at
 b
io
lo
gi
ca
l a
ss
et
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
as
 a
 li
ne
 
ite
m
 in
 th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t (
pa
ra
 6
8(
f))
. 
M
A
SB
 1
 d
id
 n
ot
 re
qu
ire
 th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f b
io
lo
gi
ca
l a
ss
et
s 
as
 
a 
se
pa
ra
te
 li
ne
 it
em
 in
 th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t. 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t f
or
 n
on
-c
ur
re
nt
 a
ss
et
s 
he
ld
 fo
r s
al
e 
FR
S 
10
1 
re
qu
ire
s 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 t
o 
di
sc
lo
se
 t
ot
al
 a
ss
et
s 
he
ld
 f
or
 s
al
e,
 
as
se
ts
 in
 d
is
po
sa
l g
ro
up
s h
el
d 
fo
r s
al
e 
an
d 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
in
 d
is
po
sa
l g
ro
up
s 
he
ld
 fo
r s
al
e 
as
 a
 se
pa
ra
te
 li
ne
 it
em
 in
 th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t (
pa
ra
 6
8A
). 
M
A
SB
 1
 d
id
 n
ot
 s
pe
ci
fy
 t
he
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t f
or
 n
on
-c
ur
re
nt
 a
ss
et
s h
el
d 
fo
r s
al
e.
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 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
an
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
of
 
pr
of
it,
 lo
ss
, i
nc
om
e 
an
d 
ex
pe
ns
es
 
FR
S 
10
1 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
pr
of
it,
 l
os
s, 
to
ta
l 
in
co
m
e 
an
d 
to
ta
l 
ex
pe
ns
es
 a
ttr
ib
ut
ab
le
 to
 e
qu
ity
 h
ol
de
rs
 a
nd
 m
in
or
ity
 i
nt
er
es
ts
 t
o 
be
 sh
ow
n 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 in
 in
co
m
e 
sta
te
m
en
t (
pa
ra
 8
2,
 9
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 1
 d
id
 n
ot
 r
eq
ui
re
 t
he
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 t
he
 p
ro
fit
, 
lo
ss
, 
to
ta
l i
nc
om
e 
an
d 
to
ta
l e
xp
en
se
s 
at
tri
bu
ta
bl
e 
to
 e
qu
ity
 h
ol
de
rs
 
an
d 
m
in
or
ity
 i
nt
er
es
t 
to
 b
e 
sh
ow
n 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 i
n 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t. 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 
ex
tra
or
di
na
ry
 
ite
m
s 
FR
S 
10
1 
pr
oh
ib
its
 
th
e 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 
in
co
m
e 
an
d 
ex
pe
ns
e 
as
 
ex
tra
or
di
na
ry
 i
te
m
s, 
ei
th
er
 i
n 
th
e 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
or
 i
n 
th
e 
no
te
s 
(p
ar
a 
85
). 
M
A
SB
 1
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
ex
tra
or
di
na
ry
 i
te
m
s 
to
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
as
 a
 
lin
e 
ite
m
 in
 th
e 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t. 
In
ve
nt
or
ie
s 
FR
S 
10
2 
In
ve
nt
or
ie
s (
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 2
 I
nv
en
to
rie
s, 
re
na
m
ed
 t
o 
FR
S 
10
2 2
00
4 
In
ve
nt
or
ie
s 
(e
ff
ec
tiv
e 
fr
om
 Ju
ly
 1
, 1
99
9)
. 
C
os
t o
f i
nv
en
to
ry
FR
S 
2 
cl
ar
ifi
es
 
th
at
 
th
e 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
pr
ic
e 
pa
id
 
fo
r 
in
ve
nt
or
ie
s 
ac
qu
ire
d 
th
ro
ug
h 
de
fe
rr
ed
 p
ur
ch
as
e 
an
d 
th
e 
pr
ic
e 
pa
id
 f
or
 
in
ve
nt
or
ie
s u
sin
g 
no
rm
al
 p
ur
ch
as
e 
is 
in
te
re
st 
ex
pe
ns
e 
(p
ar
a 
18
) 
M
A
SB
 
2 
di
d 
no
t 
pr
ov
id
e 
ex
pl
an
at
io
n 
on
 
in
ve
nt
or
ie
s 
pu
rc
ha
se
d 
on
 d
ef
er
re
d 
se
ttl
em
en
t t
er
m
s.
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t o
f I
nv
en
to
rie
s 
FR
S 
10
2 
pr
ov
id
es
 c
la
rif
ic
at
io
n 
on
 t
he
 d
iff
er
en
ce
 b
et
w
ee
n 
th
e 
ne
t 
re
al
iz
ab
le
 v
al
ue
 a
nd
 fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
le
ss
 c
os
t t
o 
se
ll 
(p
ar
a
6-
7)
.
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
02
, 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 L
IF
O
 m
et
ho
d 
to
 m
ea
su
re
 t
he
 c
os
t 
of
 
in
ve
nt
or
ie
s 
is
 p
ro
hi
bi
te
d;
 a
nd
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
co
st
 f
or
m
ul
a 
is
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 b
e 
us
ed
 fo
r i
nv
en
to
rie
s o
f s
im
ila
r n
at
ur
e 
an
d 
us
e 
(p
ar
a 
25
). 
M
A
SB
 2
 o
nl
y 
pr
ov
id
ed
 th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 fo
r n
et
 re
al
iz
ab
le
 v
al
ue
, 
no
t t
he
 fa
ir 
va
lu
e.
U
nd
er
 
M
A
SB
 
2,
 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 
LI
FO
 
m
et
ho
d 
to
 
m
ea
su
re
 
in
ve
nt
or
ie
s 
w
as
 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 
as
 
an
 
al
lo
w
ed
 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
tre
at
m
en
t. 
M
A
SB
 2
 d
id
 n
ot
 s
pe
ci
fy
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
co
st
 
fo
rm
ul
a 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
us
ed
 f
or
 in
ve
nt
or
ie
s 
of
 s
im
ila
r 
na
tu
re
 a
nd
 
us
e.
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
fo
r 
in
ve
nt
or
ie
s 
FR
S 
10
2 
re
qu
ire
s 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 t
o 
di
sc
lo
se
 t
he
 c
ar
ry
in
g 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
in
ve
nt
or
ie
s 
at
 f
ai
r 
va
lu
e 
le
ss
 c
os
t t
o 
se
ll 
(p
ar
a 
36
 (
c)
). 
FR
S 
10
2 
do
es
 
no
t 
re
qu
ire
 t
he
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 t
he
 c
ar
ry
in
g 
am
ou
nt
 i
nv
en
to
rie
s 
at
 n
et
 
re
al
is
ab
le
 v
al
ue
 (
pa
ra
 3
6)
. F
RS
 1
02
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f a
ny
 w
rit
e-
do
w
n 
of
 i
nv
en
to
rie
s 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 a
s 
an
 e
xp
en
se
 i
n 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
to
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
(p
ar
a 
36
(e
))
. 
U
nd
er
 M
A
SB
 2
, t
he
re
 w
as
 n
o 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
ca
rr
yi
ng
 
am
ou
nt
 o
f i
nv
en
to
rie
s 
to
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
at
 fa
ir 
va
lu
e.
 M
A
SB
 2
 
re
qu
ire
d 
a 
se
pa
ra
te
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 i
nv
en
to
rie
s 
he
ld
 a
t 
ne
t 
re
al
iz
ab
le
 v
al
ue
 a
nd
 t
ho
se
 h
el
d 
at
 c
os
t. 
M
A
SB
 2
 d
id
 n
ot
 
sp
ec
ify
 th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t t
ha
t t
he
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f a
ny
 w
rit
e-
do
w
n 
of
 
in
ve
nt
or
ie
s 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 a
s 
an
 e
xp
en
se
 in
 th
e 
pe
rio
d 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
(p
ar
a 
36
(e
))
. 
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0 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
Po
lic
ie
s, 
Ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
Es
tim
at
es
 a
nd
 E
rr
or
s 
FR
S 
10
8 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
Po
lic
ie
s, 
Ch
an
ge
s 
in
 A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
Es
tim
at
es
 a
nd
 
Er
ro
rs
 (e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 3
 N
et
 P
ro
fit
 o
r 
Lo
ss
 f
or
 t
he
 P
er
io
d,
 F
un
da
m
en
ta
l 
Er
ro
rs
 a
nd
 C
ha
ng
es
 i
n 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
Po
lic
ie
s, 
re
na
m
ed
 t
o 
FR
S1
08
20
04
 N
et
 P
ro
fit
 o
r 
Lo
ss
 f
or
 t
he
 P
er
io
d,
 F
un
da
m
en
ta
l 
Er
ro
rs
 a
nd
 C
ha
ng
es
 i
n 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
Po
lic
ie
s 
(e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 
Ju
ly
 1
, 1
99
9)
. 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
fo
r m
at
er
ia
l e
rr
or
s 
FR
S 
10
8 
us
es
 t
he
 c
on
ce
pt
 o
f 
m
at
er
ia
l 
er
ro
rs
, 
w
hi
ch
 a
re
 e
rr
or
s 
th
at
 
co
ul
d 
in
flu
en
ce
 th
e 
ec
on
om
ic
 d
ec
is
io
ns
 o
f u
se
rs
 ta
ke
n 
on
 th
e 
ba
si
s 
of
 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts
 (p
ar
a 
5,
 4
1)
; a
nd
 p
ro
vi
de
s d
et
ai
le
d 
gu
id
an
ce
 o
n 
ho
w
 t
o 
ac
co
un
t 
fo
r 
m
at
er
ia
l 
er
ro
rs
 (
pa
ra
 4
1-
48
). 
FR
S 
10
8 
el
im
in
at
es
 
th
e 
fu
nd
am
en
ta
l e
rr
or
 c
on
ce
pt
 (I
N
12
). 
FR
S 
10
8 
re
qu
ire
s t
he
 c
or
re
ct
io
n 
of
 e
rr
or
s 
to
 b
e 
ap
pl
ie
d 
re
tro
sp
ec
tiv
el
y,
 
an
d 
do
es
 n
ot
 a
llo
w
 a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
pr
os
pe
ct
iv
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
(p
ar
a 
41
48
). 
M
A
SB
 3
 u
se
d 
th
e 
co
nc
ep
t o
f f
un
da
m
en
ta
l e
rr
or
, w
hi
ch
 re
fe
rs
 
to
 e
rr
or
 th
at
 h
as
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t e
ffe
ct
 o
n 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
of
 o
ne
 o
r 
m
or
e 
pr
io
r 
pe
rio
ds
 s
uc
h 
th
at
 t
ho
se
 f
in
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts
 c
an
 n
o 
lo
ng
er
 b
e 
co
ns
id
er
ed
 to
 h
av
e 
be
en
 r
el
ia
bl
e 
at
 th
e 
da
te
 o
f t
he
ir 
is
su
e.
 
U
nd
er
 M
A
SB
 3
, t
he
 c
or
re
ct
io
n 
of
 f
un
da
m
en
ta
l e
rr
or
s 
co
ul
d 
be
 
ap
pl
ie
d 
re
tro
sp
ec
tiv
el
y 
(b
en
ch
m
ar
k 
tre
at
m
en
t) 
or
 
pr
os
pe
ct
iv
el
y 
(a
lte
rn
at
iv
e 
tre
at
m
en
t).
 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
fo
r 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
po
lic
y 
FR
S 
10
8 
re
qu
ire
s 
re
tro
sp
ec
tiv
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
fo
r 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
y.
 P
ro
sp
ec
tiv
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
is 
al
lo
w
ed
 o
nl
y 
w
he
n 
it 
is
 im
pr
ac
tic
ab
le
 
to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
re
tro
sp
ec
tiv
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f t
he
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
y 
(p
ar
a 
50
53
). 
M
A
SB
 3
 a
llo
w
ed
 t
he
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
y 
to
 b
e 
ap
pl
ie
d 
ei
th
er
 re
tro
sp
ec
tiv
el
y 
or
 p
ro
sp
ec
tiv
el
y.
  
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
fo
r 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
es
tim
at
es
 
FR
S 
10
8 
sp
ec
ifi
es
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
ch
an
ge
 i
n 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
es
tim
at
es
 t
ha
t 
gi
ve
 
ris
e 
to
 a
ss
et
s 
an
d 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s, 
or
 r
el
at
es
 to
 e
qu
ity
, s
ho
ul
d 
be
 r
ec
og
ni
se
d 
in
 th
e 
pe
rio
d 
of
 c
ha
ng
e. 
M
A
SB
 3
 d
id
 n
ot
 p
ro
vi
de
 su
ch
 sp
ec
ifi
ca
tio
n.
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
fo
r 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s a
nd
 e
rr
or
s 
FR
S 
10
8 
re
qu
ire
s 
a 
m
or
e 
co
m
pr
eh
en
si
ve
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 t
he
 e
ffe
ct
 o
f 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s 
an
d 
er
ro
r. 
Fo
r 
ex
am
pl
e,
 t
he
 s
ta
nd
ar
d 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f t
he
 e
ffe
ct
 o
f 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s 
an
d 
er
ro
rs
 o
n 
ea
ch
 li
ne
 it
em
 a
nd
 o
n 
ba
si
c 
an
d 
di
lu
te
d 
EP
S 
(p
ar
a 
28
31
) 
Th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
po
lic
ie
s 
an
d 
er
ro
rs
 u
nd
er
 M
A
SB
 3
 w
as
 l
es
s 
co
m
pr
eh
en
si
ve
. 
  
 
26
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 A
pp
en
di
x 
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M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
Ev
en
ts
 A
fte
r 
th
e 
Ba
la
nc
e 
Sh
ee
t 
D
at
e 
FR
S 
11
0 
Ev
en
ts
 A
fte
r t
he
 B
al
an
ce
 S
he
et
 D
at
e 
(e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 J
an
ua
ry
 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 1
9 
Ev
en
ts
 A
fte
r 
th
e 
Ba
la
nc
e 
Sh
ee
t D
at
e,
 r
en
am
ed
 to
 
FR
S 
11
0 2
00
4 
Ev
en
ts
 A
fte
r 
th
e 
Ba
la
nc
e 
Sh
ee
t D
at
e 
(e
ff
ec
tiv
e 
fr
om
 Ju
ly
 1
, 2
00
1)
. 
C
la
rif
ic
at
io
n 
on
 
di
vi
de
nd
s 
de
cl
ar
ed
 a
fte
r 
th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t 
da
te
. 
FR
S 
11
0 
pr
ov
id
es
 f
ur
th
er
 c
la
rif
ic
at
io
n 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 d
iv
id
en
ds
 d
ec
la
re
d 
af
te
r b
al
an
ce
 sh
ee
t d
at
e,
 w
hi
ch
 sh
ou
ld
 n
ot
 b
e 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 a
s l
ia
bi
lit
ie
s a
t 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t d
at
e 
(p
ar
a 
12
-1
3)
. 
M
A
SB
19
 
co
nt
ai
ne
d 
lim
ite
d 
cl
ar
ifi
ca
tio
n 
on
 
di
vi
de
nd
s 
de
cl
ar
ed
 a
fte
r b
al
an
ce
 sh
ee
t d
at
e.
 
Pr
op
er
ty
, 
Pl
an
t 
an
d 
Eq
ui
pm
en
t 
(P
PE
) 
FR
S 
11
6 
Pr
op
er
ty
, 
Pl
an
t 
an
d 
Eq
ui
pm
en
t 
(e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 J
an
ua
ry
 1
, 
20
06
). 
M
A
SB
 1
5 
Pr
op
er
ty
, P
la
nt
 a
nd
 E
qu
ip
m
en
t, 
re
na
m
ed
 t
o 
FR
S 
11
6 2
00
4 P
ro
pe
rty
, p
la
nt
 a
nd
 E
qu
ip
m
en
t (
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
fro
m
 J
ul
y 
1,
 
20
00
). 
In
iti
al
 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 
an
d 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
of
 
Pr
op
er
ty
, 
Pl
an
t 
an
d 
Eq
ui
pm
en
t 
FR
S 
11
6 
in
tro
du
ce
s 
th
e 
co
nc
ep
t 
of
 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 
su
bs
ta
nc
e 
fo
r 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f e
xc
ha
ng
ed
 a
ss
et
s. 
Th
e 
sta
nd
ar
d 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 
of
 e
xc
ha
ng
ed
 a
ss
et
s t
o 
be
 a
t f
ai
r v
al
ue
 u
nl
es
s t
he
 e
xc
ha
ng
ed
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
do
es
 n
ot
 h
av
e 
co
m
m
er
ci
al
 s
ub
st
an
ce
, o
r 
th
e 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
of
 n
ei
th
er
 th
e 
as
se
ts
 g
iv
en
 u
p 
no
r a
ss
et
s 
ac
qu
ire
d 
ca
n 
be
 m
ea
su
re
d 
re
lia
bl
y 
(p
ar
a
24
25
). 
FR
S 
11
6 
al
lo
w
s 
th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
di
sm
an
tli
ng
, 
re
m
ov
in
g 
th
e 
as
se
t 
an
d 
re
st
or
in
g 
th
e 
si
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 it
 is
 lo
ca
te
d 
to
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 th
e 
in
iti
al
 c
os
t 
of
 th
e 
pr
op
er
ty
, p
la
nt
 a
nd
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t (
pa
ra
 1
6(
c)
). 
 
M
A
SB
 1
5 
re
qu
ire
d 
th
e 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f a
cq
ui
re
d 
as
se
ts
 a
t f
ai
r 
va
lu
e,
 u
nl
es
s t
he
 e
xc
ha
ng
ed
 a
ss
et
s w
er
e 
si
m
ila
r.
M
A
SB
 1
5 
on
ly
 a
llo
w
ed
 t
he
 c
os
t 
of
 p
ur
ch
as
e 
an
d 
an
y 
co
st
 
di
re
ct
ly
 a
ttr
ib
ut
ab
le
 i
n 
br
in
gi
ng
 t
he
 a
ss
et
s 
in
to
 w
or
ki
ng
 
co
nd
iti
on
, 
in
te
nd
ed
 l
oc
at
io
n 
an
d 
us
e 
to
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 i
n 
th
e 
in
iti
al
 c
os
t 
of
 t
he
 p
ro
pe
rty
, 
pl
an
t a
nd
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t 
M
A
SB
 1
5 
in
cl
ud
ed
 t
he
 c
os
t 
in
cu
rr
ed
 a
s 
a 
re
su
lt 
of
 i
ns
ta
lli
ng
 t
he
 
pr
op
er
ty
, p
la
nt
 a
nd
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t; 
bu
t d
id
 n
ot
 a
llo
w
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
di
sm
an
tli
ng
, 
re
m
ov
in
g 
th
e 
as
se
t 
an
d 
re
st
or
in
g 
th
e 
si
te
 o
n 
w
hi
ch
 it
 w
as
 lo
ca
te
d,
 a
s p
ar
t o
f t
he
 c
os
t o
f P
PE
.  
Su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
of
 
Pr
op
er
ty
, P
la
nt
 a
nd
 E
qu
ip
m
en
t 
FR
S 
11
6 
al
lo
w
s 
th
e 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f s
ub
se
qu
en
t e
xp
en
di
tu
re
 a
s 
an
 a
ss
et
 
if 
it 
m
ee
ts
 t
he
 g
en
er
al
 a
ss
et
 r
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
cr
ite
ria
. 
A
 r
ep
la
ce
m
en
t 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 o
f a
 p
ro
pe
rty
, p
la
nt
 a
nd
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t t
ha
t i
s 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 a
s 
it 
m
ee
ts
 t
he
 r
ec
og
ni
tio
n 
cr
ite
ria
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
de
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
ca
rr
yi
ng
 
am
ou
nt
 o
f 
th
e 
re
pl
ac
ed
 p
ar
t o
f 
th
e 
as
se
t (
pa
ra
 7
0)
. F
RS
 1
16
 p
ro
vi
de
s 
th
at
 a
 f
irm
 m
ay
 c
ar
ry
 a
ll 
ite
m
s 
of
 p
ro
pe
rty
, p
la
nt
 a
nd
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t o
f 
a 
cl
as
s 
at
 a
 r
ev
al
ue
d 
am
ou
nt
 o
nl
y 
if 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
ca
n 
be
 m
ea
su
re
d 
re
lia
bl
y 
(p
ar
a 
31
). 
 
M
A
SB
 1
5 
di
d 
no
t a
llo
w
 th
e 
co
st
 o
f r
ep
la
ce
m
en
t o
f p
ar
t o
f a
 
pr
op
er
ty
, p
la
nt
 a
nd
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t t
o 
be
 re
co
gn
is
ed
 a
s 
pa
rt 
of
 th
e 
ite
m
. M
A
SB
 1
5 
on
ly
 a
llo
w
ed
 th
e 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 
as
 
as
se
t 
if 
th
e 
ex
pe
nd
itu
re
 
im
pr
ov
ed
 
th
e 
co
nd
iti
on
 o
f 
th
e 
as
se
t 
be
yo
nd
 i
ts
 o
rig
in
al
 c
ap
ac
ity
. 
U
nd
er
 
M
A
SB
 1
5,
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 a
 r
ev
al
ue
d 
am
ou
nt
 d
id
 n
ot
 d
ep
en
d 
on
 
w
he
th
er
 fa
ir 
va
lu
es
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
lia
bl
y 
m
ea
su
re
d.
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pp
en
di
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M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
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 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
D
ep
re
ci
at
io
n 
of
 
Pr
op
er
ty
, 
Pl
an
t 
an
d 
Eq
ui
pm
en
t 
FR
S 
11
6 
em
ph
as
iz
es
 th
e 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 a
pp
ro
ac
h 
to
 m
ea
su
re
 d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n.
 
A
 fi
rm
 is
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n 
ch
ar
ge
 s
ep
ar
at
el
y 
fo
r 
ea
ch
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t p
ar
t o
f a
n 
ite
m
 o
f p
ro
pe
rty
, p
la
nt
 a
nd
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t (
pa
ra
 
43
47
). 
FR
S 
11
6 
re
qu
ire
s 
fir
m
s 
to
 d
et
er
m
in
e 
th
e 
re
si
du
al
 v
al
ue
 o
f 
pr
op
er
ty
, 
pl
an
t a
nd
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t b
as
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 it
 e
st
im
at
es
 it
 w
ou
ld
 re
ce
iv
e 
at
 th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t d
at
e 
if 
th
e 
as
se
t w
er
e 
al
re
ad
y 
of
 th
e 
ag
e 
an
d 
in
 th
e 
co
nd
iti
on
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
at
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 it
s 
us
ef
ul
 li
fe
, i
.e
. n
o 
ad
ju
st
m
en
t f
or
 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 o
f i
nf
la
tio
n 
(p
ar
a 
6)
. 
FR
S 
11
6 
re
qu
ire
s 
fir
m
s
to
 a
ss
es
s 
th
e 
re
si
du
al
 v
al
ue
 a
nd
 e
st
im
at
ed
 
us
ef
ul
 li
fe
 o
f a
 p
ro
pe
rty
, p
la
nt
 a
nd
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t a
nn
ua
lly
 a
t b
al
an
ce
 sh
ee
t 
da
te
 (p
ar
a 
51
). 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
16
, c
om
pa
ni
es
 a
re
 re
qu
ire
d 
to
 s
ta
rt 
de
pr
ec
ia
tin
g 
pr
op
er
ty
, 
pl
an
t 
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t 
w
he
n 
th
e 
as
se
t 
is
 m
ad
e 
av
ai
la
bl
e 
fo
r 
us
e 
an
d 
co
nt
in
ue
 d
ep
re
ci
at
in
g 
un
til
 th
e 
as
se
t i
s d
er
ec
og
ni
se
d,
 e
ve
n 
if 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
pe
rio
d 
th
e 
as
se
t i
s 
id
le
. H
ow
ev
er
, i
f t
he
 f
irm
 a
pp
lie
s 
us
ag
e 
m
et
ho
d 
in
 
ca
lc
ul
at
in
g 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n,
 t
he
 d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n 
ex
pe
ns
e 
du
rin
g 
th
e 
id
le
 
pe
rio
d 
co
ul
d 
be
 z
er
o 
(p
ar
a 
55
). 
M
A
SB
 1
5  
di
d 
no
t c
le
ar
ly
 se
t o
ut
 th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t t
o 
de
te
rm
in
e 
th
e 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n 
ch
ar
ge
 s
ep
ar
at
el
y 
fo
r e
ac
h 
sig
ni
fic
an
t p
ar
t o
f 
an
 it
em
 o
f p
ro
pe
rty
, p
la
nt
 a
nd
 e
qu
ip
m
en
t. 
 M
A
SB
 1
5 
di
d 
no
t s
pe
ci
fy
 w
he
th
er
 th
e 
re
si
du
al
 v
al
ue
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 th
e 
es
tim
at
ed
 a
m
ou
nt
 a
 fi
rm
 w
ou
ld
 o
bt
ai
n 
cu
rr
en
tly
 f
ro
m
 
th
e 
di
sp
os
al
 o
f 
an
 a
ss
et
, i
f 
th
e 
as
se
t 
w
er
e 
of
 t
he
 a
ge
 a
nd
 in
 
co
nd
iti
on
 e
xp
ec
te
d 
at
 th
e 
en
d 
of
 it
s 
us
ef
ul
 li
fe
; o
r 
w
he
th
er
 it
 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ad
ju
st
ed
 fo
r t
he
 e
ffe
ct
 o
f c
ha
ng
in
g 
pr
ic
es
. 
M
A
SB
 1
5 
di
d 
no
t r
eq
ui
re
 th
e 
an
nu
al
 a
ss
es
sm
en
t o
f 
re
si
du
al
 
va
lu
e 
an
d 
es
tim
at
ed
 u
se
fu
l 
lif
e 
of
 a
 p
ro
pe
rty
, 
pl
an
t 
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t. 
M
A
SB
 1
5 
di
d 
no
t s
pe
ci
fy
 th
e 
st
ar
tin
g 
pe
rio
d 
to
 d
ep
re
ci
at
e 
a 
pr
op
er
ty
, 
pl
an
t 
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t 
ite
m
. 
Bu
t, 
FR
S 
11
6 2
00
4 
sp
ec
ifi
ed
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
as
se
t 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
de
pr
ec
ia
te
d 
un
til
 i
t 
w
as
 
re
tir
ed
 fr
om
 a
ct
iv
e 
us
e 
or
 it
 w
as
 h
el
d 
fo
r d
is
po
sa
l. 
 
D
is
po
sa
l 
of
 P
ro
pe
rty
, 
Pl
an
t 
an
d 
Eq
ui
pm
en
t 
FR
S 
11
6 
re
qu
ire
s 
ga
in
 o
r 
lo
ss
 o
n 
di
sp
os
al
 o
f 
pr
op
er
ty
, 
pl
an
t 
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t 
to
 b
e 
in
cl
ud
ed
 i
n 
pr
of
it 
an
d 
lo
ss
 a
cc
ou
nt
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 p
ro
hi
bi
ts
 th
e 
cl
as
si
fic
at
io
n 
of
 th
e 
ga
in
 a
s r
ev
en
ue
 (p
ar
a 
68
). 
M
A
SB
 1
5 
di
d 
no
t c
on
ta
in
 th
is
 p
ro
vi
si
on
. 
  
 
26
3 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
fo
r 
Pr
op
er
ty
, P
la
nt
 a
nd
 E
qu
ip
m
en
t 
FR
S 
11
6 
re
qu
ire
s 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 t
o 
di
sc
lo
se
 t
he
 a
gg
re
ga
te
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f 
ac
cu
m
ul
at
ed
 i
m
pa
irm
en
t 
lo
ss
es
 a
nd
 a
cc
um
ul
at
ed
 d
ep
re
ci
at
io
n 
(p
ar
a 
73
(d
))
. 
 U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
16
, 
pr
io
r-
ye
ar
 c
om
pa
ra
tiv
es
 f
or
 p
ro
pe
rty
, 
pl
an
t 
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t i
s m
an
da
to
ry
 (p
ar
a 
73
(e
)).
 
FR
S 
11
6 
re
qu
ire
s 
ad
di
tio
na
l 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
fo
r 
pr
op
er
ty
, 
pl
an
t 
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t t
ha
t i
s s
ta
te
d 
at
 re
va
lu
ed
 a
m
ou
nt
 (p
ar
a 
77
). 
 
 FR
S1
16
 d
oe
s 
no
t r
eq
ui
re
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 to
 d
is
cl
os
e 
th
e 
na
m
e 
of
 fi
rm
 o
fa
n
in
de
pe
nd
en
t 
va
lu
er
, 
th
e 
na
m
e 
of
 v
al
ue
r, 
an
d 
hi
s 
qu
al
ifi
ca
tio
n 
in
 t
he
 
ye
ar
 o
f v
al
ua
tio
n.
 
M
A
SB
 1
5 
re
qu
ire
d 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
gr
os
s 
ca
rr
yi
ng
 
am
ou
nt
 
of
 
ac
cu
m
ul
at
ed
 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n 
an
d 
ac
cu
m
ul
at
ed
 
im
pa
irm
en
t 
lo
ss
es
 a
t 
th
e 
be
gi
nn
in
g 
an
d 
en
d 
of
 t
he
 p
er
io
d.
 
H
ow
ev
er
, i
t d
id
 n
ot
 r
eq
ui
re
 th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
ag
gr
eg
at
ed
 
am
ou
nt
 o
f b
ot
h 
ite
m
s. 
U
nd
er
 M
A
SB
 1
5,
 p
rio
r-
ye
ar
 c
om
pa
ra
tiv
es
 fo
r p
ro
pe
rty
, p
la
nt
 
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t w
er
e 
no
t m
an
da
to
ry
. 
M
A
SB
 1
5 
al
so
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 f
or
 p
ro
pe
rty
, 
pl
an
t 
an
d 
eq
ui
pm
en
t t
ha
t w
as
 s
ta
te
d 
at
 a
 re
va
lu
ed
 a
m
ou
nt
, b
ut
 n
ot
 in
 a
s 
m
uc
h 
de
ta
il 
as
 re
qu
ire
d 
by
 F
RS
 1
16
.
M
A
SB
 1
5 
re
qu
ire
d 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 t
o 
di
sc
lo
se
 t
he
 n
am
e 
of
 t
he
 
fir
m
 o
f a
n 
in
de
pe
nd
en
t v
al
ue
r, 
th
e 
na
m
e 
of
 th
e 
va
lu
er
, a
nd
 h
is 
qu
al
ifi
ca
tio
n 
in
 th
e 
ye
ar
 o
f v
al
ua
tio
n.
 
Le
as
es
 
FR
S 
11
7 
Le
as
es
 (e
ff
ec
tiv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 1
0 
Le
as
es
, r
en
am
ed
 to
 F
RS
 1
17
20
04
 L
ea
se
s 
(e
ff
ec
tiv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
0)
. 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
op
er
tie
s h
el
d 
un
de
r l
ea
se
s 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
17
, i
nv
es
tm
en
t p
ro
pe
rti
es
 h
el
d 
un
de
r 
op
er
at
in
g 
le
as
e 
an
d 
fin
an
ce
 le
as
es
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 m
ea
su
re
d 
us
in
g 
th
e 
fin
an
ce
 le
as
e 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
(p
ar
a 
19
). 
M
A
SB
 1
0 
di
d 
no
t c
on
ta
in
 th
is
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t. 
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 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
an
d 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f 
in
iti
al
 d
ire
ct
 c
os
t o
f l
ea
se
 
FR
S 
11
7 
pr
ov
id
es
 t
he
 d
ef
in
iti
on
 f
or
 in
iti
al
 d
ire
ct
 c
os
t 
as
 in
cr
em
en
ta
l 
co
st
 d
ire
ct
ly
 a
ttr
ib
ut
ab
le
 to
 n
eg
ot
ia
tin
g/
ar
ra
ng
in
g 
a 
le
as
e 
(p
ar
a 
4)
. 
s 
on
 f
in
an
ce
 l
ea
se
 a
re
 
ac
co
un
te
d 
as
 p
ar
t o
f f
in
an
ce
 le
as
e 
re
ce
iv
ab
le
. (
pa
ra
 3
8)
. 
FR
S 
11
7 
ex
cl
ud
es
 th
e 
co
st
s 
in
cu
rr
ed
 b
y 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r 
or
 d
ea
le
r 
le
ss
or
 
in
 c
on
ne
ct
io
n 
w
ith
 n
eg
ot
ia
tin
g 
an
d 
ar
ra
ng
in
g 
a 
fin
an
ce
 le
as
e 
fr
om
 th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f 
in
iti
al
 d
ire
ct
 c
os
ts.
 T
he
 c
os
ts
 a
re
 r
ec
og
ni
se
d 
as
 e
xp
en
se
 
w
he
n 
th
e 
se
lli
ng
 p
ro
fit
 is
 re
co
gn
is
ed
 (p
ar
a 
38
). 
 
be
 c
ap
ita
lis
ed
 a
s p
ar
t o
f c
ar
ry
in
g 
va
lu
e 
of
 a
ss
et
s a
nd
 re
al
iz
ed
 o
ve
r l
ea
se
 
te
rm
 (p
ar
a
52
).
M
A
SB
 1
0 
di
d 
no
t p
ro
vi
de
 th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 fo
r i
ni
tia
l d
ire
ct
 c
os
t 
of
 le
as
e.
 H
ow
ev
er
, t
he
 st
an
da
rd
 st
at
ed
 th
at
 in
iti
al
 d
ire
ct
 c
os
ts
, 
su
ch
 a
s 
co
m
m
is
si
on
s 
an
d 
le
ga
l f
ee
s, 
w
er
e 
of
te
n 
in
cu
rr
ed
 b
y 
le
ss
or
s i
n 
ne
go
tia
tin
g 
an
d 
ar
ra
ng
in
g 
a 
le
as
e.
 
w
er
e 
ei
th
er
 r
ec
og
ni
se
d 
im
m
ed
ia
te
ly
 i
n 
in
co
m
e 
or
 a
llo
ca
te
d 
ag
ai
ns
t t
hi
s i
nc
om
e 
ov
er
 th
e 
le
as
e 
te
rm
.  
in
iti
al
 d
ire
ct
 c
os
ts
 a
s 
an
 e
xp
en
se
 a
t t
he
 c
om
m
en
ce
m
en
t o
f t
he
 
le
as
e 
te
rm
 b
ec
au
se
 t
he
y 
w
er
e
m
ai
nl
y 
re
la
te
d 
to
 e
ar
ni
ng
 th
e 
m
an
uf
ac
tu
re
r's
 o
r d
ea
le
r's
 se
lli
ng
 p
ro
fit
.
le
as
e 
to
 b
e 
ei
th
er
 d
ef
er
re
d 
an
d 
al
lo
ca
te
d 
to
 in
co
m
e 
ov
er
 th
e 
le
as
e 
te
rm
 in
 p
ro
po
rti
on
 to
 th
e 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f r
en
t i
nc
om
e,
 o
r 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 a
s 
an
 e
xp
en
se
 i
n 
th
e 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t 
in
 t
he
 
pe
rio
d 
in
 w
hi
ch
 th
ey
 w
er
e 
in
cu
rr
ed
. 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
an
d 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f 
le
as
e 
of
 la
nd
 a
nd
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
FR
S 
11
7 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
le
as
es
 o
f 
la
nd
 a
nd
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
to
 b
e 
sp
lit
 in
to
 tw
o 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s, 
la
nd
 c
om
po
ne
nt
 a
nd
 b
ui
ld
in
g 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 (p
ar
a 
14
17
). 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
17
, 
th
e 
le
as
e 
of
 l
an
d 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
tre
at
ed
 a
s 
an
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
le
as
e 
an
d 
pa
ym
en
ts
 m
ad
e 
fo
r t
he
 le
as
e 
re
pr
es
en
t p
re
pa
id
 le
as
e 
re
nt
al
s, 
un
le
ss
 th
e 
tit
le
 p
as
se
s t
o 
le
ss
ee
 (p
ar
a 
15
). 
M
A
SB
 1
0 
di
d 
no
t r
eq
ui
re
 th
e 
le
as
es
 o
f l
an
d 
an
d 
bu
ild
in
g 
to
 
be
 sp
lit
 in
to
 tw
o 
se
pa
ra
te
 c
om
po
ne
nt
s. 
U
nd
er
 M
A
SB
 1
0,
 le
as
es
 o
f l
an
d 
an
d 
bu
ild
in
gs
 w
er
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 b
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
as
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
or
 fi
na
nc
e 
le
as
es
 in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
w
ay
 
as
 le
as
es
 o
f o
th
er
 a
ss
et
s. 
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5 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
Th
e 
Ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 C
ha
ng
es
 in
 F
or
ei
gn
 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 R
at
es
 
FR
S 
12
1 
Th
e 
Ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 C
ha
ng
es
 in
 F
or
ei
gn
 E
xc
ha
ng
e 
Ra
te
s (
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 6
 T
he
 E
ffe
ct
s 
of
 C
ha
ng
es
 in
 F
or
ei
gn
 E
xc
ha
ng
e 
Ra
te
s, 
re
na
m
ed
 t
o 
FR
S 
12
1 2
00
4 
Th
e 
Ef
fe
ct
s 
of
 C
ha
ng
es
 in
 F
or
ei
gn
 
Ex
ch
an
ge
 R
at
es
 (e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
Re
qu
ire
m
en
t f
or
 h
ed
ge
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
an
d 
fo
re
ig
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 d
er
iv
at
iv
es
  
FR
S 
12
1 
ex
cl
ud
es
 h
ed
ge
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
an
d 
fo
re
ig
n 
cu
rr
en
cy
 d
er
iv
at
iv
es
 
fr
om
 i
ts
 s
co
pe
. 
Th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 f
or
 h
ed
ge
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
an
d 
fo
re
ig
n 
cu
rr
en
cy
 d
er
iv
at
iv
es
 a
re
 m
ov
ed
 to
 F
RS
 1
39
. 
M
A
SB
 6
 p
er
m
itt
ed
 a
 li
m
ite
d 
as
pe
ct
 o
f 
he
dg
e 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
to
 
be
 
ap
pl
ie
d 
to
 
tra
di
ng
 
tra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 
co
ve
re
d 
by
 
fo
rw
ar
d 
ex
ch
an
ge
 c
on
tra
ct
s, 
as
 w
el
l a
s f
or
ei
gn
 c
ur
re
nc
y 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s a
nd
 
ot
he
r 
fin
an
ci
al
 i
ns
tru
m
en
ts
 w
hi
ch
 w
er
e 
de
si
gn
at
ed
 a
s, 
an
d 
w
hi
ch
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
an
 e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
he
dg
e 
of
, 
ne
t 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 i
n 
fo
re
ig
n 
en
tit
ie
s a
nd
 fo
re
ig
n 
eq
ui
ty
 in
ve
st
m
en
ts
. 
In
tro
du
ct
io
n 
of
 
fu
nc
tio
na
l 
an
d 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
cu
rr
en
cy
, 
an
d 
el
im
in
at
io
n 
of
 re
po
rti
ng
 c
ur
re
nc
y.
 
FR
S 
12
1 
in
tro
du
ce
s
th
e 
co
nc
ep
t o
f 
fu
nc
tio
na
l c
ur
re
nc
y 
as
 th
e 
pr
im
ar
y 
cu
rr
en
cy
 
of
 
an
 
cu
rr
en
cy
 a
s t
he
 c
ur
re
nc
y 
us
ed
 to
 p
re
se
nt
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts.
 T
he
 te
rm
 
pa
ra
 8
). 
M
A
SB
 6
 u
se
 t
he
 t
er
m
 
re
po
rti
ng
 c
ur
re
nc
y
to
 r
ep
re
se
nt
 th
e 
cu
rr
en
cy
 u
se
d 
in
 p
re
se
nt
in
g 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts.
Tr
an
sla
tio
n 
of
 fo
re
ig
n 
op
er
at
io
ns
.
FR
S 
12
1 
re
qu
ire
s 
on
ly
 o
ne
 m
et
ho
d 
to
 b
e 
us
ed
 to
 tr
an
sla
te
 a
ll 
fo
re
ig
n 
op
er
at
io
ns
. T
he
 m
et
ho
d 
is
 th
e 
on
e 
pr
ev
io
us
ly
 c
a
pa
ra
 1
1)
. 
M
A
SB
 6
 s
pe
ci
fie
d 
th
at
 t
he
 m
et
ho
d 
us
ed
 t
o 
tra
ns
la
te
 t
he
 
fin
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 o
f 
a 
fo
re
ig
n 
op
er
at
io
n 
de
pe
nd
ed
 o
n 
th
e 
w
ay
 in
 w
hi
ch
 it
 w
as
 fi
na
nc
ed
 a
nd
 o
pe
ra
te
d 
in
 r
el
at
io
n 
to
 th
e 
re
po
rti
ng
 e
nt
er
pr
is
e.
 F
or
ei
gn
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 w
er
e 
cl
as
si
fie
d 
as
 
ei
th
er
 "f
or
ei
gn
 o
pe
ra
tio
ns
 th
at
 a
re
 in
te
gr
al
 to
 th
e 
op
er
at
io
ns
 o
f 
th
e 
re
po
rti
ng
 e
nt
er
pr
is
e"
 o
r "
fo
re
ig
n 
en
tit
ie
s"
. 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 F
un
ct
io
na
l C
ur
re
nc
y 
FR
S 
12
1 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
at
 w
he
n 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 a
 f
irm
cu
rr
en
cy
, i
t s
ho
ul
d 
be
 a
cc
ou
nt
ed
 fo
r p
ro
sp
ec
tiv
el
y 
(p
ar
a 
35
). 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
su
ch
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
n 
M
A
SB
 6
. 
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 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
C
ap
ita
lis
at
io
n 
of
 fo
re
ig
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 
FR
S 
12
1 
do
es
 n
ot
 p
er
m
it 
ca
pi
ta
lis
at
io
n 
of
 fo
re
ig
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s 
in
ca
pa
bl
e 
of
 
be
in
g 
he
dg
ed
 
in
 
an
y 
ci
rc
um
sta
nc
es
. 
Th
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 a
re
 re
qu
ire
d 
to
 b
e 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 in
 p
ro
fit
 a
nd
 lo
ss
. 
M
A
SB
 6
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
an
 o
pt
io
n 
to
 c
ap
ita
liz
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
ex
ch
an
ge
 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 
re
su
lti
ng
 
fr
om
 
a 
se
ve
re
 
de
va
lu
at
io
n 
or
 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n 
of
 a
 c
ur
re
nc
y,
 w
he
n 
th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
m
ea
ns
 o
f 
he
dg
in
g.
 
G
oo
dw
ill
 
an
d 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
ad
ju
st
m
en
t 
on
 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 
of
 
fo
re
ig
n 
en
tit
y 
FR
S 
12
1 
re
qu
ire
s 
go
od
w
ill
 a
nd
 f
ai
r 
va
lu
e 
ad
ju
stm
en
t 
to
 a
ss
et
s 
an
d 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
ar
is
in
g 
on
 a
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
of
 a
 fo
re
ig
n 
en
tit
y 
to
 b
e 
tre
at
ed
 a
s p
ar
t 
of
 t
he
 a
ss
et
s 
an
d 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
of
 th
e 
fo
re
ig
n 
en
tit
y 
an
d 
tra
ns
la
te
d 
at
 th
e 
cl
os
in
g 
ra
te
 (p
ar
a 
47
). 
M
A
SB
 6
 a
llo
w
ed
 g
oo
dw
ill
 a
nd
 f
ai
r 
va
lu
e 
ad
ju
st
m
en
t 
to
 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 li
ab
ili
tie
s 
ar
is
in
g 
on
 a
cq
ui
sit
io
n 
of
 a
 fo
re
ig
n 
en
tit
y 
to
 b
e 
tre
at
ed
 a
s 
pa
rt 
of
 (
1)
 t
he
 a
ss
et
s 
an
d 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
of
 t
he
 
fo
re
ig
n 
en
tit
y 
an
d 
tra
ns
la
te
d 
at
 t
he
 c
lo
si
ng
 r
at
e;
 o
r 
(2
) 
th
e 
as
se
ts
 a
nd
 li
ab
ili
tie
s 
of
 th
e 
re
po
rti
ng
 e
nt
ity
 w
hi
ch
 e
ith
er
 w
er
e 
al
re
ad
y 
ex
pr
es
se
d 
in
 t
he
 r
ep
or
tin
g 
cu
rr
en
cy
 o
r 
w
er
e 
no
n-
m
on
et
ar
y 
fo
re
ig
n 
cu
rr
en
cy
 it
em
s 
w
hi
ch
 w
er
e
re
po
rte
d 
us
in
g 
th
e 
ex
ch
an
ge
 ra
te
 a
t t
he
 d
at
e 
of
 th
e 
tra
ns
ac
tio
n.
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 
of
 
ch
an
ge
s 
in
 t
he
 f
or
ei
gn
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
ra
te
s 
FR
S 
12
1 
do
es
 n
ot
 r
eq
ui
re
 t
he
 a
na
ly
si
s 
of
 r
ea
liz
ed
 a
nd
 u
nr
ea
liz
ed
 
ex
ch
an
ge
di
ffe
re
nc
es
, a
nd
 c
lo
si
ng
 ra
te
s t
o 
be
 d
is
cl
os
ed
 (p
ar
a
52
).
FR
S 
12
1 
re
qu
ire
s 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 t
o 
di
sc
lo
se
 t
he
 r
ea
so
ns
 f
or
 u
sin
g 
a 
di
ffe
re
nt
 c
ur
re
nc
y 
fr
om
 t
he
 f
un
ct
io
na
l 
cu
rr
en
cy
 f
or
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
of
 
ite
m
s i
n 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts
 (p
ar
a 
53
). 
FR
S 
12
1 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
de
ta
ils
 o
f, 
an
d 
re
as
on
 f
or
 a
ny
 
ch
an
ge
 in
 fu
nc
tio
na
l c
ur
re
nc
y 
(p
ar
a 
54
). 
M
A
SB
 6
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
th
e 
an
al
ys
is
 o
f 
re
al
iz
ed
 a
nd
 u
nr
ea
liz
ed
 
ex
ch
an
ge
 d
iff
er
en
ce
s, 
an
d 
th
e 
cl
os
in
g 
ra
te
 to
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d.
Th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
su
ch
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
n 
M
A
SB
 6
. 
 Th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
su
ch
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
n 
M
A
SB
 6
. 
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 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
Re
la
te
d 
Pa
rty
 D
is
cl
os
ur
es
 
FR
S 
12
4 
Re
la
te
d 
Pa
rty
 D
is
cl
os
ur
es
 (e
ff
ec
tiv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 8
 R
el
at
ed
 P
ar
ty
 D
is
cl
os
ur
es
, r
en
am
ed
 to
 F
RS
 1
24
20
04
 
Re
la
te
d 
Pa
rty
 D
is
cl
os
ur
es
 (e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
0)
 
Ex
em
pt
io
n 
fo
r 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
of
 
re
la
te
d 
pa
rty
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e.
 
FR
S 
12
4 
do
es
 n
ot
 a
llo
w
 e
xe
m
pt
io
n 
of
 r
el
at
ed
 p
ar
ty
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
in
 (
1)
 
pa
re
nt
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 w
he
n 
it 
is
 a
va
ila
bl
e 
or
 p
ub
lis
he
d 
w
ith
 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
sta
te
m
en
ts
; 
an
d 
(2
) 
fin
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
t 
of
 
w
ho
lly
-o
w
ne
d 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 if
 it
s 
pa
re
nt
 is
 in
co
rp
or
at
ed
 in
 M
al
ay
si
a 
an
d 
pr
ov
id
es
 c
on
so
lid
at
ed
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts.
 
M
A
SB
 8
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
ex
em
pt
io
n 
of
 r
el
at
ed
 p
ar
ty
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
fo
r 
th
e 
tw
o 
ca
te
go
rie
s. 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 o
f r
el
at
ed
 p
ar
ty
  
FR
S 
12
4 
ex
te
nd
s 
ha
s 
jo
in
t c
on
tro
l o
ve
r 
th
e 
en
tit
y 
(p
ar
a 
9 
(a
)(
iii
));
 a
nd
 a
 jo
in
t v
en
tu
re
 in
 
w
hi
ch
 th
e 
en
tit
y 
is
 th
e 
ve
nt
ur
e 
(p
ar
a
9 
(c
)).
Th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f 
re
la
te
d 
pa
rty
 i
n 
FR
S 
12
4 
ex
cl
ud
es
 e
nt
er
pr
is
es
(a
) 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
by
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
w
hi
ch
 e
xe
rc
is
es
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t i
nf
lu
en
ce
 
ov
er
 th
e 
re
po
rti
ng
 e
nt
er
pr
is
e;
 (b
) s
ub
je
ct
 to
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t i
nf
lu
en
ce
 b
y 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
w
hi
ch
 c
on
tro
lle
d 
th
e 
re
po
rti
ng
 e
nt
er
pr
is
e.
 
M
A
SB
 8
 d
id
 n
ot
 in
cl
ud
e 
a 
pa
rty
 th
at
 h
ad
 jo
in
t c
on
tro
l o
ve
r 
th
e 
en
tit
y;
 a
nd
 a
 j
oi
nt
 v
en
tu
re
 i
n 
w
hi
ch
 t
he
 e
nt
ity
 w
as
 t
he
 
ve
nt
ur
e,
 in
 th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f r
el
at
ed
 p
ar
ty
. 
Th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 
of
 
re
la
te
d 
pa
rty
 
in
 
M
A
SB
 
8 
in
cl
ud
ed
 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
(a
) 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
by
 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
w
hi
ch
 
ex
er
ci
se
d 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 in
flu
en
ce
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
re
po
rti
ng
 e
nt
er
pr
is
e;
 
(b
) 
su
bj
ec
t 
to
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t 
in
flu
en
ce
 b
y 
th
e 
sa
m
e 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
w
hi
ch
 c
on
tro
lle
d 
th
e 
re
po
rti
ng
 e
nt
er
pr
is
e.
 
D
ef
in
iti
on
 o
f 
cl
os
e 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f 
fa
m
ily
 
FR
S 
12
4 
de
fin
e 
cl
os
e 
m
em
be
rs
 o
f t
he
 fa
m
ily
 o
f a
n 
in
di
vi
du
al
 a
s 
th
os
e 
fa
m
ily
 
m
em
be
rs
 
w
ho
 
ar
e 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 
to
 
ha
ve
 
in
flu
en
ce
 
or
 
to
 
be
 
in
flu
en
ce
d 
by
 th
at
 in
di
vi
du
al
 in
 d
ea
lin
g 
w
ith
 th
e 
en
tit
y,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
(a
) 
pa
rtn
do
m
es
tic
 p
ar
tn
er
 (p
ar
a 
9)
. 
M
A
SB
 8
 d
ef
in
ed
 c
lo
se
 f
am
ily
 m
em
be
rs
 a
s 
sp
ou
se
; 
pa
re
nt
; 
ch
ild
 (i
nc
lu
di
ng
 a
do
pt
ed
 c
hi
ld
 a
nd
 st
ep
-c
hi
ld
); 
br
ot
he
r; 
si
st
er
; 
an
d 
sp
ou
se
 o
f 
hi
s/h
er
 c
hi
ld
, 
br
ot
he
r 
or
 s
is
te
r. 
Th
is
 w
as
 i
n 
ac
co
rd
an
ce
 
w
ith
 t
he
 
de
fin
iti
on
 
in
 
Se
ct
io
n 
12
2A
 
of
 
th
e 
C
om
pa
ni
es
 A
ct
 1
96
5.
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 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t f
or
 r
el
at
ed
 
pa
rty
 
FR
S 
12
4 
pr
ov
id
es
 fu
rth
er
 c
la
rif
ic
at
io
n 
on
 th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t o
f 
ou
ts
ta
nd
in
g 
ba
la
nc
es
 
w
ith
 
re
la
te
d 
pa
rti
es
, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
te
rm
s 
an
d 
co
nd
iti
on
s, 
w
he
th
er
 th
ey
 a
re
 se
cu
re
d,
 a
nd
 th
e 
na
tu
re
 o
f c
on
si
de
ra
tio
n 
to
 
be
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 s
et
tle
m
en
t 
an
d 
de
ta
ils
 o
f 
an
y 
gu
ar
an
te
es
 g
iv
en
 o
r 
re
ce
iv
ed
 (p
ar
a 
17
(b
))
; a
nd
 th
e 
pr
ov
is
io
n 
of
 d
ou
bt
fu
l d
eb
ts 
re
la
te
d 
to
 th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f o
ut
st
an
di
ng
 b
al
an
ce
s (
pa
ra
 1
7(
c)
). 
FR
S 
12
4 
re
qu
ire
s 
se
pa
ra
te
 c
la
ss
ifi
ca
tio
n 
of
 a
m
ou
nt
s 
re
ce
iv
ab
le
 a
nd
 
pa
ya
bl
e 
to
 r
el
at
ed
 p
ar
tie
s 
in
to
 d
iff
er
en
t 
ca
te
go
rie
s 
of
 r
el
at
ed
 p
ar
tie
s 
(p
ar
a 
18
19
). 
M
A
SB
 8
 d
id
 n
ot
 c
on
ta
in
 su
ch
 c
la
rif
ic
at
io
n.
 
    M
A
SB
 8
 d
id
 n
ot
 st
at
e 
su
ch
 re
qu
ire
m
en
ts.
 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 P
er
 S
ha
re
FR
S 
13
3 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 P
er
 S
ha
re
 (e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
.
M
A
SB
13
 
Ea
rn
in
gs
 
Pe
r 
Sh
ar
e,
 r
en
am
ed
 
to
 
FR
S 
13
3 2
00
4
Ea
rn
in
gs
 P
er
 S
ha
re
(e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
0)
.
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t o
f E
PS
 
FR
S 
13
3 
pr
ov
id
es
 g
ui
da
nc
e 
on
 h
ow
 to
 c
al
cu
la
te
 E
PS
 w
he
n 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 
in
str
um
en
ts
 (p
ar
a
12
18
).
FR
S 
13
3 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
at
 o
rd
in
ar
y 
sh
ar
es
 is
su
ed
 u
po
n 
th
e 
co
nv
er
si
on
 o
f a
 
m
an
da
to
ry
 c
on
ve
rti
bl
e 
in
str
um
en
t s
ho
ul
d 
be
 in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 th
e 
ba
si
c 
EP
S 
fr
om
 th
e 
da
te
 th
e 
co
nt
ra
ct
 is
 e
nt
er
ed
 in
to
 (p
ar
a 
23
). 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
su
ch
 g
ui
da
nc
e 
in
 M
A
SB
 1
3.
 
 Th
er
e 
w
as
no
 su
ch
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
n 
M
A
SB
 1
3.
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
fo
r 
ea
rn
in
gs
 p
er
 sh
ar
e 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
33
, i
f t
he
re
 a
re
 a
ny
 c
ha
ng
es
 to
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r 
of
 s
ha
re
s 
as
 a
 
re
su
lt 
of
 a
 c
ap
ita
lis
at
io
n,
 b
on
us
 is
su
e,
 s
ha
re
 s
pl
it 
or
 re
ve
rs
e 
sh
ar
e 
sp
lit
 
af
te
r 
th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t 
da
te
, 
bu
t 
be
fo
re
 t
he
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 a
re
 
au
th
or
iz
ed
 fo
r 
is
su
e,
 th
e 
co
m
pu
ta
tio
n 
of
 E
PS
 s
ho
ul
d 
ta
ke
 in
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 
th
e 
ch
an
ge
s (
pa
ra
 6
4)
 
 FR
S 
13
3 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
ba
si
c 
an
d 
di
lu
te
d 
EP
S 
fo
r 
di
sc
on
tin
ue
d 
op
er
at
io
n,
 in
 th
e 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t o
r 
in
 th
e 
no
te
s 
(p
ar
a 
68
). 
 
U
nd
er
 M
A
SB
 1
3,
 if
 th
er
e 
w
er
e 
an
y 
ch
an
ge
s 
to
 th
e 
nu
m
be
r o
f 
sh
ar
es
 a
s 
a 
re
su
lt 
of
 a
 c
ap
ita
lis
at
io
n,
 b
on
us
 is
su
e,
 s
ha
re
 s
pl
it 
or
 r
ev
er
se
 s
ha
re
 s
pl
it 
af
te
r 
th
e 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t d
at
e,
 b
ut
 b
ef
or
e 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
t 
w
as
 
au
th
or
iz
ed
 
fo
r 
is
su
e,
 
no
 
ad
ju
st
m
en
t 
to
 E
PS
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 m
ad
e 
to
 a
cc
ou
nt
 f
or
 t
ho
se
 
ch
an
ge
s. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
an
 a
dd
iti
on
al
 p
ro
fo
rm
a 
EP
S 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d.
 
N
o 
su
ch
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t w
as
 in
cl
ud
ed
 in
 M
A
SB
 1
3.
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ffe
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 b
et
w
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FR
S 
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M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
fo
r 
ea
rn
in
gs
 p
er
 sh
ar
e 
FR
S 
13
3 
pr
oh
ib
its
 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 
of
 
pa
re
nt
-o
nl
y 
EP
S 
in
 
th
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
sta
te
m
en
ts.
 
If 
th
e 
en
tit
y 
pr
es
en
ts
 
bo
th
 
a 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
t 
an
d 
se
pa
ra
te
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
t, 
th
e 
EP
S 
pr
es
en
te
d 
in
 th
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
t s
ho
ul
d 
be
 b
as
ed
 
on
 c
on
so
lid
at
ed
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n.
 F
RS
 1
33
 a
llo
w
s 
EP
S 
ba
se
d 
on
 s
ep
ar
at
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 t
o 
be
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 o
nl
y 
on
 t
he
 f
ac
e 
of
 t
he
 s
ep
ar
at
e 
in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t, 
bu
t n
ot
 o
n 
th
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 in
co
m
e 
st
at
em
en
t (
pa
ra
 
4)
. 
  N
o 
su
ch
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t i
s i
nc
lu
de
d 
w
as
 M
A
SB
 1
3.
 
C
on
so
lid
at
ed
 
an
d 
Se
pa
ra
te
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l S
ta
te
m
en
ts 
FR
S 
12
7 
C
on
so
lid
at
ed
 a
nd
 S
ep
ar
at
e 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
St
at
em
en
ts 
(e
ff
ec
tiv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 
11
 
C
on
so
lid
at
ed
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
St
at
em
en
ts 
an
d 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
in
 
Su
bs
id
ia
rie
s, 
re
na
m
ed
 
to
 
FR
S 
12
7 2
00
4 
C
on
so
lid
at
ed
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
St
at
em
en
ts
 
an
d 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 
in
 
Su
bs
id
ia
rie
s (
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
0)
. 
Ex
em
pt
io
n 
fo
r 
pa
re
nt
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 
fr
om
 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts 
FR
S 
12
7 
gi
ve
s 
ex
em
pt
io
n 
fo
r 
pa
re
nt
 c
om
pa
ni
es
 f
ro
m
 p
re
pa
rin
g 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts,
 i
f 
(a
)
th
e 
pa
re
nt
 f
irm
is
 a
 w
ho
lly
 
ow
ne
d 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
, 
or
 a
 p
ar
tia
lly
 o
w
ne
d 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 w
he
re
 a
ll 
ow
ne
rs
 
ha
ve
 b
ee
n 
in
fo
rm
ed
 a
bo
ut
 a
nd
 d
o 
no
t o
bj
ec
t t
o 
th
e 
fa
ct
 th
at
 th
e 
pa
re
nt
 
do
es
 n
ot
 p
re
se
nt
 a
 c
on
so
lid
at
ed
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
t; 
(b
) 
t
de
bt
 a
nd
 e
qu
ity
 in
str
um
en
ts
 a
re
 n
ot
 tr
ad
ed
 in
 th
e 
pu
bl
ic
 m
ar
ke
t; 
(c
) 
th
e 
pa
re
nt
 is
 n
ot
 fi
lin
g 
or
 in
 th
e 
pr
oc
es
s 
of
 fi
lin
g 
its
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
t f
or
 
th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 is
su
in
g 
an
y 
in
str
um
en
ts
 in
 a
 p
ub
lic
 m
ar
ke
t; 
an
d 
(d
) 
th
e 
ul
tim
at
e 
or
 
in
te
rm
ed
ia
te
 
pa
re
nt
 
of
 
th
e 
pa
re
nt
 i
s 
in
co
rp
or
at
ed
 
in
 
M
al
ay
si
a 
an
d 
pr
od
uc
es
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 t
ha
t 
co
m
pl
y 
w
ith
 F
RS
 
(p
ar
a 
10
). 
M
A
SB
 
11
 
ga
ve
 
ex
em
pt
io
n 
fo
r 
pa
re
nt
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 
fr
om
 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts,
 o
nl
y 
if 
th
e 
pa
re
nt
w
as
 
a 
w
ho
lly
-o
w
ne
d 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 
of
 
an
ot
he
r 
pa
re
nt
 
in
co
rp
or
at
ed
 in
 M
al
ay
si
a 
(p
ar
a 
8)
. 
C
on
so
lid
at
io
n 
of
 
su
bs
id
ia
rie
s 
ac
qu
ire
d 
te
m
po
ra
ril
y 
FR
S 
12
7 
al
lo
w
s 
su
bs
id
ia
rie
s 
ac
qu
ire
d,
 b
ut
 in
te
nd
ed
 to
 b
e 
di
sp
os
ed
 o
f 
, 
to
 b
e 
ex
cl
ud
ed
 
fr
om
 c
on
so
lid
at
ed
 f
in
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts 
an
d 
ac
co
un
te
d 
fo
r u
nd
er
 F
RS
 5
 (p
ar
a 
27
28
). 
M
A
SB
 1
1 
al
lo
w
ed
 s
ub
si
di
ar
ie
s 
ac
qu
ire
d 
to
 b
e 
ex
cl
ud
ed
 fr
om
 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
if 
it 
w
as
 i
nt
en
de
d 
to
 b
e 
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0 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
C
on
so
lid
at
io
n 
of
 s
ub
si
di
ar
y 
w
ith
 
se
ve
re
 lo
ng
-te
rm
 re
st
ric
tio
ns
 
FR
S 
12
7 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n 
of
 a
 s
ub
si
di
ar
y 
th
at
 is
 u
nd
er
 s
ev
er
e 
lo
ng
-te
rm
 r
es
tri
ct
io
n,
 e
ve
n 
if 
th
e 
re
str
ic
tio
n 
ha
s 
im
pa
ire
d 
its
 a
bi
lit
y 
to
 
tra
ns
fe
r f
un
ds
 to
 th
e 
pa
re
nt
. C
on
so
lid
at
io
n 
is
 re
qu
ire
d 
un
le
ss
 th
e 
pa
re
nt
 
ha
s l
os
t c
on
tro
l o
ve
r t
he
 su
bs
id
ia
ry
 (I
N
9)
. 
M
A
SB
 1
1 
re
qu
ire
d 
th
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n 
of
 a
 s
ub
si
di
ar
y 
th
at
 w
as
 
un
de
r 
se
ve
re
 lo
ng
-te
rm
 r
es
tri
ct
io
n,
 u
nl
es
s 
th
e 
pa
re
nt
 h
ad
 lo
st
 
co
nt
ro
l o
ve
r t
he
 s
ub
si
di
ar
y,
 in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
ab
ili
ty
 o
f p
ar
en
ts
 to
 
co
nt
ro
l t
he
 tr
an
sf
er
 fu
nd
s o
f t
he
 su
bs
id
ia
ry
. 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
an
d 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t t
ha
t c
ea
se
s 
fr
om
 b
ei
ng
 
a 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
27
, i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
th
at
 c
ea
se
s 
to
 b
e 
a 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
ac
co
un
te
d 
un
de
r 
FR
S 
13
9 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
In
str
um
en
ts
 a
nd
 t
he
 c
ar
ry
in
g 
am
ou
nt
 a
t t
he
 d
at
e 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
ga
rd
ed
 a
s t
he
 c
os
t (
pa
ra
 3
1
32
) 
U
nd
er
 
M
A
SB
 
11
, 
an
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
th
at
 
ce
as
ed
 
to
 
be
 
a 
su
bs
id
ia
ry
 w
as
 to
 b
e 
ac
co
un
te
d 
un
de
r I
A
S 
25
 A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
fo
r 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts
 a
nd
 t
he
 c
ar
ry
in
g 
am
ou
nt
 a
t 
th
e 
da
te
 w
as
 t
o 
be
 
re
ga
rd
ed
 a
s t
he
 c
os
t. 
Th
e 
us
e 
of
 u
ni
fo
rm
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s
FR
S 
12
7 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 u
ni
fo
rm
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s 
fo
r r
ep
or
tin
g 
lik
e 
tra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 a
nd
 e
ve
nt
s i
n 
sim
ila
r c
irc
um
st
an
ce
s (
IN
11
). 
M
A
SB
 1
1 
al
lo
w
ed
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 d
iff
er
en
t a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s f
or
 
re
po
rti
ng
 
lik
e 
tra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 
an
d 
ev
en
ts
 
in
 
sim
ila
r 
ci
rc
um
sta
nc
es
, w
he
n 
it 
w
as
ac
co
un
tin
g 
po
lic
ie
s. 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 m
in
or
ity
 in
te
re
st
 
FR
S 
12
7 
re
qu
ire
s m
in
or
ity
 in
te
re
sts
 to
 b
e 
pr
es
en
te
d 
in
 th
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 
ba
la
nc
e 
sh
ee
t 
w
ith
in
 e
qu
ity
, 
bu
t 
se
pa
ra
te
ly
 f
ro
m
 p
ar
en
t 
sh
ar
eh
ol
de
rs
 
eq
ui
ty
. 
M
A
SB
 1
1 
pr
oh
ib
ite
d 
m
in
or
ity
 i
nt
er
es
ts
 t
o 
be
 p
re
se
nt
ed
 
w
ith
in
 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s, 
bu
t 
it 
di
d 
no
t 
re
qu
ire
 
pr
es
en
ta
tio
n 
of
 
m
in
or
ity
 in
te
re
st
s w
ith
in
 e
qu
ity
. 
In
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
A
ss
oc
ia
te
s 
FR
S 
12
8 
In
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
A
ss
oc
ia
te
s (
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 1
2 
In
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
A
ss
oc
ia
te
s, 
re
na
m
ed
 to
 F
R
S 
12
8 2
00
4 
In
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
A
ss
oc
ia
te
s (
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
0)
. 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 e
qu
ity
 m
et
ho
d 
FR
S 
12
8 
cl
ar
ifi
es
 th
at
 e
qu
ity
 m
et
ho
d 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
us
ed
 w
he
n 
th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 
ha
s 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 in
flu
en
ce
 o
ve
r 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
as
so
ci
at
es
, r
eg
ar
dl
es
s 
of
 w
he
th
er
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 h
as
 su
bs
id
ia
rie
s o
r n
ot
 (I
N
8,
 p
ar
a 
13
). 
FR
S 
12
8 
re
qu
ire
s 
eq
ui
ty
 m
et
ho
d 
to
 b
e 
us
e,
 e
ve
n 
w
he
n 
th
e 
in
flu
en
ce
 is
 s
ev
er
el
y 
re
str
ic
te
d.
 T
he
 e
qu
ity
 m
et
ho
d 
is
 n
ot
 a
pp
lic
ab
le
 o
nl
y 
w
he
n 
th
e 
in
flu
en
ce
 
is
 lo
st
 (I
N
10
). 
M
A
SB
 1
2 
st
at
ed
 t
ha
t 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
an
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
 w
as
 t
o 
be
 
ac
co
un
te
d 
fo
r 
in
 c
on
so
lid
at
ed
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 u
nd
er
 th
e 
eq
ui
ty
 m
et
ho
d 
ex
ce
pt
 w
he
n 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t w
as
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
an
d 
he
ld
 e
xc
lu
si
ve
ly
 w
ith
 a
 v
ie
w
 to
 it
s d
is
po
sa
l i
n 
th
e 
ne
ar
 fu
tu
re
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
if 
an
 e
nt
ity
 d
id
 n
ot
 i
ss
ue
 c
on
so
lid
at
ed
 f
in
an
ci
al
 
st
at
em
en
ts,
 th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
an
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 c
ar
rie
d 
at
 c
os
t o
r r
ev
al
ue
d 
am
ou
nt
s. 
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1 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
an
d 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t t
ha
t c
ea
se
s 
fr
om
 b
ei
ng
 
an
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
 
FR
S 
12
8 
cl
ar
ifi
es
 th
at
 a
n 
en
tit
y 
lo
se
s 
its
 s
ig
ni
fic
an
t i
nf
lu
en
ce
 o
ve
r 
an
 
in
ve
st
ee
 w
he
n 
it 
lo
se
s 
po
w
er
 t
o 
pa
rti
ci
pa
te
 i
n 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 a
nd
 
op
er
at
in
g 
po
lic
y 
de
ci
si
on
s o
f t
he
 in
ve
st
ee
 (p
ar
a 
10
). 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
28
, i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
th
at
 c
ea
se
s 
to
 b
e 
an
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 
ac
co
un
te
d 
un
de
r 
FR
S 
13
9 
an
d 
th
e 
ca
rr
yi
ng
 a
m
ou
nt
 a
t t
he
 d
at
e 
sh
ou
ld
 
be
 re
ga
rd
ed
 a
s t
he
 c
os
t (
pa
ra
 1
8
19
). 
M
A
SB
 1
2 
di
d 
no
t p
ro
vi
de
 su
ch
 c
la
rif
ic
at
io
n.
 
 M
A
SB
 1
2 
di
d 
no
t p
ro
vi
de
 su
ch
 c
la
rif
ic
at
io
n.
 
Th
e 
us
e 
of
 u
ni
fo
rm
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s 
FR
S 
12
8 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
us
e 
of
 u
ni
fo
rm
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s 
fo
r r
ep
or
tin
g 
lik
e 
tra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 a
nd
 e
ve
nt
s i
n 
sim
ila
r c
irc
um
st
an
ce
s (
IN
13
, p
ar
a 
26
). 
 
M
A
SB
 1
2 
al
lo
w
ed
 th
e 
us
e 
of
 d
iff
er
en
t a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
po
lic
ie
s f
or
 
re
po
rti
ng
 
lik
e 
tra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 
an
d 
ev
en
ts
 
in
 
sim
ila
r 
ci
rc
um
sta
nc
es
, w
he
n 
it 
w
as
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
po
lic
ie
s.
D
et
er
m
in
at
io
n 
of
 
gr
ou
p 
to
ta
l 
in
te
re
st
s i
n 
an
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
s 
FR
S 
12
8 
cl
ar
ifi
es
 t
ha
t 
in
te
re
st
s 
he
ld
 b
y 
jo
in
t 
ve
nt
ur
es
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 
in
te
re
st
s i
n 
as
so
ci
at
es
 (p
ar
a 
21
). 
M
A
SB
 1
2 
st
at
ed
 th
at
 in
te
re
sts
 h
el
d 
by
 o
th
er
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
s 
w
er
e
no
t i
nc
lu
de
d 
in
 th
e 
de
in
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
s. 
N
o 
ex
pl
an
at
io
n 
w
as
 g
iv
en
 fo
r 
in
te
re
st
s 
he
ld
 b
y 
jo
in
t v
en
tu
re
s.
Re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f t
he
 s
ha
re
 o
f l
os
se
s 
in
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
s 
FR
S 
12
8 
re
qu
ire
s 
an
 i
nv
es
to
r 
to
 c
on
si
de
r 
th
e 
ca
rr
yi
ng
 a
m
ou
nt
 o
f 
its
 
eq
ui
ty
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
in
 t
he
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
 a
nd
 o
th
er
 l
on
g-
te
rm
 i
nt
er
es
ts
 i
n 
as
so
ci
at
es
 w
he
n 
re
co
gn
isi
ng
 it
s s
ha
re
 o
f l
os
se
s i
n 
as
so
ci
at
es
 (p
ar
a 
29
). 
M
A
SB
 1
2 
di
d 
no
t p
ro
vi
de
 su
ch
 a
 re
qu
ire
m
en
t. 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
fo
r 
go
od
w
ill
 
in
 
as
so
ci
at
e 
FR
S 
12
8 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
go
od
w
ill
 i
n 
as
so
ci
at
es
 t
o 
be
 i
nc
lu
de
d 
in
 t
he
 
ca
rr
yi
ng
 v
al
ue
 o
f 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
 t
he
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
 a
nd
 n
ot
 s
ep
ar
at
el
y 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 (p
ar
a 
23
,3
3)
 
M
A
SB
 1
2 
re
qu
ire
d 
an
y 
di
ffe
re
nc
e 
be
tw
ee
n 
th
e 
co
st
 o
f 
ac
qu
is
iti
on
 a
nd
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
's 
sh
ar
e 
of
 t
he
 f
ai
r 
va
lu
es
 o
f 
th
e 
ne
t 
id
en
tif
ia
bl
e 
as
se
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
as
so
ci
at
e 
to
 b
e 
ac
co
un
te
d 
fo
r 
un
de
r 
M
A
SB
 2
1,
 B
us
in
es
s 
C
om
bi
na
tio
ns
. 
A
dj
us
tm
en
t 
to
 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n 
an
d 
am
or
tis
at
io
n 
w
er
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 b
e 
m
ad
e 
ac
co
rd
in
gl
y.
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2 
 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
as
so
ci
at
es
  
FR
S 
12
8 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
of
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
s, 
in
cl
ud
in
g 
th
e 
to
ta
l a
ss
et
s, 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s, 
re
ve
nu
es
 a
nd
 p
ro
fit
 o
r l
os
s 
to
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
(p
ar
a 
37
 (b
))
. 
FR
S 
12
8 
al
so
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
fin
an
ci
al
 i
nf
or
m
at
io
n 
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 i
n 
as
so
ci
at
es
 n
ot
 a
cc
ou
nt
ed
 u
sin
g 
eq
ui
ty
 m
et
ho
ds
 (
pa
ra
 
37
(i)
); 
th
e 
fa
ct
 t
ha
t 
an
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
 i
s 
no
t 
ac
co
un
te
d 
fo
r 
un
de
r 
eq
ui
ty
 
m
et
ho
d 
(p
ar
a 
37
(h
))
; 
th
e 
na
tu
re
 a
nd
 e
xt
en
t 
of
 l
on
g-
te
rm
 r
es
tri
ct
io
ns
 
pl
ac
ed
 o
n 
an
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
 (p
ar
a 
37
(f)
); 
an
d 
th
e 
re
po
rti
ng
 d
at
e 
of
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
s 
if 
it 
is
 d
iff
er
en
t f
ro
m
 th
e 
re
po
rti
ng
 d
at
e 
or
 p
er
io
d 
(p
ar
a 
37
(e
))
. 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
su
ch
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t u
nd
er
 M
A
SB
 1
2.
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
of
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
re
la
tin
g 
to
 in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
as
so
ci
at
es
  
Th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 a
ls
o 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
an
 
st
at
em
en
t i
n 
ch
an
ge
s i
n 
eq
ui
ty
 (p
ar
a
39
). 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
su
ch
 d
is
cl
os
ur
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t u
nd
er
 M
A
SB
 1
2.
 
In
te
re
st
s i
n 
Jo
in
t V
en
tu
re
s 
FR
S 
13
1 
In
te
re
st
s i
n 
Jo
in
t V
en
tu
re
s (
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 1
6 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l R
ep
or
tin
g 
of
 I
nt
er
es
t i
n 
Jo
in
t V
en
tu
re
s, 
re
na
m
ed
 t
o 
FR
S 
13
1 2
00
4 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
Re
po
rti
ng
 o
f 
In
te
re
st
 i
n 
Jo
in
t V
en
tu
re
s (
ef
fe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ju
ly
 1
, 2
00
0)
. 
C
ha
ng
es
 in
 sc
op
e 
an
d 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f 
in
te
re
st
s i
n 
jo
in
t v
en
tu
re
s 
en
tit
ie
s 
he
ld
 b
y 
ve
nt
ur
e 
ca
pi
ta
l o
rg
an
iz
at
io
ns
, m
ut
ua
l f
un
ds
, u
ni
t t
ru
st
s 
an
d 
si
m
ila
r 
en
tit
ie
s, 
w
he
n 
th
os
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 a
re
 c
la
ss
ifi
ed
 a
s 
he
ld
 fo
r 
tra
di
ng
 a
nd
 m
ea
su
re
d 
at
 fa
ir 
va
lu
e.
 T
he
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
of
 th
os
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts
 a
re
 r
ec
og
ni
se
d 
in
 p
ro
fit
 a
nd
 lo
ss
 in
 th
e 
pe
rio
d 
th
ey
 o
cc
ur
 
(I
N
5)
. 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
en
tit
ie
s i
n 
th
e 
fin
an
ci
al
 st
at
em
en
ts
 o
f v
en
tu
re
rs
 a
nd
 
in
ve
st
or
s, 
re
ga
rd
le
ss
 o
f 
th
e 
str
uc
tu
re
s 
or
 f
or
m
s 
un
de
r 
w
hi
ch
 
th
e 
jo
in
t v
en
tu
re
 a
ct
iv
iti
es
 to
ok
 p
la
ce
 (p
ar
a 
1)
. 
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 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
an
d 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f 
in
te
re
st
s 
in
 
jo
in
tly
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
en
tit
y 
FR
S 
13
1 
al
lo
w
s 
a 
ve
nt
ur
e 
to
 r
ec
og
ni
se
 i
ts
 i
nt
er
es
t 
in
 j
oi
nt
 v
en
tu
re
s 
us
in
g 
ei
th
er
 t
he
 p
ro
po
rti
on
at
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n 
or
 t
he
 e
qu
ity
 m
et
ho
d 
(I
N
6A
). 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
31
, 
th
er
e 
is
 a
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 t
ha
t 
pe
rm
its
 a
 v
en
tu
re
 t
o 
be
 
ex
em
pt
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 p
ro
po
rti
on
at
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n 
or
 e
qu
ity
 
m
et
ho
d,
 s
im
ila
r 
to
 e
xe
m
pt
io
ns
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
to
 p
ar
en
t 
co
m
pa
ni
es
 f
ro
m
 
pr
ep
ar
in
g 
co
ns
ol
id
at
ed
 f
in
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts,
 w
he
n 
th
e 
ve
nt
ur
e 
m
ee
ts
 
th
e 
ex
em
pt
io
n 
cr
ite
ria
 u
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
27
 (I
N
6)
. 
FR
S 
13
1 
cl
ar
ifi
es
 th
at
 th
e 
pr
op
or
tio
na
te
 c
on
so
lid
at
io
n 
or
 e
qu
ity
 m
et
ho
d 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
us
ed
 r
eg
ar
dl
es
s 
of
 w
he
th
er
 th
e 
in
ve
st
or
 h
as
 s
ub
si
di
ar
ie
s 
or
 
no
t (
pa
ra
31
).
 
M
A
SB
 1
6 
on
ly
 a
llo
w
ed
 a
 v
en
tu
re
 to
 r
ec
og
ni
se
 it
s 
in
te
re
st
 in
 
jo
in
t v
en
tu
re
s u
sin
g 
th
e 
eq
ui
ty
 m
et
ho
d.
 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
su
ch
 p
ro
vi
si
on
 in
 M
A
SB
 1
6.
 
  U
nd
er
 M
A
SB
 1
6,
 a
 v
en
tu
re
 th
at
 d
id
 n
ot
 p
re
pa
re
 c
on
so
lid
at
ed
 
fin
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 w
er
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 m
ea
su
re
 it
s 
in
te
re
st
s 
in
 
jo
in
t 
ve
nt
ur
es
 u
si
ng
 t
he
 c
os
t 
or
 r
ev
al
ue
d 
am
ou
nt
 u
nd
er
 t
he
 
ac
co
un
tin
g 
po
lic
y 
fo
r 
lo
ng
-te
rm
 i
nv
es
tm
en
ts
. 
H
ow
ev
er
, 
th
e 
st
an
da
rd
 a
ls
o 
re
qu
ire
d
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 i
n 
th
e 
no
te
s 
to
 t
he
 
fin
an
ci
al
 s
ta
te
m
en
ts
 o
f 
th
e 
ef
fe
ct
 i
f 
th
e 
eq
ui
ty
 m
et
ho
d 
ha
d 
be
en
 a
pp
lie
d.
 
M
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
an
d 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f 
in
te
re
st
s 
in
 
jo
in
tly
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
en
tit
y 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
31
, 
w
he
n 
jo
in
t 
co
nt
ro
l 
ce
as
es
, 
th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
 a
n 
as
so
ci
at
e 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ac
co
un
te
d 
fo
r u
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
39
, o
r u
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
27
 if
 
co
nt
ro
l i
s 
ob
ta
in
ed
, o
r 
un
de
r 
FR
S 
12
8 
if 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 in
flu
en
ce
 is
 h
el
d 
(p
ar
a 
44
, 5
1)
. 
U
nd
er
 M
A
SB
 1
6,
 w
he
n 
a 
jo
in
t c
on
tro
l c
ea
se
d,
 th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
in
 t
he
 a
ss
oc
ia
te
 w
as
 t
o 
be
 a
cc
ou
nt
ed
 f
or
 u
nd
er
 F
RS
12
5 2
00
4 
(A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
fo
r 
In
ve
st
m
en
t),
 
or
 
un
de
r 
FR
S1
27
20
04
 
(C
on
so
lid
at
ed
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
St
at
em
en
ts
 
an
d 
In
ve
st
m
en
ts 
in
 
Su
bs
id
ia
rie
s)
 i
f 
co
nt
ro
l 
w
as
 o
bt
ai
ne
d,
 o
r 
un
de
r 
FR
S1
28
20
04
 
(I
nv
es
tm
en
t i
n 
A
ss
oc
ia
te
s)
 if
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
 in
flu
en
ce
 w
as
 h
el
d.
 
Ex
em
pt
io
n 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
jo
in
t 
ve
nt
ur
e 
ac
qu
ire
d 
te
m
po
ra
ril
y 
FR
S 
13
1 
al
lo
w
s a
n 
in
te
re
st
 in
 jo
in
t v
en
tu
re
 a
cq
ui
re
d,
 b
ut
 in
te
nd
ed
 to
 b
e 
, t
o 
be
 e
xc
lu
de
d 
fr
om
 b
ei
ng
 a
cc
ou
nt
ed
 
fo
r 
us
in
g 
pr
op
or
tio
na
te
 
co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n 
or
 
eq
ui
ty
 
m
et
ho
d.
 
Su
ch
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t i
s c
on
si
de
re
d 
un
de
r F
RS
 5
 (I
N
7)
. 
M
A
SB
 1
6 
al
lo
w
ed
 a
n 
in
te
re
st
 in
 a
 jo
in
t v
en
tu
re
 a
cq
ui
re
d 
to
 
be
 e
xc
lu
de
d 
fr
om
 a
pp
ly
in
g 
eq
ui
ty
 m
et
ho
d,
 if
 it
 w
as
 in
te
nd
ed
 
to
 b
e 
di
sp
os
ed
 o
f 
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 b
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w
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FR
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A
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an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
A
pp
lic
at
io
n 
of
 
pr
op
or
tio
na
te
 
co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n 
or
 e
qu
ity
 m
et
ho
d 
fo
r 
in
te
re
st
 in
 jo
in
t v
en
tu
re
s 
op
er
at
in
g 
un
de
r 
se
ve
re
 
lo
ng
-te
rm
 
re
str
ic
tio
ns
 
FR
S 
13
1 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 p
ro
po
rti
on
at
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n 
or
 
eq
ui
ty
 m
et
ho
d 
fo
r i
nt
er
es
t i
n 
jo
in
t v
en
tu
re
s t
ha
t o
pe
ra
te
s u
nd
er
 a
 se
ve
re
 
lo
ng
-te
rm
 r
es
tri
ct
io
n,
 e
ve
n 
if 
th
e 
re
str
ic
tio
n 
ha
s 
im
pa
ire
d 
its
 a
bi
lit
y 
to
 
tra
ns
fe
r 
fu
nd
s 
to
 
th
e 
ve
nt
ur
er
. 
Th
e 
ap
pl
ic
at
io
n 
of
 
pr
op
or
tio
na
te
 
co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n 
or
 e
qu
ity
 m
et
ho
d 
is
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
un
le
ss
 th
e 
jo
in
t c
on
tro
l i
s 
lo
st
 (I
N
8)
. 
M
A
SB
 1
6 
al
lo
w
ed
 a
n 
in
te
re
st 
in
 a
 j
oi
nt
 v
en
tu
re
 t
o 
be
 
ex
cl
ud
ed
 fr
om
 a
pp
ly
in
g 
eq
ui
ty
 m
et
ho
d,
 a
nd
 r
eq
ui
re
d 
it 
to
 b
e 
ac
co
un
te
d 
in
 a
cc
or
da
nc
e 
to
 F
RS
 1
25
20
04
 
(A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
fo
r 
In
ve
st
m
en
t) 
w
he
n 
th
e 
in
te
re
st
 i
n 
a 
jo
in
tly
 c
on
tro
lle
d 
en
tit
y 
op
er
at
ed
 u
nd
er
 se
ve
re
 lo
ng
-te
rm
 re
st
ric
tio
ns
 th
at
 si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 
im
pa
ire
d 
its
 a
bi
lit
y 
to
 tr
an
sf
er
 fu
nd
s t
o 
th
e 
ve
nt
ur
er
. 
se
pa
ra
te
 fi
na
nc
ia
l s
ta
te
m
en
ts 
FR
S 
13
1 
cl
ar
ifi
es
 t
ha
t 
th
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
fo
r 
th
e 
pr
ep
ar
at
io
n 
of
 a
n 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 e
st
ab
lis
he
d 
in
 F
RS
 1
27
 (p
ar
a 
46
). 
Th
er
e 
w
as
 n
o 
su
ch
 c
la
rif
ic
at
io
n 
in
 M
A
SB
16
. 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
ts
 
fo
r 
in
te
re
st
s 
in
 
jo
in
tly
 
co
nt
ro
lle
d 
en
tit
ie
s 
FR
S 
13
1 
re
qu
ire
s 
a 
ve
nt
ur
e 
to
 d
is
cl
os
e 
th
e 
m
et
ho
d 
us
ed
 in
 re
co
gn
is
in
g
its
 in
te
re
st
 in
 jo
in
tly
 c
on
tro
lle
d 
en
tit
ie
s, 
ei
th
er
 th
e 
be
nc
hm
ar
k 
tre
at
m
en
t 
(p
ro
po
rti
on
at
e 
co
ns
ol
id
at
io
n)
 
or
 
al
lo
w
ed
 
al
te
rn
at
iv
e 
(e
qu
ity
 
m
et
ho
d)
(p
ar
a 
57
); 
an
d 
pr
es
en
t i
ts
 in
te
re
st
s 
in
 jo
in
t v
en
tu
re
s 
us
in
g 
on
e 
of
 th
e 
tw
o 
fo
rm
at
s (
pa
ra
30
).
Th
er
e 
w
as
no
 s
uc
h 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 r
eq
ui
re
m
en
t i
n 
M
A
SB
 1
6
as
 it
 
on
ly
 a
llo
w
ed
 e
qu
ity
 m
et
ho
d.
Fi
na
nc
ia
l I
ns
tru
m
en
ts 
FR
S 
13
2 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
In
str
um
en
ts:
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
an
d 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
 
(e
ff
ec
tiv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
M
A
SB
 
24
 
Fi
na
nc
ia
l 
In
str
um
en
ts
: 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
an
d 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
, r
en
am
ed
 to
 F
RS
 1
32
20
04
 F
in
an
ci
al
 In
str
um
en
ts:
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
an
d 
Pr
es
en
ta
tio
ns
 
(e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 
Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 
20
02
). 
C
ha
ng
es
 
in
 
th
e 
sc
op
e 
an
d 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f f
in
an
ci
al
 in
str
um
en
ts 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
32
, 
th
e 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f 
fin
an
ci
al
 a
ss
et
s 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
in
cl
ud
es
 c
on
tra
ct
s 
se
ttl
ed
 in
 a
n 
de
fin
iti
on
s 
fo
r 
de
riv
at
iv
es
, 
he
dg
ed
 
ite
m
, 
he
dg
in
g 
an
d 
he
dg
in
g 
in
str
um
en
t a
re
 re
m
ov
ed
 to
 a
vo
id
 re
du
nd
an
ci
es
 w
ith
 F
RS
 1
39
 (p
ar
a 
11
). 
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pp
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di
x 
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M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
In
iti
al
 
m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
of
 
th
e 
co
m
po
ne
nt
s 
of
 
a 
co
m
po
un
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 in
str
um
en
t 
FR
S 
13
2 
pr
ov
id
es
 n
o 
op
tio
n 
to
 m
ea
su
re
 th
e 
lia
bi
lit
y 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 o
f 
a 
co
m
po
un
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 in
str
um
en
t o
n 
in
iti
al
 r
ec
og
ni
tio
n.
 A
ny
 a
ss
et
s 
an
d 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
ar
e 
re
qu
ire
d 
to
 b
e 
se
pa
ra
te
d 
fir
st
 a
nd
 t
he
 r
es
id
ua
l 
is
 t
he
 
am
ou
nt
 o
f t
he
 e
qu
ity
 c
om
po
ne
nt
 (I
N
13
). 
M
A
SB
 2
4 
pr
ov
id
ed
 t
he
 o
pt
io
n 
to
 m
ea
su
re
 t
he
 l
ia
bi
lit
y 
co
m
po
ne
nt
 o
f 
a 
co
m
po
un
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 i
ns
tru
m
en
t 
on
 i
ni
tia
l 
re
co
gn
iti
on
, e
ith
er
 a
s 
th
e 
re
si
du
al
 a
m
ou
nt
 a
fte
r s
ep
ar
at
in
g 
th
e 
eq
ui
ty
 a
nd
 a
ss
et
s, 
or
 b
y 
us
in
g 
a 
re
la
tiv
e-
fa
ir-
va
lu
e 
m
et
ho
d.
 
eq
ui
ty
 in
str
um
en
t (
tre
as
ur
y 
sh
ar
es
) 
U
nd
er
 
FR
S1
32
, 
if 
an
 
en
tit
y 
ac
qu
ire
s 
its
 
ow
n 
eq
ui
ty
 
in
str
um
en
t 
(tr
ea
su
ry
 s
ha
re
s)
, 
th
e 
eq
ui
ty
 i
ns
tru
m
en
ts
 s
ho
ul
d 
be
 d
ed
uc
te
d 
fr
om
 
eq
ui
ty
. N
o 
ga
in
 o
r l
os
s 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 re
la
tin
g 
to
 th
e 
de
al
in
g 
of
 
tre
as
ur
y 
sh
ar
es
 (p
ar
a 
33
). 
 
Tr
an
sa
ct
io
n 
co
st
s 
in
cu
rr
ed
 d
ur
in
g 
eq
ui
ty
 tr
an
sa
ct
io
ns
FR
S 
13
2 
re
qu
ire
s 
tra
ns
ac
tio
n 
co
st
s 
in
cu
rr
ed
 a
s 
pa
rt 
of
 a
n 
eq
ui
ty
 
tra
ns
ac
tio
ns
 to
 b
e 
de
du
ct
ed
 fr
om
 th
e 
eq
ui
ty
 (p
ar
a
35
, 3
7,
 3
8,
 3
9,
 4
1)
.
 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
fo
r 
fin
an
ci
al
 in
str
um
en
ts
 
FR
S 
13
2 
re
qu
ire
s 
ad
di
tio
na
l 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
n 
(a
) 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
va
lu
at
io
n 
te
ch
ni
qu
es
, 
(b
) 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
fin
an
ci
al
 a
ss
et
s 
th
at
 a
re
 
pa
rti
al
ly
 d
er
ec
og
ni
se
d,
 (
c)
 c
ar
ry
in
g 
am
ou
nt
s 
of
 f
in
an
ci
al
 a
ss
et
s 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 li
ab
ili
tie
s 
he
ld
 fo
r 
tra
di
ng
, a
nd
 f
in
an
ci
al
 a
ss
et
s 
an
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
lia
bi
lit
ie
s 
de
si
gn
at
ed
 a
t 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
pr
of
it 
an
d 
lo
ss
, 
(d
) 
th
e 
am
ou
nt
 o
f t
he
 c
ha
ng
e 
in
 fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
of
 a
 fi
na
nc
ia
l l
ia
bi
lit
y 
de
si
gn
at
ed
 a
t 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
th
ro
ug
h 
pr
of
it 
an
d 
lo
ss
 th
at
 is
 n
ot
 d
ue
 to
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 in
te
re
st
 
ra
te
s, 
(e
) 
de
ta
ile
d 
in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
ab
ou
t 
is
su
ed
 
co
m
po
un
d 
fin
an
ci
al
 
in
str
um
en
ts
 w
ith
 m
ul
tip
le
 e
m
be
dd
ed
 d
er
iv
at
iv
es
 f
ea
tu
re
s 
th
at
 h
av
e 
in
te
rd
ep
en
de
nt
 v
al
ue
s, 
an
d 
(f)
 d
et
ai
ls 
of
 a
ny
 d
ef
au
lts
 a
nd
 b
re
ac
he
s 
of
 
lo
an
 a
gr
ee
m
en
ts 
(I
N
17
). 
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 A
pp
en
di
x 
2 
M
ai
n 
di
ffe
re
nc
es
 b
et
w
ee
n 
FR
S 
an
d 
M
A
SB
 st
an
da
rd
s 
(c
on
tin
ue
d)
 
C
at
eg
or
y 
FR
S 
St
an
da
rd
s 
M
A
SB
 S
ta
nd
ar
ds
 
In
ve
st
m
en
t P
ro
pe
rty
 
FR
S 
14
0 
In
ve
st
m
en
t P
ro
pe
rty
 (e
ffe
ct
iv
e 
fr
om
 Ja
nu
ar
y 
1,
 2
00
6)
. 
N
o 
st
an
da
rd
 fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rti
es
. M
A
SB
 d
id
 n
ot
 a
do
pt
 
IA
S 
40
 In
ve
st
m
en
t P
ro
pe
rty
. 
FR
S 
14
0 
su
pe
rs
ed
es
 
pa
rt 
of
 
IA
S 
25
 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
fo
r 
In
ve
st
m
en
t t
ha
t d
ea
ls
 w
ith
 in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rti
es
. I
A
S 
25
 w
as
 
th
en
 r
en
am
ed
 t
o 
FR
S 
12
5 2
00
4 
A
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
fo
r 
In
ve
st
m
en
t 
(e
ff
ec
tiv
e 
fr
om
 S
ep
te
m
be
r 1
, 1
99
8)
. 
C
ha
ng
es
 in
 sc
op
e 
an
d 
de
fin
iti
on
 o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rty
 
FR
S 
14
0 
de
fin
es
 in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rty
 a
s 
la
nd
 o
r 
bu
ild
in
g 
or
 p
ar
t o
f 
a 
bu
ild
in
g 
or
 b
ot
h;
 h
el
d 
(b
y 
ow
ne
r, 
or
 b
y 
le
ss
ee
 u
nd
er
 fi
na
nc
e 
le
as
e)
 fo
r 
re
nt
al
s, 
or
 c
ap
ita
l 
ap
pr
ec
ia
tio
ns
 o
r 
bo
th
, 
ra
th
er
 t
ha
n 
fo
r 
us
e 
in
 t
he
 
pr
od
uc
tio
n 
or
 s
up
pl
y 
of
 g
oo
ds
 
or
 s
er
vi
ce
s 
or
 f
or
 a
dm
in
is
tra
tiv
e 
pu
rp
os
es
or
 fo
r s
al
e 
in
 th
e 
or
di
na
ry
 c
ou
rs
e 
of
 b
us
in
es
s (
pa
ra
5)
.
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
40
, 
an
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
pr
op
er
ty
 i
nc
lu
de
s 
pr
op
er
tie
s 
un
de
r 
op
er
at
in
g 
le
as
e 
th
at
 (a
) 
m
ee
t t
he
 d
ef
in
iti
on
 o
f a
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rty
, 
(b
) a
re
ac
co
un
te
d 
fo
r a
s i
f t
he
y
w
er
e 
fin
an
ce
 le
as
ed
,a
nd
 (c
) u
se
 th
e 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
m
od
el
 fo
r t
he
 a
ss
et
s r
ec
og
ni
se
d 
(p
ar
a 
6)
.  
IA
S 
25
 d
ef
in
ed
 in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rty
 a
s 
an
 in
ve
st
m
en
t i
n 
la
nd
 
or
 b
ui
ld
in
gs
 th
at
 w
er
e 
no
t o
cc
up
ie
d 
su
bs
ta
nt
ia
lly
 f
or
 u
se
 b
y,
 
or
 i
n 
th
e 
op
er
at
io
ns
 o
f, 
th
e 
in
ve
st
in
g 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
or
 a
no
th
er
 
en
te
rp
ris
e 
in
 th
e 
sa
m
e 
gr
ou
p 
as
 th
e 
in
ve
st
in
g 
en
te
rp
ris
e.
N
o 
su
ch
 c
la
rif
ic
at
io
n 
w
as
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 IA
S 
25
. 
 
 
FR
S 
14
0 
cl
ar
ifi
es
 t
ha
t 
pr
op
er
ty
 (
a)
 i
nt
en
de
d 
fo
r 
sa
le
 i
n 
th
e 
or
di
na
ry
 
co
ur
se
 o
f 
bu
si
ne
ss
, 
(b
) 
co
ns
tru
ct
ed
 o
r 
de
ve
lo
pe
d 
on
 b
eh
al
f 
of
 t
hi
rd
 
pa
rti
es
, (
c)
 o
cc
up
ie
d 
by
 o
w
ne
r, 
(d
) c
on
str
uc
te
d 
or
 d
ev
el
op
ed
 fo
r f
ut
ur
e 
us
e 
as
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
pr
op
er
ty
, 
an
d 
(e
) 
le
as
ed
 t
o 
an
ot
he
r 
en
tit
y 
un
de
r 
fin
an
ce
 l
ea
se
; 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
ex
cl
ud
ed
 f
ro
m
 
be
in
g 
re
co
gn
ise
d 
as
 a
n 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rty
 (p
ar
a 
9)
. 
  N
o 
su
ch
 c
la
rif
ic
at
io
n 
w
as
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 IA
S 
25
. 
Re
co
gn
iti
on
 a
nd
 m
ea
su
re
m
en
t 
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rty
 
FR
S1
40
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rty
 t
o 
be
 in
iti
al
ly
 m
ea
su
re
d 
at
 c
os
t 
an
d 
su
bs
eq
ue
nt
ly
 
at
 
(1
) 
co
st
 
le
ss
 
ac
cu
m
ul
at
ed
 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n 
an
d 
im
pa
irm
en
t l
os
se
s 
(p
ar
a 
56
), 
or
 (
2)
 a
t f
ai
r 
va
lu
e 
w
ith
 c
ha
ng
es
 i
n 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 in
 p
ro
fit
 a
nd
 lo
ss
 (p
ar
a 
33
). 
In
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rty
 c
ou
ld
 b
e 
re
co
gn
is
ed
 a
nd
 m
ea
su
re
d 
un
de
r 
M
A
SB
 
15
 
(d
ep
re
ci
at
ed
 
co
st
 
or
 
re
va
lu
at
io
n 
w
ith
 
de
pr
ec
ia
tio
n)
; 
or
 
IA
S 
25
 
(c
os
t 
le
ss
 
im
pa
irm
en
t 
or
 
re
va
lu
at
io
n)
, w
ith
 c
ha
ng
es
 in
 v
al
ue
 ta
ke
n 
to
 re
se
rv
e.
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at
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ta
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ds
 
In
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su
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op
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tie
s a
cq
ui
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 e
xc
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ng
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FR
S 
14
0 
us
es
 t
he
 c
om
m
er
ci
al
 s
ub
st
an
ce
 c
rit
er
ia
 i
n 
re
co
gn
is
in
g 
th
e 
in
iti
al
 c
os
t 
of
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
pr
op
er
tie
s 
ac
qu
ire
d 
in
 e
xc
ha
ng
e 
fo
r 
a 
no
n-
m
on
et
ar
y 
as
se
t 
or
 a
ss
et
s, 
or
 a
 c
om
bi
na
tio
n 
of
 m
on
et
ar
y 
an
d 
no
n-
m
on
et
ar
y 
as
se
ts
 (p
ar
a 
27
28
). 
 
N
o 
su
ch
 c
la
rif
ic
at
io
n 
w
as
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 IA
S 
25
. 
Re
co
gn
iti
on
 
of
 
in
di
vi
du
al
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
op
er
tie
s 
un
de
r 
op
er
at
in
g 
le
as
e 
FR
S 
14
0 
al
lo
w
s 
th
e 
re
co
gn
iti
on
 o
f i
nd
iv
id
ua
l i
nv
es
tm
en
t p
ro
pe
rti
es
 fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
op
er
tie
s 
ob
ta
in
ed
 u
nd
er
 a
n 
op
er
at
io
n 
le
as
e,
 w
hi
ch
 u
se
s 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
m
et
ho
d 
(p
ar
a 
6)
.  
FR
S 
14
0 
al
so
 c
la
rif
ie
s t
ha
t t
he
 u
se
 o
f a
n 
op
tio
n 
to
 re
co
gn
is
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
op
er
tie
s 
un
de
r 
an
 o
pe
ra
tin
g 
le
as
e 
in
di
vi
du
al
ly
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
th
e 
ad
op
tio
n 
of
 fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
m
od
el
 fo
r a
ll 
in
ve
stm
en
t p
ro
pe
rti
es
 (p
ar
a
6)
.
N
o 
su
ch
 c
la
rif
ic
at
io
n 
w
as
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 IA
S 
25
. 
C
ha
ng
e 
in
 a
cc
ou
nt
in
g 
m
et
ho
d 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rty
 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
40
, a
 c
ha
ng
e 
fr
om
 o
ne
 m
od
el
 to
 th
e 
ot
he
r 
sh
al
l o
nl
y 
be
 
m
ad
e 
if 
it 
w
ill
 r
es
ul
t 
in
 a
 m
or
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n.
 T
hu
s, 
it 
is 
un
lik
el
y 
th
er
e 
w
ill
 b
e 
a 
ch
an
ge
 fr
om
 th
e 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
m
od
el
 to
 c
os
t m
od
el
 
as
 it
 is
 u
nl
ik
el
y 
to
 re
su
lt 
in
 m
or
e 
ap
pr
op
ria
te
 p
re
se
nt
at
io
n 
(p
ar
a
31
). 
N
o 
su
ch
 c
la
rif
ic
at
io
n 
w
as
pr
ov
id
ed
 in
 IA
S 
25
.
Re
co
gn
iti
on
 
of
 
th
ird
 
pa
rty
 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fo
r 
th
e 
im
pa
irm
en
t 
of
 in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rty
. 
FR
S 
14
0 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
fr
om
 th
ird
 p
ar
ty
 fo
r i
m
pa
irm
en
t o
f 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
op
er
ty
 t
o 
be
 r
ec
og
ni
se
d 
in
 p
ro
fit
 a
nd
 l
os
s 
w
he
n 
th
e 
co
m
pe
ns
at
io
n 
be
co
m
es
 re
ce
iv
ab
le
 (p
ar
a 
72
). 
N
o 
su
ch
 c
la
rif
ic
at
io
n 
w
as
 p
ro
vi
de
d 
in
 IA
S 
25
. 
D
is
cl
os
ur
e 
re
qu
ire
m
en
t 
fo
r 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rti
es
 
FR
S 
14
0 
re
qu
ire
s 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
m
et
ho
d 
ch
os
en
 f
or
 m
ea
su
rin
g 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rti
es
 (c
os
t o
r f
ai
r v
al
ue
), 
an
d 
ot
he
r r
el
at
ed
 in
fo
rm
at
io
n 
(p
ar
a 
75
 (
a)
(h
))
. 
U
nd
er
 F
RS
 1
40
, 
w
he
n 
a 
va
lu
at
io
n 
ob
ta
in
ed
 f
or
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t 
pr
op
er
ty
 
is
 
ad
ju
st
ed
 
si
gn
ifi
ca
nt
ly
 
fo
r 
th
e 
pu
rp
os
e 
of
 
fin
an
ci
al
 
sta
te
m
en
t, 
a 
re
co
nc
ili
at
io
n 
be
tw
ee
n 
va
lu
e 
ob
ta
in
ed
 
an
d 
ad
ju
st
ed
 v
al
ua
tio
n 
sh
ou
ld
 b
e 
di
sc
lo
se
d 
(p
ar
a 
77
). 
FR
S1
40
 r
eq
ui
re
s 
an
 
en
tit
y 
th
at
 a
pp
lie
s 
th
e 
co
st
 m
od
el
 f
or
 t
he
 i
nv
es
tm
en
t 
pr
op
er
tie
s 
to
 
di
sc
lo
se
 th
e 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
of
 th
e 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rti
es
 (p
ar
a 
79
 (e
))
. 
IA
S 
25
 o
nl
y 
re
qu
ire
d 
th
e 
di
sc
lo
su
re
 o
f 
th
e 
fa
ir 
va
lu
e 
of
 
in
ve
st
m
en
t p
ro
pe
rti
es
 if
 th
ey
 w
er
e 
ac
co
un
te
d 
fo
r a
s l
on
g-
te
rm
 
in
ve
st
m
en
ts 
an
d 
no
t c
ar
rie
d 
at
 fa
ir 
va
lu
e.
 
 
 
